

CDR Jeffrey C. Jackson

Notations re: Transcript of statement to Administrative Investigation Board of 24  
August 2006

Note 1: D13 Ass't Chief of Law Enforcement (v. D11)

Note 2: DWO, [REDACTED] (v. DWO [REDACTED]); Add 1<sup>st</sup> officer tour as Operations Officer,  
Group Boston

Note 3: Recommend replace "...addressing a request for more cutter training." With  
"...requesting more formal cutter training." This was my initiative, not a  
response to an existing request.

Note 4: LCDR [REDACTED] stated that the CO "had been briefed, and agreed to the dive  
plan." I also stated that the routing of the dive plan to me was a requirement I  
had started last year, as an info addee on routing slips so that I could track ship's  
personnel and activities.

Note 5: Per note 4, I was informed that the CO had previously been briefed.

Note 6: I observed the deployment of the brow, and discussed the ice conditions, etc.

Note 7: I also stated to BOSN that persons could travel further on the ice, to the extent I  
walked, as long as they avoided the thin, weak seam in the ice we had marked  
with cones.

Note 8: I also did not want ice liberty delayed too long because I wanted our cooks to be  
able to participate.

Note 9: The Russian scientist inquired of me, through a scientist who spoke better  
English, if he could do the "polar bear swim." I said no. The CO arrived during  
this discussion and stated that he would allow the swim. I observed the swim to  
ensure the man was tethered. The swim took place off the port bow of the ship,  
near the dive site, and lasted about 5 seconds. To the best of my recollection,  
divers were still assembling gear at the site but had not entered the water.

Note 10: I don't recall stating that the dive operation was going fine at this point, and I  
am uncomfortable with that statement. My observations of the team were  
those of a person with no training in assessing how well a dive operation is  
going. The divers seemed calm as they donned their gear.

Note 11: I actually went to the dive site because I had noticed from a distance that ENS  
[REDACTED] had left the water. I inquired about her situation from – as I recall -  
LTJG [REDACTED] who told me that her suit had developed a leak. I stated that I

recalled that the 2 other divers were on the surface, but my memory is not certain.

- Note 12: Following my round to warn those on ice liberty that the galley would be secured on schedule at 1800, I went to the messdeck to eat dinner. After dinner I asked the cooks if they had been on the ice (yes) and asked FN [REDACTED] a messcook, the same question. FN [REDACTED] stated that he and the other messcooks had not been on the ice. I asked him for an estimate of when he and the others could leave the scullery and visit the ice. FN [REDACTED] responded that at 1815 the group would be free. I then passed to the bridge that ice liberty would secure at 1845, to give the messcooks ½ hour of time on the ice. Following this, I went back to the ice and, as I recall, lit a cigar and walked the perimeter. I know that I came back to the ship at about 1810 to finish my cigar on the port smoking deck, and I watched ice liberty from this vantage. I then went to the pilothouse and discussed the plan for securing ice liberty with BMCS [REDACTED].
- Note 13: My opinion of initial response at the dive site is that it was proceeding effectively but in an atmosphere of great haste and panic as responders struggled to free the divers from their gear and begin emergency first aid.
- Note 14: After following the second stretcher up the brow I found YNC [REDACTED] on the forecastle.
- Note 15: [REDACTED] (v. [REDACTED])
- Note 16: OPS had already begun the process of establishing comms; I did not prompt him in this regard.
- Note 17: Shortly after arriving in Sickbay I directed ENS [REDACTED] to begin a log of events. After about 40 minutes – an estimate – we had reliable comms with a flight surgeon on a phone in the Sickbay berthing area. LTJG [REDACTED] conferred with the flight surgeon. HSC [REDACTED], LCDR [REDACTED] and myself were also in the room. LTJG [REDACTED] described the situation to the flight surgeon, and was given permission to ‘call,’ which is an emergency medicine term for ending resuscitation efforts. After ending his discussion with the flight surgeon, LTJG [REDACTED] and HSC [REDACTED] each went to their respective responders. I ushered all others from Sickbay and closed the door. The groups collaboratively agreed that resuscitation should be ended. I covered BM2 Duque, HSC [REDACTED] covered LT Hill. The responders grieved together for a number of minutes. I privately discussed the next steps in broad terms with HSC [REDACTED] primarily our need for body storage.

Regarding Iridium, to my knowledge the system did not drop because of high latitudes. Iridium was used effectively last year for e-mail and voice comms at the North Pole.

Note 18: Many tasks were delegated due to the amount of work that needed to be done quickly. I reviewed, corrected and routed to CO the casualty report messages, participated in moving the bodies to our climate control chamber, and discussed the situation with the District 13 command center in an attempt to have a proper notification of LT Hill's death made to CWO [REDACTED].

The Class A mishap report was not filed until approximately 36 hours after the incident. This was a decision that I made. I had been in voice contact with HSC [REDACTED] at Pensacola and the Area Command Center and passed a quick summary of events as I knew them. I was also performing admin triage at a fairly hectic pace, in an environment with slow connectivity and intermittent voice comms, and our pre-mishap plan required a meeting of the Safety Board (serving as our Mishap Analysis Board) to review the message. Given the broadly-witnessed trauma of the event and other pressing issues, I was not willing to call such a meeting right after the event. On Friday afternoon I directed our EO, LCDR [REDACTED] to draft this message. Our MAB met on Saturday morning, and the message was sent shortly afterwards. In hindsight, I should have disregarded the MAB process because it was cumbersome, there was little value added, and the Board members had other pressing issues. I will address this in a revision to our Pre-Mishap Plan.

I would like to note that during this interview I was asked if I had chosen to omit any mention of the concurrent times of our ice liberty and the dive in our Class A Mishap. I stated that this was not the case, and that any discussion of ice liberty during the dive had simply not come up. LCDR [REDACTED] drafted the message, and he is an extremely skilled and forthright officer. I read the message aloud to HEALY's Safety Board (MAB) as a review prior to release. If this omission was a mistake, the fault is mine.

Note 19: I have no recollection of any dive ops staged from HEALY. To the best of my recollection, all HEALY dives had been staged from either the LCVP small boat or from nearby ice, or a combination of both.

Note 20: Regarding the monitoring of beer consumption: I helped the Morale Committee move the beer and soft drinks to the ice, and we chose a spot near the base of the brow to put the bottles and cans into the snow for cooling. Several CPO's were present, along with ENS [REDACTED], and we discussed the previous problems with using a checklist to monitor the 2 beer limit; mostly that it was cumbersome and betrayed an unfounded distrust of the crew, especially in such a closely monitored situation as ice liberty. There was also a limit on the amount of beer brought to the ice. After this discussion, I made the decision to rely on deckplate CPO leadership and presence, and our crew's maturity. Again, this decision was my own.

Note 21: See Note 9.

(b)(6) & (7)(C)

- Note 22: It should be noted by the Board that HEALY has frequently conducted dive operations beyond the reach of helicopter support. Our last scheduled mission of 2006, in October, had a requirement for potential dive support, if needed, to recover an AUV; we were not scheduled to have a helo embarked during this mission. In review this seems dangerous and poorly thought out, and I am disappointed in myself for not recognizing the problem. I would include our carriage of just one hyperbaric chamber in the same category.
- Note 23: I was asked during this interview if I was aware of the need to coordinate diving while moored with other nearby ships, such as at an ISC. I am, and stated the standard requirements to secure suction/discharge, not cycle rudders, not rotate shafts, and secure sonar. I was not asked whether HEALY had ever taken such actions in the past when operating alone in the ice and divers were deployed near the ship. To my knowledge, we have not made this pipe or taken some/all of the actions that we do perform when divers are deployed at ISC Seattle. I was informed last year by LT Hill (my memory, may have been ENS ██████████) when I asked the same question about divers deploying from a nearby floe. I don't recall specifics of the conversation, but I was told that it was not necessary for our type of sonar to be secured, or place restrictions on other ship systems. I am not a diver, so I cannot attest to the accuracy of this statement. I have not seen a policy that addresses diving near, but not under, a ship operating independently.
- Note 24: I learned this after the dive. Prior to the dive, I was assured by LCDR ██████████ that the dive had been briefed to the CO. I assumed that all required preparatory steps were complete, other than having the CO sign the dive plan.
- Note 25: I stated that I knew that LT Hill had completed Dive Officer school, a longer training regimen than the basic dive course.
- Note 26: ENS ██████████ attended dive school before reporting to HEALY. I assumed that she attended school while she was a cadet, since she recently reported from CGA.
- Note 27: Class D "HIPO"
- Note 28: LT Hill had either just been promoted to LT, or selected for LT.
- Note 29: I called a meeting with LT Hill in the wardroom to discuss my concerns. CO (CAPT ██████████) and OPS (LCDR ██████████) were present.
- Note 30: I could recall from memory during this interview that the dive bill provides guidance on administrative and operational requirements, but that was the extent of my specific knowledge. I had not reviewed our Dive Bill on this deployment because I was not aware that we were diving on this mission, and had not conducted dive ops on the previous 2006 mission. I acknowledge that

77

PAGE 4 OF 10 PAGES.

(b)(6) & (7)(c)

I had not reviewed our dive bill since our 2005 deployment, and did not review it prior to offering guidance on the ATON recovery mission in early 2006.

- Note 31: The Class A mishap message was released approximately 36 hours after the deaths.
- Note 32: The HEALY cutter organization manual has not been updated since the cutter was commissioned in 1999. I have been slowly rewriting it, with the goal of finishing an updated version before my tour ends. It is a fair assumption that I would not have made significant changes to our dive bill and dive organization sections of the CORM, unless prompted to do so by our Dive Officer.

With consideration given to the 32 notes above, I agree with the summary of interview prepared the Administrative Investigation Board.

 Jackson

(b)(6) & (7)(C)

CDR Jeffrey C. Jackson

Notations re: Transcript of statement to Administrative Investigation Board of 24  
August 2006

Note 1: D13 Ass't Chief of Law Enforcement (v. D11)

Note 2: DWO, [REDACTED] (v. [REDACTED] EDISTO); Add 1<sup>st</sup> officer tour as Operations Officer,  
Group Boston

Note 3: Recommend replace "...addressing a request for more cutter training." With  
"...requesting more formal cutter training." This was my initiative, not a  
response to an existing request.

Note 4: LCDR [REDACTED] stated that the CO "had been briefed, and agreed to the dive  
plan." I also stated that the routing of the dive plan to me was a requirement I  
had started last year, as an info addee on routing slips so that I could track ship's  
personnel and activities.

Note 5: Per note 4, I was informed that the CO had previously been briefed.

Note 6: I observed the deployment of the brow, and discussed the ice conditions, etc.

Note 7: I also stated to BOSN that persons could travel further on the ice, to the extent I  
walked, as long as they avoided the thin, weak seam in the ice we had marked  
with cones.

Note 8: I also did not want ice liberty delayed too long because I wanted our cooks to be  
able to participate.

Note 9: The Russian scientist inquired of me, through a scientist who spoke better  
English, if he could do the "polar bear swim." I said no. The CO arrived during  
this discussion and stated that he would allow the swim. I observed the swim to  
ensure the man was tethered. The swim took place off the port bow of the ship,  
near the dive site, and lasted about 5 seconds. To the best of my recollection,  
divers were still assembling gear at the site but had not entered the water.

Note 10: I don't recall stating that the dive operation was going fine at this point, and I  
am uncomfortable with that statement. My observations of the team were  
those of a person with no training in assessing how well a dive operation is  
going. The divers seemed calm as they donned their gear.

Note 11: I actually went to the dive site because I had noticed from a distance that ENS  
[REDACTED] had left the water. I inquired about her situation from - as I recall -  
LTJG [REDACTED], who told me that her suit had developed a leak. I stated that I

recalled that the 2 other divers were on the surface, but my memory is not certain.

- Note 12: Following my round to warn those on ice liberty that the galley would be secured on schedule at 1800, I went to the messdeck to eat dinner. After dinner I asked the cooks if they had been on the ice (yes) and asked FN [REDACTED], a messcook, the same question. FN [REDACTED] stated that he and the other messcooks had not been on the ice. I asked him for an estimate of when he and the others could leave the scullery and visit the ice. FN [REDACTED] responded that at 1815 the group would be free. I then passed to the bridge that ice liberty would secure at 1845, to give the messcooks ½ hour of time on the ice. Following this, I went back to the ice and, as I recall, lit a cigar and walked the perimeter. I know that I came back to the ship at about 1810 to finish my cigar on the port smoking deck, and I watched ice liberty from this vantage. I then went to the pilothouse and discussed the plan for securing ice liberty with BMCS [REDACTED].
- Note 13: My opinion of initial response at the dive site is that it was proceeding effectively but in an atmosphere of great haste and panic as responders struggled to free the divers from their gear and begin emergency first aid.
- Note 14: After following the second stretcher up the brow I found YNC [REDACTED] on the forecastle.
- Note 15: [REDACTED] (v. [REDACTED])
- Note 16: OPS had already begun the process of establishing comms; I did not prompt him in this regard.
- Note 17: Shortly after arriving in Sickbay I directed ENS [REDACTED] to begin a log of events. After about 40 minutes – an estimate – we had reliable comms with a flight surgeon on a phone in the Sickbay berthing area. LTJG [REDACTED] conferred with the flight surgeon. HSC [REDACTED], LCDR [REDACTED] and myself were also in the room. LTJG [REDACTED] described the situation to the flight surgeon, and was given permission to 'call,' which is an emergency medicine term for ending resuscitation efforts. After ending his discussion with the flight surgeon, LTJG [REDACTED] and HSC [REDACTED] each went to their respective responders. I ushered all others from Sickbay and closed the door. The groups collaboratively agreed that resuscitation should be ended. I covered BM2 Duque, HSC [REDACTED] covered LT Hill. The responders grieved together for a number of minutes. I privately discussed the next steps in broad terms with HSC [REDACTED], primarily our need for body storage.

Regarding Iridium, to my knowledge the system did not drop because of high latitudes. Iridium was used effectively last year for e-mail and voice comms at the North Pole.

Note 18: Many tasks were delegated due to the amount of work that needed to be done quickly. I reviewed, corrected and routed to CO the casualty report messages, participated in moving the bodies to our climate control chamber, and discussed the situation with the District 13 command center in an attempt to have a proper notification of LT Hill's death made to CWO [REDACTED]

The Class A mishap report was not filed until approximately 36 hours after the incident. This was a decision that I made. I had been in voice contact with HSC [REDACTED] at Pensacola and the Area Command Center and passed a quick summary of events as I knew them. I was also performing admin triage at a fairly hectic pace, in an environment with slow connectivity and intermittent voice comms, and our pre-mishap plan required a meeting of the Safety Board (serving as our Mishap Analysis Board) to review the message. Given the broadly-witnessed trauma of the event and other pressing issues, I was not willing to call such a meeting right after the event. On Friday afternoon I directed our EO, LCDR [REDACTED] to draft this message. Our MAB met on Saturday morning, and the message was sent shortly afterwards. In hindsight, I should have disregarded the MAB process because it was cumbersome, there was little value added, and the Board members had other pressing issues. I will address this in a revision to our Pre-Mishap Plan.

I would like to note that during this interview I was asked if I had chosen to omit any mention of the concurrent times of our ice liberty and the dive in our Class A Mishap. I stated that this was not the case, and that any discussion of ice liberty during the dive had simply not come up. LCDR [REDACTED] drafted the message, and he is an extremely skilled and forthright officer. I read the message aloud to HEALY's Safety Board (MAB) as a review prior to release. If this omission was a mistake, the fault is mine.

Note 19: I have no recollection of any dive ops staged from HEALY. To the best of my recollection, all HEALY dives had been staged from either the LCVF small boat or from nearby ice, or a combination of both.

Note 20: Regarding the monitoring of beer consumption: I helped the Morale Committee move the beer and soft drinks to the ice, and we chose a spot near the base of the brow to put the bottles and cans into the snow for cooling. Several CPO's were present, along with ENS [REDACTED] and we discussed the previous problems with using a checklist to monitor the 2 beer limit; mostly that it was cumbersome and betrayed an unfounded distrust of the crew, especially in such a closely monitored situation as ice liberty. There was also a limit on the amount of beer brought to the ice. After this discussion, I made the decision to rely on deckplate CPO leadership and presence, and our crew's maturity. Again, this decision was my own.

Note 21: See Note 9.

- Note 22: It should be noted by the Board that HEALY has frequently conducted dive operations beyond the reach of helicopter support. Our last scheduled mission of 2006, in October, had a requirement for potential dive support, if needed, to recover an AUV; we were not scheduled to have a helo embarked during this mission. In review this seems dangerous and poorly thought out, and I am disappointed in myself for not recognizing the problem. I would include our carriage of just one hyperbaric chamber in the same category.
- Note 23: I was asked during this interview if I was aware of the need to coordinate diving while moored with other nearby ships, such as at an ISC. I am, and stated the standard requirements to secure suction/discharge, not cycle rudders, not rotate shafts, and secure sonar. I was not asked whether HEALY had ever taken such actions in the past when operating alone in the ice and divers were deployed near the ship. To my knowledge, we have not made this pipe or taken some/all of the actions that we do perform when divers are deployed at ISC Seattle. I was informed last year by LT Hill (my memory, may have been ENS [REDACTED] when I asked the same question about divers deploying from a nearby floe. I don't recall specifics of the conversation, but I was told that it was not necessary for our type of sonar to be secured, or place restrictions on other ship systems. I am not a diver, so I cannot attest to the accuracy of this statement. I have not seen a policy that addresses diving near, but not under, a ship operating independently.
- Note 24: I learned this after the dive. Prior to the dive, I was assured by LCDR [REDACTED] that the dive had been briefed to the CO. I assumed that all required preparatory steps were complete, other than having the CO sign the dive plan.
- Note 25: I stated that I knew that LT Hill had completed Dive Officer school, a longer training regimen than the basic dive course.
- Note 26: ENS [REDACTED] attended dive school before reporting to HEALY. I assumed that she attended school while she was a cadet, since she recently reported from CGA.
- Note 27: Class D "HIPO"
- Note 28: LT Hill had either just been promoted to LT, or selected for LT.
- Note 29: I called a meeting with LT Hill in the wardroom to discuss my concerns. CO (CAPT [REDACTED]) and OPS (LCDR [REDACTED]) were present.
- Note 30: I could recall from memory during this interview that the dive bill provides guidance on administrative and operational requirements, but that was the extent of my specific knowledge.

- Note 31: The Class A mishap message was released approximately 36 hours after the deaths.
- Note 32: The HEALY cutter organization manual has not been updated since the cutter was commissioned in 1999. I have been slowly rewriting it, with the goal of finishing an updated version before my tour ends. It is a fair assumption that I would not have made significant changes to our dive bill and dive organization sections of the CORM, unless prompted to do so by our Dive Officer.

With consideration given to the 32 notes above, I agree with the summary of interview prepared the Administrative Investigation Board.

[REDACTED]

77

PAGE 10 OF 10 PAGES.

(b)(6) & (7)(c)