




CANUSLANT 2013



Joint Response Team Exercise **June 17-20, 2013** **Saint John, New Brunswick** **Calais, Maine**



An international exercise to respond to a simulated oil spill in the Bay of Fundy. This exercise was sponsored by the Canadian Coast Guard and the United States Coast Guard, in conjunction with industry partner Shell, as part of ongoing joint exercises conducted under the Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan, Atlantic Geographic Annex.



Executive Summary: Conclusions and Recommendations

The Canadian / U.S. Joint Response Team (JRT) for the Atlantic Region held a Canada-United States Atlantic (CANUSLANT) full scale exercise (FSE) in June 2013. The exercise was conducted as a response to an oil spill threatening impacts to the Bay of Fundy, Passamaquoddy Bay and along the Canadian and United States coastlines on the border between the Province of New Brunswick and the State of Maine. This exercise incorporated USCG Sector Northern New England's (SNNE) Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) full scale exercise requirements.

For CANUSLANT 2013 Shell joined with the JRT as an industry partner, playing the role of Responsible Party / Polluter, and deployed their Spill Management Team to the response. The exercise was designed to test the two command post option in the Atlantic Geographic Annex (AGA) including utilization of a single Joint Information Center (JIC), a Joint Environmental Team (JET), cross border liaisons, implementation of a shared situation display and use of the Incident Command System (ICS) by both the U.S. and Canadian command posts. This exercise also tested a Joint Area Command (JAC) concept as a draft annex to the AGA for the first time in a CANUSLANT exercise. A joint Equipment Deployment Drill was held in conjunction with this exercise and included deployment of the USCG Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System (VOSS) on the CCGS Edward Cornwallis and the USCGC Marcus Hanna, as well as joint boom deployment from U.S. and Canadian vessels in Saint Andrews.

This latest in an ongoing series of biennial exercises was preceded by two simultaneous ICS-320 Intermediate Incident Management Team classes held in Portland, ME and Halifax, NS to partially simulate the interactions between two command posts. Additional ICS training was conducted by Shell ahead of the exercise, and a training day was held one day prior to the exercise to acquaint participants with a variety of subjects, plans and systems to be used.

The overall goals of the exercise were to examine procedures and assumptions in the Atlantic Geographic Annex (AGA) to the Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan (JCP) and in SNNE's Maine and New Hampshire Area Contingency Plan (ACP), and to recommend appropriate changes for maintaining optimal joint contingency response capabilities.

The CANUSLANT 2013 full-scale exercise demonstrated the capabilities of designated governmental agencies, in conjunction with industry resources, to provide a coordinated and integrated response to cross-boundary pollution incidents which threaten their respective areas of responsibility. This comprehensive exercise provided an opportunity to re-examine, in more depth, some of the various issues which can hinder a trans-border pollution response and provided a forum to investigate and implement new ideas and review procedural changes to existing plans used to respond to such an event.

The key lessons learned and recommendations are outlined in the following pages. It should be noted that the inputs for the report were a compilation of players', controllers' and evaluators' observations and, thanks to the work and effort of all involved, allow the report to portray a detailed snapshot of issues and recommendations for improving a joint response.



Introduction and Background

The CANUSLANT 2013 full-scale exercise was conducted using Incident Command Posts in Saint John, New Brunswick at the Saint John Convention and Trade Center and in Calais, Maine at Washington County Community College. Equipment deployments staged out of the Saint Andrews Biological Station (SABS) in New Brunswick and the Saint John Port Authority pier.

CANUSLANT 2013 was the latest in a series of biennial exercises, events, and workshops conducted jointly by Canada and the United States since 1974, to exercise and improve the Canada/United States Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan and its Atlantic Geographic Annex.

The Canada-United States Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan for Spills of Oil and other Noxious Substances was developed by a Joint US/Canada Working Group on Great Lakes Pollution. This was the result of a recommendation by the International Joint Commission (IJC) in their Special Report on Potential Oil Pollution, April 1970.

The original plan was incorporated into the Canada/U.S. revised Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement which was signed by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States on April 15, 1972.

Following the introduction of an international contingency plan for the Great Lakes, it was agreed that there was a need to establish joint contingency plans for all waters of mutual interest, where the use of combined resources would improve the response posture and capability of each nation. This has resulted in the adoption of four geographically oriented appendices covering the Atlantic Coast, Pacific Coast, Beaufort Sea, and the Dixon Entrance.

As a result of the increase in the scope of the JCP, the number of agencies involved, and lessons learned since the original JCP was approved, the JCP has been revised on an as required basis. The latest revision was finalized in May 2013, shortly before this exercise took place. As such, the exercise was planned and conducted under the previous 2003 version of the plan. Some of the changes to the JCP affect lessons learned during this exercise and are noted in the individual lesson learned reports. The AGA to the plan has been updated regularly to reflect changes in organizations at the regional levels with the latest revision in June 2010.

Across our shared border and as defined in the JCP and AGA, a Joint Response Team (JRT) coordinates contingency planning and exercises. The JRT consists of representatives of specified agencies in Canada and the U.S. The JRT is co-chaired by the Canadian Coast Guard Regional Director Coast Guard Programs, Atlantic Region* and the USCG First District Incident Management and Preparedness Advisor**, and is convened at the request of the CCG On-Scene Commander (OSC) or the USCG Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) or for routine annual meetings.

(*Updated JCP calls for CCG Regional Superintendent of Environmental Response as Co-Chair)

(**Incident Management and Preparedness Advisor is a new position created as the District's lead expert on USCG response under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan)



The general functions of the JRT include:

1. Give advice and counsel to facilitate coordinated planning, preparedness and response to a harmful substance incident;
2. Preparing JRT briefing reports and recommendations concerning amendments to the JCP or its Geographic Annexes;
3. Providing advisory support to the CCG OSC and the USCG FOSC; and
4. Respond to cross-border environmental emergencies after being convened at the request of member agencies.

Exercise Topic Selection

An initial exercise Concepts and Objectives (C&O) meeting was held in Halifax, NS in October 2011 with representatives of various agencies of the two governments. A list of 18 exercise objectives was created and discussed based on findings and lessons learned from previous exercises and workshops, particularly the 2011 Table-Top Exercise in Bar Harbor, ME, as well as discussions from JRT meetings and recent updates to the AGA in 2010. Shortly after the C&O meeting, Shell International Trading and Shipping Company (STASCO) agreed to participate in CANUSLANT 2013 as an industry partner. As a result, a second C&O meeting was held in January 2012 to review the exercise objectives, identify possible participants, identify resources available to use in the exercise and form the Exercise Planning Team (EPT). The 14 exercise objectives that were identified from this meeting were further refined over the course of the next year during the design process to become the final objectives listed in the next section. A brief discussion of the rationale for each objective follows.

The two incident command post option is defined in the AGA, Section VI and had not been tested in many years. It was decided that this would be a good opportunity to test this incident management organization and use of a single Joint Information Center (JIC) for public affairs called for under this option in the AGA. The Joint Environmental Team (JET) is formed to address the challenges of coordinating scientific, environmental and regulatory advice during an international spill. To go along with the two command post option, Shell would be testing both their U.S. and Canadian spill management teams, staffing the JIC and supporting the JET. Cross border liaison teams from the USCG and CCG would be dispatched for the exercise. The ability to disseminate spill related information to agencies and stakeholders by each command post as well as to provide situation briefings and reports up the chain of command would be tested.

Another objective discussed was to conduct a shift change process within the command posts and to conduct 24 hour operations. Due to the fiscal and staffing limitations of several agencies involved, it was decided that to start the exercise, an ICS-201 Incident Brief would be conducted by the initial Incident Commanders to the oncoming (Unified) Command to demonstrate a position transfer process.



Use of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) has been standard in the U.S. for many years for management of oil spill responses. In Canada, there was a recent phase out of their Response Management System to implement a Canadian Incident Command System very similar to the one used in the U.S. CANUSLANT 2013 would be the first major test of implementation of ICS by Canadian agencies.

During a National Joint Response Team Meeting, the CANUSLANT regional JRT was tasked with developing a concept for a higher level command structure above the Incident Commanders involving the USCG District Commander and the CCG Assistant Commissioner. Through the exercise design process a draft version of a new AGA Appendix Q – Joint Area Command (JAC) was developed for testing during the exercise. Many of the concepts of the NIMS Area Command were incorporated to this Appendix. Also, as the USCG updated their Spill of National Significance (SONS) Response Management Instruction in May 2012, during the design process for this exercise, elements of a U.S. SONS declaration and a National Incident Command were deliberately not incorporated into CANUSLANT 2013.

Several different types and versions of incident management and situational display software have evolved over the past several years and have been utilized on various incidents. One objective of the exercise was to try to incorporate an ICS software system and a Geographic Information System (GIS) based display to provide common situational reporting between the two countries and make it available to other command locations as needed. Many pre-exercise discussions took place to help integrate data between Shell, Canadian agencies, the State of Maine and the Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA).

Any response in the northern areas of Maine along the border would be challenging due to limited infrastructure in place to support it. SNNE established a relationship and agreement with the Washington County Community College (WCCC) in Calais, ME for use of their facilities as an Incident Command Post (ICP) if needed for a response. CANUSLANT 2013 provided an opportunity to test the use of the facility and surrounding area logistics to support an ICP.

The process for approval of alternative response technologies, especially use of dispersants, has been discussed for several years by the JRT. Although the process was understood, there was doubt that it would be able to get approval through the Canadian government in a sufficient time to permit its use during an incident. With the stand-up of the JAC during the exercise, involving high level representatives of government agencies, CANUSLANT 2013 would be a good time to push the process and provide visibility of the issue to the agency representatives.

The EPT took advantage of ongoing outreach efforts by the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), CCG Department of Fisheries and Oceans, New Brunswick Department of Agriculture, Aquaculture and Fisheries and other agencies to interact with the commercial fisheries and aquaculture industry along the border region. These outreach efforts provided information to the industry on oil spill planning and response, fisheries closing and reopening procedures, resources at risk and compensation/claims. In return there was discussion of industry preparedness, equipment and concerns which were able to be used in the exercise as injects and for discussion.



Finally, to provide for an equipment deployment opportunity, the EPT agreed to conduct a joint equipment deployment with CCG, ALERT and ME DEP vessels in the vicinity of Saint Andrews and to engage the USCG Atlantic Strike Team to transport and deploy their Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System (VOSS) on both a USCG Cutter and a CCG Ship in Saint John. Communications capabilities between the vessels would be tested at each location as well.

Exercise Objectives:

The following objectives were established for this exercise:

- A. Establish two Incident Command Posts, one in each country, ensuring that they “speak as one” with common objectives, open dialog, strong liaisons, and using common terminology.
 - A.1. Establish and utilize a process for the generation of Executive Summary reports for senior management and political leaders.
 - A.2. Exercise a process for managing liaison with local agencies and stakeholders.
 - A.3. Exercise Incident Command System (ICS) implementation for Canadian government agencies.
 - A.4. Exercise the establishment of a Joint Environmental Team.
- B. Establish and practice a Joint Area Command.
- C. Implement a situation display to share information in near real time between Command Posts and with other entities.
- D. Exercise logistical limitations of utilizing Incident Command Posts (ICPs) in the border region.
- E. Exercise U.S. & Canadian processes for approval to use dispersants and in-situ burning. Discuss the joint approval process for use in the cross-border area.
- F. Exercise the implementation, coordination and function of a Joint Information Center (JIC) between cross border agencies and private sector partners to ensure consistent messaging including the establishment of appropriate public affairs outreach tools.
- G. Evaluate the fisheries (including aquaculture) closure and reopening trans-boundary decision making process.
- H. Exercise a shift change process for the ICP.
- I. Conduct an equipment deployment to evaluate the capability to jointly implement a response / protection strategy.
- J. Conduct a communications drill to evaluate the capabilities of trans-boundary communications between various response, command and control entities.



Summary of Results by Objective

All identified objectives were tested and successfully completed. The following is a summary of results as identified through an exercise hotwash conducted with exercise players, observers and controllers, as well as through detailed Exercise Evaluation Guide analysis provided by the Evaluators and through comments on individual participant feedback forms. Several major issues are further described on individual Lesson Learned Reports and include recommendations for action.

A. Two Incident Command Posts

Senior participating agency representatives tend to agree that the use of two incident command posts during the initial stages of an incident would not be the best course of action. If an incident occurs, it should begin with a single incident command post with representatives of both countries represented to jointly make initial decisions, set objectives and priorities. As an incident begins to impact across the border, then the decision to create a second ICP in the affected country would occur. The option also exists to keep a single ICP and create a Forward Operating Base(s) and to conduct geographic “branch level planning” in each country.

A.1. An incident situational reporting schedule needs to be set early and confirmed that it will meet the reporting needs up the chain of command with both times and format. The ICS-209 Incident Status Summary should be an acceptable document for reporting during an incident. Responding to multiple requests for information at different times and in different formats is a drain on resources and is highly inefficient.

Regularly scheduled briefs and conference calls need to be conducted between both ICPs and with the JAC in order to synchronize the response.

For the U.S. ICP, a Regional Response Team 1 call out was conducted during the exercise to provide an initial event briefing.

A.2. Liaison with local agencies and stakeholders was considered and plans developed for outreach on both sides of the border. The Tribal / First Nations engagement plan called for representatives to be sent to engage their leaders and offer for a representative to be at the ICP.

A.3. Despite it being their first large scale use of ICS in a major exercise, the Canadian government agencies performed exceptionally well in their roles. Training opportunities ahead of the exercise such as the ICS-320 Intermediate Incident Management Team courses prepared responders for their roles. Continued training in ICS throughout the Canadian government will increase proficiency for response. The CCG needs to identify a naming convention and identification method (ICS vests) for their personnel in an ICP when functioning in the Federal Monitoring Officer role.

A.4. The Joint Environmental Team was successful in its final products and outcomes but had coordination and communication issues to overcome working from multiple locations and in dealing with the Environmental Unit (EU) and Wildlife Unit at each ICP.



Lessons Learned:

- An organization chart (ICS-207) for both ICPs should be displayed in each ICP.
- The use of Deputies within the Incident Command was very effective in managing the workload and providing clear direction and supervision. It also assisted in ensuring that someone was generally available at all times in the Sections, even during planning meetings.
- A list should be provided in each ICP of the plans, regulations and procedures that are applicable to the incident as well as points of contact for subject matter experts on each.
- More training needs to be provided on the use of the ICS-213 Resource Request form. On the spot training and adjustments by the Finance and Logistics Sections facilitated speedy procurement.
- The Marine Transportation System Recovery Unit (MTSRU) at the U.S. ICP should be located with the Situation Unit.
- Designation of a Marine Transportation Security Act (MTSA) regulated facility as a staging post in Eastport was slow due to the need for Facility Security Plan considerations.
- General communications between the IC, JAC and JIC need improvement.
- So much was going on with marine mammals in this region, perhaps it could become its own unit along with the Wildlife Unit.
- There is a need for better distribution and awareness of the ICS-202. Discussion during a “team meeting” after the Command and General Staff Meeting would be helpful.
- In general there was a need for more communication and collaboration throughout the ICP, not only within sections but also between sections. Information passed in the planning meetings did not always filter down to the personnel in the Section accomplishing the tasks.
- The common ICS-230 Meeting Schedule between the two ICPs worked well. There may need to be adjustments and communications between the two ICPs if one runs longer on a meeting.
- Although there was some confusion about the use of multiple time zones, it is simpler to use the time zone of the actual incident as the primary time rather than attempt to use GMT/ZULU which would only heighten the confusion.
- The practice of providing measurements in both U.S. Standard and Metric equivalents in documents, plans, briefs, press releases, etc. was useful in preventing errors in conversion.
- Many plans were generated as additions to the Incident Action Plan. Setting aside time for review and briefs to the IC is necessary. Better distribution and awareness of approved plans is required throughout the ICP.
- Although notifications were made to U.S. Customs and Border Patrol and Canada Border Services Agency offices, direct contact with the local offices at the border crossing would be helpful for awareness and to facilitate resolution of potential problems.
- In an actual incident, it would be imperative to engage local agencies and stakeholders to incorporate “local knowledge” for assistance throughout the ICPs.
- There is a need to include the Air Operations Branch early on in the dispersant decision making process.



Key Recommendations:

- Review AGA Section VI 2.3.1 and add language to better define the roles, responsibilities, reporting chain and staffing of the cross border liaisons. Review if the ICS terminology of Agency Representative better fits the description of these personnel.
- Continue Canadian government ICS training opportunities to increase proficiency for response.
- Identify a naming convention and identification method (ICS vests) for CCG personnel in an ICP when functioning in the Federal Monitoring Officer role.
- Appendix K to the AGA needs to be reviewed and updated to reflect the new “Science Table” concept on the Canadian side as well as to clarify that the JET functions as the “Environmental Unit” and not as a separate entity.
- A better understanding of the marine mammal response plan is needed. A review and familiarization of the AGA Wildlife Response Guidelines Annex should be conducted.

B. Establish and Practice a Joint Area Command

The Joint Area Command was established with senior agency representatives from the USCG, CCG, Transport Canada, Canadian Border Services Agency, Shell, Maine Department of Environmental Protection, Environment Canada and other agencies. The learning curve was high for the group but they worked well once established.

Lessons Learned:

- The JAC requires a strong facilitator, familiar with the plans and issues to set and maintain the agenda and to keep the group on track and focused on strategic level objectives and issue resolution.
- Having senior representatives of government agencies present in one forum expedited the resolution of issues and provided subject matter experts on policy issues to help guide issues towards resolution. In the absence of the JAC, the Regional Response Team could assume a similar role on the U.S. side but no similar mechanism currently exists on the Canadian side.

Key Recommendations:

- A review of the JAC concept should be conducted to compare it with the updated JCP Section 405 Issue Resolution and the updated USCG Commandant Instruction 16456.6 Spill of National Significance (SONS) Response Management to determine if the JAC is the right mechanism to use in a cross border incident.
- A “white paper” should be drafted by the JRT Co-Chairs for presentation to the national JCP Committee detailing the findings of the JAC concept and function during the exercise.



C. Shared Situation Display

The use of multiple systems for sharing situation status during the exercise was able to be managed in an effective way. The Incident Action Plan (IAP) software system allowed both ICPs to be able to access the IAP and ICS forms from any location with web access. The Shell GIS based Common Operating Picture (COP) was able to be accessed from any location as well and included input from both U.S. and Canadian agencies as well as Shell data. Further discussions are needed regarding the sharing of shape files between the U.S. and Canada as well as regarding proprietary data issues. Much information can be shared and pre-loaded into a system such as the Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA) or the owner and location of data can be identified for use during an actual response.

Lessons Learned:

- The Response Group's (TRG) IAP software system in use during the exercise was seen as very valuable in the timely development, tracking and sharing of all ICS forms including the IAP and add-on plans linked to the IAP.
- There is a need for additional personnel trained in using the IAP software system so that responders are not just relying on the contractors to input data.
- Having a web-based IAP software system was beneficial in that it was available anywhere with internet access and a password.
- The pre-set meeting documents screen in the IAP software aided the flow of the meetings and review of pertinent forms. There were quick "as-you-go" revisions with an experienced operator at the computer.
- The COP display was getting cluttered. It would be helpful to have a list of data layers which need to be visible to meet the requirements for each section of the ICP and for the various planning meetings.
- There needs to be access to the COP available throughout the ICP and remotely.
- There is a need to communicate/alert COP users and the ICP when new information becomes available or is updated on the COP.

Key Recommendations:

- Both the USCG and Canadian government should invest in an IAP generation software system (or compatible systems) to increase the efficiency within a command post and to provide a web based commonly accessible response management system.
- Training needs to be provided for users of the IAP software system in order to make the most effective use of the system throughout the ICP.
- The GIS unit needs a clear understanding of the customers' needs. A checklist with questions could be developed as a guide to help identify what information is needed, or what the customer is trying to accomplish, to help tailor a product to meet their need.
- The symbology for maps needs to be reviewed and possibly wildlife need to be broken out by species.



D. Logistical Limitations

On the U.S. side, the exercise demonstrated the limitations of ICP options in the U.S. border region. The Washington County Community College was an excellent option for up to approximately 150 responders. Lodging in the area was stretched in supporting those numbers however; and would be more stretched during tourist season. Discussions following the exercise lean toward the use of the WCCC as a Branch/FOB and suggest that the ICP be in a larger facility in a more developed city area that provides more lodging and messing options. On the Canadian side, the venue was well suited for use as an ICP and was readily able to support the logistical needs.

Lessons Learned:

- SNNE has identified additional potential ICPs which may be able to support a larger number of responders in Belfast and Augusta as well as the existing location in Portland.
- Some agencies/OSROs had policies prohibiting movement of personnel/equipment out of the country. There is a need to identify these issues immediately when ordering resources.
- Testing of IT and phone systems need to be comprehensive to ensure they will function with the expected load. Problems with the phone system at the Calais ICP significantly hampered the exercise, particularly the inability to deliver “injects” from Control.
- Having adequate IT support on-scene in the ICPs, especially during set-up was instrumental and provided for rapid troubleshooting of tech issues.

Key Recommendations:

- There is a need to develop plans to enhance communications, berthing and messing if using an ICP in a remote area of SNNE’s AOR.
- On the U.S. side consider ICPs closer to an airport and with more berthing supply. Use remote order locations as a Branch/FOB.

E. Dispersants and In-Situ Burning (ISB)

The approval process for the use of dispersants and in-situ burning in U.S. waters is defined in the Region I Regional Response Plan, and each of the Area Contingency Plans, and has been pre-authorized for designated areas in a 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the USCG, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of the Interior, Department of Commerce/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and State environmental agencies.

On the Canadian side, there is currently no defined approval process captured within a plan for the use of dispersants. Conflicting regulatory language currently makes it not possible for “approval” to be given; a waiver to the Fisheries Act needs to be granted by the Prime Minister to allow use of dispersants. During the exercise, the Canadian Incident Command “allowed” use of dispersants by issuing a letter not objecting to test their use. This still placed a legal



burden on the Polluter who decided to go ahead with the use of dispersants despite the potential liability.

The approval process for in-situ burning in Canada is not an issue and can be approved by the OSC once recommended by the “Science Table”.

The Canadian government should review appropriate legal statutes and policy, and make changes if necessary, to more clearly define if the use of dispersants could be allowed, and should devise a set approval process.

Lessons Learned:

- Although the steps necessary to be taken to get approval for dispersant use in Canada are known, this exercise was designed to force the issue forward to higher levels of government for awareness and action. Senior agency representatives present in the JAC were able to discuss the request by the RP/Polluter and define issues that needed to be resolved under Canadian law.
- It is also important to note that staging dispersant planes out of U.S. airports to deploy dispersants in Canadian waters without clear approval from Canadian officials at a minimum would have raised significant perception concerns.
- Providing the JET adequate time to discuss the net environmental benefits of alternative response technologies was important given their level of knowledge regarding dispersant science.
- Absence of a Net Environmental Benefit Analysis (NEBA) for this location significantly slowed down dispersant deployment as an alternative emergency response.
- There should be a separate Dispersant Group within Air Ops.
- Staging aircraft for dispersant application at multiple airports allows greater flexibility for various weather conditions in the region.
- There may be an issue with some OSROs as to how many aircraft can be deployed outside of the U.S. at one time due to other contracted obligations.

Key Recommendations:

- The NEBA framework that evolved from the discussions should be documented and further refined.
- Canadian Response Organizations (ROs), ALERT and ECRC, do not have in-situ burning capabilities. Even when boom is available, there is no trained staff, operational manual, safety manual or monitoring manual. This capability should be developed in Canada.
- Dispersant and ISB approval flow charts should be included in the AGA.
- Generic monitoring plans for ISB and dispersant use should be available.



F. Joint Information Center

A JIC was implemented located primarily at the Saint John ICP but with a subset of personnel working at the Calais ICP. There were issues of coordination between the two locations and different processes and timelines for approval of press releases and messaging. The approval process for Canadian agencies offered challenges as it required higher level approvals. The approval process for the U.S. ICP was slow and no releases were approved on the first day of the exercise. Canadian agencies pulled away from the JIC during Day 1 of the exercise so JIC products were not “joint”. While a joint UC press conference was held in the U.S., the Canadian command held a “Technical Briefing” to keep the government agencies in an oversight role.

Lessons Learned:

- In spite of any boundary, it is important to present a unified message of the response. Several operational locations may be necessary to handle an incident; however, the public should receive a clear impression that everyone is working in unison on strategies, objectives and public messaging.
- As long as the information is consistent, it does not matter who is putting it out.
- There was good use of status boards to track information and follow ups within the JIC and good information gathering cohesion within the unit.
- There was a true integration of effort among all agencies present as well as with the public affairs team representing the RP/Polluter.
- The Public Information Emergency Response (PIER) system was very effective for tracking information for the JIC but access and training should be provided throughout the command to help manage information flow and distribute information.
- French language translation was provided for the exercise and incident web sites were established in both French and English.
- The co-location of the JIC and the Liaison team was beneficial and is recommended to continue.
- Translation of quantities (gallons, liters, metric tons, barrels, etc.), needs to be very carefully monitored. Using layman’s terms such as “size of an Olympic sized swimming pool” is helpful to the public’s understanding.

Key Recommendations:

- A reference file of general talking points regarding a spill (such as the RRT1 pamphlets) should be developed to be used for strategic communication.
- To meet the demands of today’s 24 hour news cycle, the approval process for messaging needs to be streamlined and delegation of authority for release of messages provided to Incident Commanders or PIOs.



G. Fisheries Closure/Reopening Process

During the exercise design process, it was decided that there was a need to address the fisheries closure and reopening process in a cross-border response. To gather information from the aquaculture and fisheries industry and to provide them with information on actions taken during a response to, and the effects of, an oil spill, outreach sessions were attended with the industry as part of an ongoing effort by the Maine Department of Environmental Protection and Department of Fisheries and Oceans. USCG, ME DEP, ME DMR, NOAA, US FWS, Shell, DFO, TC, NB Department of Agriculture, Aquaculture and Fisheries and other agencies attended meetings with industry representatives and gathered feedback on issues which was then used to help create injects for the players during the exercise.

Lessons Learned:

- The involvement of the aquaculture and fisheries industry in the exercise was beneficial and should be expanded to have them participate directly.
- During the exercise, ongoing contact between NOAA in Washington, DC and the Calais and Saint John ICPs helped in determining joint areas to be closed and the development of closure and opening protocols.
- The right people with the right experience and knowledge were present during the exercise to make sound decisions (NOAA, ME DMR, DFO).
- Discussions included talks about economic effects, environmental effects (mainly protection of birds and whales) and the need to keep senior leadership and the public well informed.
- There was outstanding early coordination between the parties; however, there was a need to better communicate final decisions between the ICPs to prevent inconsistency problems (i.e. why are we closed and they are not?).
- Notification to local fisheries by phone would occur within the first few hours of an incident with ongoing notification following. Maine DMR used zone councils and fisheries advocates to get the word out.

Key Recommendations:

- Guidance for joint closure and opening protocols should be included in the AGA.

H. Shift Change Process

To begin the exercise, an Incident Brief was held to show the turnover process from the initial Incident Commander to the (Unified) Command. Individual evaluations/critiques were conducted and shared confidentially with the participants as a professional development opportunity. The handover process was very informative for the participants as they got to observe a succinct briefing and questions/answers between the Incident Commanders prior to the handoff of the incident. The use of 24 hour operations with a shift change was discussed by the design team but dismissed due to the cost and logistics involved.



I. Equipment Deployment

An Equipment Deployment Drill was held in conjunction with the exercise and featured two separate components; a USCG Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System (VOSS) deployment aboard the USCGC Marcus Hanna and on the CCGS Edward Cornwallis in Saint John, NB, and a deployment of boom for shoreline protection from small boats near Saint Andrews, NB. Both deployments were considered successful and highlighted the ability to jointly operate with vessels and crews from both countries as well as response organizations. The USCG Atlantic Strike Team deployed their VOSS (by trailer) for use in the exercise. Coordination with CBP and CBSA prior to the exercise ensured ease of cross border transport.

A separate AAR has been submitted in the USCG Contingency Preparedness System (COE#5280) for the VOSS deployment, which incorporates the CCGS Edward Cornwallis Debrief Report. Some of the lessons learned are incorporated below.

Lessons Learned:

- Engage CBP and CBSA early and retain applicable customs paperwork to ease cross-border movement of response equipment.
- For the crew of the Marcus Hanna, having to deal with the 26-32' tidal range and swift currents at the pier was something they are not accustomed to. This created slight problems for the brow and how it was set up across the buoy deck of the ship, using a lot of valuable space. There were constant adjustments being made on mooring lines and brow lines (approx every 10-15 minutes).
- The USCG is not exempt from transiting the Port of Saint John without a pilot although the CCG is. Fees for pilotage may be an issue in a response and an alternative would be for the USCG to moor cutters in Eastport or other ports. This also applies to some pier services (line handling, trash, fenders, etc.) which were provided without charge for the exercise but may incur costs otherwise.
- U.S. government fuel cards/credit cards are not accepted everywhere in Canada. For the Marcus Hanna to take on fuel they would have needed to use a purchase order. Alerting the USCG D1 Contracting Officer in advance ensured that they were available 24/7 if the cutter needed anything.
- The boom deployment using resources of ALERT (Seatruck, Sweep and Mini Max 30 skimmer), the CCG PRV II and the Maine DEP 32' boat encountered a challenge due to a large number of lobster pots in the water and had to change their deployment location. They also had to contend with a 25' tide and 5 knot current. These challenges should be considered during an incident in this region.

Key Recommendations:

- During the exercise, consideration for use of Vessels of Opportunity (VOOs) was discussed by the Operations section. The ACP should include a VOO plan or checklist. Transport Canada has procedures in place for use of VOOs which could be used as a template.



J. Communications

For the Equipment Deployment Drill, the communications capability between vessels of multiple agencies and industry was tested. Using standard marine VHF frequencies, all were able to communicate. Response organizations also maintain caches of radios able to be distributed during a response to provide common communications

During the exercise, communications were provided by several standard means including landline phone, mobile phone, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone, wireless internet and various web based video and chat programs/applications. There were many issues identified with setting up communications for large scale ICPs, though most were able to be resolved due to on-site support.

Lessons Learned:

- There was a major breakdown on Day 1 of the exercise with the phone system installed in the Calais ICP. Due to the set-up of the phone system, a lack of proper instructions on how to use it, and an incorrect phone listing, it was not possible to connect on most calls to the Calais ICP. This resulted in a breakdown of exercise control as the SimCell (located in Saint John) was unable to provide any injects to the Calais ICP. The issue was partly resolved on Day 2 of the exercise but still caused a disruption to communications with the Calais ICP. Proper testing of the phone system prior to the exercise would have averted this issue.
- Internet access was not as much of an issue during this exercise due to site visits and testing conducted prior to the exercise by USCG ESD/ESU, Shell IT staff and site IT staffs which resolved many firewall issues and ensured adequate bandwidth. During the exercise, on site IT support helped resolve almost all other access issues as they occurred.
- Mobile device operations in the near border region present the challenge of dealing with roaming between mobile carriers and the resultant billing issues. Participants were frequently advised before and during the exercise to be aware of this issue, and to contact their mobile carrier for activation of international phone and data plans. In any actual incident, there is a need to work with cellular providers to enhance signals in the region and possibly setup additional cell towers to ensure connectivity with respective U.S. or Canadian carriers.
- Use of video teleconferencing, Skype or other conferencing software such as HSIN Connect, Bridgit (SMART), Go ToMeeting, WebEx, Live Meeting. Etc. would have enhanced the ability to coordinate and communicate between ICPs, JAC, JIC and other locations and made it easier to share information and collaborate. Restrictions on the ability to utilize many of these systems on government operated computer systems is a major hurdle to overcome. During the exercise design process, the design team was unable to utilize Live Meeting from the RP due to the inability to access it with government systems.



Key Recommendations:

- There is a need to fully check the communications set-up in any location used for an exercise or ICP prior to utilization for the exercise or incident response.
- Communications in a remote area such as Northern Maine present challenges to the USCG. There is a need to practice utilization of USCG deployable communications assets for response such as those provided by CAMSLANT and to identify additional communications resources that may be available from other Federal, State or industry sources.
- Having USCG Electronics System Support Unit and industry IT support on-site at each ICP before and during the exercise was paramount to “making it all work”. Support presence should be a standard part of any major exercise or incident response.
- There needs to be more use and testing of collaboration and conferencing systems to identify what systems would be best suited for use in a response and to help familiarize personnel with usage of these systems.

Exercise Design Issues

During the development process and during the exercise, several lessons learned were identified.

Lessons Learned:

- Need to follow planning process timelines better to allow for proper review of materials, printing times, testing and validation of logistics – MSEL sync meeting needs to be an actual line by line review with all parties to truth data and ensure there are adequate injects for all participating agencies and sections.
- All exercise documentation including logistical information such as exercise phone lists need to be complete and accurate and available in the EXPLAN or at check-in for all.
- There should be engagement with local officials and local Chamber of Commerce to inform them of extent of footprint that will be coming to town.
- Longer training sessions with a more in-depth review of plans and technology are required before the exercise.
- Better training for control and evaluation staff ahead of the exercise. Explain the roles of Venue Controller, Lead Controller, MSEL Manager, assistants and SimCell and how they work together to make the exercise flow.
- ICS coaches in sections worked very well and provided an opportunity to sign off ICS qualifications during down times.
- The ICS-320 course before the exercise was very worthwhile and provided a chance for the incident management team participants from multiple organizations to understand each other’s procedures and policies.
- Do not be afraid to give more and harder-to-complete injects.
- Oil needs to impact both sides for the exercise to keep both ICPs engaged.
- Engage with finance personnel to ensure proper participants are identified.
- Add VIP (role player) visits requiring “special attention”.
- Should attempt to do a cold start exercise – set-up as people are actually arriving.
- Don’t solve the problem during the planning – save it for the exercise!



Lesson Learned	
Title: Short description of best practice/lesson for improvement to the Plan.	Utilization of a template ICS 202 and 233.
Observation: Discuss the observed issue or problem. Observation can be positive (how something was done exceptionally well) or negative (something did or did not happen)	The experienced Shell Planning Section Chief utilized a template ICS 202 that was developed during the ICS-320 course to facilitate development of Decision/Directives, Incident Priorities, Limitations and Constraints, Critical Information Reporting Criteria, IMT Operating Procedures, Safety Message, Overall and Strategic Objectives, and 50 Assignments outlined in the Open Action Tracker within 1 hour. Typically this process takes much longer. The majority of these items would be consistent for other CANUSLANT exercises or actual incidents.
Discussion: More amplified discussion of the observation paragraph answering the questions, Who, What, Where , When, Why and How	By using a template, the PSC was able to greatly expedite the development of the many products typically generated during the “Initial Unified Command Meeting” and “Unified Command Objectives Meeting”. Even when using the Example Decisions and Example Incident Objectives outline in the IMH it often takes an experienced PSC and ICs several hours to develop these products while the Command and General Staff amble forward without any direction/tasking from UC. Expediting this process will expedite assignment and achievement of objectives and tasks.
Best Practice/Lesson Learned: Discuss the positive action taken to generate success or action that should have been taken to avoid or alleviate the problem. (Do not repeat the observation or discussion)	Capturing this ICS 202 (General Response Objectives) and ICS 233 (Open Action Tracker) and using it as an 80% solution template for future response operations will greatly expedite future Initial Unified Command Meetings and Unified Command Objectives Meetings.
Recommended Action: Discuss how to repeat the success or permanently correct the problem. Should recommend who should make the correction	ICS 202 (General Response Objectives) and ICS 233 (Open Action Tracker) developed during CANUSLANT 2013 offer a template that can provide an 80% solution for a similar size spill incident in the border region and a 50% solution for a medium to large spill incident elsewhere. These templates should be captured as a template/starting point for developing key decision documents and Objectives for similar incidents/exercises.



Lesson Learned	
Title: Short description of best practice/lesson for improvement to the Plan.	Availability of major response assets to depart their AORs and support a cross-border or other out-of-zone response.
Observation: Discuss the observed issue or problem. Observation can be positive (how something was done exceptionally well) or negative (something did or did not happen)	There was some question as to whether major response assets such as MSRC's Maine Responder, New Jersey Responder, Delaware Responder, dispersant planes or in-situ burning fire resistant boom would be permitted out of their AORs to support a cross-border or other out-of zone response. This uncertainty could have resulted in major delays during the critical early hours of a major response.
Discussion: More amplified discussion of the observation paragraph answering the questions, Who, What, Where , When, Why and How	It would greatly expedite deployment of major response assets if each RRT could have an agreement in place regarding the conditions under which they will allow major response assets such as oil spill response vessels or dispersant application planes to depart their AOR to support a response in another AOR or across the border.
Best Practice/Lesson Learned: Discuss the positive action taken to generate success or action that should have been taken to avoid or alleviate the problem. (Do not repeat the observation or discussion)	There may be company restrictions on how many aircraft are allowed to be deployed across the border for dispersant application. The possibility exists to stage aircraft at multiple airports on either side of the border to respond and mitigate the need to deploy as many out of country.
Recommended Action: Discuss how to repeat the success or permanently correct the problem. Should recommend who should make the correction	The RRTs should meet with key stakeholders (OSROs) to determine which major response resources within their AORs they will allow to be drawn away to support an out-of-zone response and under what conditions. Development of template plans or agreements would be beneficial.



Lesson Learned	
Title: Short description of best practice/lesson for improvement to the Plan.	Cross-border equipment/personnel deployment constraints/delays.
Observation: Discuss the observed issue or problem. Observation can be positive (how something was done exceptionally well) or negative (something did or did not happen)	Several requirements came up that may have delayed deployment of key response assets across the international border between the U.S. and Canada. These constraints included SOLAS requirements and possibly OSHA and liability concerns as well as direct border crossing logistics/procedures.
Discussion: More amplified discussion of the observation paragraph answering the questions, Who, What, Where , When, Why and How	The initial struggle with cross-border movements was more due to different country regulations and procedures.
Best Practice/Lesson Learned: Discuss the positive action taken to generate success or action that should have been taken to avoid or alleviate the problem. (Do not repeat the observation or discussion)	A solution may be to have government liaisons from Federal agencies, or familiar with Federal agency’s legislation and procedures in the Operations Section as Technical Specialists (THSP) to address questions or give direction to the Ops personnel on avenues they can use to identify solutions to problems thus expediting the cross border movements. CBSA personnel in the JAC provided guidance and helped resolve some issues.
Recommended Action: Discuss how to repeat the success or permanently correct the problem. Should recommend who should make the correction	Any existing policies or agreements at the national level should be identified and shared with the JRTs. A meeting should then be held with Customs and Border Patrol, Canada Border Services Agency, Transport Canada, CCG, USCG and other key stakeholders to clearly resolve any cross border equipment or worker deployment issues and to review Section VIII of the AGA. A review of the checklist should be conducted to make sure it captures the step-by-step procedures that will address and expedite border crossings requirements for future exercises and incident responses.



Lesson Learned	
Title: Short description of best practice/lesson for improvement to the Plan.	Dispersant Application Approval Process
Observation: Discuss the observed issue or problem. Observation can be positive (how something was done exceptionally well) or negative (something did or did not happen)	<p>From the Calais ICP perspective, the dispersant application process was very rushed. The Air Operations Branch Director approached the ICs at @ 1700 when the exercise was starting to wrap up for the day and noted that the “Canadians agree that dispersant use is the right thing to do and want us (Shell) to do it” but the Prime Minister is overseas and thus is not available to approve the required waiver to the DFO Law (Fisheries Act). The Calais IC’s did not receive a complete Dispersant Use Checklist and it was not clear if the EU in Calais had had a chance to fully review the proposed test application.</p> <p>From the perspective of the EU and JET, the Canadian approval process is very cumbersome and does not allow for “approval” to be given for use of dispersants.</p>
Discussion: More amplified discussion of the observation paragraph answering the questions, Who, What, Where , When, Why and How	<p>The USCG FOSC clarified that he could not authorize dispersant use in Canadian waters (out of his jurisdiction) and that he was a bit uncomfortable with dispersant planes launching from Bangor, ME to deploy dispersants in Canadian waters without full approval from Canadian authorities. However, after a call with JAC representatives, the ICs in Calais were willing to sign off on the fact that dispersant use was being recommended by the JET and that they deferred the decision to use dispersants in Canadian waters to the ICs in the Canadian ICP. The proposed much larger scale use of dispersants at first light the next morning was not fully outlined and a formal evaluation and decision-making process for this application was not pursued before sign off on this larger application.</p> <p>The Canadian government agencies did not “approve” the use of dispersants, but rather provided a letter not prohibiting their use. This left a liability issue still open to the RP/Polluter IC who chose to use the dispersants. There was a communication breakdown between the two ICPs which somehow allowed a second dispersant application to take place which was not conveyed to the Calais ICP.</p>



<p>Best Practice/Lesson Learned: Discuss the positive action taken to generate success or action that should have been taken to avoid or alleviate the problem. (Do not repeat the observation or discussion)</p>	<p>The Air Operations Branch needs to be brought into the process early to help identify issues involved with aerial dispersant applications.</p>
<p>Recommended Action: Discuss how to repeat the success or permanently correct the problem. Should recommend who should make the correction</p>	<p>The dispersant application approval process, and the laws and regulations governing it in Canada, need to be streamlined in order to enable the potential use of dispersants when appropriate. The dispersant use checklist should be routed through the Environmental Unit (or JET) and signed off with a recommendation before the ICs are requested to approve dispersants.</p>



Lesson Learned	
<p>Title: Short description of best practice/lesson for improvement to the Plan.</p>	<p>Challenges of exercise Control and Evaluation in multiple locations</p>
<p>Observation: Discuss the observed issue or problem. Observation can be positive (how something was done exceptionally well) or negative (something did or did not happen)</p>	<p>A SimCell was established in Saint John to provide support to both ICPs. Due to a communications issue (phone system issue) the SimCell was unable to provide injects by phone to the Calais ICP as planned.</p> <p>The Venue Controllers at the Calais ICP were not sufficiently trained in the role of Controller and were unable to assume the role of an on-site SimCell when the phone system issue was identified. Also, the Calais Controllers did not receive a copy of the MSEL until the second day of the exercise.</p> <p>While the exercise scenario was sufficiently detailed and challenging to drive exercise play for much of the exercise, there were very few exercise injects that made it into the Calais ICP.</p>
<p>Discussion: More amplified discussion of the observation paragraph answering the questions, Who, What, Where, When, Why and How</p>	<p>Despite repeated requests from one of the evaluators, the exercise Controllers and Evaluators at the Calais ICP did not receive a copy of the MSEL until the 2nd day of the exercise.</p> <p>Due to technical issues (and sometimes user error) phone calls between players, Controllers and Evaluators in Calais and the SimCell in Saint John were unable to connect. There was not adequate coordination or communications between Venue Controllers in Calais and the Controllers in Saint John.</p> <p>There was also no Lead Evaluator position for the Calais ICP. Thus the Evaluator for the Command Staff assumed this role as well as assisting the Venue Controller in order to ensure that the 8 Evaluators in Calais were coordinated and to help kick-start injects into the Calais ICP. As the technical issues were identified, work-arounds put into place, and MSEL injects provided to the Calais ICP, the second day of the exercise saw some improvement for delivery on injects to players.</p>



<p>Best Practice/Lesson Learned: Discuss the positive action taken to generate success or action that should have been taken to avoid or alleviate the problem. (Do not repeat the observation or discussion)</p>	<p>Aside from the technical IT issues and the need to confirm communications systems discussed in a separate L/L, there needs to be extended training provided to inexperienced Controllers and Evaluators in a large FSE of this sort. Methods for communication and coordination need to be tested and acknowledged by C/E staff.</p> <p>It needs to be confirmed that all C/E staff are provided a copy of the complete MSEL along with the C/E Handbook and that paper copies of each individual inject are available at each location as a back-up method in case of a communications failure or inability of the SimCell to connect with players.</p>
<p>Recommended Action: Discuss how to repeat the success or permanently correct the problem. Should recommend who should make the correction</p>	<p>Provide adequate pre-exercise training to Controllers and Evaluators and ensure that they have copies of all exercise documents necessary to perform their function.</p> <p>Ensure paper copies of injects are available at the exercise site(s) to be used if there is a breakdown of other inject methods such as phone/email/radio, etc.</p>



Lesson Learned	
Title: Short description of best practice/lesson for improvement to the Plan.	Joint Environmental Team (JET)
Observation: Discuss the observed issue or problem. Observation can be positive (how something was done exceptionally well) or negative (something did or did not happen)	<p>The JET was successful in its final products and outcomes but had coordination and communication issues to overcome. Issues included working from multiple locations and dealing with the Environmental Unit (EU) and Wildlife Unit at each ICP.</p> <p>Having a separate EU in addition to the JET was redundant and caused coordination issues among the parties who should have been working all together on the incident.</p>
Discussion: More amplified discussion of the observation paragraph answering the questions, Who, What, Where , When, Why and How	<p>From the Calais NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator's (SSC) perspective, a JET between the two ICPs was not fully established. There was a U.S. SSC representative in Canada, but Calais was behind the curve with respect to development of joint plans. If a regular meeting schedule between the ICPs (virtual or in-person) had been established and plans and documents had been shared earlier it may have been consider more Joint.</p> <p>From the perspective of the NOAA SSC's at the Saint John ICP, the JET was 60-75% successful. It succeeded in providing technical input to the command using technical input from the U.S. on issues that may have had potentially negative impacts on Canada. It failed in that the communications between resource experts across the border happened only indirectly (often through the Canadian-based NOAA SSC to the Canadians and through the U.S. based NOAA SSC to U.S. reps). What was accomplished is notable (dispersant approval in Canada, fisheries closure, in situ burning coordination), how it was accomplished was unnecessarily clumsy and obscured by self-imposed barriers.</p> <p>The JET functioned more as the former Canadian Regional Environmental Emergencies Team (REET) with a strong U.S. liaison (strong in that the NOAA SSC led much of the discussion and was a co-chair). It did not work as designed or optimally. JET is a place where the ends should not justify the means. It needed better face-to-face (even virtually) communications with counterparts. In the JET they had the added struggle of dealing with Montreal and Ottawa (the Canadian's R&D and Science folks) who were on the phone and familiar to the Canadians, but</p>



	<p>mostly unknown to U.S. representatives.</p> <p>There were several conference calls between the ICPs over the two days, and for the most part the Calais ICP EU was kept apprised. Most of the U.S. SSCs cross-border info was through direct conversations with the SSC serving at the Saint John ICP via cell phone. Otherwise, the Calais ICP EU was behind the power curve regarding info from the JET.</p> <p>Recent changes to the REET construct on the Canadian side into a “Science Table” meant that support was mostly provided via conference call. As the Canadian agencies deal with the recent changes to their organizations, the scientific support role will become more defined and the process for utilizing it more familiar.</p> <p>For this exercise, two distinct EUs were formed, one at each ICP, as well as a JET which worked out of the Saint John ICP, separately from the EU. This is not the construct that is called for in the AGA. Appendix K to the AGA defines the formation and function of the JET.</p>
<p>Best Practice/Lesson Learned: Discuss the positive action taken to generate success or action that should have been taken to avoid or alleviate the problem. (Do not repeat the observation or discussion)</p>	<p>Provide a means for joint review of documents and plans between multiple locations if established. Ensure concurrence between all entities before a plan or recommendation is forwarded to the Command from the JET or EU.</p> <p>It was also noted that there is a need to provide training to a responsible party/polluter on the role of the JET in the response organization and also about the AGA and Wildlife Appendix.</p>
<p>Recommended Action: Discuss how to repeat the success or permanently correct the problem. Should recommend who should make the correction</p>	<p>The JET Appendix K to the AGA needs to be reviewed and updated to reflect the change from the Canadian REET to the “Science Table” concept as well as the role of the JET in providing scientific support to the Incident Commanders. There also should be clarification that the JET functions as the Environmental Unit when formed and not as a separate entity.</p>



Lesson Learned	
Title: Short description of best practice/lesson for improvement to the Plan.	Cross-Border Liaisons
Observation: Discuss the observed issue or problem. Observation can be positive (how something was done exceptionally well) or negative (something did or did not happen)	<p>Proper ICS terminology would be to classify the cross-border liaisons as “Agency Representatives” (AREP)</p> <p>There needs to be further guidance in the AGA section 2.3.1 on the roles, responsibilities and reporting chain for AREPs dispatched cross-border when operating multiple command posts.</p> <p>An adequate number of AREPs with proper knowledge and training need to be dispatched from each side.</p>
Discussion: More amplified discussion of the observation paragraph answering the questions, Who, What, Where , When, Why and How	<p>During the exercise there was a lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the “liaisons” sent to the cross-border ICPs by the USCG and CCG. Due to budget constraints, only two U.S. liaisons were sent to Saint John.</p>
Best Practice/Lesson Learned: Discuss the positive action taken to generate success or action that should have been taken to avoid or alleviate the problem. (Do not repeat the observation or discussion)	<p>There needs to be a defined role, reporting chain, and a list of responsibilities/actions for the AREPs to perform while in the cross-border ICP. A regular schedule should be established for reporting back to their respective command and coordinating actions.</p>
Recommended Action: Discuss how to repeat the success or permanently correct the problem. Should recommend who should make the correction	<p>Review and revise Section 2.3.1 of the JCP AGA.</p>



Lesson Learned	
Title: Short description of best practice/lesson for improvement to the Plan.	Use of IAP Software
Observation: Discuss the observed issue or problem. Observation can be positive (how something was done exceptionally well) or negative (something did or did not happen)	Use of a web based ICS forms software program greatly facilitated the development of the IAP, the tracking of information, the presentations in meetings and sharing of information between the two ICPs.
Discussion: More amplified discussion of the observation paragraph answering the questions, Who, What, Where , When, Why and How	<p>The IAP Software was very valuable in timely development, tracking and sharing of all ICS forms including the full IAP and appendix plans such as salvage, air monitoring, etc. The system was web based and able to be shared anywhere with password access. Pre-set meeting document screens followed the flow of meetings, and review of forms enabled quick as you go revision with an experienced operator. The system was very good in tracking open action items (ICS-233).</p> <p>The use of IAP software by only TRG personnel resulted in the IAP not being completed by the end of Day 1 as had been planned in the Calais venue. Generally, there was a need for more training and access throughout the ICPs.</p> <p>The IAP software and Shell COP helped with situational awareness. Paper copies of some forms were used by OPS in Calais and there were some issues of duplicating work when working off paper copies. It was found that paper forms are still utilized and needed in conjunction with the software.</p> <p>There is a need to have a backup plan for loss of connectivity/system crash.</p>
Best Practice/Lesson Learned: Discuss the positive action taken to generate success or action that should have been taken to avoid or alleviate the problem. (Do not repeat the observation or discussion)	<p>If an IAP software system is to be utilized, there needs to be wide access to it throughout the ICP and detailed training must be provided for all personnel who will be utilizing it.</p> <p>A basic understanding of ICS forms is necessary before using an IAP software system especially as it relates to the interaction between forms and the information on them. Quite often in an IAP software system, there is automatic cross feeding of information from one form to another so the user needs to understand the impact of what they input.</p>



	<p>There needs to be a backup system in place for documenting the versions of forms as they progress throughout the response.</p>
<p>Recommended Action: Discuss how to repeat the success or permanently correct the problem. Should recommend who should make the correction</p>	<p>Use of an IAP software system by the USCG and CCG would greatly enhance the efficiency of a response and facilitate the sharing of information across borders in a response.</p>



Lesson Learned	
Title: Short description of best practice/lesson for improvement to the Plan.	Joint Area Command
Observation: Discuss the observed issue or problem. Observation can be positive (how something was done exceptionally well) or negative (something did or did not happen)	A Joint Area Command concept was developed as a draft Appendix Q to the AGA for trial during this exercise. The concept worked well with coordination between senior personnel from government and industry involved. Further refinement or discussion about whether this is the right construct needs to occur.
Discussion: More amplified discussion of the observation paragraph answering the questions, Who, What, Where , When, Why and How	Utilizing the Area Command concept of the Incident Command System, the JAC brought together senior representatives of various government agencies as well as the Responsible Party/Polluter. The JAC provided strategic guidance and provided decision making for identified issues. Having such senior members together to discuss and decide on issues presented such as: transboundary movement of resources, dispersant use, Jones Act/Canada Shipping Act of 2001 and Places of Refuge, provided valuable input into issues which have been in need of clarification in the Atlantic Geographic Annex.
Best Practice/Lesson Learned: Discuss the positive action taken to generate success or action that should have been taken to avoid or alleviate the problem. (Do not repeat the observation or discussion)	Strong facilitation of the JAC is needed to keep the group on point and on function as an “Area Command”. The tendency to become “tactical” must be avoided in order for the JAC to fulfill its role in supporting the Incident Commanders, providing strategic direction and resolving major issues.
Recommended Action: Discuss how to repeat the success or permanently correct the problem. Should recommend who should make the correction	The JRT needs to discuss the potential use of a JAC and whether this is the right construct to use. It also needs to be weighed against updated USCG Commandant Instruction on Spills of National Significance and use of a National Incident Command and the recent changes to the JCP dealing with issue resolution. A white paper should be prepared by the JRT Co-Chairs for presentation to the National JRT Committee. Also included in this discussion needs to be the role of the JRT during a spill. The updated JCP identifies new roles for the JRT Co-Chairs, such as issue resolution, which need to be examined more closely. The avenue for interagency coordination on the Canadian side needs to be further explored as well.



Lesson Learned	
Title: Short description of best practice/lesson for improvement to the Plan.	ICS Implementation for Canadian Government Agencies
Observation: Discuss the observed issue or problem. Observation can be positive (how something was done exceptionally well) or negative (something did or did not happen)	<p>This exercise provided a major opportunity for Canadian Coast Guard and government agencies to implement an ICS response in conjunction with industry, while responding in the FMO role. Challenges were initially noted in the coordination of the FMO role but were recognized and corrected as the exercise progressed. IT issues occurred and the need for IT personnel deployed on site for a response is imperative. Excessive amounts of time spent reporting the same information to various sectors of government could be alleviated with the acceptance of the ICS-209 Incident Status Summary form. There was no mechanism established by CCG for an outreach protocol with Local, Provincial, First Nation or other political leaders.</p>
Discussion: More amplified discussion of the observation paragraph answering the questions, Who, What, Where , When, Why and How	<p>The integration of the Responsible Party (RP) went quite well with the RP utilizing Government personnel to expedite operations through procedures, process and legislation they were not familiar with. This was beneficial in the fact that RP staff learned from the experience and now have a clearer understanding of the processes of another country.</p> <p>The FMO Command quickly identified and imbedded liaison personnel to monitor and report on the RP's activities. It was noted early on that the integrated FMOs were being pulled more into the response role than the FMO role of monitoring activities. This impacted reporting flow of information back to the FMO Command. In addition, there was an early need to establish scheduled updates with the FMO team for progress reports. Both of these issues were recognized part way through the first day of the response and mechanisms put into place to correct the issues.</p> <p>During the start up the FMO staff was able to link in to the Government LAN without incident. This was the first time that there were no issues with users connecting to the DFO LAN during an incident of this type. Success was short lived however as the connection broke down on the second day. The RP had IT personnel on site but they were unable to work on the issue as they did not have necessary approvals to work on the government LAN.</p> <p>There appeared to be excessive amounts of time spent providing</p>



	<p>the same information to various sectors of the Coast Guard or Parliament in the reporting structure or format to which they are accustomed. When monitoring a response which is RP lead, government bureaucracy often lags behind the quick movements and decision making mechanisms of the private sector. As such, time becomes a very valuable resource which should not be utilized in duplication of effort. In the ICS format, the information contained in the ICS-209 Information Status Summary form contains all of the up to date information of the incident. The ICS-209 form was not accepted by CCG HQ and therefore was not utilized for briefing senior officials.</p> <p>It was recognized that there was no mechanism established by CCG for an outreach protocol with Local, Provincial, First Nation or other political leaders. It was discussed that CCG would have personnel available as part of a joint team assigned to strategic locations to brief officials and hold town meetings. It was also discussed that the CCG may not have enough ICS trained staff to monitor or carry out all the necessary activities/duties in the ICS structure for an incident of this magnitude.</p>
<p>Best Practice/Lesson Learned: Discuss the positive action taken to generate success or action that should have been taken to avoid or alleviate the problem. (Do not repeat the observation or discussion)</p>	<p>Continue with the training of personnel in ICS and in the implementation of the FMO role into an ICS organization. Similar training is necessary for industry as to the role of the FMO in an ICS response.</p> <p>The Deputy FMO position proved to be very valuable in assisting the FMO on the ICS format, keeping him on track for meetings as well as representing the FMO at other meetings which he could not attend.</p> <p>Assignment of a person to field calls for the FMO and screen only those which are necessary for the FMO would free up much time for the FMO to address other pressing issues.</p> <p>Continue to hold exercises with the integration of industry and government in the same physical location whenever possible.</p> <p>It is imperative that DFO IT be part of exercises or events on a continual basis to assist in providing connectivity to the</p>



	<p>government LAN and with other IT functions.</p> <p>Continued and expanded efforts must be made to integrate other sector areas of expertise within DFO to have as part of their duties to aid in a response to an Incident of National Significance. For example, during this exercise other sector oil spill response trained personnel were utilized in the areas of Finance, Logistics and Large and Small Fleet. This needs to be expanded to include other areas such as Human Resources requirements, Contracting, Admin Assistants, IT and all other employees within CCG and DFO.</p>
<p>Recommended Action: Discuss how to repeat the success or permanently correct the problem. Should recommend who should make the correction</p>	<p>Look at naming convention for FMO positions to identify their role in ICS (i.e. Incident FMO, Planning FMO, etc.); possibly use different colored vests or make sure they have correct position tags on vests.</p> <p>CCG National Headquarters should accept the ICS-209 form as sufficient level of information for ICS reporting. All other necessary documents should be prepared utilizing the information contained in the ICS-209 by ICS trained personnel at the HQ level.</p>



Participating Agencies and Organizations

Canada

Canadian Coast Guard
CCGS Edward Cornwallis
St. Andrews Biological Station
Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Environment Canada
Transport Canada
Public Safety Canada
Canada Border Services Agency
Atlantic Emergency Response Team, Inc.
Eastern Canada Response Corporation
Point Tupper Marine Services
Saint John Port Authority
Province of New Brunswick
 Environment & Local Government
 Emergency Measures Organization
 Agriculture, Fisheries, and Aquaculture

United States

U.S. Coast Guard
 First Coast Guard District
 Sector Northern New England
 National Strike Force Atlantic Strike Team
 Public Information Assist Team
 ESU Boston
 ESD Southwest Harbor
 ESD South Portland
 USCGC Marcus Hanna
State of Maine
 Department of Environmental Protection
 Department of Marine Resources
 Dept. of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife
 Washington County Community College
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration
 National Marine Fisheries Service
 Scientific Support Coordinator
Environmental Protection Agency
Department of the Interior
 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
 Bureau of Indian Affairs
 Park Service
U.S. Maritime Administration
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
College of the Atlantic

Industry

Shell Trading and Shipping Company
The Response Group
International Tanker Owners Petroleum Federation (ITOPF)
Marine Spill Response Corporation
National Response Corporation



Exercise Agenda

ALL TIMES ADT

Sunday June 16, 2013

All Day Travel day for designated set-up team and Equipment Deployment Drill participants.

Monday June 17, 2013

All Day Travel day for all participants
All Day Venue set-up (rooms, comms, IT) by designated set-up team
All Day Equipment Deployment Drill staging / set-up
TBD Communications Drill (for Equipment Deployment)
1500 ME DEP Boat Orientation Tour (Robbinston Boat Ramp) (by invitation)

Tuesday June 18, 2013

0730 Equipment Deployment Drill Check-in / Safety Brief / Work Assignments
0800 Equipment Deployment Drill START
0800 Venue set-up by designated set-up team / Player Orientation and Training

0800 Welcome Saint John: Mike Voigt, CCG
CDR Wayne Clayborne, USCG
Shell

Calais: CAPT Gilda, USCG
Keith Laidlaw, CCG
Peter Blanchard, Maine DEP
Shell

0815 Training:
Shell Safety Day (Global) *Time for Safety* Saint John / Calais

0900 Atlantic Geographic Annex Saint John: Ryan Green, CCG
Calais: Joe Boudrow, USCG
ME/NH Area Contingency Plan (Calais) Calais: Wyman Briggs, USCG
Bay of Fundy Contingency Plan (Saint John) Saint John: Ryan Green, CCG

0930 Canadian Coast Guard – Role in a Response Saint John: Joe LeClair, CCG
Calais: Keith Laidlaw, CCG

0945 Environmental Resources at Risk Saint John: Environment Canada
Calais: Steve Lehmann, NOAA

1015 30 Minute Break

1030-1200 PIER Training (JIC Personnel – JIC Room) Saint John: Marc Mullens, O’Briens



Tuesday June 18, 2013 (cont.)

1045	What is a Common Operating Picture	Saint John: GIS Team Calais: GIS Team
1100	Salvage State of Maine Response Equipment	Saint John: SMIT Calais: Peter Blanchard, MEDEP
1115	Dispersant/ISB Decision Making Process	Saint John: Georges Long, EC Calais: Steve Lehmann, NOAA
1130	Response Equipment Overview	Saint John: ALERT Calais: MSRC
1145	Incident Action Plan (IAP Software)	The Response Group (TRG)
1200	Lunch	
1300	Exercise Plan/Ground Rules	Saint John: Nicole Franks, NJR Calais: Mark Rae, NJR
1400	Incident Brief (ALL)	Saint John: Ryan Green, CCG Calais: LT Ostrander, USCG
1445	Player Training, Set-up and Familiarization by Section JIC Refresher Training (JIC Personnel)	Saint John: Marti Powers, Shell
1500	Controller & Evaluator Training	Saint John: Nicole Franks, NJR Calais: Mark Rae, NJR
1500	Equipment Deployment Drill END / Hotwash Begins	
1800	Dinner/Social (Calais Motor Inn, Saint John Cruise Ship Terminal)	

Wednesday June 19, 2013

0730	Check-in (ICPs/JIC)	
0800	START EXERCISE	
1200	Lunch (Working lunch – Section leaders ensure your section is covered)	
1700	PAUSE EXERCISE (End Day 1)	
1700	Controller/Evaluator Synch Meeting (Conference Call)	

Thursday June 20, 2013

0800	RESUME EXERCISE Day 2	
1200	Lunch (Working lunch – Section leaders ensure your section is covered)	
1600	END EXERCISE	
1600	Participant Hot Wash by Section	
1730	Take down of ICPs and pack-up of equipment	
1730	Controller / Evaluator Hot Wash	

Friday June 21, 2013

0900	Exercise Hot Wash Review (Select personnel)	
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Evaluation Procedures

Based on the assumption that multiple evaluation tools were necessary to ensure comprehensive capture of key exercise feedback, evaluation was conducted utilizing a combination of the following four control mechanisms:

1. Each incident management response section was assigned a full-time Evaluator. Likewise, equipment deployment locations had Controller/Evaluators assigned throughout the duration of operations.
2. Evaluators immediately conducted a 'hot wash' with their respective sections following the conclusion of the exercise to capture lessons learned, best practices and areas for improvement. Group spokespersons were identified to brief out the findings on the final day of the exercise evolution.
3. All exercise players/participants were encouraged to fill out feedback forms that were collected at the conclusion of the multi-day event.
4. All exercise paperwork was captured by the evaluation team and turned in to the Lead Evaluator for review and consideration of inclusion in this report.

In addition, an exercise debrief was held to highlight the lessons learned by each section during the exercise and to identify major areas for emphasis in the After Action Report.

A follow on telephone conference was held to discuss the major issues identified for each objective in the draft AAR.

A discussion was held during the November 2013 Joint Response Team Meeting to further refine the major issues to include in the final draft of the AAR.



Design Team

The following people were members of the CANUSLANT 2013 Exercise Design Team. This group of individuals worked for over a year and a half in preparation for the exercise. Without their commitment and dedication, this exercise would never have taken place. The Canadian Coast Guard and U.S. Coast Guard as well as the Joint Response Team thank this team for their hard work, preparation and attention to detail for this important exercise.

Canadian Coast Guard: Joe LeClair, Ron MacKay, Steve Bornais, Ryan Green, Angela Sangster, Rob Estensen, Bruce English

New Brunswick Environment: Patrick Stull

Environment Canada: Marc-Etienne LeSieur, Georges Long

Transport Canada: Kazi Shah Jalal, George Anderson, Mihai Balaban

USCG First District: Joe Boudrow, CDR Wayne Clayborne, Cornell Rosiu, Patrick McNeilly, Ron Pigeon, Russ Cornelia, PAC Jeffrey Hall

USCG Sector Northern New England: Wyman Briggs, LCDR David Bradley, MSTC Dan Wehr

USCG Electronic Systems Support Unit/Detachments: Paul Poremski, LT Courtney Harrison, Don Parker, IT1 George Grohs

USCG Exercise Support Team: Donald McVaugh, Damon Sanders, Darren Hill

USCG Atlantic Strike Team: CWO3 David Studer

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Steve Lehmann

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: James Carew, Mike Nalipinski

U.S. Department of the Interior: Andrew Raddant

Maine Department of Environmental Protection: Thomas Smith, Ginger McMullin, Kara Walker, Bob Shannon

Shell: Bruce Johnson, Todd Barr, Nancy Rumberg, Alain Boulanger, Martin Padilla, Barbara Parker, Nicole Franks, Marti Powers, Shawn Trahan

ALERT: Bob Totten

Marine Spill Response Corporation: Tom Gallant, Rich D'Allesandro

Port of Saint John: Capt. John McCann, Darryl McGrath

Controllers/Evaluators

The following people were members of the CANUSLANT 2013 control and evaluation teams. This group of individuals worked diligently during the exercise to ensure appropriate situational scenario injects were provided and/or to capture all relevant evaluation data for comprehensively understanding regional response capabilities and limitations. Without their commitment and dedication, this exercise would not have run, and the lessons learned to be incorporated into future response efforts would not have been successfully completed. The Canadian Coast Guard and U.S. Coast Guard as well as the Joint Response Team thank this group for their hard work, preparation, and attention to detail during this important exercise.



Control Staff:

Canadian Coast Guard: Joe LeClair, Bruce English, Kyle Jarvis, Patrick Fraser, Angela Sangster, David Jennings, Chris Purcell

Transport Canada: Mihai Balaban

USCG First District: Joe Boudrow, Patrick McNeilly, Ron Pigeon, Russ Cornelia, Tom Walker

USCG Exercise Support Team: Donald McVaugh, Damon Sanders, Darren Hill, Carol Swinson, LCDR Rob Carroll, Mike Steele, Mike Herring, Jackie Stephens

USCG Atlantic Strike Team: CWO3 David Studer

Maine Department of Environmental Protection: Thomas Smith

Shell: Bruce Johnson, Todd Barr, John Pilgrim, Mario Bonafonte, Jules DiRocco (CTEH), Bruce Johnson (CTR), Doug Martin

NJR: Nicole Franks, Dan Smiley, Chris Rasmussen, Suzanne Lagoni, Tom Callahan, Helen Chapman, Mark Rea, Sam Sacco, Richard Wright

ALERT: Bob Totten

Eastern Canada Response Corporation: Darin Connors

Marine Spill Response Corporation: Rich D'Allesandro

Port Tupper Marine Services: Davis Hart

Port of Saint John: Darryl McGrath

Canadian Rivers Institute: Susan Farquharson

International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation: Rebecca Coward, Dr. Joe Green

Evaluators:

Canadian Coast Guard: Ron MacKay, Steve Bornais, Roger Percy, Larry Hagerty, Rob Estensen, Bruce English, George Armstrong, David Jennings, Chris Purcell

USCG First District: Joe Boudrow, Patrick McNeilly, Ron Pigeon

USCG Sector Northern New England: Wyman Briggs, Arn Hegggers, Andrew Germann

USCG Sector Southeastern New England: Erin Lambie

USCG Sector Boston: LT Whitney Griffin

USCG Public Information Assist Team: PA2 Jaclyn Young

Maine Department of Environmental Protection: Sheryl Bernard

Shell: Marti Powers

NJR: Richard Wright

International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation: Dr. Joe Green



Exercise Images



Equipment deployment Saint Andrew with ALERT, CCG PRVII and ME DEP 32' boat



Loading the VOSS onboard USCGC Marcus Hanna pier side in Saint John



VOSS prepared for deployment on the deck of CCGS Edward Cornwallis



Crew from CCGS Edward Cornwallis and USCG AST deploy VOSS boom aboard the Cornwallis



USCGC Marcus Hanna deploys VOSS in Saint John Harbor



Planning and Operations Sections in Calais ICP



Exercise briefing at Calais ICP



Calais JIC



Preparing for a mock media brief in Calais



Saint John ICP main room (OPS, PLNG, LOGS, FIN, Safety, Legal)



JIC and LNO in Saint John ICP



Information management boards in the Saint John JIC



Using the GIS based Common Operating Picture and ICS software for a Command briefing in Saint John



UC room in Calais ICP



Conducting a planning meeting in Calais ICP