



# Waves on the Waterfront

CG-FAC, Office of Port and Facility Compliance  
Safety, Security, and Stewardship  
for the Nation's Ports and Facilities

Volume 1  
Issue 3

February  
2013



## Announcements

**MTSR/CART  
Workshop  
26-28 Feb 2013  
Sector San Diego**

**CG-FAC Policy  
Letter 12-04 was signed  
19 Dec 2012. This Policy  
incorporates guidance  
from PAC 03-09 and  
extends the 30 day  
provision for additional  
circumstances.**

**Available on Homeport!**

**NEW!!!**

**Transfer Monitor  
User Guide**

**Now Available on  
MISLE NET**

## **Facility Security Officer Training Requirements Public Meeting**

The Coast Guard Office of Port and Facility Compliance (CG-FAC), in collaboration with the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, held a public meeting on November 9, 2012. The purpose of this meeting was to receive public comments on the development of a Facility Security Officer (FSO) training program. The primary focus was to develop the model curriculum for this new program and to discuss other subjects related to the new FSO training and certification requirements.

The draft FSO model course presented in this public meeting is the first step toward achieving compliance with Section 821 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act (CGAA) of 2010 [Pub. L. 111-281]. The CGAA Section 821 requires the Coast Guard to: (1) Establish comprehensive FSO training requirements designed to provide full security training that would lead to the certification of FSO's; and (2) Coordinate with the Maritime Administration in developing the new FSO training curriculum.


The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 [Pub. L. 107-295, codified at 46 U.S.C. 70101 et seq.] provided the Coast Guard with statutory authorities and mandates to advance the Coast Guard's maritime security mission. Pursuant to its authority under MTSA, the Coast Guard promulgated regulations in Title 33, Code of Federal Regulation (CFR), Subchapter H that apply to certain maritime facilities listed in 33 CFR parts 105 and 106.


**Cont'd on p. 3**

## **Next Issue....**

- ◆ AWW: New webpage and sharing of information
- ◆ Notice for Comment for Port Authority Access to Facility Vulnerability Assessments & Integration of Security Systems

## Top Five Enforcement Sanctions taken against M TSA Regulated Facilities in 2012.





**...cont'd from p. 1 (Facility Security Officer Training Requirements Public Meeting)**

Following the public meeting, the Coast Guard opened a public comment period that close on November 23, 2012. CG-FAC is currently is in the process of analyzing all comments received on the draft FSO model course. The input received will facilitate the completion of the FSO Model Course, the development of a policy letter expected to promulgate in the spring of 2013, and the initiation of a rulemaking for future regulations.

Documents related this initiative can be obtained from the public docket (public docket number [USCG-2012-0908](#)) or from our [Homeport FSO Public Outreach Repository](#). If you have questions concerning this initiative, please contact LTJG Lindsey Musselwhite, USCG at 202-372-1136, email [Lindsey.A.Musselwhite@uscg.mil](mailto:Lindsey.A.Musselwhite@uscg.mil); or LCDR José L. Ramírez, USCG at 202-372-1150, email [Jose.L.Ramirez@uscg.mil](mailto:Jose.L.Ramirez@uscg.mil).



## Meet the Staff of Port Facility & Compliance (CG-FAC)

### LT Russell A. Amacher U.S. Coast Guard

Lieutenant Amacher is currently assigned to Coast Guard Headquarters in the Cargo and Facility Security Branch where he is responsible for program management and oversight of policy development for field operations involving domestic ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo security including enforcement of the Maritime Transportation Security Act.

Lieutenant Amacher joined the Coast Guard in 1991 and spent thirteen years enlisted, including seven years of sea time, achieving the rank of Food Services Specialist Second Class. His enlisted assignments included the Coast Guard Cutter (CGC) Spencer in Boston, MA, CGC Sweetbrier in Cordova, AK, Group Fort Macon, NC, CGC Gentian in Fort Macon, NC, and the CGC Elm in Fort Macon, NC. During his assignments in Fort Macon he earned a Bachelor's Degree in Business Management and was selected to attend Officer Candidate School in New London, CT.

After completing Officer Candidate School in 2004 he was assigned to Marine Safety Unit Savannah, GA where his duties included work in vessel and facility inspections, contingency planning, and maritime law enforcement. In 2008, he transferred to Sector Portland, OR where he served as the Domestic Vessels Branch Chief. In this position, Lieutenant Amacher led multiple teams of vessel inspectors on U.S. flagged vessels including Military Sea Lift Command ships, large cargo vessels, ferries, cruise ships, and small excursion vessels. In 2011, LT Amacher and his wife Alisa transferred to Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, DC.



## Especially Hazardous Cargo (EHC) Project Narrative

### LT Charlie Sinks

In September 2009, the Coast Guard collaborated with the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC) to host a Cargo Security Symposium in Reston, Virginia. The goal of the event was to identify risks involved with the bulk transportation of Certain Dangerous Cargo (CDC) and the strategies to mitigate those risks. The result of the event was a recommendation that the Coast Guard “develop a national policy for CDC transshipment security based on risk that is multimodal, multi-agency, and includes industry input during development.” In response, the Coast Guard chartered a Cargo Security Risk Reduction Workgroup composed of representatives from the public and private sectors to study these issues further.

The workgroup met monthly from December 2009 to December 2010 and submitted a final report to the Coast Guard and to NMSAC in April 2011. In the report, the workgroup recommended that the Coast Guard should identify the highest consequence cargoes within the CDC category and develop a national strategy to mitigate the risks associated with the shipment of those cargoes. The workgroup suggested that the Coast Guard’s strategic approach to reducing this risk should include developing a system to track vessels carrying these high consequence cargoes, identifying key maritime areas with the greatest security concerns, developing standardized force packages for vessel escorts, and identifying the roles that the public and private sectors would have in ensuring the security of these cargoes.

On October 15, 2010, President Obama signed into law the 2010 Coast Guard Authorization Act (CGAA). Section 812 of the 2010 CGAA narrowed the CG’s focus to a new sub-category of CDC called Especially Hazardous Cargo (EHC).

The CGAA defined EHC as “anhydrous ammonia, ammonium nitrate, liquefied chlorine gas, liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, and any other substance which the Secretary determines, by regulation, to pose significant risk of creating a transportation security incident.”

The CGAA directed the Coast Guard to conduct a study to “identify measures to improve the security of maritime transportation of especially hazardous cargo,” to report the results of that study to Congress, and to develop a national strategy based on the study’s results.



To complete the National Study on Waterside Security of Especially Hazardous Cargo, the Coast Guard used a previously commissioned Commodity Flow Study that identified the ports and waterways with the highest levels of CDC traffic based on 2008 and 2009 transit data from the Ship Arrival Notification System and the Inland River Vessel Movement Center. The National Study also drew on the recommendations from the workgroup report and input from focus groups conducted within Coast Guard Headquarters. The Coast Guard reported the results of the study to Congress in May 2012 and is currently in the process of finalizing a National Strategy for the Waterside Security of Bulk Transit, Transfer, and Storage of Especially Hazardous Cargo.



In the National Strategy, the Coast Guard defines the risk associated with EHC as the product of the risk elements: **threat**, **vulnerability**, and **consequence**. Within this framework, **threat** is the likelihood of an attack taking place; **vulnerability** is the probability that such an attack would succeed; and **consequence** is the impact that a successful attack would have on the local population, infrastructure, and economy. The National Strategy has four strategic goals that seek to mitigate EHC risk by addressing each risk element.



-The first goal is to reduce the **threat** of an EHC release by increasing the Coast Guard's awareness of the location of EHC by using vessel tracking and by using intelligence to assess the likelihood of an attempted attack.

-The second goal is to reduce the MTS's **vulnerability** to an EHC release by improving the ability of the Coast Guard and its partners to prevent a release by optimally allocating protective resources like vessel escorts.

-The third goal is to reduce the **consequence** of an EHC release by improving rapid response capability of the Coast Guard and its partners by ensuring response personnel are trained and equipped and that response plans are up to date and exercised.

-The fourth goal is to reduce the **consequence** of an EHC release by reducing the time it takes to restore port activities to normal operations through resiliency planning and system redundancy.

The Coast Guard plans to convene workgroups in 2013 to develop an implementation plan to determine how it will accomplish these goals.

## Introduction of New MTSA/ISPS Training Presentation

Coast Guard Headquarters Office of Port and Facility Compliance (CG-FAC) has developed a training presentation designed to provide maritime industry and Coast Guard personnel new to the maritime community an introduction to the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS). Additionally, the presentation provides basic information on the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), America's Waterways Watch program and suspicious activity reporting procedures. The presentation includes detailed speaker notes and can be found on Port and Facility Compliance website under Facilities, CG Portal under MTSA, and also on Homeport under Featured Homeport Links, MTSA, General Information.



## International Art Contest for Students K-12

In an effort to bring awareness to “being green,” the maritime community is looking towards young creativity in children for new ideas. The U.S. Coast Guard, JASON Project, and North American Marine Environmental Protection Association are sponsoring an art contest themed “Let’s Make Ships Greener.” Contestant entry is open to K-12 students.

K-12 students are encouraged to portray a broad range of environmentally friendly ideas for ships such as energy efficiency in powering of ships to eco-safe/clean waste water management systems.

Art work will be judged based on the artist’s interpretation of the theme and ability for others to understand their portrayal, creativity, quality of art, and the effect it has upon the viewers.

### Entry Requirements:

Entry must be two-dimensional, done on white poster-board of dimensions 28 x22 inches (71x56 cm). Pale colors should not be used because they are too difficult to reprint. All artwork must be original, no computer graphics accepted, however any art medium may be used. Any artwork that has a copyright or trademark will be disqualified.

You must take a high-resolution (at least 3072 x 2304 pixels) digital photograph of your poster in order to submit your entry. You or your teacher/facilitator must then upload the digital photo of your poster along with your name, grade, school/after-school program name, school/after-school program address, and teacher/facilitator’s name, phone number, and e-mail address via [www.jason.org/contests](http://www.jason.org/contests).

**All entries must be uploaded by March 1, 2013**

## Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Hazmat Interpretations Site

MSTC K. Collins


Have you ever looked in the Transportation Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR), and asked yourself, "What does this mean?" Well, your question may have already been answered by the experts, and you didn't even know it. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Hazardous Materials Safety (OHMS) provides written clarification on many of the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 100-185) in the form of interpretation letters.

Within the regulations, PHMSA has established procedures by which individuals can contact them directly in order to receive interpretations of the HMR. These interpretation letters reflect PHMSA's application of the current HMR with respect to the specific facts presented by the person requesting the clarification.

Interpretations do not create legally-enforceable rights or obligations and are provided to help the public understand how to comply with the HMR.

As regulations and interpretations change, OHMS regularly reviews previous interpretations on their site for accuracy and applicability. Interpretation letters are published to provide the

public with a greater awareness and understanding of the HMR. Letters of interpretation which are found to be inaccurate or no longer applicable are removed and may be revised and reissued if warranted. Letters which do not appear on this website may no longer be valid.




To search and view these interpretations, go PHMSA's Hazardous Materials Safety main page: <http://phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat>. There is a section titled "Stay Connected" at the bottom of the page and within that section there is an icon labeled Interpretations (second from the left). Click on the link and it will bring you directly to the Hazmat Interpretations page.

Users are provided with four ways to search for an interpretation: First you can view interpretations by date if you know when the request was sent.

Second, you can view interpretations by the Applicable Hazmat Regulation (49 CFR 176.xx). Third, you can view Formal and Informal interpretations provided by the Chief Counsel. Lastly, you can enter a search term in the text box and search by keyword.

If you do not find an interpretation that resolves your question, you can request an interpretation by following the instructions as described in 49 CFR 105.20. The turnaround for your request could take from six weeks up to six months, all depending on the complexity of the question. Once PHMSA OHMS finalizes the letter of interpretation it will be posted on their website for all others to see and use. Before submitting a formal request for interpretation, field units should first route their interpretation query through their cognizant District, and as necessary, Area and Headquarters Staff for assistance in interpreting the regulation in question.



## Transfer Monitors – Adding Value to the Prevention Program

LCDR Kevin Lynn

It is early Wednesday morning when the unit fax machine spins up. As the printed pages exit the machine, the watch stander sees the familiar “National Response Center” heading and then scans the document to get the incident details...

“A tank was overfilled on a barge...”  
“Heavy Fuel Oil...”  
“Quantity in water: 20 Barrels...”  
“...most likely due to operator error.”

...and the rest of the day is filled with a flurry of response and investigative activities to determine the cause of the incident and oversee operations to minimize environmental damage. Could this incident have been prevented? Maybe, maybe not. But, are there actions you can take to tip the scales towards the “Maybe” category? There certainly are. Part of that action includes the design and administration of an effective Transfer Monitor Program.

### Why Transfer Monitors?

Performing transfer monitor activities are an effective way to increase compliance with facility and vessel pollution prevention regulations.


As part of the Marine Environmental Protection mission under the Coast Guard Maritime Prevention Program, they serve a primary purpose of reducing the likelihood of oil spills and hazardous material releases during product transfer operations. The Coast Guard is authorized to conduct transfer monitors under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33 USC 1221), Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 USC 1251), Port and Tanker Safety Act, (33 USC 1221 and 46 USC 37) and Executive Order 12777.

As a Prevention oriented activity the benefits of conducting transfer monitors can be difficult to express. The below graph shows three different trends over a ten-year period. The first is the number of transfer monitor activities performed annually (in hundreds). The second and third show the number of pollution incidents involving a facility or vessel where the facility or vessel was somehow involved in a transfer – either as the cargo source or recipient. Interpreting this data supports a conclusion that an increased rate of transfer monitor activity generally yielded less pollution incidents, and vice versa. While the correlation is rough, it does give reason to consider the merits of a transfer monitor program.

### Identifying the Threats and Investments

What is a consequence of not having an effective Transfer Monitor Program?

Transfer Monitor Activity vs. Facility and Vessel Pollution Incidents\*



Lack of a program can send signals to the maritime industry that lead them to relax adherence to standards and procedures. This in turn can result in oil spills that have an environmental impact and hazardous material releases that create significant human health hazards. There are other threats that are equally important – such as impacts to the marine transportation system when waterways must be closed after an incident to minimize contamination of transiting vessels and allow for response operations. These closures translate to delays in shipping and inconveniences to mass transit systems and ultimately result in negative financial impacts in terms of lost revenue and the implementation of contingency plans until normal services are restored. Vessels and facilities also face damage to their environmental stewardship reputation, time lost responding to the incident, and the possibility of penalty actions. Uninvolved facilities and vessels can also be impacted, especially if they are located within or in close proximity to response operations, or are dependent on Coast Guard services such as receiving a planned facility inspection that must now be rescheduled.

Physical and operational threats extend to Coast Guard personnel. Pollution response personnel and resources must be mobilized to oversee or direct operations, Facility Inspectors are needed to inspect the facility to ensure regulatory compliance exists, and other planned missions may need to be rescheduled or cancelled because personnel are no longer available.

In contrast to the broad reaching threats of an ineffective or non-existent Transfer Monitor Program, the investments needed to establish an effective program are fairly minimal. All that is really needed are a few qualified facility inspectors who recognize the power of Prevention activities and are willing to spend a little effort to develop a risk based approach to performing transfer monitors.



### **Achieving Effectiveness - Risk Based Approach**

Facility Inspectors should employ a risk based approach to planning transfer monitor activities.

From a waterfront facility perspective, the most obvious factor in beginning an assessment of the impact a mission has is to review the historical performance of the facility involved. Those facilities with past occurrences of spills or releases, or repeated findings of non-compliance with pollution prevention regulations (such as hose testing or transfer operation requirements) certainly warrant scrutiny. However, facilities with a “clean” operating history should not automatically be discounted, especially if the products being transferred pose significant environmental or human health hazards, involve very large quantities, or are located close to environmental or publically sensitive areas. Additionally, because a majority of oil and hazardous material transfer operations occur at waterfront facilities, the multi-mission capabilities of Facility Inspectors that can be exercised through the planned combination of safety and security spot checks to increase efficiency should be strongly considered. Employing concepts similar to operational risk assessments done prior to mission sorties can be one way of assessing risk versus gain.

### **Actions Beyond Traditional Regulatory Enforcement**

After a decision has been made when and where to conduct a transfer monitor, along with other applicable missions such as a MTSA security spot check, Facility Inspectors should consider what actions can be taken to enhance our service to both the maritime industry and Coast Guard. We must not forget that in addition to our duties as a law enforcement agency, we also take action to safeguard life. Simple acts such as establishing a positive relationship with the tankerman or facility person in charge may yield actionable intelligence on best practices, or unsafe and questionable operations. The Facility Inspector can also demonstrate a genuine concern for the well-being of maritime industry personnel simply by using and explaining the purposes of his or her tools. For instance, using a multi-gas meter to scan the marine transfer area for dangerous concentrations of flammable or hazardous gas and communicating your findings can go a long way to build a positive relationship. **Cont'd on p. 10**



### ...cont'd from p. 9 (Transfer Monitors – Adding Value to the Prevention Program)

#### Final Words

Even the best run transfer monitor programs fail to achieve full potential if actions are not properly documented. The Headquarters Office of Port and Facility Compliance has a responsibility to provide you with documentation expectations and rules. As such, this past December saw the posting of the new MISLE Transfer Monitor User Guide on MISLENET. This comprehensive guide steps you through the MISLE process from start-to-finish. As an incentive to following the steps of the guide, a narrative is no longer a necessary part of the MISLE activity, as all required information is captured in other areas of the MISLE record. As Program Manager for waterfront facility safety and security inspections, I ask that you follow the user guide procedures. Doing so helps close the gap in MISLE data integrity problems and gives critical performance and impact data that is used to support *funding, resources, and personnel* that are desperately needed to perform facility inspections. This user guide is available at: [http://mislenet.osc.uscg.mil/misle\\_user\\_guides.aspx#Facilities](http://mislenet.osc.uscg.mil/misle_user_guides.aspx#Facilities)

In a time of increasing demands and limited personnel resources, ensuring prevention activities are efficient and add value must be a principle concern of Operational Commanders, and Facility Inspectors, alike. So the next time you are tempted to grab an advance notice of transfer off the fax machine, complete an operational risk assessment and then jump into a GV, ask yourself if you are following a system that can bring value and efficiency to transfer monitors and the Prevention Program.

## Breach of Security LT Russell Amacher

Breach of Security (BOS), as defined in 33 CFR 101.5, means an incident that has not resulted in a transportation security incident, in which security measures have been circumvented, eluded, or violated. What does this mean? Does this mean that if a gun is found in a person's belonging during the initial search of a cruise ship that this is a breach of security? Is it a breach of security if a person enters a facility through an open gate that does not have a security guard present?

An example of a breach of security is when a person or person's gain access to a regulated facility or vessel by climbing or cutting through perimeter fencing or crashing through a guarded gate with a vehicle. There is guidance on how and when to document a breach of security in NVIC 03-03, Change 2. Along with that you can find the Breach of Security MISLE Guide in Homeport, CG Portal, MISLE Net., and COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION 16610.30.

As per 33 CFR 101.305(b), the owner and/or operator of a MTSA regulated facility that is conducting activities that warrant an active facility security plan, shall, without delay, report a BOS to the National Response Center (NRC). Determining where the BOS took place determines the type of qualification needed by the CG Inspector to respond. A BOS at a waterfront facility should be investigated and documented by a qualified facility inspector (EU). A civilian port security specialist (PSS) holding an EU qualification meets this criteria. If an inspected vessel is involved, a marine inspector (MI) must be consulted. If a licensed mariner is involved, an investigating officer (IO) must be consulted.

A prompt and focused response is necessary when a BOS is reported. This response must determine the intent, the actual threat, and the adequacy of the prevention and response measures taken by the facility/vessel. The results of the initial response will determine the appropriate Coast Guard actions.


After documenting the incident, determine if a site visit is necessary to verify repairs, review procedures/infrastructure, gather additional information, gather evidence for a potential civil penalty, etc. If a site visit is conducted, document the visit in MISLE as an “Announced or Unannounced Security Spot Check” and follow guidance for the Safe Port Act to ensure credit. Use “Announced or Unannounced Security Spot Check” as a detection activity to “Refer to Enforcement” if you need to process a civil penalty. If a site visit is not necessary, review relevant Facility Security Plan (FSP) procedures to ensure no changes are needed and document in MISLE as a “Follow-up Facility Inspection Activity” (which does not count towards fulfilling the Safe Port Act requirement of conducting two security inspections to MTSA facilities yearly, with one inspection being unannounced). In a criminal case situation, during the course of interviewing the Facility Security Officer (FSO), Facility Inspectors can gather all suspect information and license plate numbers for Field Intelligence Support Team (FIST)/Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) to conduct background checks and/or criminal investigations.

There doesn't need to be two separate MISLE Activities, as in one activity to document the BOS and one for a deficiency (Follow-up Inspection). You can do both in the same activity with the following benefits: the follow-up MISLE Activities can be closed at the local level without sending to Coast Guard Headquarters (HQ); BOS & deficiencies will be captured in MISLE in the facilities history, and will be available in Coast Guard Business Intelligence (CGBI) for data calls.

Attempted security breaches are not defined by 33 CFR Subchapter H and as such have no reporting requirements. COTPs should encourage all facilities to report attempted security breaches to allow the Coast Guard to investigate and document successful implementation of facility/vessel security plans.

- Security Breach, Potential – indicates a security breach has been reported but the investigation has not yet determined if a breach occurred.
- Security Breach – indicates an actual breach has occurred.

Inspections conducted after a Security Breach was Identified



-Security Breach, Erroneous or Unverifiable – indicates that the investigation found that there was no breach or there was insufficient evidence to prove a breach did or did not happen (i.e. a gate was found unlocked or a fence cut but it is unknown if anyone actually accessed it).

-Security Breach, Attempted – indicates a breach was attempted but stopped by security measures in place. If the investigation determines a breach was stopped due to reasons other than security measures, it shall be determined a Security Breach.

So far in 2012, there have been 186 initial security breach investigations documented in MISLE. The results below do not reflect additional follow-up inspections or activities that may relate to a security breach. The below chart identifies what districts have performed security breach inspections:



# Getting beyond Green Amber Red

By: LCDR Kevin Lynn

How many times has someone said “You’re no good to me dead?” One too many? Well, there is a good reason for that, because YOU are the most important asset to the Coast Guard. So how do you look someone in the eye before you head out and say “Don’t worry boss, we’re going to be safe...”

Step one - perform Operational Risk Management (ORM). Actually, there are seven steps to the ORM process and they are:

- (1) Identify mission tasks,
- (2) Identify hazards,
- (3) Assess risks,
- (4) Identify options,
- (5) Evaluate Risk versus Gain,
- (6) Execute Decision and
- (7) Monitor Situation.

ORM is NOT performing a General Assessment of Risk (GAR\*) model once before departing the office and calling it good. At the field level, ORM should be deliberate – complete mission planning BEFORE you head out. ORM can also be time critical – on the job when something sudden and unexpected occurs. In all cases, ORM is a continuous process because -

***“Failure to respond to changes in the situation can become a link in a chain of errors that lead to a mishap.”***

The Coast Guard is taking action to re-emphasize ORM. In early January ALCOAST 003/09 entitled “Operational Risk Management Program Advancements – SITREP One” was released, which announced efforts that are underway to enhance risk management training, hazard identification, and assessment processes. Take a moment to read through it. Then take a few more minutes and visit [www.uscg.mil/safety](http://www.uscg.mil/safety). Then, if you were surprised to learn that you should be doing more than just a GAR model (and even if you weren’t surprised), load up COMDTINST 3500.3 and read it – it’s only

24 pages long with the enclosure!

Take steps to protect yourself and your crew. Exercise Operational Risk Management.

\*Did you think GAR means Green Amber Red? Per COMDTINST 3500.3, that is what the acronym stands for – and while a useful model, it is designed to only address general risk concerns, and not necessarily the whole picture.

“The Coast Guard, like most dynamic organizations, is ever adapting to political, funding, and mission demands that expose it to dynamic and unknown safety challenges. These safety challenges can only be resolved with adaptive and dynamic risk management systems that identify and mitigate hazards ahead of mishaps.”

– CG-113



**WE STILL  
WANT TO HEAR  
FROM YOU!!!!**



# Area Maritime Security Committee of the Year Award

The AMSC of the Year award recognizes outstanding achievements and contributions of AMSCs in safeguarding our nation's MTS, including port areas, adjacent waterways, coastal and shore side areas, waterfront facilities, maritime critical infrastructure, and global supply chains.

Sponsored by the Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy (CG-5P)

For additional details on nominations requirements and adjudication of award recipient, please see CG-FAC Policy Letter 13-01, Annual Reporting Requirements for Area Maritime Security Committees.

USCG

LCDR Dwayne Meekins: 202-372-1109  
Dwayne.L.Meekins@uscg.mil  
LT Bradley Bergan: 202-372-1149  
Bradley.P.Bergan@uscg.mil  
LTJG Cale Cooper: 202-372-1166  
Cale.M.Cooper@uscg.mil



Photo courtesy of the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (2012). <http://www.panynj.gov/>

**Interested COTPs should submit nominations to their District representatives for endorsement. District endorsed nominations should be forwarded to [AMSC@uscg.mil](mailto:AMSC@uscg.mil) or one of the CG-FAC-1 Port Operations Branch points of contact. Nominations with their endorsements are due by close of business on the final work-day of February.**

**The winner will be announced via Coast Guard Message System (CGMS) and formally recognized at either that year's *Joint Harbor Safety Committee* – *Area Maritime Security Committee Conference* or AMSC-specific conference or workshop. Awards will be mailed to the COTP associated with the selected AMSC immediately following the release of the CGMS announcement.**

*Area Maritime Security Committees: excellence through participation.*

*Innovation  
Leadership*

*Community*

*Outreach*

*Improvement*

## Office of Port and Facility Compliance (CG-FAC)

### Office Chief

Captain Andrew Tucci 202 372-1080

### Domestic Ports (CG-FAC-1)

LCDR Ulysses Mullins 202-372-1106  
Mr. Wayne Young 202-372-1118

#### Port Operations (AMSC & MTS Recovery)

LCDR Dwayne Meekins 202-372-1106  
LT Brad Bergan 202-372-1149

#### Information & Industry Outreach (NMSAC)

Mr. Ryan Owens 202-372-1108  
LCDR Ulysses Mullins 202-372-1106

### Cargo and Facilities (CG-FAC-2)

CDR Jeff Morgan 202-372-1171  
Mr. Jim Bull 202-372-1144

#### Security Standards (Regulation Development)

LCDR Loan O'Brien 202-372-1133  
LCDR Jose Ramirez 202-372-1131

#### Cargo & Facility Security (MTSA)

LCDR Kevin Floyd 202-372-1132  
LT Russell Amacher 202-372-1131

#### TWIC Implementation

LCDR Gregory Callaghan 202-372-1168  
LT Matthew Layman 202-372-1160

#### Facility Safety & Outer Continental Shelf

LCDR Kevin Lynn 202-372-1130  
Mr. David Condino 202-372-1145  
LT Mike St. Louis 202-372-1114  
MSTC Kevin Collins 202-372-1127

### USCG TWIC Help Desk

202-372-1166  
[TWIC.HQ@uscg.mil](mailto:TWIC.HQ@uscg.mil)