Area Maritime Security Committees

Challenges, Accomplishments, and Best Practices

Annual Report

U.S. Coast Guard

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Assistant Commandant's Perspective

By RDML Joseph A. Servidio
Assistant Commandant of Prevention Policy

Area Maritime Committees are the foundation of our nation's maritime security efforts. The cooperative effort between the private sector, and federal, tribal, state, and local agencies is a widely recognized model of successful public-private partnership, and has built a strong, mature, and comprehensive maritime security regime.

In the decade since the first Area Maritime Security Committees were formed there have been significant threats – but no successful attack – in the Marine Transportation System. This is a direct result of the hard work Area Maritime Security Committee and the organizations they represent, have undertaken to assess risk, establish and meet security standards, develop plans, coordinate operations, and share information. Port areas on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts, the Western Rivers, and the Great Lakes are more secure, resilient, and prosperous because of the cooperation, communication, and work of Area Maritime Security Committees.

This report details some of the challenges, accomplishments and best practices of Area Maritime Security Committees across the country. I am impressed with the scope and complexity of the challenges committees face, and the innovation and professionalism committee members have employed overcoming issues. Moreover, committee members commit their time, talent, and energy not for pay or out of legal obligation, but out of a sincere desire and common objective to serve and protect their communities. Thank you! I also thank the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee for providing feedback on this report and for their service to the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security.

While we have spent a decade improving security, we know there is more work to be done as risks continue to develop and evolve. Cyber security, increased use and transport of liquefied natural gas, and hazardous materials including certain dangerous cargos are some of the emerging security concerns we have. I am confident that our Area Maritime Security Committees will be more than equal to the tasks. I will do everything I can to support their work, and I am proud of the diligence, determination, and commitment to maritime security exhibited by all of our AMSCs.

Joseph A. Servidio,
Rear Admiral, United States Coast Guard
Assistant Commandant of Prevention Policy

1.0 Background

As required by 33 CFR 103, Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSCs) bring federal, state, local, and tribal government and industry partners together to collaborate on maritime security. AMSC personnel conduct meetings, create partnerships and networks, share information, conduct training, assess vulnerabilities, and mitigate risks in support of the Area Maritime Security Plan.

AMSC annual reports document these activities, and note best practices, challenges, accomplishments and recommendations. These reports also track Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) data and security clearance status for AMSC members. These efforts ensure the Coast Guard and the maritime communities maintain alignment with national preparedness goals, strategies, and reporting requirements, and improve AMSC effectiveness. In addition to a yearly roll up of the AMSC submitted reports, this report also highlights efforts taken at a national level (some in 2013) to implement broader policy initiatives that will impact the AMSC community.

2.0 Challenges

AMSCs were asked to identify challenges they encounter throughout the year. The reports highlighted several common challenges:

Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) – Tight application timelines, resource intensive application criteria and application reviews, challenging post-award requirements and delays have been recurring issues. As a result, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Coast Guard Headquarters have attempted to alleviate some of these challenges.

In 2012, Headquarters chartered a Port Security Grant Program Working Group (PSGPWG); members include FEMA, Coast Guard HQ staff as well as Area and District Port Security Specialists. The focus of the group was to study and recommend improvements to the PSGP process, particularly the COTP Field Review process. This resulted in the development of a one-page Excel-based form designed to assess proposed projects. This solution has been discussed by Headquarters and the FEMA-Grants Program Directorate and was incorporated in the FY-2013 PSGP.

While many AMSCs have seen the PSGP as a challenge, the Eighth District noted in its annual report that the PSGP has helped fund several security projects. Many of the Eighth District AMSCs have been able to streamline the PSGP process, enabling them to overcome challenges (see Enclosure (1), Item 5 for additional details).

CG-5P recommendation: AMSCs are responsible for advising the COTP, conducting the AMS Assessment, and developing the AMSP, per 33 CFR 103.310-400. COTPs must prioritize AMSC work to meet the overall security needs of the port community. This can include grant review and other support functions. Consider the use of sub-committees or other mechanisms to ensure that AMSCs fulfill their primary responsibilities, and make the best use of the talents of all members.

Maintaining AMSC Support – Another common challenge several AMSCs identified is a decline in support and participation by industry partners in AMSC meetings. Reasons cited for declining support included the increased responsibilities of AMSCs, budget pressure, and the long distances some members must travel for committee meetings.

The travel distances for many of these meetings cannot be avoided, but using alternatives such as video teleconferencing may help mitigate the challenge. The AMSC concept is predicated on collaboration and sharing of information among industry stakeholders within the port and joint issue resolution to avert large-scale disasters. Several AMSCs noted best practices in their annual reports which have kept committee members engaged. For example, the Ninth District has implemented an AMSC membership outreach program that has helped sustain their AMSC partner's productivity (see Enclosure (1), Item 22). This program has increased interest, participation, and reduced travel costs for AMSC partners and re-vitalized AMSC member engagement. As another example, Sector Ohio Valley conducted short seminar-format exercises to evaluate TSI planning scenarios. These exercises helped evaluate the various portions of the AMSP without the associated costs involved in larger AMSTEP exercises (see Enclosure (1), Item 8).

3.0 Accomplishments

AMSCs are a forum for coordination of security related issues and partnerships in the ports. Their collaborative efforts strengthen cooperation among stakeholders. In 2012, AMSCs conducted 457 meetings nationwide, although, MTSA only requires a minimum of one meeting per committee each year. AMSCs also conducted 129 Joint Agency training events in 2012.

These coordination and collaboration opportunities have resulted in effective real world security response and recovery efforts.

AMSCs were critical in maritime security pre-planning for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, the Presidential Inauguration, the War of 1812 Bicentennial Commemoration, the Super Bowl, and the America's Cup. AMSCs were also instrumental in assisting the Federal Government's response efforts for Hurricane Sandy and Occupy protest movements on the West Coast.

CG-5P recommendation: Using information obtained from the Coast Guard's Contingency Preparedness System, lessons learned from these and other real world events should be shared with AMSCs to help advance coordination and collaboration with this advisory body where pre-planning efforts are needed in advance of scheduled events: http://cps.uscg.mil/cps

AMSC training efforts were substantial. The following figures highlight AMSC training efforts nationwide.



Figure 1 - AMSC Nationwide training break down by Areas: ICS includes FEMA and Emergency Response incident command training; Recovery includes MTSRU training; Maritime Security includes MSRAM, Cyber, TWIC, and Port Ops training; Joint Agency includes the total amount of AMSC training, excluding the actual exercises; Exercises include all tabletop exercises and drills; Meetings are tallied up from all AMSC's in each respective area.

CG-5P established the "AMSC of the Year" award in 2012 to recognize the outstanding achievements and contributions of AMSCs in safeguarding our nation's MTS, including port areas, adjacent waterways, coastal/shoreside areas, waterfront facilities, and other maritime critical infrastructure, and to protecting global supply chains. The inaugural recipient of the award went to the Port of New York/New Jersey and Port of Albany, New York AMSC on April 26, 2013. AMSCs interested in competing for this yearly award can find application details in CG-FAC Policy Letter 12-03 (found in the AMSC Committee Management collaboration community on Homeport).

The AMSCs were also involved in projects that provided increased security within their respective Port Areas. AMSC projects included:

The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) – PSGP funded projects help close maritime security vulnerability gaps. In the Eighth District, funding of the National Association of State Boating Law Administrators (NASBLA) Tactical Operators Course provided training for over 300 first responders from dozens of local agencies. Another significant project funded was the Houston Ship Channel Security District-Area Maritime Security Port Assessment, which satisfied the 33 CFR 103 Assessment requirements. Other notable PSGP procurements included the purchase

of new security vessels and helicopters and funding for equipment maintenance, and TWIC enhancements.

Blue Force Tracking (BFT) – AMSC New York and New Jersey initiated Phase II of this multi-phase project. The initial purchase for Phase II will provide 53 tracking units to local law enforcement and first responder agencies in both New York and New Jersey. Once Phase II is complete, approximately 80 vessels will be outfitted with BFT kits in support of joint maritime operations.

The success of the Blue Force Tracking in NYC & NJ has led to similar projects in Sectors Puget Sound and Jacksonville.

Outreach – COTPs continue to emphasize outreach to industry partners in an effort to increase AMSC membership and encourage involvement. Examples include:

- The Ninth District held an AMSC meeting at the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribal Complex to increase working partnerships with First Nation Tribes;
- COTP Sault Ste Marie recognized an under-represented area in their AOR and formed a Straits of Mackinac Regional Subcommittee; and
- Sector Detroit organized a port partner area familiarization cruise for the Saginaw River All Hazards Subcommittee.

4.0 Best Practices

The AMSC reports identified several helpful and practical best practices. Enclosure (1) lists best practices reported in the 2012 annual reports. Below are some of the most noteworthy programs, concepts and initiatives identified.

Use of the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)[1] – Sector New Orleans uses HSIN as a primary method of communication with stakeholders. Sharing information helps avoid interagency stove piping and facilitates a common operating picture. HSIN offers each event participant the opportunity to post plans and documents which are then visible to other agencies. HSIN was widely used in preparation for the War of 1812 Celebration, Super Bowl XLVII, and Hurricane Isaac response and recovery efforts. HSIN was also useful in organizing the response and recovery for multiple oil spills. HSIN provides users with the capability of interactive video conferencing and streaming; training events, and response and recovery planning.

Radiation Detection Planning – Sector Boston and its AMSC established a Preventive Radiological Nuclear Detection (PRND) Working Group. This working group was formed in December 2011 and is developing the PRND Concept of Operations and Standard Operating

[1] For more information on HSIN go to http://hsin.gov

Procedures for the Boston COTP AOR. It capitalized on Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's (DNDO) Maritime Program Assistance program to assist in developing a small vessel (less than 300 gross tons) Radiological/Nuclear (RAD/NUC) detection program. The goal of this program is to decrease the likelihood of an illicit RAD/NUC device entering the United States through the maritime domain. Sector Boston is developing this program from the lessons learned from the DNDO-sponsored West Coast Maritime Pilot (WCMP) project conducted in Puget Sound, Washington and San Diego, California. The WCMP established a risk-informed RAD/NUC detection program focused on interdicting persistent threats from small vessels.

Cyber Security – MSU Pittsburgh conducted Operation Cyber Shield; the first AMSC tabletop cyber training and exercise program of its kind. This exercise provided all participants an opportunity to develop, evaluate and refine organizational response procedures prior to, during, and after malicious cyber activity within the Port of Pittsburgh. The exercise provided insight into cyber incidents, the affect on industry, local, state and federal governments and promoted discussions on mitigation strategies, response and post incident recovery procedures. This exercise captured the attention and attendance of several federal agencies including: Coast Guard Cyber Command, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. As a result of this exercise, the Port of Pittsburgh AMSC established a cyber security working group to develop a cyber security program. CG-FAC-1 also has created a cyber security homeport[2] page to post newly promulgated information on cyber security issues.

5.0 Security Activities of Note

Maritime security efforts are far from steady state. As "low hanging fruit" issues are addressed and resolved, more complex and challenging concerns emerge for action. CG-5PC is continually working on new policy issues that ultimately require leveraging the AMSC community. Security issues that the Coast Guard is working on and could impact members of the AMSCs include:

Cyber – Cyber systems are an integral part of the nation's critical infrastructure, and are vital to the nation's economy and security. Both the public and private sector are increasingly dependent on cyber systems for both routine and emergency services. Like other systems, cyber systems are vulnerable to accidents, natural disasters, and deliberate attacks. Cyber systems also have unique vulnerabilities, many of which are not apparent to the casual user, and are subject to accidental or intentional disruptions sometimes originating far from the area of actual impact. Commercial vessels, facilities, and other elements of MTS critical infrastructure (CI) may have significant cyber vulnerabilities.

To address these vulnerabilities, the President of the United States signed Presidential Policy Directive-21 (PPD-21) and Executive Order (EO) 13636 to Improve Critical Infrastructure (CI) cyber security. E.O. 13636 and PPD-21 require federal agencies to collaborate with their

[2] http://homeport.uscg.mil; under Missions>Maritime Security>Cyber Security tab

respective industry sectors to identify CI where a cyber security incident could result in catastrophic regional or national effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security. It also tasks the National Institute for Standards & Technology (NIST) with developing a voluntary "framework" of standards and best practices to help CI owners and operators identify, assess, and manage cyber risk. CG-FAC, CGCYBER and AREA staffs are working closely with DHS to implement E.O. 13636 and PPD-21 and to develop the Coast Guard's approach to improving cyber security of maritime critical infrastructure. While this is taking place, it is imperative that AMSCs and their communities understand that the cyber threat continues to evolve and is as much a threat to security as any physical threat. AMSCs should remain vigilant to cyber threats and cyber trends. Any unusual or suspicious cyber activities should be reported the National Response Center. Additional discussion on Cyber Security and the Marine Transportation System including a definition of cyber security, and what the Coast Guard is currently doing to address it was provided in ALCOAST 323/13.

Chemical Safety/Security – The Coast Guard continues to improve its understanding of the risks associated with especially hazardous cargo shipments (EHCs). To date, the Coast Guard has provided Congress with a National EHC Strategy, an enterprise-wide endeavor that will require significant coordination across the Department. Upon its approval by DHS, an implementation working group will be chartered to identify requirements, roles and responsibilities. The recently signed Chemical Security Executive Order strives to improve information sharing among Federal departments and agencies and increase coordination efforts with State, Local, and Tribal entities involved in chemical regulation and response. In addition, the Executive Order directs Federal agencies to modernize policies, regulations and standards and seek out stakeholder input to identify best practices[3]. This will ultimately influence the implementation of the EHC Strategy. While future guidance is being developed, AMSC communities should continue sharing best practices and working together to minimize the potential for safety hazards from handling all hazardous materials.

Transportation Workers Identification Credentials (TWIC) – Congress established the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). MTSA requires DHS to issue a maritime worker identification card that uses biometrics to control access to secure areas of maritime transportation facilities and vessels. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) jointly administer the TWIC program. TSA is responsible for enrollments, security threat assessments, credential production, and systems operations. The USCG is responsible for establishing and enforcing access control requirements for MTSA-regulated vessels and facilities. To date, over 2.3 million activated TWICs have been issued to

[3] The Executive Order is available for viewing online at the White House's web site: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/01/executive-order-improving-chemical-facility-safety-and-security

workers and are used as a key component in implementing access control measures at 3,200+ MTSA regulated facilities and 14,000+ MTSA regulated vessels.

The Coast Guard is leading and completing work on a final Rulemaking project to address TWIC reader requirements for MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. On March 22, 2013, the Coast Guard released the TWIC Reader Notice of Proposed Rule Making for an extended 90-day public comment period. During that time, 4 public meetings were hosted in Houston, Seattle, Chicago, and Washington DC. The comment period closed on June 20, 2013, and the Coast Guard is currently adjudicating the nearly 200 comments received. The Coast Guard anticipates the final rule will be published by mid to late 2014. Additional guidance on TWIC, including Policy Actions, can be found on Homeport.

America's Waterway Watch (AWW) – Suspicious activity reporting is a vital component of the Coast Guard's maritime security efforts. Although this topic is not addressed in detail in Coast Guard regulations, the AWW web site, http://americaswaterwaywatch.uscg.mil/home.html, provides good information and tools. CG-FAC has made an effort to encourage "Online Partnerships" with the new AWW website to help spread the word. This web page was launched at the start of 2013. The target audience has been waterfront companies, industry, education institutions, local LE, and other government agencies. An example of this is Mass Maritime Academy's webpage, (www.maritime.edu). Additionally, the Facebook page spreads the word of the program many people and other agencies online. This effort has been completed at no cost. Finally, the National Maritime Center has included the AWW logo and link to the web page on their standard congratulations letter that is issued with a new Merchant Mariner Credential

Bringing MSR activities up to CG-FAC-1 –After a thorough discussion between the Office of Maritime Security Response (CG-MSR) and the Office of Port and Facility Compliance (CG-FAC), CG-MSR's AMSP functions were transferred to CG-FAC. This consolidation enhances policy development, oversight, and management of AMS program functions. This consolidation also strengthens the lines of responsibility for executing the PWCS mission.

Beyond the Borders (BTB) Initiative – In 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the "Beyond the Border" (BTB) declaration in an effort to secure the vital economic partnership between our countries. The function of the BTB is to rapidly respond to and recover from disasters and emergencies on either side of the border and mitigate the impacts of disruptions on communities and the economy by managing traffic in the event of an emergency at affected border crossings. Vital to the BTB partnership are the lessons learned from exercises and real

world events that had a MTS Recovery and MTS Recovery Unit function.

6.0 Conclusion

Maritime security is the first line of defense for the United States and AMSCs are an integral part of the maritime security regime. 2013 and 2014 will be important years for the AMSCs as they assist COTPs with preparing for their five-year Area Maritime Security (AMS) Assessments, AMS Plan reviews and updates. While challenges still exist, AMSCs are a valuable asset to the Coast Guards Maritime Security Regime. Through sustained collaboration, AMSCs will continue being a valuable asset to national maritime security.

Enclosure (1) Best Practices and Accomplishments reported by AMSCs

Item	Source	Best Practice/Accomplishment	Explanation
1	San Francisco AMSC	Underwater Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) purchased using PSGP funds	Locally based ROVs directly support the Port of San Francisco Underwater Terrorism Preparedness Plans (UTPPs). An ROV has advantages over a diver in the waters of San Francisco Bay; specifically with regard to exposure to cold water and overcoming strong currents, as well as, underwater endurance. ROV sonar and cameras allow for characterization of underwater features to determine likely targets for divers to investigate, saving valuable dive time. Should a region be threatened with underwater mines, bottom characterization is a necessary intelligence component to mine countermeasures (MCM) operations. This ROV gives the port the ability to efficiently inspect subsurface structures and vessel hulls in support of normal port security operations and activities as well as during periods of increased threat.
2	San Francisco AMSC	Partnered/coordinated with NORTHCOM to have an economist evaluate the consequence of a variety of port closure scenarios and then brief the AMSC	Sector San Francisco coordinated with Booz-Allen Hamilton (BAH) to provide an economist to participate in a NORTHCOM sponsored study on the economic impact of a shutdown of various ports. The study was based on a mine warfare incident, but BAH provided one of the economists to brief the AMSC on the expected economic losses of a port shutdown.
3	Columbia River AMSC	Quick Response Vessels (QRV) procured via Port Security Grant Program	The Port Security Grant Program, provided the Columbia River AMSC with funds to purchase five of these QRVs. Three vessels will be operated by local fire departments in Vancouver, WA and Astoria, OR. These QRVs will provide first-line marine fire and LE response where existing response capabilities may be hours away. The two remaining QRVs will be operated by the Oregon State Police as LE vessels in areas where marine security assets are scarce or non-existent.
4	Guam AMSC	Mobile X-Ray Screening Vehicle/Systems procured via Port Security Grant Program	After thorough multi agency planning, a $1.5M Port Security Grant was awarded to AMSC Guam to purchase mobile X-ray screening vehicles. This equipment will increase the capacity to screen in-bound containers in the commercial port of Guam by 90%

Item	Source	Best Practice/Accomplishment	Explanation
5	Eighth District	Port Security Grant Program closing security gaps in the Eighth District	Port Security Grants funded numerous projects that closed local and regional security gaps identified by the AMSCs. In particular, grant funding of the National Association of State Boating Law Administrators Tactical Operators Course enabled the training of over 300 first responders throughout D8. One of the most significant projects approved for FY12 was the Houston Channel Security District-Area Maritime Security Port Assessment. Some other notable projects include security vessels and helicopter procurement, Maritime Domain Awareness and Interagency Operations capabilities enhancements, equipment maintenance, and TWIC program improvements.
6	AMSC Pittsburg	Operation Cyber Shield first cyber tabletop AMSTEP exercise of its kind	This exercise provided participants and port stakeholders an opportunity to develop, evaluate and refine the organizational response procedures that would be used during and after a suspicious and/or malicious cyber event within the Port of Pittsburgh. Participants discussed their organization's response to a cyber incident, mitigation strategies, as well as post incident recovery procedures. This exercise prompted interest and attendance from several federal agencies including the U.S. Coast Guard Cyber Command, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Because of the insights gained during this exercise, Port of Pittsburgh AMSC established a Cyber workgroup to work with the AMSC.
7	Sector New Orleans	Sector New Orleans COTP uses the Homeland System Information Network (HSIN) to communicate to all interested port partners during large-scale events happening in NOLA	Sector NOLA COTP used HSIN as the primary method of communicating with port partners and stakeholders during the War of 1812 Celebration, Hurricane Isaac, Super Bowl XLVII as well as multiple Type II and III oil spill responses. Because port partners have HSIN accounts and special permissions to access protected event sites, security information is well protected. HSIN allows each event participant to post their individual plans and documents. Sharing information in this manner helps promote a common operating picture. HSIN also provides interactive video conferencing and streaming, facilitating maritime domain awareness for port partners.

Item	Source	Best Practice/Accomplishment	Explanation
8	Ohio Valley AMSC	AMSC meetings incorporated short seminar-format exercises to evaluate Transportation Security Incident planning scenarios in the AMSP.	During AMSC meetings members are presented with a TSI scenario and asked to describe how they will share incident information, how they will establish an incident management system, and how they will respond, etc. After each seminar is completed, a short review of relevant sections of the AMSP is conducted to ensure port partners clearly understand their role during an actual TSI. The exercises help to evaluate the various portions of the AMSP without the associated costs involved in larger AMSTEP exercises.
9	First District	MTSRU activated in anticipation of Hurricane Sandy	This was the first time the D1 MTSRU had been activated since its inception in 2012. The MTSRUs focused on regional MTS recovery actions and accurate reporting of port status in CART during this multi-sector event. MTS Recovery SMEs brought in from other Districts and Sectors assisted in managing the round-the-clock effort. The MTSRU developed briefing materials for senior D1 leadership, LANTAREA, Coast Guard Headquarters and DHS. The unit remained activated until 14 November 2012, at which time members gathered for a hot wash to capture lessons learned for the MTSRU Demobilization Report and Hurricane After-Action Report.
10	First District	MTS Recovery Go-Kits	D1 purchased MTS Recovery Go-Kits for each of its five Sectors. The Go-Kits consisted of a Dell Latitude E6520 Nonstandard Laptop Computer, HP Office Jet Multi-Function printer, Microsoft Windows 7 (Ultimate Edition) along with Microsoft Office Home and Business 2010. This equipment allows the Sectors' MTSRUs to operate independently of the Coast Guard computer network from any location with a suitable source of power and an Internet connection. Go-Kits enable them to enter and update data into CART to provide port status information to all echelons of the chain of command.

Item	Source	Best Practice/Accomplishment	Explanation
11	First District	Joined the Headquarters-chartered Port Security Grant Program Working Group	Served as a member of the Headquarters-chartered Port Security Grant Program Working Group (PSGPWG). The focus of the group is to study and recommend improvements to the PSGP process, particularly the COTP Field Review process. A five-member National Working Group (NWG) comprised of members of the full PSGPWG, including a D1 staff representative, undertook the task of redesigning the COTP Field Review form used by the COPTs to assess and review projects proposed for funding under the PSGP. The NWG provided an insightful argument to the PSGPWG on why the core capabilities from the National Preparedness Goal should be included in the revision of the COTP Field Review form. Rationale and suggestions were widely acknowledged by the PSGPWG, Coast Guard Headquarters and FEMA-GPD and were incorporated into the document. The NWG developed a one-page Excel-based form for assessing proposed projects that were approved by Headquarters and FEMA-GPD and will be used during the FY-2013 PSGP.
12	Sector Southeastern New England	Transfer of excess Coast Guard vessels to local port partners	In 2012, through GSA personal property disposal policies, the transfer of excess Coast Guard vessels to local port partners provided increased security capability in southeastern Massachusetts. An excess 41' Utility Boat (UTB) was reassigned to the Cape and Islands Harbormaster Association. Two 41' UTBs were given to the New Bedford, Massachusetts Fire Department, one of which will provide first response to mariners in distress and the other firefighting capability. Two Response Boats Small (RBS) are used by the Army Corps of Engineers Cape Cod Canal Field Office for conducting security patrols and responding to emergencies on the canal. More Coast Guard vessels are anticipated to relocate to southeastern Massachusetts communities in 2013.

Item	Source	Best Practice/Accomplishment	Explanation
13	Sector New York	Blue Force Tracking Project	The Blue Force Tracking (BFT) Project Phase II initiative continues with an additional fifty-three kits ordered and installation ongoing in 2013. Twenty-one law enforcement and first responder agencies in New York and New Jersey are receiving the kits. Once Phase II is completed, approximately eighty vessels will be outfitted with BFT kits in support of joint maritime operations. The success of this initiative has led to a similar project at Coast Guard Sector Puget Sound.
14	Sector Boston	Established a Preventive Radiological Nuclear Detection Working Group	Sector Boston and the AMSC established a Working Group to develop a Preventive Radiological Nuclear Detection Concept of Operations and Standard Operating Procedure for use in the Boston COTP AOR. Capitalizing on the availability of the Department of Homeland Security Maritime Assistance Program of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the focus of this effort is to assist in developing a small vessel (less than 300 gross tons) Radiological/Nuclear (RAD/NUC) detection program to decrease the likelihood that an illicit RAD/NUC device could enter the United States through a maritime pathway. The effort in the Boston COTP Zone is based on lessons learned from the DNDO-sponsored West Coast Maritime Pilot (WCMP) project held in Puget Sound, Washington and San Diego, California from 2008 to 2010. The WCMP established a passive, efficient, risk-informed regional RAD/NUC detection program focused on detecting and interdicting RAD/NUC threats from small vessels.
15	Fifth District	Underwater Dive and Search Capabilities	The Virginia AMSC continues to focus Port Security Grant funds to support underwater dive and search capabilities among local law enforcement and fire/rescue agencies; enhancing capacity for anti-terrorism measures and port recovery capabilities.

Item	Source	Best Practice/Accomplishment	Explanation
16	Fifth District	Geographic separation solutions	Sector North Carolina now conducts its AMSC and OPA Area Committee meetings on the same date and location; based on guidance from PPD-21 by integrating all national preparedness systems to rapidly recover from all hazards. This has proved to be a significant positive step in addressing the unit's geographic separation with its command cadre and Prevention staff relocated to Wilmington and its Planning staff in Morehead City. These joint meetings have fostered command focus and enhanced state, local and industry participation.
17	Fifth District	Baltimore's Maritime Tactical Operations Group (MTOG)	The continued engagement and activity of AMSC Baltimore's MTOG has fostered significant improvements in local law enforcement agency cooperation. Efforts to improve joint tactics, training, equipment and communications have paid off in planning and executing maritime security operations for the frequent NSSE occurring in the National Capital Region.
18	Seventh District	Port of Jacksonville Interoperable Communications Initiative	Sector Jacksonville's Port Wide Interoperable Communications Initiative is progressing with the Jacksonville Port Authority (JPA) purchasing communications hardware for use by all maritime security stakeholders in the port. Sector Jacksonville expects to execute an MOA with JPA to institutionalize JPA's role in serving as the communications hub for all Jacksonville and nearby Fernandina, FL stakeholders. Additionally, the Jacksonville, FL and Fernandina, FL Executive Steering Board (ESB) has entered into contract with a firm to produce an integrated port-wide communications plan
19	Seventh District	Blue Forces Tracking and EAIS devices	The Jacksonville ESB sponsored a port security grant investment to procure and install Blue Forces Tracking (BFT) Encrypted Automatic Identification System devices on state and local maritime law enforcement vessels. They procured and installed 32 devices on state and local L/E boats in conjunction with Two tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) development workshops that helped create a BFT TTP. The TTP will be promulgated via FMSC Policy Letter.

Item	Source	Best Practice/Accomplishment	Explanation
20	Ninth District	Combine Federal Security Officer (FSO) Exercise	The Port of Oswego conducted its first combined FSO exercise, combining the FSOs from five regulated facilities to develop, plan and execute a functional exercise of a potential IED delivered by a small vessel. This was the first time that all the regulated facilities in Oswego have jointly tested their Facility Security Plans simultaneously. This exercise was the culmination of a newly formed FSO working group.
21	Ninth District	AMSC Membership Outreach	During 2012, COTPs continued to place emphasis on outreach efforts to increase AMSC membership and generate renewed interest. Specific efforts and examples included: (1) A full AMSC meeting held at the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribal Complex to increase working partnership with First Nation Tribes; (2) Stood up the Straits of Mackinac regional subcommittee in the southeastern part of the Sault Ste. Marie COTP zone which was under represented; (3) Conducted a port partner cruise for the Saginaw River All Hazards Subcommittee to provide valuable area familiarization; (4) Review of a different AMS Plan section during each meeting to highlight gaps and update the plan; and (5) Created keynote speaker topic as a standard agenda item to educate members and facilitate discussion.
22	Ninth District	AMSC Planning	Planning efforts and early engagement with the AMSCs helped to identify risks, vulnerabilities and port wide security capabilities ahead of the NATO and War of 1812 Bicentennial events. Additionally, the COTPs and AMSCs involved received AMS Plan exercise credit for their involvement in these real world events.

Enclosure (2) Challenges encountered by the AMSCs

Item	Issue	Details	Recommendation	Primary Responsibility for Resolution
1	Increased narcotics and alien smuggling well north of the Mexican/US border	Smugglers have displayed the ability to travel great distances to avoid detection. Mexican "panga" vessels well offshore and north of the border require concentrated patrols and interdiction efforts by Coast Guard, DHS, state, and local law enforcement.	Apply resource optimization tools and leverage the combined capacity of maritime law enforcement agencies. Plans include working with port partners to establish random patrol schedules without further taxing resources.	Local
2	Undocumented aliens (UDA) entering the US through non-regulated facilities within the Port of Brownsville	UDAs are entering the US through non-Coast Guard regulated facilities in the Port. In the absence of a Facility Security Plan, non-regulated facilities create enforcement limitations for the Coast Guard.	Continue leveraging partnerships with the U.S. Border Patrol and other LE agencies. Request enforcement guidance on this UDA issue for non-regulated facilities.	Local Forward to: District LE Office, Area LE Office, HQ CG-FAC-1, CG-MLE
3	Arctic Oil Exploration mission and growth	In 2012, Shell brought two Arctic drilling vessels to Seattle for refurbishment and outfitting. These transits require significant resources to provide security and safety zones during transits. Activists protested near the moored platforms requiring Coast Guard interaction and AMSC oversight.	Inter-agency and international cooperation and support is needed to determine security and safety requirements for this rapidly developing mission.	Local
4	Deep Draft Arctic Port Infrastructure	Multiple projects relating to the development of a Deep Draft Arctic port are ongoing. Stakeholders support and planning for maritime security concerns associated with a deepwater port in the Arctic will be crucial.	Encourage Western Alaska AMSC members and stakeholders to continue their involvement in Arctic port infrastructure development programs.	Local

Item	Issue	Details	Recommendation	Primary Responsibility for Resolution
5	No Coast Guard presence in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)	There are no permanently assigned CG resources to provide a safety and security presence in the CNMI. AMIO, Counter Drug operations, growing military outload operations, boating safety and SAR are difficult to support without a CG asset in the AOR.	Until a station or cutter is based in the CNMI, regular WPB patrols should focus on Saipan to compliment the marine safety efforts of MSD Saipan and to provide a stronger security presence in the CNMI.	Local issue – see Best Practice #12 in enclosure (1) for possible help in this area Forward issue to: CG-DCO-8 Director of Operations Resource Management for analysis.
6	Inability to conduct Certain Dangerous Cargo (CDC) vessel escorts as directed by the Maritime Security and Response Operations Manual (MSRO)	Lack of CG resources, stringent training requirements, geographic constraints between Lake Pontchartrain and the Lower Mississippi River (LMR) creating two mutually exclusive operating areas and extensive transits between AORs are taxing on man-hours and fuel costs.	Coast Guard Headquarters consider funding additional resources on the LMR. Sector New Orleans is coordinating with local agencies to narrow resource gaps.	Headquarters – CG-FAC is working this issue through its HEC efforts
7	Alert Warning System (AWS) shortcomings	While this system is viewed as potentially useful, the time and resources required to make it a viable method of communication are greater than the perceived benefit. The port relies on alternative communication methods to disseminate urgent information to stakeholders. These alternatives are adequate, but each has limitations. The ability to conduct timely two-way communication among 180 MTSA facilities is more effective than the AWS but remains challenging.	The first recommendation; synchronize AWS member profiles to Homeport user profiles, empowering participants to manage/update their own accounts and alert preferences. The second recommendation; provide additional manpower and expertise to perform the tasks mentioned.	Headquarters – CG-FAC will take for research and action

Item	Issue	Details	Recommendation	Primary Responsibility for Resolution
8	Presidential Policy Directive-8, National Preparedness (PPD-8) and the National Preparedness Goal.	There is a general lack of understanding about how the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC) and AMSC align with the National Preparedness System as discussed in PPD-8 and the National Preparedness Goal.	The Coast Guard should promulgate clear policy and guidance (1) to galvanize nationwide AMSC action in order to align with the FEMA regions and states; (2) to clarify the AMSC' roles in the Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment process, and; (3) to facilitate an integrated," capabilities-based approach to AMS preparedness within the framework of awareness, prevention, protection, response, consequence management, and recovery. Doing so will lay the foundation for alignment of Coast Guard plans and programs with other federal, state and local plans and programs, particularly those supported by the various grant programs.	Forward to: CG-FAC, MSR/CPE
9	Rhode Island Common Operating Picture' (RICOP)	RICOP is a non-standard computer system used to access video cameras strategically placed in the maritime zone of Rhode Island. Linking this system into Sector Woods Hole Command Center would greatly enhance the Coast Guard's maritime domain awareness. Coast Guard telecommunications policy does not allow technical support by the Electronics Support Unit (ESU) for nonstandard equipment, and places all procurement, support and funding requirements on the Sector. At the present time, the Sector does not have the funding or technical expertise to accomplish this installation.	The Coast Guard should revise its current policy to encourage integration of technologies used by our port partners. Technical support should be provided by ESU's for installation and maintenance of nonstandard equipment that facilitates interagency communications and capitalizes on technology, which enhances MDA.	Headquarters – CG-FAC forwarded this issue to CG761 who stated that ESU's are generally directed to not support nonstandard equip. until recurring lifecycle support funding is identified. A solution to this matter would have to go through the CROP process to identify if project is feasible to be maintained through local ESU.

Item	Issue	Details	Recommendation	Primary Responsibility for Resolution
10	Port Security Grant Program	PSGP continues to demand an ever-increasing amount of time, attention and oversight, placing additional workload on the COTP and their staff. Furthermore, the compressed and unrealistic timelines associated with PSG program places considerable stress on the COTPs and AMSCs to schedule, facilitate and complete the field review phase.	In order to conduct a proper review of all PSG program submissions, the COTPs and AMSCs need to have more time (3-4 weeks minimum). This time is crucial: (1) to allow for an objective review team to be identified; (2) to allow scheduling day(s) with enough advance notice to review members; and, (3) to allow the time needed for actual review/approval	Headquarters – CG-PSA-2
11	Port Security Grant Program	Primary challenge for D7 Sectors. This non-resourced mission continues to be an inefficient labor intensive program. The FMSC is the central figure called upon to resolve numerous complex finding issues.	FEMA and CG-PSA-2 should involve the Sector Commanders when releasing policy and results. This allows the COTPs to better shepherd the program. D7 is pleased to see some effort by FEMA to resolve these complex funding issues	Headquarters - CG-PSA-2

Item	Issue	Details	Recommendation	Primary Responsibility for Resolution
12	PSGP Funding Formula	The funding formula used by the NRP (National Review Panel) in evaluating grant applications and awarding port security grants is flawed and needs to be reviewed.	D1 recommends that COMDT (CG-PSA) urge FEMA-GPD to revisit the funding formula used by the NRP in evaluating grant applications and awarding port security grants. As an example of a problem that exists with the current funding formula, the Sector Southeastern New England Group II port area of Narragansett and Mount Hope Bays in Rhode Island and southeastern Massachusetts was one of 23 Group II port areas, six of which were re-designated from Group III to Group II in FY-2012, that received no funding under the FY-2012 PSGP. This represents 51% of the Group II port areas nationwide that requested funding in FY-2012.	Headquarters - Forward to CG-PSA
13	Cyber Security	MTS cyber security threats are becoming a topic of discussion within the maritime community. LANT Districts are concerned that AMSCs may be over-tasked to assist with this relatively unknown threat. There is a valid concern, however, in tasking the AMSC with developing prevention and recovery strategies for the private sector as part of the AMSP.	Every effort must be made to maximize AMSC involvement as the known threats to the MTS become better understood. There must be a concerted effort, however, to ensure that a balance is found between existing AMSC work and future cyber tasking.	Local – see Best Practice #6 in enclosure (1) for possible help on this issue Headquarters – issue still evolving, information will be disseminated as it becomes available

Item	Issue	Details	Recommendation	Primary Responsibility for Resolution
14	AMSC Funding	Funding for AMSC meetings, outreach and associated travel has become a challenge given the current budgetary environment and large AORs. In addition, other federal, state, local and private sector stakeholders are already curtailing AMSC participation due to reductions in travel budgets.	Consider increasing the amount of AMSC funding so that the field can maintain AMSC membership, continue their outreach efforts and overcome the geographic challenges. The earlier in the year (1st or 2nd quarter) that these funds are provided to the units, the better. Another option would be to reduce the frequency of AMSC meetings or combine with Area Committee activities for an All-Hazards approach.	Local – Following the release of the annual AMSC funding message, if additional funding is required, contact CG-FAC for further guidance.
15	AMSC Management responsibilities	Responsibility for managing the AMSC as the executive secretary and maintaining the AMSP falls primarily on the civilian PSS. Many are also responsible for managing MSRAM, the PSGP, HOMEPORT exercise design and management, and many other tasks.	Caution must be exercised in further expanding the workload on AMSCs and their executive secretaries. Program managers must continue seeking ways to assist the Sectors in meeting these increasing demands.	No specific recommendation given with this challenge.
16	AMSC Reports	The current process of AMSC reporting is very cumbersome	Consider using a web-based reporting system for AMSC activities instead of the current annual AMSC report format. This would allow field units to document all activities in real time and increase efficiency.	Headquarters – CG-FAC will discuss this option and determine its feasibility

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17	AMSC Participation	AMSC members volunteer their time and effort without compensation or travel/per diem support. Port recovery planning, exercise participation, annual port risk assessments, grants management and HOMEPORT participation create an ever increasing burden on the volunteer port community. AMSCs continue to struggle with nurturing the high level of interest and participation needed to maintain a vibrant port security program.	Program managers must strive to reduce, or at least minimize, the increase in new requirements levied on the AMSC and its members. Creating dedicated port risk assessment teams or placing MSRAM assessments on a two-year cycle and continuing to work on reducing the exercise burden are positive steps in this direction.	Local – see Best Practice #21 in enclosure (1) for possible help with this issue
18	Port Security Specialist Manning levels	The lack of training and experience of PSSs combined with manpower shortages have created mission accomplishment challenges for sectors.	Training support through Coast Guard CYBERCOM, Domestic Port Assessment teams, and possible contractor augmentation, should be considered.	Local CG-FAC-1 to research possible training availability.
19	Change in Government can change the focus of the AMSCs	Following the election of a new government, interaction can slow down drastically. The transition can lead to minimal communications.	Introduce the new Government and promote communications to the AMSC as soon as possible. This top down approach will ensure the governmental staff is fully involved in the security of the ports and facilities.	Local

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20	Marine Fire Fighting (MFF) capabilities	There is a concern over the lack of MFF capabilities in various AORs. As an example, MFF in MSU Savannah was identified as shortfall that is an essential response capability that supports both the AMSP and ACP. It is integral to the overall response, recovery and resiliency of the area.	At the national level, a comprehensive assessment of the MFF and salvage needs should be conducted to ensure equitable and appropriate distribution of grant funds. The disparity between needs and current capabilities must be addressed	Local/CGHQ - CG-PSA-2 and CG-CVC. Also look at Best Practice #12 for possible help on this issue
21	Sector Planning Staff excessive workload	The workload placed on Sector planning staffs who typically manage the AMSC program continues to grow.	Recommend an examination of the feasibility of resourcing a Security Specialist (Port Grant) to each COTP zone to administer this growing program.	Headquarters - Sector Staffing Model staff CG-741
22	MSRAM Policy on Canada	Coast Guard policy on MSRAM does not allow field units to include Canadian infrastructure in the local MSRAM data. Due to the proximity of the international border, shared waterways, and infrastructure, results in an incomplete risk picture. MSRAM's inability to address transfer threats and measure economic impacts associated with choke points lowers the accuracy and completeness of the risk picture.	Coast Guard Headquarters should continue to work through DHS to install a US-Canadian cooperative bi-lateral agreement or MOU for sharing MSRAM data and critical infrastructure information.	Headquarters – CG-PSA-2 is currently working on a MOU that addresses this issue; it should be promulgated within the next year.

Area Maritime Security Committees

Challenges, Accomplishments, and Best Practices

U.S. Coast Guard
Washington, D.C.

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