

As Prepared for Delivery

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Amenities:

Good evening, everyone! Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you tonight.

[Extemporaneous welcome and acknowledgement of distinguished guests.]

It's a real honor to be among such distinguished company. And such a diverse company it is, I might add. I see so many prominent individuals from both the public and private sector—scholars, lawmakers, and leaders in business, law, military service, and government.

But we are all joined together by an intense interest in the security of our nation and in our fight against terrorism. It is a high-stakes fight...one that we can't afford to lose.

Each of us is a contender in that fight. And not a could'a-been-contender, like the dockworker played by Marlon Brando in the great American movie "On the Waterfront."

I'm sure you old movie buffs will agree that "On the Waterfront" is a great movie for many reasons, especially the superb acting of Marlon Brando and the late Rod Steiger. It also offered a very revealing look at the waterfront of America in the mid 1950s. Among other things, we were able to see that there is often much more going on there than meets the eye.

Unfortunately, the movies are about as close as most Americans get to the waterfront. There is, indeed, much more than meets the eye. It's really too bad that more people don't pay much attention to what happens in our ports and waterways, because they are so necessary to our prosperity as a nation, and so much a part of our maritime heritage.

I'd like for us as fighters in this war on terrorism to think for a moment about how important our maritime transportation system really is, and how vulnerable it is to attack.

Introduction:

I think it's good to remind ourselves from time to time that we have a tremendous maritime heritage. From the days of colonial settlement to the modern day, our history reminds us how very important the sea has been to us as a nation.

The fact is, we always have been a maritime nation and we probably always will be. One of the first acts of the Congress of the United States back in 1790 was to establish a system of cutters to protect the fragile economic stability of our new nation. The purpose of these ten original cutters was to patrol the eastern seaboard and to guard our major ports from the effects of illegal trade and smuggling.

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Today, we call that venerable service the United States Coast Guard. We have grown over the years in both size and mission, but it is still our duty to provide maritime security to this nation, continuing to protect its prosperity as we have for nearly 212 years.

Through the centuries, our nation's commerce on the world's oceans has produced our tremendous economic vitality and prosperity. Currently, maritime commerce contributes nearly \$1 trillion dollars to our nation's gross domestic product. More than 95% of our foreign trade passes through our seaports.

As a nation that depends so heavily on the oceans and sea-lanes as avenues of our prosperity, we know that whatever action we take against further acts of terrorism must protect our ports and waterways and the ships that use them.

The openness of our ports is the key to that prosperity. In the wake of the terrible events of last fall, however, the flimsiness of the locks that guard them should demand our careful inspection and urgent attention.

I'd like to do three things in my time with you this evening. First, I want to share with you the strategy that we have been developing to fix the lock of maritime security over the past nine months or so.

I also want to speak plainly about some critical needs and gaps in capability that we must address to be effective in implementing our strategy.

Finally, I'd like to touch briefly on the President's proposal to create the Department of Homeland Security, and how the Coast Guard might fit in that reorganization.

The Unique Problems of Maritime Security.

Let me begin by outlining the unique problems that we face in addressing our maritime security.

Most people don't realize that the differences between aviation security and maritime security are much larger than simply the mode of transportation. Unlike airports, which usually are confined to a piece of public real estate behind a single perimeter fence, seaports are located on open, sprawling waterfronts. Most were developed in colonial days, even before there was a national government.

There is no national or centralized authority to govern seaports. Instead, our seaports have a strong history of localization—leaving federal, state and local governments with overlapping jurisdiction over port facilities.

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Yet, the ports and waterways of our maritime transportation system are just as valuable as—and even more vulnerable than—our airports. Each year, thousands of ships and millions of containers enter and leave the United States through our ports.

Such valuable and vulnerable assets as our ports are likely to be found at the top of a terrorist's list of potential targets. If those who wish us harm should attack our ports, the resulting economic impact on the nation—even beyond the immediate devastation and loss of life caused by the attack itself—would make the post-9/11 aviation shut-down pale in comparison.

Beyond the Seaports:

While we might consider the value and vulnerability of our seaports to be self-evident, these commercial centers comprise only a small portion of our maritime borders. In addition to roughly 360 seaports, the maritime border consists of roughly 95,000 miles of open shoreline, 25,000 miles of navigable waterways, and more than 3.4 million square miles of exclusive economic zone.

In our efforts to protect the most valuable and vulnerable elements of this vast maritime frontier, it would be a real mistake to build our first line of defense in close proximity to the highest valued targets. Doing so would be like a homeowner locking the jewelry box in the bedroom of the house, while leaving the front door open.

Instead, it would make sense to form a layered defense, sort of like situating your home in a gated community, surrounded by an electronic perimeter fence, protected by an alarm system linked to a good, solid deadbolt—and allowing a mean, hungry dog to roam freely in the house.

But those precautions would be intended to keep bad things out. What about welcoming visitors—and allowing people in the house and their goods to come and go freely? That becomes a real problem, when your main concern is keeping the bad things out.

The problem quickly becomes very complex, as you all know very well.

But, as complex as the problem may be, it seems to me that the solution must depend in large measure on a strong police force, and a neighborhood watch that is both active and aware.

And it will require an effective strategy to coordinate these efforts.

President Bush recently unveiled the National Homeland Security Strategy, which outlines plans to accomplish three broad objectives: to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism; and to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. It is a sound strategy that depends primarily on sharing information, securing our borders, protecting vital infrastructure, partnering with others at home and abroad, and preparing to respond quickly to future events.

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The Coast Guard has been at the center of effort to define a maritime security strategy that complements the President's broader homeland security strategy.

There are five principle elements of that strategy: improving Maritime Domain Awareness; ensuring the controlled movement of high interest vessels; enhancing our presence and response capabilities in the ports and harbors as well as the high seas; protecting critical infrastructure; and increasing domestic and international outreach.

Maritime Domain Awareness:

First, we must increase awareness of the threats. Prior to September 11th, our awareness of potential threats to our nation was relatively low. Our preparations regarding serious threats to our homeland were focused mainly on first response capability and consequence management.

If we hope to prevent even worse events than the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington, we must have more knowledge of our vulnerabilities and the threats against us. Therefore, increasing awareness should be our primary concern. Doing so will enable us to carry out the remainder of the strategy of prevention more effectively.

As leaders in developing our nation's maritime security strategy, the Coast Guard has coined a phrase to describe this heightened sense of vigilance. We call it "Maritime Domain Awareness."

What do we mean by Maritime Domain Awareness, or MDA? Simply put, it is possessing comprehensive awareness of our vulnerabilities, threats, and targets of interest on the water.

This is not a new idea. It is a new name applied to a more aggressive, more effective means of gathering, using, and sharing information and intelligence than has ever been possible in the past.

Above all, it has to do with having access to detailed knowledge about our adversaries, and sharing that information more effectively among federal agencies and with our domestic and international partners in both the private and public sectors.

This knowledge also must be provided to our combined forces, both afloat and ashore, in a single integrated operating picture of relevant information within the area of interest. The picture must be timely, accurate, scalable, and reliable enough to minimize uncertainty.

Controlling The Movement of High Interest Vessels:

The second element of our strategy is to ensure the controlled movement of high interest vessels. To do this, we must identify, board, and inspect any vessel that could be used as a weapon of mass destruction.

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We now screen all foreign flag vessels over 300 gross tons, requiring them to provide a 96-hour advance notice of arrival. Security checks are conducted on the information provided by these vessels, including crew lists and passengers aboard.

We also board certain high interest vessels at sea before they enter port, and escort others into port to diminish the potential for hijacking.

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We have asked for 160 Sea Marshals for armed escort of these vessels, as well as necessary resources to increase on-the-water patrols for all 49 Captains of the Ports. These sea marshals will also provide surge capability to maritime regions in the event of increased threat levels.

Enhancing Presence and Response Capabilities:

Third, we must enhance presence and response capabilities. These capabilities will be used to detect, intercept and interdict potential threats as far from our shores as possible. We must effectively thwart criminal or catastrophic events. Therefore, we must develop a concentric layered defense capability.

We are employing boats, cutters, and aircraft to increase presence wherever the United States has key interests. Our counter-drug and migrant interdiction efforts strike at funding sources for organized crime and terrorism. Our migrant interdiction patrols also deter foreign terrorists from crossing our borders undetected.

And we will continue to partner closely with the Navy to get this job done. The Coast Guard and the Navy have refined the National Fleet Policy statement to improve interoperability of our ships and aircraft and closer coordination between our services. Thirteen Navy patrol boats currently work under the authority of Coast Guard commanders to protect vital coastal areas. We in turn, provide forces to assist in the waterside security of USN assets both at home and abroad.

Additional presence in our ports and coastal waters also will come from six new Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Teams, comprising nearly 500 active duty personnel. The first of these was commissioned earlier this month. We will also be looking for 70 more Port Security Response Boats and increased staffing for small boat stations to arrive soon. Funding for these new units has been requested within our FY 2003 budgets. It is vital that we receive that funding to increase presence in our ports and waterways.

Presence is deterrence. Just ask any cop on the beat.

Assessing and Protecting Critical Infrastructure:

Fourth, to protect critical infrastructure and enhance force protection, we must take measures to be consistent with the Administration's Critical Infrastructure and Protection Program.

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Using a risk-based decision matrix, we have identified critical infrastructures in all 49 Captain of the Port Zones, and we have established interim measures to protect them. These critical infrastructures include everything from national icons, such as the Statue of Liberty, to critical nuclear power plants. The actual protection part will be shared between federal, state and local governments and the private sector, as the risks dictate.

And as I noted earlier, we are also involved with the U. S. Navy in protecting our nation's military bases, many of which are in our major ports.

We have also requested additional funding for Anti-terrorism and force protection, requiring specific enhancements to physical infrastructure, cyber-security, personal protective equipment, chemical weapons of mass destruction detection equipment, and weapons.

Increasing Domestic and International Outreach:

Fifth, to increase domestic and international outreach, we must strengthen partnerships and strategic relationships with our neighbors at home and abroad.

The Coast Guard considers maritime security an all-hands evolution. We will need effective security plans for commercial vessels, offshore structures, and waterfront facilities. Because so many of the critical facilities and vessels of concern are owned and operated by the private sector, and because of the need to be fiscally responsible at the federal level, the Coast Guard can't do it all. We have to work this problem together with our partners at the federal, state, and local levels.

We must also work with the International Maritime Organization to assist us in improving security by pressing our borders outward.

In essence, we will be creating a "maritime neighborhood watch," if you will.

An Effective Strategy:

This five-part maritime border security strategy incorporates the core competencies of the Coast Guard into multi-agency, multi-national, and layered operations to push our maritime borders outward—into and beyond the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone.

I'd like to take just a moment to note that there is some very important legislation in the works that would help us achieve this strategy.

The Port Security Bill now in conference will establish a framework and authorities for a comprehensive maritime security program. I believe it contains some very important provisions that will heighten national awareness of the need for collective action, and encourage a coordinated interagency and public-private partnership approach to port and waterways safety and security. We are hoping that the final bill that emerges from conference will:

- Establish port security standards;

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- Fund port security assessments of key economic and strategic ports;
- Require Security and Contingency plans for vessels and facilities;
- Provide greater awareness through credentialing; international outreach; and notification; requirements for people, vessels, and cargo; and
- Extend the U.S. jurisdiction to 12 nautical miles to push out U.S. borders.

The House bill also includes a Coast Guard Authorization Act, which we hope will remain in the bill through conference, since there has not been a Coast Guard Authorization Act since 1998.

These provisions will go a long way toward ensuring that our strategy works.

Closing the Gaps:

Obviously, we all have a lot to do to accomplish this strategy. Despite our future plans, the Coast Guard has major gaps in capability now, which will probably remain well into the coming years.... But we will press on to correct these capability gaps with a great sense of urgency.

These are indeed remarkable times...unprecedented times for us. None of us serving today on active duty in the armed forces can remember a previous time when the security of our homeland was under direct attack.

That changes everything.

We must adapt to that change. Today, the mission of homeland security makes up a greater portion of the Coast Guard's multi-mission set, but this mission is not new to us. Perhaps it is more urgent today than it was in the early days of last year, but it remains just as important today as it was in the early days of our new Republic.

Our success in performing all of our many missions during the past decades has come through the hard work, and often at the expense of the Coast Guard's greatest asset—our people.

Today, in our continued efforts to protect the American people from harm, we must make sure that our people have the best available technical and operational systems with which to perform their duties. And these systems must be fully integrated from the high seas to the shores of our great nation, so our people can work smarter...not harder.

Looking ahead, the demand for our services will surely increase. The Coast Guard is planning for these new challenges, but there are obstacles.

Even as the scope of our mission grows, our fleet of ships and aircraft is aging. Some of our cutters saw action in World War II, and most of them date from the 1960s. And some of our aircraft are older than the men and women who fly them.

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An aging fleet presents significant challenges, both to our operational performance and our logistics support.

The Coast Guard also needs a more dynamic capability to detect, intercept and interdict potential threats on the high seas, using a layered defense of major cutters, patrol boats, and maritime patrol aircraft.

As the leader in Maritime Homeland Security, the Coast Guard must have the most capable ships, aircraft and command and control technology available to protect our nation and carry out our many missions.

I believe we will soon have that capability through an innovative acquisition project, called the Integrated Deepwater Systems Program, more commonly referred to as Deepwater.

Over a period of two decades, the Deepwater Program will acquire 91 ships, from fast patrol boats to high endurance cutters. We will also receive 35 new fixed-wing aircraft, 34 helicopters, and 76 unmanned surveillance aircraft, as well as upgrades to 49 existing cutters and 93 helicopters. We will also have better communications, surveillance and command and control systems than ever before. These are the transformational tools necessary to create an effective, layered defense of our nation's maritime interests in the 21st century.

By undertaking Deepwater, we are embracing a culture of innovation, technology, and effective management practices, while strengthening our stewardship of the public trust. The bottom line is that we will be able to perform all our missions more effectively.

Deepwater is the centerpiece of our strategy for maritime homeland security. I believe that the success of everything that I've been talking about today depends to a very large degree on the success of Deepwater. We will succeed. We must.

We know that there are indeed many obstacles to overcome. But we are determined to overcome them.

Failure is Not an Option:

I'm sure all of you know the story of Apollo Thirteen. You will recall that in April of 1969, three courageous U.S. astronauts, Jim Lovell, Fred Haise, and Jack Swigert, were hurtling through space at 2,000 miles per hour on their way to a third moon landing, when the oxygen fuel cells in the command module malfunctioned, leaving them stranded in a tiny spacecraft nearly 200,000 miles from earth.

At that moment, Astronaut Jim Lovell uttered the now famous words, "Houston, we've had a problem."

On the ground in Houston, flight director Gene Kranz knew that unless they were able to fix that problem, the crew would consume their remaining oxygen and power long before they could

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return to earth. He also knew that, even if they could manage to return, they would have no way of controlling the capsule's fiery plunge into the earth's atmosphere.

Yet, he was determined to find innovative solutions to the many seemingly insurmountable problems ahead. As he told his ground crew, "Failure is not an option." Those astronauts returned safely to Earth.

Once again, with all that is at stake before us today, it is clear that failure is not an option.

We must make ourselves ready to succeed, and expect nothing less.

Preparing to Succeed:

With his recent proposal to create a single Homeland Security Department, the President has taken the next logical step to ensure an effective posture of readiness for the nation. He is preparing us to succeed.

From my perspective, it is a necessary change, whose time has come. I believe that the proposed organization will:

- Bring unity of effort and unity of command to homeland security efforts, with clear lines of authority to get the job done.
- Serve to enhance awareness of threats and vulnerabilities so that effective preventative actions can be instituted;
- Minimize the impact of a terrorist act, should a response be needed; and
- Help ensure alignment of personnel, strategy, and resources to the highest priority areas.

Furthermore, I believe that the Coast Guard is a logical component of the proposed Department for three reasons.

First, nearly 50% of our current operating budget is directly related to the core missions of the proposed Department.

Second, the bulk of our remaining missions contribute indirectly to the overall security interests of the nation.

And third, we also have a unique set of competencies, capabilities, and authorities that will add considerable value to the Department.

In short, the Coast Guard has been engaged in homeland security for 212 years. We will continue with all speed to do just that.

Finally, I maintain that if we are moved to this new department, and if we are to remain effective in the 21st century, we must be moved intact; we must maintain our military, maritime, and multi-mission character; and we must retain our entire mission set.

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Conclusion:

Ladies and gentlemen, we are all contenders in this good fight. Unlike Terry Malloy, Brando's character in "On the Waterfront," we can't ever afford to lament what could have been.

It has often been said that the future often arrives unannounced. The future arrived suddenly, violently, and without warning on a clear day last September. The future is now.

That future requires a new strategy of better awareness, better preventive security measures and broader cooperation among neighbors and friends.

And more than ever before, America requires a strong maritime guardian to protect our people from harm. That has been the role of the Coast Guard since 1790. As we have in the past, we will continue striving every day to make sure that Americans are both safe and secure, and to remain always ready for whatever comes next.

Thank you very much.