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**“The Role of the Coast Guard in Achieving
Maritime Security”**
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I. Introduction

- **Our interpretation of our “World of Work” is fundamentally different post 9/11:**
 - a. **Never before has the task of attempting to make sense of our future operating environment - and the required capabilities to ensure our success - been more relevant – or difficult.**
 - b. **CG – lead federal agency**
 - c. **Broad maritime authority**
 - d. **Member of military, law enforcement & intel communities**
 - e. **Multi-mission capabilities and expertise**
 - f. **Domestic and International partnerships**

**II. CG is in the Perfect Storm of Transformation:
My job is to Manage the Churn:**

- a. Transition to DHS – brand new organization**
- b. Build out our capabilities**
- c. Rearrange our mission focus**
- d. Reshape our mission balance**
- e. Huge modernization program**
- f. Internal reorganization due to internal priorities and external pressures**

- **How we see the challenge: Asymmetric and transnational means of attack common to all emerging threats ...**

a. Terrorism is not the only threat to “homeland security.”

b. Many threats fall outside traditional narrow bounds of “national security”

- **Smuggling drugs, migrants, and conventional weapons**
- **Circumvention of environmental law, hazardous materials and other environmental threats**
- **Violation of economic sanctions**
- **Violation of EEZ**
- **Piracy**
- **Vulnerability of transportation systems, infrastructure**

c. However, use of established criminal pathways/routes, or means of conveyance (commercial ships, containers, crew, etc.) has been and will continue to be exploited by those with terrorist intent.

III. The maritime dimension of both National and Homeland Security:

- a. Most new threats have distinct maritime dimension
- b. Threats conveyed in ways that are not effectively countered by naval forces
 - Look like and mingle with legitimate commercial and recreational traffic
 - Can't launch cruise missiles or air strikes against them
 - Must engage up close and personal –to determine intentions and sort suspicious from innocent
 - Must board, even if vessels resist or refuse to stop; requires enforcement
- c. Port Security – *and beyond* - big focus for CG. Can't afford to bring maritime economy to stop.
- d. Big challenge is how to ensure legit cargo/commerce vital for our economic strength, is not delayed as security is enhanced.
- e. Therefore, in a highly globalized world with transnational systems, its not a "home and away game" issue any more ...

- f. **It is about: understanding the entire threat vector domain, in our case - the maritime domain ... the ability to recognize and interdict the bad from the good, the suspicious from the innocent, the unsafe from the safe.**
- g. **Therefore, we want to focus on the “sweet spot” of awareness and prevention activities – that’s our best ROI**
- h. **This is a “battlefield” of many players ... commercial, public, private, foreign and domestic ...**
- i. **Therefore, achieving maritime security, now and into the future, will only occur at the confluence of:
law enforcement authority,
all-source intelligence/information,
and military engagement.
Coast Guard only service that operates seamlessly in all three dimensions - that’s who we are. *This is our core competency – seamless application of civil authority or military engagement upon demand.***

IV. Maritime Security Strategy: 4 pillars – Speak to the left two:

- 1. Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness**
- 2. Create and Oversee Maritime Security**

Regime

Pillar #1: MDA ... it is MY PRIORITY and must be a national imperative.

Initiatives:

- **Deepwater**
- **Rescue 21**
- **AIS**
- **96-hour ANOA**
- **Fusion Centers**
- **JHOC**
- **Port Info Teams**

Pillar #2: Prevention...
Create and Oversee
Maritime Security Regime:

- **MTSA 2002: July 2004**
enforcement begins worldwide
- **Port Security and Threat**
Assessments
- **Increased int'l/fed/state/local**
partnerships
- **Port State Control activities**

Pillar #3: Protection ...

**Increase Operational
Presence and Enhance
Deterrence:**

ACTIVITIES:

- **International Security Code Enforcement**
- **Cued Intel, Integrated Surveillance and Tracking**
- **Foreign Port Security Audits**
- **Shore, Surface and Air Patrols**
- **Vessel boarding and interdiction**
- **Int'l boarding agreements**
- **Port Assessments**
- **Family of Plans and exercises**

ASSETS:

- **Foreign port security auditors**
- **Major cutters, aircraft and boats**
- **Law enforcement detachments**
- **NVMC & IRVMC**
- **Vessel/Facility/Port Inspection Teams**
- **Port Information Teams**
- **MSSTs and Sea Marshalling**
- **Maritime Industry Stakeholders**

AUTHORITIES:

- **Right of Visit, Bi-lateral Agreements, Consensual Boardings**
- **International Law applies**
- **Full U. S. Jurisdiction – All vessels**
- **Full U. S. Jurisdiction – All vessels, Facilities, and Port Control (COTP)**

Pillar #4: Response...Improve

Response Posture:

- **Reconstitute CBR-D program**
- **Update National Response Plans**
- **Develop National Incident Management System**
- **Port Commands**
- **Integrated Command Centers**
- **Rescue 21**
- **Enhance National Strike Team capabilities**
- **Increase MSSTs**
- **Expand Airborne Use of Force**

V. The Way Ahead:

- **Aggressively implement MTSA regs and Port State Control actions**
- **Close existing capability and capacity gaps**
- **Refine Security Partnerships with DOD, Public, Private and Int'l Stakeholders**
- **Refine and Integrate maritime security plans and activities**
- **Maintain traditional relationship with USN**

VI. From my perspective:

- **We're doing great work, but we're not there yet:**
- **We probably already own 40-60% of the solution ... but getting linkage and protocols with other relevant agencies, databases, inputs for the remaining 40% is critical to ensure that visibility of activity throughout the maritime domain.**
- **Process, policy, hardware and technology**
- **My concern lies in increasing our capabilities, capacity, force structure. Getting Deepwater funded.**
- **At the end of the day, attaining full MDA is all about providing options to the National Command Authority ... *engagement on our terms, where, when and how it makes the most sense.***

In closing:

- **Enemy will continually adapt to our responses. War on terrorism is like war on drugs. Lessons: We must be able to anticipate, communicate, and cooperate.**
- **Full spectrum of warfare is no longer limited to an away game— “over there.” War has come home. Involves use of military and civilian**

authority and power – optimal engagement across the spectrum.

- **Pre-emption is a valid and necessary tool. We can't afford just to react anymore.**
- **Surveillance and tracking technologies – AS PART OF MDA - will be vital to our capabilities to anticipate. (e.g. Deepwater & C-130 J integrated surveillance package).**

- **Coast Guard is uniquely positioned among the 5 services as an instrument of national security.**
- **Homeland security must be seen as an integral component of national security. Must partner to be effective. Can't afford to act independently. "Jointness" has never been more important or more vital to our success. Includes jointness with federal, state and local stakeholders as well.**