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Executive Summary

The term *Evergreen* refers to the continuous process of strategy development and strategic renewal, coordinated with each Commandant’s 4-year tenure. The main purposes of the *Evergreen* process are to instill *strategic intent* throughout the Coast Guard and to identify robust *core action strategies* for the Coast Guard. Strategic intent is a shared organizational understanding of where the Service as a whole should be headed and why. The Project *Evergreen* cycle ensures various levels of internal and external stakeholders are led through a proven scenario-based strategy development process resulting in clearly defined and vetted strategic priorities for the Coast Guard. *Evergreen II* represents the third iteration of the Coast Guard’s scenario-based strategy development process (following *Longview* (1998-2001) and *Evergreen I* (2002-2005)). *Evergreen II* builds on the Coast Guard’s growing body of scenario planning work, but is distinguished by the scope of effort undertaken. This document reflects the synthesis of nearly four years of work (2006-2009) by hundreds of people inside and outside the Coast Guard.

Scope of Effort

**Senior Leader Workshops and Engagement:** The September 2007 Senior Leader Workshop forged the *Evergreen II* core strategies, which were presented to the Leadership Council in February 2008 and to the Senior Executive Leadership Conference in April 2008. At the April 2008 conference, breakout groups provided input on specific strategies and their implementation. Additionally, in September 2008 retired reserve flag officers and master chief petty officers participated in breakout groups that provided input and insights into strategy implementation.

**Mid-level Coast Guard Personnel:** Three *Evergreen* workshops (including a first ever Chief Petty Officer Academy session in 2008) were conducted with approximately 200 mid-level Coast Guard personnel. In addition to introducing the Service’s future senior leaders to the *Evergreen* process, the workshop participants conducted a future world analysis of *The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship* and developed implementation actions for the *Evergreen II* Core Action Strategies.

**Maritime Shipping Industry Stakeholder Participation:** A first ever *Evergreen* Stakeholder Workshop brought together private sector participants representing various aspects of the shipping industry as well as environmental/non-governmental organizations. These stakeholders provided individual insights into the opportunities and challenges that the maritime industry may face in the future, and the consequent roles and responsibilities they anticipated for the Coast Guard or the Federal Government. Not only did the output validate several core strategies, the workshop suggested important new areas of emphasis.
**Results of Effort**

**Evergreen II Core Action Strategies:** After becoming thoroughly familiar with one of five plausible “future world” scenarios describing life 23 years in the future, participants develop strategies the Coast Guard should implement now in order to meet future needs. Each group’s strategies are then compared across all five “worlds” to determine which strategies work in all scenarios. The 13 strategies listed below proved to be robust across the entire range of plausible future operating environments described in the *Evergreen* scenarios. For this reason, the Coast Guard can be confident that these strategies will help prepare the Service to succeed in an uncertain future.

- **21st Century Partnerships** - Seek out and institutionalize domestic and international partnerships with private, public, and non-profit stakeholders as an essential means of mission execution.

- **Advancing Global Maritime Governance** - Execute international engagement to advance U.S. interests and build international capacity for effective maritime governance.

- **Maritime Policy Engagement** - Shape the development, coordination, and implementation of U.S. and international policies that govern or influence the maritime domain.

- **Strategic Change Management** - Manage continuous and accelerating change as a fundamental factor of mission performance, to improve service agility and close the gap between strategic intent and execution.

- **Mission Portfolio Management** - Manage Coast Guard missions as an integrated portfolio that optimizes the interrelationships between safety, security, and stewardship, improves operational agility, and manages risk to maximize total service delivery.

- **MDA 2.0** - Provide leadership for the development of an integrated global maritime domain awareness system where certified and validated information provides a comprehensive understanding of risk and enables effective mission execution.

- **Polar Mission Capacity** - Develop policy and expand capacity to project U.S. sovereign maritime presence in the Arctic and to protect and advance U.S. interests in the Polar Regions.

- **Underwater Mission Development** - Define the underwater responsibilities of the Coast Guard, build knowledge, and expand applicable Coast Guard missions into the underwater portion of the maritime domain.

- **The Best Team** - Develop a dynamic human resources system that anticipates organizational needs and has the agility and flexibility to quickly provide the capacity and competencies required in a constantly changing environment.

- **The Right Skills** - Provide each component of the workforce a tailored career-long continuum of education, training, and professional experience that is linked to strategic objectives and desired organizational competencies, and obtained from both inside and outside the Coast Guard.
**Intelligent Technology Acquisition** - Employ a strategy-driven acquisition process that continually and systematically assesses and acquires new technology supporting integrated mission requirements.

**Communications Excellence** - Expand and professionalize a sophisticated, timely, internal and external communications capability that serves all stakeholders, supports mission execution, and shapes the strategic environment.

**A Green Coast Guard** - Identify and mitigate the environmental impacts of Coast Guard activities, creating a “green Coast Guard” that is the example for environmental stewardship.

**Next Steps**

Making *Evergreen* a more integral part of the Coast Guard way of doing business is the most important next step. Critical actions to ingrain *Evergreen* in Coast Guard culture include linking it more directly to the planning and budgeting processes; incorporating concepts and strategies into the unit management and organizational performance evaluation processes; including *Evergreen* in the curriculum of appropriate leadership and education/training programs; and developing outreach programs that extend knowledge of the Coast Guard’s *Evergreen* process throughout DHS, other government agencies, Congress, and the general public.

With Coast Guard modernization underway, and with the revitalization of strategic and mission planning processes, this *Evergreen* report arrives at an important time. However, it does not reflect the “conclusion” of our thinking about these core action strategies or their place within Coast Guard priorities. This report strikes a line and records our activities and insights to date. Our strategic thinking shall continue uninterrupted.
Introduction

The Coast Guard initiated Evergreen II, the third full round of the Evergreen scenario-based strategy development process, in September 2006. ADM Thad Allen so directed in his Commandant’s Intent Action Order Number 6 (Coast Guard Maritime Strategy and the Evergreen Cycle of Strategic Renewal). Although similar to scenario planning efforts in Longview and Evergreen I, this iteration greatly expanded efforts to embed strategic intent throughout the Service, to refine and test core strategies through successive workshops, and to link strategy development to the Coast Guard’s decision-making processes. Evergreen II continued and broadened the previous efforts by exposing a greater number of mid-grade personnel to scenario-based planning and also reaching out to the Coast Guard’s stakeholder community.

Evergreen II began with a slightly different methodology from the previous iterations. Rather than developing a new set of scenarios from the start, the Coast Guard modified the five scenarios that were developed during a 2006 inter-agency scenario-based planning exercise called Project Horizon. The Coast Guard had participated in Project Horizon through the Department of Homeland Security, and it was among the first agencies to customize the Horizon platform scenarios for its own planning purposes. The Evergreen II Core Team and the project contractor (The Futures Strategy Group, LLC) adapted the five Horizon scenarios for use in the specialized environment of the Coast Guard.

A summary of the five scenarios is included later in the report.

Evergreen II Workshops

The five scenarios developed for Evergreen II were used in a series of workshops:

Spring 2007 Workshops (March/April 2007) - Two workshops were attended by approximately 150 junior-to-mid-grade officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel as well as several Coast Guard Auxiliarists. The primary focus of these workshops was to review the recently released The U.S Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS) within the context of the Evergreen scenario “worlds” and identify action items that would help to facilitate CGS execution. The workshops also introduced the participants to the scenario planning methodology and further institutionalized strategic thinking within the Service. The insights gleaned from these workshops were also useful in the later development of the Evergreen II Core Action Strategies.

Core Action Strategy Workshop (September 2007) - The third strategy workshop involved approximately 60 senior strategic leaders of the Coast Guard: officers, enlisted, Auxiliarists, and civilian employees. Its goal was to produce a group of robust strategies that tested well across the five “worlds” that could be subsequently synthesized into a new set of Core Action Strategies for the organization.
Chief Petty Officer’s Academy Workshop (September 2008) – An Evergreen workshop was conducted at the Chief Petty Officer Academy in Petaluma, California. This workshop involved 85 participants consisting of new Chief Petty Officers and the Academy staff. The objective of the workshop was to develop implementation considerations for six of the Evergreen II strategies while introducing the Evergreen process and instilling strategic intent at the senior enlisted level of the workforce.

Maritime Shipping Industry Stakeholder Workshop (September 2008) – The first ever Evergreen Stakeholder Workshop was attended by 37 private-sector participants representing various aspects of the maritime shipping industry as well as environmental/non-governmental organizations. Twelve Coast Guard senior officers and civilian employees also participated. The workshop sought individual stakeholder insights into the opportunities and challenges that the maritime industry may face in the future, and the consequent roles and responsibilities they anticipated for the Coast Guard or the Federal Government.

The Cycle of Strategic Renewal

Evergreen’s success in fostering strategic intent and ensuring strategic alignment across leadership transition relies on its cycle of strategic renewal and alignment with the Commandant’s tenure. As noted below, the cycle of strategic renewal proceeds through the Commandant’s tenure, contributing to key phases/processes and events.

The U.S. Coast Guard Cycle of Strategic Renewal: Conceptual Diagrams
**Evergreen Phase I:** Scenario Development

**Evergreen Phase II:** Internal Core Strategy Development

**Evergreen Phase III:** Stakeholder Insights Collection, Contingent Strategy Development, and Trigger Event Analysis

**Evergreen Phase IV:** Strategy Implementation and Embedding Strategic Intent (occurs throughout the cycle).

A detailed description of the four phases and their application during the *Evergreen II* process follows in this report.
Phase I: Scenario Development

Core Team Description
The Core Team is the internal scenario team that worked with the project contractor (The Futures Strategy Group, LLC) towards the development of the Evergreen Strategies. The 16 member Core Team consisted of civilians, Auxiliarists, senior enlisted personnel, and officers ranging from O-4 to O-6 with various career backgrounds. As a group, they contributed to every stage of the Evergreen process.

In addition to the Office of Strategic Analysis, Core Team membership was comprised of members from the Coast Guard’s Human Resources Directorate, Office of Budget and Programs, Office of Oceans and Transportation, Intelligence Coordination Center, Office of International Affairs, the Strategic Transformation Team, and the DOD Office of Net Assessment.

Interview Summary
The first major task in developing the Evergreen II scenarios was to reexamine the “forces for change” that could plausibly have an impact on the Coast Guard’s operating environment and on the Service itself over the next two decades. To this end, the contractor team interviewed a carefully selected group of over 100 Coast Guard officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel based in all operating regions, including outside of the U.S. and its territories.

These interviews took place between December 2006 and March 2007. The Evergreen II Core Team conducted a smaller set of external interviews during that same period.

Major insights regarding emerging issues and forces for change included:

Globalization will go forward and will be a significant driver of change – more merchandise trade, greater movements of people, rising new economic powers, and a host of changes in multi-national and organizational relationships. These dynamics will have impacts on a wide range of Coast Guard missions and activities.

Global terror will pose security challenges for the U.S. indefinitely. Many noted that the goal of “protecting the homeland” is now at least equal to the traditional Coast Guard mandate of “saving lives.” Looking forward, only a few interviewees predicted that the global war on terror would recede significantly in importance over the next 20 years.

Climate change turned out to be a high-leverage issue, with powerful repercussions on a wide range of Coast Guard missions and activities. It is not just the direct potential impacts of climate change – rising sea levels, more intense storm cycles, etc.; it is the indirect impacts – collapsing economies, failed States, disease, migration, and ultimately terror and conflict – that had a lot of interviewees concerned.
Energy will have a huge impact on Coast Guard activities. Underlying discussions around the future potential importance of the Persian Gulf, West Africa, the Arctic and the Northwest Passage is the belief that traditional hydrocarbon-based energy supplies will be important to the U.S. for at least two decades. This has broad implications for the Nation and for the Coast Guard. As one interviewee put it, “Where there is energy, there will be engagement.”

U.S. – Canadian relations was a topic of much discussion as they affect future developments around the opening of the Northwest Passage and, related to this, fisheries, minerals, petroleum, and marine transportation. Immigration and border security as they apply to U.S.-Canadian relations were prominent discussion points as well.

Fish stocks were generally believed to be critically at risk – in the gloomiest outlook, irreversibly so, owing to demographic pressures and lack of enforcement of international rules. But there were exceptions in points of view. Some foresee fish farms as supplying increasingly large amounts of fish for large markets like the U.S. and China. These, too, suggest a future role for the Coast Guard.

The Evergreen II Scenarios
The following are brief summaries of the planning scenarios used for Evergreen II. The actual scenarios contain far richer detail and were each approximately 50 pages in length. It is important to note that these scenarios are not intended to be predictive in nature (i.e., we do not expect the actual future to look like any of these specific scenarios). They are, instead, intended to present a purposefully broad range of possible outcomes. The scenarios are used to vet potential strategies only. For example, if a strategy is viable across all five scenarios, there is a high likelihood the strategy will be relevant in the year 2030, regardless of what the actual future holds.
Asian Way

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge to Nation State Power and Influence</th>
<th>Gap in Global Standard of Living</th>
<th>U.S. Economic Competitiveness</th>
<th>Perception of Serious Threat to U.S. Security and/or Quality of Life</th>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Low</td>
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In 2030 Asian Way is a disconcerting world for the United States. The perceived threat is very low – there has not been a serious attempt at terrorism in a decade and a half – but a sense of malaise, of America being eclipsed, has taken hold. The economy is not in recession, but growth has been sluggish, and Asia’s growing influence and economic power can no longer be denied.

In a sense, America has done it to itself. After an attempt by a terrorist group to bring a biological agent across the Great Lakes in 2015, a “Manhattan-Project”-style effort was undertaken to seal the borders, coasts, seaports, and airports using cutting-edge technology. And the effort has been a success. But it has isolated the United States from its neighbors, and for several years has impeded trade with the entire world. Mexico and Canada, feeling burned by their giant neighbor, have therefore turned away from the U.S. and forged closer relationships with other regions of the world, most notably Asia.

Despite unquestioned military supremacy, and while the U.S. economy is still the largest in the world on paper, the center of gravity has definitely shifted toward Asia. Asia as a whole is where the action is. The fastest-growing companies, the hottest technologies, even the most popular entertainment all seem to be Asian. The cream of the Western educational crop now often prefers to go work in “the Wild East.” Whispers about corruption, back-room deals, unethical behavior, and family favoritism are often heard these days by American executives who can’t seem to compete, as well as by American workers who seem to have missed out on the Asian gravy train. America is culturally and economically divided and politically gridlocked, with the coasts generally prospering from the increase in Asian involvement in the American economy, and much of the interior stagnating and suffering. Infrastructure in the United States flourishes and evolves where it serves the interests of Asian corporations; elsewhere, it is falling into decrepitude.
Asian Way

Globally, a scramble for resources is on, with a general lack of global governance allowing plundering by the new global corporate oligarchs. The United States faces a series of difficult choices: Does it try to maintain its way of doing things – insisting on transparency, democracy, and rule of law – or does it try to adopt the opaqueness, favoritism, and government-business connections that Asians have seemingly used to such advantage? Does the U.S. try to beat them, or join them?

Illustrative Challenges and Opportunities for the Coast Guard in Asian Way

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Ensuring resiliency in the maritime system</td>
<td>□ New uses of littoral (Arctic) (underwater)</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Federal-state governmental relations</td>
<td>□ Get back to regional alliances (Americas)</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Restoring infrastructure/intermodalism</td>
<td>□ Demand for protein, aquaculture, desalination,</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Lack of political cohesion</td>
<td>air/water purification technologies</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Lack of resources/funding</td>
<td>□ Gain more influence in global arena on</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Maintaining environment/monitor the Exclusive</td>
<td>environmental issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Zone</td>
<td>□ Transparency of U.S. business practices attractive</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Private maritime paramilitaries for hire</td>
<td>□ Government-business partnership</td>
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**Be Careful What You Wish For**

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<tr>
<th>Challenge to Nation State Power and Influence</th>
<th>Gap in Global Standard of Living</th>
<th>U.S. Economic Competitiveness</th>
<th>Perception of Serious Threat to U.S. Security and/or Quality of Life</th>
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<td>Low</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
<td>Strong</td>
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2030 is a world of excitement, opportunity, freedom, and technological wonders— with some real problems. Democracy flourishes in all regions of the globe. The global economy is growing and wealth is being distributed more evenly than ever before, although some areas of poverty remain. Nation-states still command the global political landscape; conflicts are usually low level and typically resolved through peaceful means.

Social turmoil in China added to nearly six years of geological instability in the Pacific Ring of Fire has brought about the near disappearance of fragile "just-in-time" supply chains. In place of these systems large organizations now emphasize resiliency, risk management, and geographic dispersion. The result has been manufacturing sites and transportation systems spread across the globe and new fast-growing middle classes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

On the downside, there is a globally acknowledged environmental crisis, with recently revived forecasts of rising sea levels, created by a combination of human and natural causes.

The U.S. is finding that participating and leading in a world made up of activist fellow democracies is more chaotic and challenging than might ever have been foreseen in the early 2000s. The realization of that desire to see a world composed of democracies has reminded many of that old wisdom that you should be careful what you wish for. Democracy has created new sources of conflict and tension, alongside more peaceful trends. U.S. resources are often strained in an effort to support or nurture these new democracies.

Collective action is the preferred approach to activities across the globe. Sometimes this is done within the framework of international organizations. However, over time, it has become more common for the actions to be taken by issue-specific coalitions of nations. Over recent years, such coalitions have tended to require U.S. participation and often leadership. However, this has led to a considerable stretching of U.S. resources. Furthermore, while U.S. participation is often expected, many nations continue to resent the U.S. presumption of leadership. Often when the U.S. takes the lead in some global issue, it finds an "anti-U.S." coalition forming to curtail U.S. actions.
**Be Careful What You Wish For**

In 2030 the globe is enjoying strong, vital growth. Overall global trade and investment levels are high and continuing to rise. Consumers are confident and R&D spending is strong — especially in areas connected to sustainable industry and agriculture, environmental remediation, aerospace, energy, cyber-technologies, smart materials, and bio-genetics.

**Illustrative Challenges and Opportunities for the Coast Guard**

in *Be Careful What You Wish For*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Unprecedented increase in global maritime activity; more shipping with wide divergence in size, speed, and automation; new sea routes, including Arctic shipping; significant underwater activity; permanent floating “cities,” factories, and ports plus massive increase in environmental refugees</td>
<td>Significantly increased profile for Coast Guard missions globally plus new locations for classic missions: polar, underwater</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significant geologic instability around Ring of Fire and rising sea levels lead to “first responder” stresses and threats to Coast Guard shore facilities</td>
<td>Urgent need to build Coast Guards around the world</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global fishing ban in place</td>
<td>Global sensor net taking the “Search” out of Search and Rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>All U.S. resources stretched very thin; very hard to accomplish anything without partners</td>
<td>Coast Guard is the one military service whose full range of classic missions is still required and even enhanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China is becoming unstable and potentially antagonistic</td>
<td>Coast Guard successes with partnerships give it a huge operational advantage</td>
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<td>Being seen as “green” is very important</td>
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### Congagement

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<th>Challenge to Nation State Power and Influence</th>
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2030 is a world in which political and economic power increasingly are organized regionally, rather than globally. The retreat into this regional bloc construct was precipitated primarily by two waves of flu-like pandemics originating in Asia between 2013-2016. The acrimony with which European, American, and Japanese executives and investors withdrew from Asia during this time engendered resentment and anger among the Asian peoples towards the West, and as such has made the retreat to regionalism lasting. A lack of progress in several World Trade Organization meetings in the early 2010s led the U.S. to establish the Americas Free Trade Alliance (AFTA). The European Union (EU) has expanded to include Turkey and the Ukraine. China is the acknowledged leader of a “Greater Asia” that took shape in the early 2020s after their remarkable economic turnaround. “Greater Asia” is now commonly defined as including Korea, Taiwan (which reunified with the mainland peacefully), and most of Southeast Asia. On certain issues of mutual concern, it expands to cover the Indian subcontinent as well.

Thus, three major regions solidified in the early 2020s, with a fourth, the United Islamic Alliance (UIA) formed by Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, emerging later in the decade. The power blocs are not monolithic, however. The other major players – Brazil, Russia, and India – shift among them opportunistically to varying extents. The remaining nations in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia with resources and/or major markets are the objects of energetic competition, while those nations with few resources or markets are neglected.

Regional competition for scarce natural resources is a major theme of this world. There is a growing tendency to want to secure long-term control of natural resources. This has led to a sense of global resource shortages based on threat assessments, rather than on actual market dynamics. Africa is the scene of “proxy wars” between regions, as they look to build up stockpiles of critical resources.

The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq/Afghanistan and the establishment of a Palestinian state had initially eased Middle East tensions somewhat, but it has not ended the threat of terrorism. For a number of reasons the U.S. has been spared terrorist attacks; Europe, in contrast, has not been quite so lucky. There are also anti-government insurgencies of varying strengths in parts
**Congagement**

of India, China, Latin America, and Russia, as well as in the nonaligned regions. In 2023 there were simultaneous anthrax releases in the three religious ‘capitals’ (Rome, Jerusalem, and Mecca) by an African group protesting the world’s alleged neglect of their region.

The World Energy Forum, instituted to facilitate the flow of energy natural resources and prevent conflict over energy supplies, represents almost the lone example of truly global cooperation. Meanwhile, the global commons are the big loser from the erosion of global treaties and watchdogs. Trade, commerce, and capital flows still benefit from a legacy global architecture, but new investments follow the strong new intra-regional economic and political relationships. These dynamics create a continually shifting mixture of both tension and trade, both confrontation and engagement, or ‘congagement’.

**Illustrative Challenges and Opportunities for the Coast Guard in Congagement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Expanding coastal border control in response to increased illicit trade, smuggling, and contraband, as well as an increased border size (e.g., Americas vs. U.S. only)</td>
<td>□ Assisting other AFTA nations in the development of improved regional coastal security and resource protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Maritime domain uses increase in volume and complexity</td>
<td>□ Utilizing the Coast Guard’s global goodwill to improve diplomatic relations and develop bilateral agreements with external regional blocs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Erosion of global authorities’ efficacy, along with diminishing goodwill between large regional blocs</td>
<td>□ Leveraging technology to monitor coastal borders and maritime resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Global commons (e.g., Arctic, high seas, and Antarctica) are under attack by unilateral exploitation</td>
<td>□ Facilitating trade with other regional blocs</td>
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19
Lockdown

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<th>Challenge to Nation State Power and Influence</th>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>High</td>
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This is a multi-threat world marked by persistent terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the most challenging economics the U.S. — and the world — have faced in more than 50 years. The U.S. has been the primary target of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) attacks launched by a new, radical Islamic terror network. The assaults have exposed critical vulnerabilities in supply chain and transportation systems. In response, the U.S. has turned heavily defensive, protectionist, and isolationist. This has had a profoundly negative impact on nearly every aspect of economic life in the U.S., with harsh and bewildering effects across much of the global economy.

The U.S. economy was the primary target of terror attacks that occurred in 2019. In a series of masterfully planned and executed explosions, by far the worst of which was the “fizzled” detonation of a nuclear weapon in the Port of Long Beach, 7,000 people perished. Within hours of the Long Beach attack, two shipping containers, one in Chicago and the other in Philadelphia, were remotely detonated by terrorist conspirators connected with the Long Beach assault. These were radioactive “dirty bomb” explosions, resulting in comparatively small numbers of deaths but intensifying almost beyond belief the disorder, fear, and uncertainty that swept the nation over the following months.

A single government body – the Department of Homeland Defense – now holds responsibility for all activities related to defense and domestic security. Since 2019, federal law enforcement missions have been militarized. To regain America’s confidence to secure itself, there has been a consolidation and federalization of military and security capacity. *Posse comitatus* is ended.

Despite an increasingly belligerent China, the global posture of the U.S. is very limited. The Navy is forward deployed, but only to areas of utmost strategic interest. In the Northern Pacific, the U.S. relies on Japan becoming an offensive force. By invitation, the U.S. has returned to the Panama Canal Zone. In general, the U.S. posture is very North American-centric (U.S., Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean), in line with a “NAFTA+” regional economic and security pact.

Beyond the greater NAFTA region, the developing world is undergoing acute stress, with export markets collapsing and global aid drying up. Africa and parts of South America are particularly hard hit, and collapsing states are creating *de facto* ungoverned territories.
Lockdown

In 2030, the economy has only begun to stabilize after a sustained fall, precipitated by events beginning with the 2019 terror attacks. Since that time, the nation has suffered through what amounts to a deep, prolonged recession. High inflation and unemployment have contributed to the highest “misery index” since 1980. Public finances in 2030 are still precarious, notwithstanding efforts to increase tax revenue and control spending on non-essential items.

By 2030 no physical attacks on the U.S. homeland have occurred in seven years. The latest concern is cyber-security and China’s increasing military power. The U.S. is no longer at the dynamic center of the grand global exchange of goods, services, inventions, culture, belief, and ideas. In 2030, there’s a rising national debate over whether to remain effectively “locked down” or to reengage the world, in the hopes of reversing the nation’s material decline and to reassert U.S. values and interests in a world lacking leadership and direction.

Illustrative Challenges and Opportunities for the Coast Guard in Lockdown

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Striking a successful balance of security and efficiency in maritime operations</td>
<td>Contribute tangibly to U.S. global reengagement efforts (e.g., via security training, International Maritime Organization leadership, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme fiscal environment, leading to pressure to code non-security missions</td>
<td>Exploit attractiveness and security of government careers at a time of economic difficulty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and protection of NAFTA Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
<td>Leverage multi-mission history and culture and become an educational and training resource for the new homeland defense organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adequate capacity and capabilities to perform Arctic missions</td>
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The world of 2030 is full of shadowy ambiguity. The U.S. economy is thriving, but social safety nets have disappeared as the global business drive for profits ruthlessly discards those who can’t (or don’t) contribute. It increasingly seems that efficiency trumps all other considerations and anything that does not contribute is routinely devalued. Although the top tier of corporate-driven capitalism has benefited tremendously from this, poverty in many developing nations is exploding.

In December of 2012, anthrax was released into the Chicago Board of Trade ventilation system. An increasingly disrespected government had no solutions; but this time the private sector stepped into the breach, apprehended the al-Qaeda perpetrators, and set up procedures to prevent similar attacks. The next year global corporate leaders formed the “Davos Group,” composed of the 250 most powerful private and public corporations from around the world, to fill the vacuum created by ineffectual government. They had the wherewithal to fix the problems that mattered to them – and they did. But this increased concentration of power in private sector organizations that were accountable only to stockholders, not to other citizens of any country.

In the Islamic world, the ascendancy of extremists across the Arab world, Iran, and elsewhere had empowered Islamic moderates who created a new organization, the Development and Economic Empowerment Network – DEEN – in 2011. Under charismatic leadership, it became an internationally recognized and respected voice against terrorist violence and a proponent of outreach and service to the world’s poor and disenfranchised. To finance these programs, DEEN secured a steady and growing source of funding from oil-rich Arab states that were also under attack from terrorists. Its growing humanitarian stature enhanced DEEN’s political clout and it was a key player in establishing the independent Palestinian state in 2014.

A third significant actor on the world stage is the collection of nations known as the Group of 120. The G-120 evolved out of the old G-77 group of developing nations who way back in 1964 organized around a common set of development needs and requirements. They are generally the have-not nations and they do not wield nearly as much power as Davos or even DEEN, but they are a player.
**Profits and Principles**

The world is not a safe place — in the U.S., in Paris, and even in Tokyo. The threat of terrorism has receded in recent years. Street crime, however, has been on the upswing since the world began treating poverty like some kind of social failure. This violence is particularly unsettling because it is random and often seems spontaneous.

As 2030 draws to a close, there is a startling dichotomy in how people in the United States feel about the future. There is a huge gap between the buoyant economic optimism of the top 10 percent and the desperation of the bottom 10 percent; but there is a continuing paranoia that reflects personal economic and physical insecurities.

### Illustrative Challenges and Opportunities for the Coast Guard in Profits and Principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Attracting and retaining people in a government agency, in the face of strong private sector competition for talent</td>
<td>Leverage Coast Guard history to establish a strong brand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attaining adequate funds in a wealthy world with reduced government appropriations</td>
<td>Partner with appropriate private sector entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding the right mission balance in a world in which everything is global</td>
<td>Pursue non-traditional funding sources and revenue models</td>
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Phase II - Internal Core Strategy Development

The entire purpose of the scenarios developed in Phase I was to use them to forge robust strategies in the course of strategy workshops. In the case of *Evergreen II*, there were, in total, three scenario workshops that contributed to the development of the core action strategies. Follow-on workshops with stakeholders and other Coast Guard participants added important refinements to these strategies.

**Spring 2007 Workshops**
Two workshops were held in the spring of 2007; these were attended by approximately 150 junior-to-mid-grade officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel as well as several Coast Guard Auxiliarists. One objective was to acquaint these high-performing Coast Guard people with the scenario planning methodology and to institutionalize strategic thinking within the organization. The particular focus of these workshops was a review of the January 2007 *The U.S Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS)*, which incorporates insights developed in *Evergreen I* and *Long View*. The output from these workshops was a series of action items that would facilitate the execution of the CGS in light of the Coast Guard’s potential range of operating environments embodied by the scenarios (further detailed in Phase IV). In addition, insights from these workshops informed the later development of the core action strategies.

**Fall 2007 Workshop**
The third strategy workshop, held in September 2007, was for senior strategic leaders of the Coast Guard: officers, enlisted, Auxiliarists, and civilian employees. Its goal was to produce strategies for the organization, along the lines of those produced by *Long View* and *Evergreen I*. The question addressed by each of the five scenario world teams was, “Given what we now know about the challenges and opportunities in this scenario world, and given what we know today about the Coast Guard’s strengths and weaknesses, what does the Service need to begin doing right away to better position itself for future success?”

On the final day of the workshop, the five scenario world teams presented their strategies to the entire 58-person workshop group. The bulk of that day was spent stress-testing all these scenario-specific strategies within each of the other four teams’ scenarios, to determine which of all the strategies were “robust” or workable across all five scenario futures. Core Team members, and the contractor team, captured key observations and comments so that all workshop strategies could be systematically evaluated and ranked in the next phase of the process.

**Forging “Robust” Strategies**
The September scenario workshop produced a total of 60 draft strategies. Over the course of the following weeks, the project contractor and Core Team dissected and evaluated each of the strategies, with critical commentary and guidance provided by Core Team members and others who had been present in workshop discussions.

Thirteen core strategies were proposed that would improve Coast Guard relevance and mission performance in a wide-range of potential futures. At the May 2008 Senior Executive
Leadership Conference, the Core Team introduced these *Evergreen II* strategies to Coast Guard senior leaders, and engaged them in break-out groups to discuss implementation issues. These strategies do not represent *all* that the Coast Guard should do to prepare for the future; however, they are strategies that have been stress-tested across a variety of future operating conditions and found to be valid across that broad array of potential conditions. They are therefore very good investments for the Coast Guard’s future.

The table on the following page shows the *Evergreen II* Core Action Strategies and Future States followed by a more in-depth discussion of each of the strategies including strategic rational, implementation considerations, and lineage to *Long View* and *Evergreen I*. 
### Evergreen II Core Action Strategies

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Core Action Strategies</th>
<th>Future States</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>21st Century Partnerships</strong> - Seek out and institutionalize domestic and international partnerships with private, public, and non-profit stakeholders as an essential means of mission execution.</td>
<td>The Coast Guard values and uses partnerships as a critical element for executing its responsibilities. The service and its wide spectrum of partners routinely cooperate, through enduring relationships, to address common interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advancing Global Maritime Governance</strong> - Execute international engagement to advance U.S. interests and build international capacity for effective maritime governance.</td>
<td>The U.S. Coast Guard has sufficient authorities, resources, and experience to conduct sustained international engagement in support of U.S. foreign policy. The Coast Guard is recognized domestically and globally as the vital U.S. ambassador for strengthening maritime regimes, domain awareness, and operational capabilities of international partners.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime Policy Engagement</strong> - Shape the development, coordination, and implementation of U.S. and international policies that govern or influence the maritime domain.</td>
<td>The Coast Guard has the analytic capacity, policy-making competency, and experience to participate where necessary and lead where appropriate in shaping maritime policy. Policy development, coordination, and implementation are collaborative, strategic, and reflect the integrated contributions of our missions to policy execution.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Change Management</strong> – Manage continuous and accelerating change as a fundamental factor of mission performance, to improve service agility and close the gap between strategic intent and execution.</td>
<td>The Coast Guard has the competencies and the capacity to anticipate and quickly adapt itself to accelerating global change – across leadership cycles and without detracting from current operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mission Portfolio Management</strong> - Manage Coast Guard missions as an integrated portfolio that optimizes the interrelationships between safety, security, and stewardship, improves operational agility, and manages risk to maximize total service delivery.</td>
<td>The Coast Guard’s multi-mission character is central to the identity of its workforce. Its mission portfolio is widely valued by stakeholders as a mutually reinforcing set of authorities, resources, and capabilities that effectively manages risk and provides superior service to the public.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MDA 2.0</strong> – Provide leadership for the development of an integrated global maritime domain awareness system where certified and validated information provides a comprehensive understanding of risk and enables effective mission execution.</td>
<td>Global maritime stakeholders use readily available, dynamic, and trusted knowledge to improve decision making, decrease decision time, and optimally employ resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Polar Mission Capacity</strong> - Develop policy and expand capacity to project U.S. sovereign maritime presence in the Arctic and to protect and advance U.S. interests in the Polar Regions.</td>
<td>The Coast Guard has the ability to adapt to the changing environment and increasing activity in the Polar Regions. It readily accomplishes its missions in the Arctic and Antarctic and is recognized as a leader in maritime polar operations and policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Underwater Mission Development</strong> - Define the underwater responsibilities of the Coast Guard, build knowledge, and expand applicable Coast Guard missions into the underwater portion of the maritime domain.</td>
<td>The Coast Guard anticipates emerging technology and commercial applications in the underwater environment and has the needed authorities, capabilities, competencies, and partnerships to fulfill its safety, security, and stewardship roles.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The Best Team</strong> - Develop a dynamic human resources system that anticipates organizational needs and has the agility and flexibility to quickly provide the capacity and competencies required in a constantly changing environment.</td>
<td>The Coast Guard consistently fields a team whose competencies match the current and future needs of the organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The Right Skills</strong> - Provide each component of the workforce a tailored career-long continuum of education, training, and professional experience that is linked to strategic objectives and desired organizational competencies, and obtained from both inside and outside the Coast Guard.</td>
<td>Both required technical and specialty experts and strategic leaders are produced and valued. Personnel make career development choices that benefit both themselves and the organization. The service demonstrates commitment to professional education and development.</td>
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<td><strong>Intelligent Technology Acquisition</strong> - Employ a strategy-driven acquisition process that continually and systematically assesses and acquires new technology supporting integrated mission requirements.</td>
<td>The Coast Guard is able to rapidly identify and implement new technologies that provide the best value to support current and future mission needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communications Excellence</strong> - Expand and professionalize a sophisticated, timely, internal and external communications capability that serves all stakeholders, supports mission execution, and shapes the strategic environment.</td>
<td>The Coast Guard’s workforce embraces its culture, core values, and roles. The service cultivates a clear and consistent public understanding of its identity, multi-mission character, and the value it delivers. The Coast Guard’s internal and external communications are open, honest, responsive, and effective.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>A Green Coast Guard</strong> - Identify and mitigate the environmental impacts of Coast Guard activities, creating a “green Coast Guard” that is the example for environmental stewardship.</td>
<td>Coast Guard platforms, facilities, and activities are seen as environmentally friendly and the service reaps the benefits of reduced life-cycle costs and favorable public recognition.</td>
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21st Century Partnerships

**Strategy**
Seek out and institutionalize domestic and international partnerships with private, public, and non-profit stakeholders as an essential means of mission execution.

**Future State**
The Coast Guard values and uses partnerships as a critical element for executing its responsibilities. The service and its wide spectrum of partners routinely cooperate, through enduring relationships, to address common interests.

**Strategic Rationale – Key Future Driving Factors**
Workshop participants foresaw that the increasing complexity of the maritime domain will result in more dynamic threats/challenges, a potentially wider spectrum of domestic and foreign stakeholders, and shifting mission priorities (e.g., extending missions to polar and underwater environments). Partnerships with private and public sector stakeholders (domestically and internationally) were thought to be essential to successful mission execution in the year 2030 as they will generate operational efficiencies and help build the Coast Guard’s political constituencies. Participants also noted that the Coast Guard should anticipate, build, and sustain partnerships before they are critically needed – not following an incident (and Congressional action) as they often have been in the past (e.g., OPA 90 and MTSA initiatives following the *Exxon Valdez* spill, and the events of 9/11, respectively).

While the value of partnerships is already appreciated in the Coast Guard, the workshop participants foresaw a much more networked and generally more globalized future where partnerships took on new and perhaps not yet fully understood importance. The value of partnerships emerged most strongly from three worlds, but tested well across all worlds for a variety of reasons. In some worlds non-government actors were substantially empowered to contribute to public sector problems, and in others the integration of businesses globally required new policies and frameworks fully employing the power of partnerships. In circumstances where “trust” was broadly eroded, partnerships established communities where trust could be built and sustained. Across all worlds, the rapid advance of technology and accelerating change meant that partnerships were essential to keeping up with maritime industry, and created essential “signal generators” for the early detection and adaptation to change.

Spring 2007 Workshop participants found that strong partnerships with public and private sector stakeholders were critical to the successful implementation of all six of the strategic priorities in *The Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS)*. They also emphasized the importance of building international partnerships and the critical need for the Coast Guard to build competencies in this area (especially cultural/language skills). Participants articulated that the Coast Guard should consider additional exchange/liaison opportunities (public and private sector; domestic and international) as a means to developing and sustaining successful partnerships.
Implementation Considerations

In implementing this strategy, the Coast Guard must initially establish a culture within the service that values partnerships as an essential means to achieve operational success (for all missions – not just those relating to Marine Safety). The current haphazard approach to partnership must be replaced by a more formal, systematic and analytical approach. Targeted recruiting and better training and education programs will be necessary to develop skills and competencies essential to anticipating, initiating, building, and sustaining partnerships. Specifically, foreign language, cultural, and diplomatic skills will be critical to forging and nurturing these partnerships (this is directly relevant to the implementation of The Best Team and The Right Skills strategies). Other key implementation considerations include:

- Partnerships must be sustained despite changes in mission emphasis (this will be essential to implementation of the Mission Portfolio Management strategy).
- Partnerships based primarily on individual/social relationships will be difficult to sustain as members are transferred or leave their respective organizations. Although the social context is vital to building trust and understanding, an effort must be made to institutionalize successful partnerships at all levels through codification (e.g., statute, MOU, MOA, etc.).
- Success will require leveraging appropriate authorities to build and sustain partnerships at the field level (e.g., COTP, CO/OIC, FMSC, SMC, FOSC). Additionally, the service should utilize members with long-term ties to the community (e.g., Auxiliarists, Reservists, retirees, etc.) to foster and sustain those relationships.
- The business acumen of Coast Guard members must be improved to better prepare them to form effective partnerships with the maritime industry. This might include such things as expanded industry training programs, professional education at commercial maritime training centers, or memberships in professional maritime organizations.
- Non-government and not-for-profit organizations have an increasing role in service delivery and activities that were once mostly governmental. Partnering will take on new dimensions in the future, particularly in international capacity building and governance. The Coast Guard must join in a much wider range of partnerships to integrate U.S. national efforts in the maritime domain.
- The Service can make better use of, and expand the number of, formal Coast Guard Advisory Committees.
- There is an opportunity to increase the number of liaison and exchange opportunities with public and private sector stakeholders both in the U.S. and with foreign partners. This will not only facilitate the development of a wide array of strategic partnerships, but would also be essential to the implementation of the MDA 2.0 strategy. The implementation of The Best Team strategy would provide the capability and flexibility to fill these positions with qualified people.
- Partnerships should be pursued as an essential element of the Communications Excellence strategy.
• The strategy requires an increase in Coast Guard capacity for international training of foreign maritime forces and partner with DOD and DOS to help implement the *Advancing Global Maritime Governance* strategy.

**Lineage to Long View and Evergreen I**

Although the concept of partnering is implicit in virtually all of the externally focused *Long View* and *Evergreen I* strategies, it is explicitly called out in two:

**Long View (#5):** The Coast Guard will identify, prioritize, and energize strategic partnerships and alliances in line with organizational needs and emerging mission requirements.

**Evergreen I (#5):** Lead a partnership of maritime stakeholders to ensure appropriate access to integrated systems, sensors, intelligence, information and analysis of maritime activities and conditions to gain a complete operating picture of the U.S. Maritime Domain.
Advancing Global Maritime Governance

**Strategy**
Execute international engagement to advance U.S. interests and build international capacity for effective maritime governance.

**Future State**
The U.S. Coast Guard has sufficient authorities, resources, and experience to conduct sustained international engagement in support of U.S. foreign policy. The Coast Guard is recognized domestically and globally as the vital U.S. ambassador for strengthening maritime regimes, domain awareness, and operational capabilities of international partners.

**Strategic Rationale – Key Future Driving Factors**
Both *Evergreen I* and *The Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS)* established international engagement as a key strategic priority for the Coast Guard. The workshop participants largely validated and further advanced this concept. They foresaw increasing complexity in the governance and use of the global maritime commons as well as the U.S. EEZ and continental shelf. This included increased use and competition for resources, increasing transnational threats using the seas, and continued plurality of nations engaged in the maritime domain (i.e., no singularly dominant player).

This held true even though the future worlds forced participants to consider the slowing or reversal of globalization, varying degrees of regional alignment versus independent action, weak and strong concepts of U.S. sovereignty, as well as the possible erosion of U.S. global power and influence. Despite this variety in future geopolitical environments, there emerged a common theme: the importance of international engagement and influence. Greater interdependence among nations and the increasing use of international bodies to resolve global problems emerged across multiple worlds. Global issues intertwined consistently with U.S. interests, though sometimes in very different dimensions. One broad conclusion of this workshop (and a conclusion paralleled in Project Horizon) is that the alignment of U.S. policy processes along “domestic” and “international” divisions is looking like an artifact of the 20th century.

The participants broadly believed that it will be vital to the U.S. to assist other nations and work with the international community to advance maritime governance. This would include improving international regimes, developing greater awareness of the global maritime domain, and building the operational capabilities of coastal nations to enforce their domestic and international maritime regimes. Workshop participants generally recognized that the U.S. Coast Guard will continue to be a multi-mission service that is ideally positioned to carry out international engagement aimed at improving global maritime governance.

This concept was discussed at length in the Spring 2007 Workshop sessions while conducting an analysis of the *CGS* through the 2030 future worlds. This effort looked
closely at the CGS strategic priority “Focusing International Engagement on Improving Maritime Governance.” The only future worlds where this strategy did not fare as well were in regionally organized worlds, where international governing bodies were weak. Even in that case, there was still a need to influence maritime governance – just through regional structures. Many of the implementation considerations will be the same whether the focus is global or regional. There was also a great deal of discussion about the need to develop competencies in this area and the potential to require international affairs/overseas assignments as a prerequisite for promotion/advancement to senior levels.

**Implementation Considerations**

In order to successfully implement this strategy, many workshop participants believed that the Coast Guard would need to acquire or expand authorities, expertise, and independent funding to better engage at the international level. Central to these implementation factors will be the policy position of DHS that international capacity building is essential to homeland security and to larger national interests. Hence the Coast Guard should be leading efforts abroad where it is uniquely qualified to do so.

Personnel with needed competencies (e.g., language/cultural fluency skills, international relations, etc.) will have to be recruited, hired, or developed from within the service. Implementing this strategy will also require stronger and expanded interagency relationships with DOS, DOD, DHS, OMB, and interagency planning groups. Other implementation considerations include:

- Expanding the number of foreign nationals admitted to Coast Guard training and education programs will facilitate the strategy.
- It is critical for the success of the strategy that all international maritime standards that involve U.S. interests and Coast Guard equities are negotiated through either the leadership or with the advice/support of the Coast Guard.
- The Service should seek independent funding to allow the Coast Guard to conduct expanded international engagement in support of the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* and other national strategies.
- Implementation of this strategy will be helped by the implementation of *The Best Team, The Right Skills, Communications Excellence*, and *21st Century Partnerships* strategies.
- The partnerships forged, or strengthened, by implementing this strategy will be essential to effective implementation of the *MDA 2.0, Polar Mission Capacity, and Underwater Mission Development* strategies.
- Maintaining and strengthening partnership with U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps (through the Global Maritime Partnership initiative, or other international partnership programs) will ensure unity of effort and avoid competition for missions.
- The strategy requires that the Service should seek a significant increase in capacity (number of individuals and platforms) for international engagement, including the
capacity to negotiate international agreements that govern activities in the global maritime commons.

**Lineage to Longview and Evergreen I**
There was no stand-alone articulation of international engagement as a core strategy in *Long View*.

As indicated below, this strategy validates and reinforces the work from the previous iteration of *Evergreen*:

**Evergreen I (#1):** *Execute a robust international engagement effort within the framework of national strategies to advance global maritime safety and security and facilitate commerce, through multilateral agreements, multinational operations, international training efforts and diplomatic missions in support of national interests.*

**Evergreen I (#2):** *Act as the lead U.S. agency for negotiating international maritime standards, as national interests dictate.*
Maritime Policy Engagement

Strategy
Shape the development, coordination, and implementation of U.S. and international policies that govern or influence the maritime domain.

Future State
The Coast Guard has the analytic capacity, policy-making competency, and experience to participate where necessary and lead where appropriate in shaping maritime policy. Policy development, coordination, and implementation are collaborative, strategic, and reflect the integrated contributions of our missions to policy execution.

Strategic Rationale - Key Future Driving Factors
The workshop participants foresaw a future world characterized by increased complexity and use of the maritime domain (especially the U.S. EEZ, continental shelf, and the global maritime commons); increased competition among users of the maritime domain with the need for robust regimes and adjudication mechanisms; and greater interdependence among nations and partners.

Across very different worlds and for different reasons, participants found it critical that the U.S. and international community develop maritime policies to guide the governance of this highly dynamic and complex domain. These policies need to be coordinated so that they are mutually supporting across safety, security, environmental, and economic interests. They must also be adaptable enough to keep up with the rapid pace of change.

The participants recognized that while the Coast Guard does not unilaterally make maritime policy and does not lead in many areas where these policies are implemented, the Coast Guard’s broad maritime authorities and responsibilities, as well as its reputation as an honest broker, position the service to positively shape U.S. and international maritime policy and even lead in key areas of development.

Distinct elements of policy engagement and leadership emerged in different worlds. Climate change and potential coastal disruptions suggested the need for strong domestic and international leadership in establishing maritime resiliency, response, and recovery. Emergence of non-government entities with significant capacities to advance national interests suggested new policy frameworks and partnerships. Increasing pressure and competition for control and exploitation of the global maritime commons prompted examination of our Nation’s interests as both a coastal State and a global maritime power. Participants saw increasingly complex and competitive interests where the Coast Guard might find itself at the center of policy making and adjudications.

This concept was addressed at length in the Spring 2007 Workshop sessions when discussing the strategic priority Strengthen Regimes for the U.S. Maritime Domain in the Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS). The participants universally supported the concept of more sophisticated regimes (rule sets) to help govern the maritime domain. While U.S. policies are only a part of these regimes, they can frame the context for how the regimes will be developed and be enforced. There
was also much discussion of the need for improved regimes in three specific dimensions: *international governance* (to the regional and global level), *new geography* (to include underwater and polar portions of the maritime domain), and *threat* (to include all threats and hazards). The first step in developing these new or modified regimes may be to develop or modify U.S. policies that address these dimensions.

**Implementation Considerations**

This strategy suggests that the Coast Guard Commandant’s ability to “wear a national maritime policy hat” in addition to the “Coast Guard service chief hat” is a robust advantage across various futures. To be able to do this effectively, and sustain the capacity over time, will be a challenge.

Implementation will require the Coast Guard to anticipate and understand the dynamics of change in the maritime domain and build a sufficient level of agility/adaptability into maritime policy (this strategy is linked to *Strategic Change Management*). In addition, the implementation of *The Best Team* and *The Right Skills* strategies will be critical to the Coast Guard’s ability to acquire the competencies necessary for policy analysis and development, as well as the capacity to “play” more broadly in this arena. Related implementation considerations touched on during the workshops included:

- The strategy will depend on recruiting, hiring, and/or growing personnel with policy skill sets and experience (e.g., public policy experience and education, policy analysis skills, negotiation skills; ability to operate in the interagency and international forums, etc.).
- The Service should identify individuals with demonstrated skills in this area and tap into those skills when needed.
- Better planning, coordination, and tracking mechanisms for Coast Guard maritime policy activities must be instituted.
- Expanded opportunities for detailee or rotational work within the interagency, with particular attention to DHS, DOD, DOS, and DOT, will facilitate maritime policy engagement.
- A maritime policy role that closely links Coast Guard capacity and leadership in a supporting role to the U.S. Government’s larger policy development mechanisms must accompany this strategy.
- The Service needs to build the capacity to effectively participate in policy development and leadership. This strategy does not suggest a “light staff” structure. It requires that the Coast Guard show up and participate substantively in a wide range of global and domestic policy making forums.
- The strategy requires thinking beyond just “maritime policy.” Maritime and Coast Guard concerns touch transportation policy, national security policy, environmental policy, etc.
- The Coast Guard’s maritime industry training program and industry-related education programs need to be expanded and diversified.
• Implementation of the 21st Century Partnerships and Communications Excellence strategies are vital to effective policy execution within this strategy.

• Implementation of this strategy, in turn, is vital to the implementation of the Polar Mission Capacity, MDA 2.0, and Underwater Mission Development strategies.

**Lineage to Long View and Evergreen I**

**Long View (#1):** *Take a leadership role in developing an integrated maritime management system.* This was the idea of a holistic approach that balances transportation, law enforcement, national security, natural resource management, marine safety, and environmental protection perspectives. This begins to address the need for coordinated and comprehensive U.S. maritime policies, but does not specifically address the Coast Guard’s role in national or international policy development.

**Evergreen I (#4b):** *Lead government and private sector maritime stakeholders in development of maritime safety and security strategies.* While this was specifically addressing strategies, National Strategies can and do influence national policy. U.S. policy can also influence international policy.
Strategic Change Management

**Strategy**
Manage continuous and accelerating change as a fundamental factor of mission performance, to improve service agility and close the gap between strategic intent and execution.

**Future State**
The Coast Guard has the competencies and the capacity to anticipate and quickly adapt itself to accelerating global change – across leadership cycles and without detracting from current operations.

**Strategic Rationale – Key Future Driving Factors**
Workshop participants anticipated a future marked by accelerating change across all operating environments – there is likely to be more change in the next 20 years than in the previous 100. The maritime domain will become increasingly complex, and the incidence of major events and industry advances will increase and accelerate. There will be greater use and competition for resources. Demand for Coast Guard services will grow, but may also shift or abruptly change. There will likely be increased competition for traditional Coast Guard roles and the Service will be under a great deal of pressure to deliver ever more complex and specialized services.

Participants largely concurred that it will be critical for the Coast Guard to become a more agile organization whose organic capacity for perception, decision, response, and follow-through will be keys to success. Anticipating, planning, managing, and building human capital around “change” were explicit, primary strategies emerging from multiple worlds, and testing robustly across all worlds.

The exercise of envisioning alternate futures created a strong, shared understanding that current state of change in the Coast Guard was in reality a permanent state of change, not a discrete set of initiatives that, once “accomplished,” would lead to tranquil seas on the other side. The underlying strategic discussion, in most worlds, revolved around processes and capacity necessary to sustain change as a fundamental factor of mission performance, without consuming the Coast Guard workforce or degrading current mission performance.

Spring 2007 Workshop participants indicated that having the ability to manage change was essential to the implementation of several of the Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS) strategic priorities. The participants believed that as change accelerates and complexity increases, a reactive approach becomes untenable. The participants also indicated that an evolving MDA system would have to be anticipatory to ensure that decision makers could more rapidly adapt to changing conditions. The participants also discussed the need to attract and retain a workforce that is not only comfortable with change, but thrives on it.

**Implementation Considerations**
Organizational direction should be informed by a future-thinking process that builds strategic intent for the enterprise. Through planning and execution, core strategic ideas
should eventually shape structure, function, and performance. However, many significant enterprise “course corrections” (and redirections) occur outside the strategy and planning cycle. They occur when opportunities and challenges prompt leadership decisions that have lasting impact on the enterprise. Leaders can be most confident in making these decisions when 1) they have already formed shared strategic intent about the future of the Coast Guard, and 2) they know and appreciate the capacity of the organization for change.

Capacity for change is not free. To build a more agile organization, leadership must provide adequate resources at all required levels of the organization (e.g., sufficient staffing, money, time, etc.) in order to successfully manage change. Managing change by “matrix teams” is usually less successful because these “one time” efforts do not leave in place systems for monitoring, follow-up, and adjustment. Constant staffing of “one-off” change efforts out of current operations and program staffs also can put current operations at risk. Participants strongly identified the risk of transformation fatigue and distraction.

The Service should avoid creating a “Change Office” where the expectation becomes that change happens only at headquarters. This could provide an excuse for other elements of the organization to be less adaptable and accountable (“Change is their job – not mine.”). Building an organizational capacity and aptitude for change will require a more organic approach that is continuously underway within Coast Guard systems at all levels of the organization. However, some component of the organization should track enterprise-wide change initiatives and advise senior leaders on the way ahead.

This is new, and Coast Guard members are just beginning to think about such change management as a “factor of performance” and not a “distracter from performance.” The ability to anticipate change and quickly adapt will be a critical success factor for the organization across all future operating environments considered. Implementation considerations include:

- Implementation of the *The Best Team* and *The Right Skills* strategies is essential to obtaining or developing the competencies and capacity needed.

- An essential building block for change is decision-making. Accelerating change in the maritime environment and strategic change management (agility) both point to significantly more decisions than the Coast Guard is culturally used to. They will come at leadership faster, and will likely be made within a context of strategic intent but without exhaustive analysis. The Coast Guard currently grows decision-making skills of individuals through operational practice; there must also be an analogue that grows skills through strategic practice. The organization’s basic decision making processes may need overhaul and new decision-support tools must be developed.

- Another essential component of change is follow-through. “Idea starters” are essential, but equally important are “idea finishers” (i.e., those who can implement, follow up, and adjust).

- More closely linked sourcing to strategy and strategic decisions will be necessary to increase program responsiveness.

- Implementation suggests the importance of planning, but also a certain “lightness” in planning processes – with room for incremental testing and refining of decisions.
• Implementation of this strategy is linked to the *Communications Excellence* strategy. The Coast Guard “brand” should portray an organization that anticipates, embraces, and readily adapts to change – this should be seen as part of the Coast Guard’s culture. This should also be understood and valued by the workforce and recognized by Coast Guard stakeholders and the general public.

• Maintaining the Coast Guard’s core identity is important and is related to communicating value of portfolio management/mission integration. Most importantly, the Coast Guard must ensure that mission execution is not degraded while change is occurring.

**Lineage to Long View and Evergreen I**

While *Long View* did not produce any strategies regarding change management, the three *Evergreen I* strategies (9-11) that are within the strategic imperative, “*Position the Coast Guard to act with strategic intent in a complex and uncertain environment*” closely support this new strategy.

**Evergreen I (#9):** Institutionalize strategic thinking to link all activities and investments to broader organizational objectives.

**Evergreen I (#10):** Develop a requirements-driven human resources system to ensure continuous alignment of competencies (skill, knowledge, and aptitude) with organizational needs.

**Evergreen I (#11):** Employ an acquisition and logistics process that supports the continuous assessment of all requirements to optimize the availability of appropriate resources and capabilities.
Mission Portfolio Management

**Strategy**
Manage Coast Guard missions as an integrated portfolio that optimizes the interrelationships between safety, security, and stewardship, improves operational agility, and manages risk to maximize total service delivery.

**Future State**
The Coast Guard’s multi-mission character is central to the identity of its workforce. Its mission portfolio is widely valued by stakeholders as a mutually reinforcing set of authorities, resources, and capabilities that effectively manages risk and provides superior service to the public.

**Strategic Rationale – Key Future Driving Factors**
Participants believed that it will be critical for the Coast Guard to develop into a more agile organization that can anticipate changing requirements and rapidly adapt its mission portfolio to match those requirements. “Mission portfolio management” was not coined by any one world, but the term captures a common line of thinking expressed by many participants in multiple worlds. Mission portfolio management begins with the traditional multi-mission nature of the Coast Guard. What is different, however, is a much more sophisticated understanding of how authorities, competencies and capacities interrelate; a greater awareness of when external demands are changing; and a greater dynamism in surging or easing effort into and out of mission areas, without losing competencies or constituencies. The idea reflects our multi-mission character made more dynamic – where level of effort and nature of effort are in constant, thoughtful adjustment. Unity of effort within the Coast Guard will be critical to success. Efficiency will be highly valued in U.S. government organizations and those that can consistently demonstrate value and efficiency will get the needed resources to continue to operate.

Spring 2007 Workshop participants indicated that a multi-mission service must have a more agile human resources component to meet the demands of a dynamic operating environment. This strong “signal” from the Spring Workshops suggested the addition of a new strategic priority (Developing Foundational Human Resource Capabilities) that cuts across all six of the current Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS) strategic priorities and that would enable the Coast Guard to recruit, retain, train, and grow the workforce needed for successful mission execution. This concept and the discussions surrounding it closely match the mission portfolio concept, and suggest that attention to our workforce will be one of the key implementation considerations.

**Implementation Considerations**
The Coast Guard will initially need to consider the cultural and organizational changes necessary to achieve the dynamism needed to manage a multi-mission portfolio. A culture of “jointness” must be created within the organization. Such jointness is not something that is simply “implemented” – it must be taught, grown, and fostered throughout the workforce and each member’s career. This will be a challenge in a workforce that is tending towards specialized skills. This strategy suggests avoiding “closed specialties”
within the Coast Guard – or at least managing specialization so that the workforce is grown to achieve multi-mission identity by mid-career.

The organization must determine where and by whom the portfolio will be managed as well as what processes will be used and what tools and metrics will be needed for measurement and evaluation. Internal and external communications will be critical to not only informing the workforce and stakeholders, but also obtaining feedback and input that can be used in making intentional, thoughtful decisions about the mix of effort in our missions. The service will need to be anticipatory rather than constantly reacting to changes in the external environment with hard shifts in mission emphasis. This will require stronger capabilities in risk assessment, trend analysis, and contingency planning.

Additional implementation considerations include:

- The strategy requires that regular, recurring strategic planning processes be aligned with the budget cycle to enable the portfolio management process to better influence planning, budgeting, and execution.

- The strategy presumes development of tools and processes for decision makers to understand system performance across all missions and understand the full constituency impact of “portfolio” actions. Ideally, there would be a measure for “total service delivery” that can be reported to OMB and GAO to fulfill Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requirements, Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) review, or future performance management requirements.

- In addition to using established advisory committees, the Service should consider creating a “Board of Advisors” that cuts across external constituencies.

- Success requires that the Service establish/earn buy-in with political constituencies (authorizers and appropriators) as well as within DHS for the integrity and utility of the Coast Guard’s mission portfolio.

- Coast Guard missions must be “deconstructed” and synergies identified beyond just service delivery (i.e., multi-mission platforms). The Service must strive to understand cross-mission synergies in: operations, cost, authorities, awareness and fusion, partnerships, and workforce scalability/surge; and, strive to really understand, with a “business eye,” the value of being multi-mission.

- This strategy is complementary to the Strategic Change Management strategy and cuts across the entire Evergreen II strategy set.

**Lineage to Long View and Evergreen I**

“Mission portfolio management” is really a significant “second spiral” to the O & M merger strategies started in Long View, and carried through Evergreen I.

**Long View (#2) – Shift from a program-focused approach to mission planning and execution to an integrated cross-programmatic approach that better serves the nation** – This set the stage for the idea of portfolio management. This strategy called for integrated mission planning and execution with a very straightforward objective – eliminating gaps and overlaps, primarily at the Headquarters level. While this merger was not acted on for many years, it is now nearly complete. The Long View strategy does not, however, fully
address the sophistication required in the concept of portfolio management across all missions. Rather, it represents an incremental improvement by breaking down some of the stovepipes that existed within the organization.

**Long View (#3)** – *Institute a geographically based unified command structure that can plan and execute diverse mission simultaneously.* This strategy was directed specifically at the field-unit level of the organization and the creation of what are now sector commands. This, and the above strategy, has helped to breakdown some organizational stovepipes and has begun to move the organizational culture away from one where individuals identify more with their specific program, than with the larger organization – but the Coast Guard has a long way to go to creatively and dynamically manage this new organization.

**Evergreen I (#9):** *Institutionalize strategic thinking to link all activities and investments to broader organizational objectives.*

**Evergreen I (#10):** *Develop a requirements-driven human resources system to ensure continuous alignment of competencies (skill, knowledge, and aptitude) with organizational needs.*

**Evergreen I (#11):** *Employ an acquisition and logistics process that supports the continuous assessment of all requirements to optimize the availability of appropriate resources and capabilities.*
MDA 2.0

**Strategy**

Provide leadership for the development of an integrated global maritime domain awareness system where certified and validated information provides a comprehensive understanding of risk and enables effective mission execution.

**Future State**

Global maritime stakeholders use readily available, dynamic, and trusted knowledge to improve decision making, decrease decision time, and optimally employ resources.

**Strategic Rationale – Key Future Driving Factors**

With the exponential growth of technology, coupled with unprecedented levels of innovation and the increasing complexity of the maritime domain, the workshop participants anticipated the Coast Guard and other partners/stakeholders would soon become inundated with information. They believed it will be imperative for MDA to move beyond data collection and toward an evolving and innovative system that will analyze and process an overwhelming amount of information into reliable, actionable knowledge that can be easily used by decision-makers. They believed this ability to base decisions upon knowledge and understanding (vice raw or no data) would lead to much greater operational effectiveness.

The workshop participants were also particularly concerned with cyber security and the challenge of validating and verifying data. They believed that illicit groups will likely take advantage of rapidly advancing technology to introduce spoofing, jamming, deception, and electronic forgery into the vast amounts of data the Coast Guard and its partners will collect through the MDA program. As a result, information security and assurance processes will become increasingly more important in ensuring that decisions are made based on verifiable, validated, and secure knowledge.

One can find numerous analogies being worked on today that evoke this type of concept. They include social networks (such as MySpace, FaceBook, and LinkedIn), early warning mass broadcasts (such as Amber Alerts), personalized content broadcasts (such as RSS feeds), and mashups (web applications that combine data from more than one source into a single integrated tool). The common feature they share is they are using innovative approaches to process and disseminate rapidly changing information in a focused personalized manner.

In the Spring 2007 Workshops, MDA was seen as critical across the full range of Coast Guard roles (safety, security, stewardship) in all of the scenarios’ operating environments. Participants expressed concern with the proliferation of data and the resulting difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of information. They indicated that MDA needed to be raised to a significantly more mature level. This included having full underwater awareness, global reach, small vessel awareness, anticipatory capabilities, information assurance/management processes, and data fusion/analysis capabilities that will result in improved decision making. Participants also emphasized the human
component to MDA - developing cultural/language competencies and establishing relationships/partnerships (public/private sector; national and international) through exchanges, fellowships, and liaison positions as an essential means to collect information for MDA purposes.

**Implementation Considerations**

In implementing this strategy, it must be recognized that MDA will be an ever-evolving system that adapts and is constantly updated to keep pace with requirements, technological advances, innovative approaches, emerging threats, and new data sources. It should be driven by and integrated into the Coast Guard’s operations/business processes as it will be difficult to determine what is considered worthwhile knowledge without an understanding of how the information will assist the decision maker(s) in mission execution. This effort should focus on how the Coast Guard uses and shares data versus focusing on new data collection. A “need to share” approach should be encouraged more so than one based on “need to know.”

Recognizing that knowledge and understanding, which depend largely upon intuition, experience, and training, are essential to achieving MDA, the workshop participants noted that developing critical competencies and leveraging key partnerships will be as important as obtaining capabilities in the quest for MDA.

Additional implementation considerations include:

- As increasingly more information is collected and shared, additional regimes may be required to address issues regarding privacy concerns and proprietary information.

- Information assurance and security processes must be incorporated into the system. The means to trace and verify sources of information must be developed to mitigate spoofing of the system.

- Implementation of this strategy must take into account the Intelligent Technology Acquisition and 21st Century Partnerships strategies.

- MDA will also be a critical component of implementing the Polar Mission Capacity and Underwater Mission Development strategies.

- The private sector will look to the Coast Guard for leadership and direction in the consistent and secure use of MDA. This will be driven by commercial applications of MDA as well as government use of MDA to ensure regulatory compliance. Ensuring a fair and predictable competitive environment will be critical, along with the protection of personal and proprietary information.

**Lineage to Long View and Evergreen I**

This strategy validates and reinforces the earlier MDA work in Long View and Evergreen I. In many ways this strategy reflects a maturation of the previous MDA strategies. What is different is this concept anticipates that new computing technologies and innovative approaches will allow the Coast Guard to process vast amounts of data, validate and verify it, look for anomalies, find linkages across countless data sources and databases, anticipate
future behavior, and then present knowledge to the decision-maker in a timely and usable manner. The previous strategies were:

**Long View (#4):** Acquire full maritime domain awareness.

**Evergreen I (#4a):** Lead the inter-agency establishment of requirements for maritime-relevant intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and observation systems that support homeland security, maritime safety and mobility, and natural resources protection.

**Evergreen I (#5):** Lead a partnership of maritime stakeholders to ensure appropriate access to integrated systems, sensors, intelligence, information and analysis of maritime activities and conditions to gain a complete operating picture of the U.S. Maritime Domain.
Polar Mission Capacity

**Strategy**

Develop policy and expand capacity to project U.S. sovereign maritime presence in the Arctic and to protect and advance U.S. interests in the Polar Regions.

**Future State**

The Coast Guard has the ability to adapt to the changing environment and increasing activity in the Polar Regions. It readily accomplishes its missions in the Arctic and Antarctic and is recognized as a leader in maritime polar operations and policy.

**Strategic Rationale – Key Future Driving Factors**

Workshop participants noted that over the next 25-30 years receding Arctic ice will likely result in increasing areas available to navigation including increasing access to energy resources. Receding Arctic ice has already led to longer navigational seasons and increased maritime activity, particularly in relation to energy extraction. In the U.S. Arctic in 2008, petroleum leases that were expected to garner bids of approximately $800 million instead brought bids in excess of $2.6 billion. Oil companies are currently investing in large fleets for energy exploration and development. Shell Oil is ready to deploy an extensive fleet to the U.S. Arctic, but must await the outcome of litigation over potential environmental impacts. There are also increases in vessel transits associated with land-based mineral extraction in the Arctic and increases in cruise ship visits to both Polar Regions. This increasing human activity brings increased risk of maritime accidents, pollution from spills and vessel emissions, and other potential environmental degradation. The Arctic is also characterized by unsettled maritime boundaries, such as the Canadian/U.S. maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea; by jurisdictional disputes, including the Canadian/U.S. dispute over the status of waters in the Northwest Passage; and by unresolved jurisdictional claims over the Extended Continental Shelf. Russia, Canada, and even some non-Arctic nations, including China and Korea, are building icebreakers and ice-reinforced vessels as part of efforts to increase their presence and influence in the Arctic.

Currently, the Antarctic Treaty limits military presence in the Antarctic region, but increasing global demand for resources is already being accompanied by greater pressure on nations to assert their territorial claims to the continent and tap into this region’s vast economic potential. While the “tyranny of distance” continues to maintain a fragile peace in Antarctica, rising energy costs are likely to put pressure on treaty agreements in the foreseeable future.

Workshop participants recognized that changes in the Polar Regions will have a significant impact on the Coast Guard’s responsibilities, particularly in the Arctic. As this unique domain becomes more accessible to shipping, resource exploitation, and other activities, the Coast Guard must be ready to execute all of its missions in a region characterized by minimal infrastructure and an often harsh, unpredictable operational environment. Increasing vessel traffic will likely be accompanied by an increasing need for waterways management, maritime domain awareness, enforcement of laws and treaties, marine safety and security, environmental protection and response, search and rescue, and support of research activities.
Evergreen II Project Report

There was extensive discussion of polar operations during the Spring 2007 Workshops. Participants generally indicated that the development of polar capabilities and competencies would be critical to implementing several of the strategic priorities within the Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS). In fact, concerns over the current lack of polar capabilities and competencies played a large part in the articulation of two additional strategic priorities: Developing Foundational Human Resource Capabilities and Linking Acquisition of Platforms and Technology to Strategy.

Implementation Considerations

The workshop participants’ recognition of the need to develop Arctic policy has proven to be exceptionally prescient. Two major Arctic policy initiatives have been completed since the workshops, and a third initiative aimed at broader national ocean policy will also impact U.S. Arctic policy. In January 2009, President Bush signed NSPD-66/HSPD-25, “Arctic Region Policy”, which establishes U.S. national policy priorities in the Arctic. In April 2009, Arctic Council nations, including the United States, approved the recommendations contained in the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), a comprehensive assessment of the future impacts of increased human activity in the Arctic maritime domain with accompanying recommendations for environmental protection and sustainable development. These events dramatically changed the Arctic policy landscape and provided extensive guidance on U.S. domestic and international policy priorities in the Arctic. A third initiative, announced by President Obama in June 2009, establishes an Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force to develop recommendations concerning a new national ocean policy, a strengthened ocean governance framework, and a framework for effective coastal and marine spatial planning.

Guided by these policy developments, implementation of this strategy also requires identifying and expanding the resource capacity needed to project U.S. maritime presence and protect and advance U.S. interests in Polar Regions. Implementation of this strategy will be resource-intensive and require significant lead time. In addition to the competencies that would be required, construction of new icebreakers, aircraft, and shore facilities will likely be needed. A 2006 National Academy of Sciences report, “Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs” concluded that the U.S. needs three multi-mission icebreakers and one single-mission icebreaker (Antarctic re-supply). The report recommended that the U.S. immediately begin to program, design, and construct two new polar icebreakers to replace CGC POLAR SEA and CGC POLAR STAR (currently in caretaker status) and that the new ships should be operated by the U.S. Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard is currently conducting a High Latitude Mission Analysis Report to identify the appropriate mix of resources needed to implement NSPD-66 policy priorities, to respond to AMSA recommendations for the Arctic, and to effectively meet future mission requirements in the Polar Regions. In addition, the Coast Guard has increased its Arctic Domain Awareness C-130 flights and, beginning in 2008, is establishing seasonal forward operating locations and deploying additional assets to the U.S. Arctic to inform decisions on future resource requirements for Arctic mission execution. The results of these initiatives will drive future decisions on Coast Guard Polar Region resource requirements, including icebreakers. In the interim, the Coast Guard must continue to take steps necessary to place the two Coast Guard Polar Class icebreakers in operational status and maintain that status until future Polar Region resource needs are determined and acquired.
The National Science Foundation (NSF) controls the funding for Coast Guard icebreaker operations. The Coast Guard is currently working with NSF and Congress to return funding for the Polar icebreakers to the Coast Guard. However, the arrangement that currently exists does not allow the Coast Guard to exercise full control over its polar icebreakers and thus to implement operational priorities related to the growing Coast Guard role of safety, security, and stewardship in the Arctic. It is critical that the Coast Guard continue to seek the return of its full polar icebreaker funding.

Additional implementation considerations include:

- Due to the unique nature of operating in the high latitude regions, the Coast Guard will need to foster a cadre of polar-capable personnel through recruiting, education, outreach programs, training, and operational experience (this must be part of implementation of the *The Best Team* and *The Right Skills*).

- The strategy requires work with interagency partners to improve governance related to the Polar Regions, especially the Arctic. These partnerships must be expanded to work internationally with Arctic nations and the Arctic Council and other international bodies to improve crewing, classification, and safety for the polar marine transportation system. (See *Advancing Global Maritime Governance* strategy.)

- Continued support for U.S. accession to the *United National Convention on the Law of the Sea* is needed to ensure a seat at the table as the Arctic nations resolve disputes and claims, and develop new regimes for the high latitudes.

- The Service must continue to remind Congress of the risks involved in relying on leased foreign icebreakers to re-supply U.S. bases on Antarctica.

- Implementation of the *MDA 2.0* and *Intelligent Technology Acquisition* strategies can help by improving Coast Guard polar capabilities through the use of technology (e.g., sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), and satellite imagery)

- Construction of nuclear powered heavy icebreakers needs to be considered. They are a much better match for the *A Green Coast Guard* strategy and they allow for more power and extended endurance. A partnership with the U.S. Navy for nuclear engineers to serve aboard the icebreakers, with either active duty personnel or Military Sealift Command civilian mariners, would help to achieve this aim. It would also help the USN expand its nuclear assignment portfolio beyond nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines.

**Lineage to Long View and Evergreen I**

There were no *Long View* strategies that can be directly linked to polar operations, but one of the *Evergreen I* strategies, while more broadly focuses, does have at least an Arctic component.

*Evergreen I* (#8): Control and respond to air, surface, and subsurface activities from the inland waterways to the seaward boundary of the EEZ to protect and enhance the safe and legitimate use of the U.S. Maritime Domain.
Underwater Mission Development

**Strategy:**
Define the underwater responsibilities of the Coast Guard, build knowledge, and expand applicable Coast Guard missions into the underwater portion of the maritime domain.

**Future State:**
The Coast Guard anticipates emerging technology and commercial applications in the underwater environment and has the needed authorities, capabilities, competencies, and partnerships to fulfill its safety, security, and stewardship roles.

**Strategic Rationale – Key Future Driving Factors**
The workshop participants generally believed that technological, commercial, military, and scientific advances over the next 25 years will significantly change the way humans interact with the underwater environment. These changes will in turn shift what has been primarily a sparsely traveled and military-dominated environment into one populated by often conflicting commercial, recreational, scientific, military, and even criminal uses.

Advances in manned submarines, remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) will provide humans with greater access to the underwater environment. Today, a small number of luxury and tourist submarines routinely operate underwater, but in the future there are expected to be a growing number of commercial, recreational, and illicit submarines with a wide range of capabilities transiting the waters surrounding the U.S. While UUVs are decades behind unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), they are rapidly advancing in both capabilities as well as in numbers, and provide a cost-effective and safe way for humans to operate in this often harsh and inhospitable environment.

Another prominent underwater development will be the continued growth of an expanding set of undersea infrastructure, both on the outer continental shelf and interconnecting the continents. Today, this infrastructure includes undersea fiber optic communication cables, offshore energy production facilities, and oil and gas pipelines. In the future, it is anticipated that this infrastructure will assume even greater economic, political, and military value, as it expands to include electrical transmission lines, unconventional energy production (e.g., wind, current, tidal, thermal, etc.), undersea resorts, seabed mining, and aquaculture facilities. Workshop participants indicated that the Coast Guard will likely be required to conduct/participate in assessments of environmental and navigational impacts of underwater infrastructure and operations.

As commercial and recreational undersea uses expand, many of the Coast Guard’s missions will, by necessity, include an underwater component. In one scenario, **Lockdown**, there was much discussion of the need to establish undersea tracking and monitoring networks for MDA purposes, while recognizing the application of this capability to a variety of missions. These missions will include protecting underwater infrastructure, suppressing underwater smuggling, safeguarding undersea and seabed resources, providing or overseeing underwater search and rescue, implementing and
enforcing safety regulations for manned and unmanned underwater vehicles/structures, and establishing underwater waterways management regimes.

Many of the participants in the Spring 2007 Workshops recognized the growing importance of the underwater realm and the Coast Guard’s potential future role. Their ideas included developing an underwater component of MDA, amending Coast Guard authorities to specifically include underwater responsibilities, and acquiring equipment and developing competencies to conduct underwater inspections, provide security, and conduct or oversee underwater search and rescue.

**Implementation Considerations**

The first step in implementing this strategy is to define what underwater responsibilities the Coast Guard will have. This must be done in concert with other agencies that have equities in the underwater portion of the maritime domain (e.g., the U.S. Navy (USN), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Minerals Management Service (MMS), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), etc.). This step alone will require the Coast Guard to grow or acquire a cadre of personnel with underwater knowledge, experience, and competencies that it may not currently have. This must be part of implementing *The Best Team* and *The Right Skills* strategies.

Other implementation considerations include:

- The strategy requires that the Coast Guard develop and acquire undersea sensors and equipment (e.g., UUVs), and develop doctrine for using them. Partnerships with the USN and scientific community must also be developed to tap into technology and training for underwater operations.

- The Coast Guard should play a vital role in coordinating and developing the regimes and authorities that will govern underwater activities.

- The Coast Guard’s ability to anticipate, build, and sustain the needed private and public sector partnerships and influence international regulations and policies will also be important implementation considerations and must be considered when implementing the *21st Century Partnerships* strategy.

- Implementing this strategy may be costly in both dollars and the time needed to develop the authorities, capabilities, competencies, and partnerships needed. However, some, if not many, of the authorities already exist. The Coast Guard is already responsible for at least some aspects of maritime safety, security, and stewardship in the underwater portion of the U.S. maritime domain. For example, the implementing regulation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 100, states:

  - § 101.110 (Applicability): *Unless otherwise specified, this subchapter applies to vessels, structures, and facilities of any kind, located under, in, on, or adjacent to waters subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.; and,*

  - § 101.400 (Enforcement): *(a) The rules and regulations in this subchapter are enforced by the COTP under the supervision and general direction of the District Commander, Area Commander, and the Commandant.* ...
• Lag time for developing underwater mission capabilities may be substantial, so initial implementation activities should begin soon.

**Lineage to Long View and Evergreen I**
This strategy can basically be considered a new strategy, even though *Evergreen I* strategy #8 (below) addresses the ability to control and respond to activity in the underwater (subsurface) portion of the maritime domain. However, the Coast Guard has done very little to position itself to realize underwater capabilities and that portion of the strategy statement has been largely ignored.

*Evergreen I* (#8): “Control and respond to air, surface, and subsurface activities from the inland waterways to the seaward boundary of the EEZ to protect and enhance the safe and legitimate use of the U.S. Maritime Domain.”
The Best Team

**Strategy**
Develop a dynamic human resources system that anticipates organizational needs and has the agility and flexibility to quickly provide the capacity and competencies required in a constantly changing environment.

**Future State**
The Coast Guard consistently fields a team whose competencies match the current and future needs of the organization.

**Strategic Rationale – Key Future Driving Factors**
Workshop participants foresaw the Coast Guard in a future world marked by accelerating change, increasing complexity and sophistication in the maritime domain, and the potential for rapid variations in mission emphasis. To be a successful multi-mission service in this dynamic and challenging environment, the Coast Guard will need an agile human resources component. This component must be able to anticipate mission shifts, readily utilize a wide range of innovative employment options, and ultimately field a workforce of sufficient size with the skills and capacity needed to meet emerging demands. This is not simply having the traditional ability to “surge” forces as needed. Instead it is about being able to anticipate or quickly react to changes in the external environment, identify the skills required, and flow or ease competencies and capacity into and out of mission areas. This is the “people” component to Mission Portfolio Management. The real or perceived inability to consistently put forth the optimal workforce for any environment will greatly impair mission execution, adversely impact the level of confidence that the public and stakeholders have in the service, and could result in the transfer of missions (and resources) to organizations that are deemed more capable and responsive.

Participants also addressed workforce dynamics and acknowledged that future economic and labor markets may present significant challenges for Coast Guard human resource managers. Lucrative opportunities in the private sector may be abundant and military/government service may not be viewed as desirable. The next generation workforce may have a culture of “free agency” where long-term loyalty to an organization is an anachronism. Significant amounts of resources will be invested in members the organization desires to retain, but who may ultimately decide to leave the service and seek other opportunities. There were also concerns that the “up-or-out” model will not work, as the high performers will likely take their skills and experience elsewhere, leaving behind an organization with a lower quality workforce. As the external environment demands the ability to constantly adapt to change, workshop participants were adamant that the Coast Guard must have an agile human resources system that can successfully meet the challenges ahead.

In the Spring 2007 Workshops, human resource issues were unanimously viewed as critical in the eyes of the workshop participants and were seen as the foundation for the successful implementation of all six strategic priorities in the Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS). Participants indicated that the Coast
Guard must have the capability to regularly assess workforce needs in a challenging and dynamic environment. In particular, they emphasized that the service must also have the authority and flexibility to obtain critical skills and competencies through a variety of pathways (e.g., lateral entry and direct commission programs, recruiting technical/cultural/language expertise within and outside the U.S., and experience gained outside of the organization).

**Implementation Considerations**

Human resources policies and procedures often require a greater lead time for implementation than operational processes and almost always have an impact on the organization’s culture. As this strategy cuts across virtually the entire Evergreen strategy set, near-term implementation is essential to the successful implementation of the other strategies. Additional implementation considerations include:

- Innovative, customized programs will be required to readily reach out and obtain personnel with needed skills (e.g., technological expertise, language fluency, cultural savvy, mediation/negotiation skills, business acumen, etc.), while still maintaining Coast Guard core values and culture.

- Measurement tools, and adequate planning and analysis staffing, are necessary to anticipate future organizational needs and look at long-term performance of human resources policies, programs, and procedures.

- The future will require recruitment and utilization of Reservists, Auxiliarists, retirees, and former service members who possess skills/competencies needed to achieve strategic objectives (e.g., language skills, ties to public or private sector stakeholders, and positions of influence within the community).

- Improved alignment and integration of the recruit, assign, educate, train, and retain functions will be critical. The Service must recognize that these functions have operational (near-term) and strategic (future) components.

- Unintentional disincentives to recruitment and retention of personnel with needed competencies must be identified and eliminated.

- Innovative incentives for retaining members with critical skills (e.g., homestead options, extended tours, provided housing, flexible work hours, subsidized child care, etc.) must be considered.

- The inter-service transfer process from the other uniformed services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, NOAA Corps, and Public Health Service) must be streamlined to tap into highly skilled, service oriented people.

- Expansion of the Direct Commission Officer (DCO) and Reserve Officer Candidate Indoctrination (ROCI) programs in targeted specialties will assist in execution of this strategy.

- The Service should seek to expand the Coast Guard Reserve end strength to match the capability requirements identified in the Contingency Personnel Requirements List (CPRL).
**Lineage to Long View and Evergreen I**

This strategy is very similar to several of the strategies that were developed during the Long View and Evergreen I iterations.

**Long View (#6):** Develop a flexible, dynamic human resources system that provides the capabilities essential for complex, diverse and multi-mission operations and management.

**Long View (#9):** Maintain critical focus on core Coast Guard missions by out-sourcing non-core functions where justified by analyses of all costs and benefits.

**Evergreen I (#9):** Institutionalize strategic thinking to link all activities and investments to broader organizational objectives.

**Evergreen I (#10):** Develop a requirements-driven human resources system to ensure continuous alignment of competencies (skill, knowledge, and aptitude) with organizational needs.

**Evergreen I End State (#10):** Technical and leadership competency requirements are based on current and future work and workloads, and we have systems in place that continually develop, allocate, and transform human capital accordingly.
The Right Skills

**Strategy**
Provide each component of the workforce a tailored career-long continuum of education, training, and professional experience that is linked to strategic objectives and desired organizational competencies, and obtained from both inside and outside the Coast Guard.

**Future State**
Both required technical and specialty experts and strategic leaders are produced and valued. Personnel make career development choices that benefit both themselves and the organization. The service demonstrates commitment to professional education and development.

**Strategic Rationale – Key Future Driving Factors**
Workshop participants envisioned a world in 2030 characterized by increasing complexity and sophistication in the maritime domain, more dynamic threats and challenges, shifting priorities, and a wider spectrum of domestic and foreign partners and stakeholders. It was recognized that in order to be a successful multi-mission organization in this rapidly changing world, the Coast Guard must have an education and training system that spans a member’s career, is aligned with strategic priorities, and provides the organizational competencies to achieve those priorities. Participants noted that a more complex and sophisticated maritime environment will require the Coast Guard to place greater value on developing a system that grows (and promotes) specialization and depth of knowledge in the workforce while also producing strategic leaders. In addition, they foresaw a much more networked and generally more globalized future where the ability to build and sustain expanded relationships (interagency, intergovernmental, public/private sector) would be vital to future mission execution. Participants articulated that Coast Guard personnel at all levels must have greater experience/understanding of joint-service/agency issues, international competencies (cultural savvy, language skills), and a more thorough understanding of private sector processes and concerns. Additional and expanded exchange programs, fellowships, and liaison billets were thought to be excellent initiatives to better prepare the service and its workforce for an uncertain future.

Spring 2007 Workshop participants identified human resource issues as the foundation for the successful implementation of all six of the strategic priorities in the *Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS)*. Participants generally agreed that expanded education and training programs would be particularly vital to the implementation of the *Achieving Awareness in the Maritime Domain, Enhancing Unity of Effort in Maritime Planning and Operations, Integrating Coast Guard Capabilities for National Defense*, and *Focusing International Engagement on Maritime Governance strategic priorities*. In particular, the participants stressed the need to expand education/training in foreign languages and cultural understanding as well as developing/expanding opportunities for joint education/training with other public and private sector entities. The project Core Team noted during the synthesis process that the
Coast Guard’s graduate school programs generally reflect near-term program needs and are not aligned with strategic outcomes (e.g., the Coast Guard only sends one member to graduate school each year for International Affairs).

**Implementation Considerations**

Human Resources policies and procedures often require a greater lead time for implementation than operational processes and almost always have an impact on the organization’s culture. As this strategy, like the previous one, impacts virtually all other strategies, near term implementation of *The Right Skills* is essential to the successful realization of all strategies. Additional implementation considerations include:

- Organizational leadership is essential to bring about the cultural shift necessary to drive this to implementation. Proof of the organizational commitment would have to be forcefully demonstrated to the workforce to change the perception that professional education and training is not valued as much as operational experience for advancement within the Coast Guard. It must be understood that appropriate professional education and training are vital to developing the required level of technical specialization as well as the strategic and critical thinking skills necessary to lead organizational change.

- The post of Coast Guard Chief Learning Officer (CLO) should be established, with responsibility, authority, and control of funding to manage and coordinate delivery of internal and external training and education programs and ensure they are tied to strategic outcomes.

- The Service must identify potential gaps where current education and training programs do not adequately take into account emerging strategic initiatives (e.g., expanded missions to polar and underwater environments) or new platforms and systems, and develop and deliver education and training programs to address those gaps and meet future needs.

- Professional education and training programs need to be linked to those of the Department and interagency partners to drive cooperation and interoperability in furtherance of Coast Guard and national strategic objectives.

- Industry training programs and professional education need to be expanded at commercial maritime training centers to improve the business acumen of Coast Guard members.

- Consideration should be given to starting a Coast Guard High School Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) program.

- Incentives can be offered for educational achievement, including earned degrees, licenses, or certificates (e.g., promotion points, cash bonuses, assignment preference, etc.).

- This strategy will require more “general detail” billets to allow members to pursue education and training full time during certain stages of their career.

- The number of joint military and joint interagency billets should be increased, and these assignments should be linked to promotions.
**Lineage to Long View and Evergreen I**

Although the concepts are generally implied in the work from *Long View* and *Evergreen I* (HR system linked to strategy), this should be considered a new strategy.

**Long View (#6):** Develop a flexible, dynamic human resources system that provides the capabilities essential for complex, diverse and multi-mission operations and management.

**Evergreen I (#9):** Institutionalize strategic thinking to link all activities and investments to broader organizational objectives.

**Evergreen I (#10):** Develop a requirements-driven human resources system to ensure continuous alignment of competencies (skill, knowledge, and aptitude) with organizational needs.

*Evergreen I End State (#10):* Technical and leadership competency requirements are based on current and future work and workloads, and we have systems in place that continually develop, allocate, and transform human capital accordingly.
Intelligent Technology Acquisition

Strategy
Employ a strategy-driven acquisition process that continually and systematically assesses and acquires new technology supporting integrated mission requirements.

Future State
The Coast Guard is able to rapidly identify and implement new technologies that provide the best value to support current and future mission needs.

Strategic Rationale – Key Future Driving Factors
The workshop participants believed that over the next 25 years it will be critical for the Coast Guard to be able to continuously evaluate new technologies and rapidly acquire those that provide the best value to meet the service’s current and future mission requirements. This was due to the belief that:

- Technology will continue to advance exponentially (processing power, miniaturization, autonomous vehicles/robotics, ubiquitous sensors, etc.).
- The life cycle of technologies will be increasingly shortened and will likely outpace the acquisition process (“technology stern chase” is exacerbated).
- There will be increased competition for the Coast Guard’s roles and responsibilities as well as increased budgetary pressure for the Coast Guard to accomplish its missions more efficiently.

In the year 2030, it was perceived that the Coast Guard will face an increasingly complex operating environment (e.g., larger mix of vessel technologies, greater use of the underwater domain, greater volume of maritime traffic, more competing uses for the maritime domain, and more sophisticated terrorist and smuggling operations). Coupled with an increased reliance on partnerships (information sharing, interoperable platforms), and technology as force multipliers (such as taking the search out of SAR), the integration of technologies, internal and external to the service, will be critical for the organization to gain the efficiencies (e.g., in personnel and costs) necessary to ensure successful mission execution.

The Spring 2007 Workshop participants indicated that the strategic management of platforms and technology acquisitions would be an imperative that spans and supports all six of the Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS) strategic priorities. The workshop participants believed the future operating environment would require the Coast Guard to evaluate, obtain, and sustain technological currency (leading edge/near leading edge capabilities and competencies), develop/streamline an acquisitions process that mitigates the “technology stern chase,” leverage R&D from all available sources (internal, DOD, commercial, etc.), and be interoperable with external partners.
Implementation Considerations

The workshop participants recognized that the increased integration of Coast Guard systems and technologies will require an in-depth knowledge of mission requirements, existing capabilities, and available resources. Additionally, the Coast Guard must have an organic ability to collaboratively develop requirements amongst program, resource, and product line managers; continuously assess new technologies (e.g., with recurring seed funding); evaluate alternatives; and make best-value determinations. This is the “things” (platforms, systems, and processes) piece of Mission Portfolio Management. To successfully implement this strategy, acquisitions must be optimized across missions to allow the Coast Guard to maximize total service delivery. The Service must also develop the tools to rapidly analyze new and emerging technologies for their potential application to the marine environment and to Coast Guard mission execution. Additional implementation considerations include:

- The Service must link and leverage R&D investment in technology assessment and technology development to inform future acquisition investments.
- Discipline must be exercised to devote adequate time and resources to the concept-development phases of major systems acquisitions, including competitive prototyping as appropriate.
- The strategy requires employment of an evolutionary acquisition process that accounts for changes to mission requirements and new technologies over the course of the development and production phases of a system’s acquisition.
- The Service should consider leasing short life-cycle C4IT systems whenever possible.
- Standardization of equipment and systems across the interagency, DOD, and state and local government should be attempted where possible. This should be part of implementing 21st Century Partnerships.
- Partnerships will help to tap into the R&D capabilities of DOD, the interagency, and industry to find technical solutions to current and emerging problems (e.g., UAVs, UUVs, satellite imagery, etc.).
- When possible, long-term manufacturer’s warranties should be required on new acquisitions.
- Novel funding sources, like public/private partnerships and fee-for-service, can help offset the high cost of major acquisitions.
- Better tools must be developed to show return on investment (ROI) in major acquisitions in terms of service delivery, recovery of contraband, prevention of adverse events, lives and property saved, etc.
- Better risk assessment and decision support tools will be needed to identify most critical areas for the Service to “buy down” risk through new acquisitions. These tools should also help identify the risks inherent in continuing to operate with outdated, unreliable, or obsolete equipment, systems, and infrastructure.
This was viewed as a cross-cutting strategy that is essential to the implementation of several other strategies including MDA 2.0, Polar Mission Capacity, Underwater Mission Development, A Green Coast Guard, and Communications Excellence.

**Lineage to Long View and Evergreen I**

This strategy differs from the Long View strategy (shown below), as it addresses the acquisition process for the full range of technologies that will be needed for future mission execution (not just IT).

**Long View (#8):** Develop a philosophy of information management and an information technology acquisition approach that leverages the best capabilities of the marketplace and the best practices of successful agencies and firms, and seek wherever possible to purchase the best systems the market has to offer rather than develop systems in house.

This strategy is quite similar to the Evergreen I strategy and end state listed below, but may go beyond the idea a bit in terms of supporting integrated mission requirements.

**Evergreen I (#11):** Employ an acquisition and logistics process that supports the continuous assessment of all requirements to optimize the availability of appropriate resources and capabilities.

**Evergreen I End State (#11):** Readiness standards are balanced between current and future mission needs, while acquisition and logistics systems continuously meet readiness standards.
Communications Excellence

**Strategy:**
Expand and professionalize a sophisticated, timely, internal and external communications capability that serves all stakeholders, supports mission execution, and shapes the strategic environment.

**Future State:**
The Coast Guard’s workforce embraces its culture, core values, and roles. The service cultivates a clear and consistent public understanding of its identity, multi-mission character, and the value it delivers. The Coast Guard’s internal and external communications are open, honest, responsive, and effective.

**Strategic Rationale – Key Future Driving Factors**
Workshop participants anticipated explosive growth of traditional and non-traditional media sources to the year 2030. They also expected an extraordinary increase in both the quantity and speed at which all manner of information will be conveyed. This context was present and critical in all worlds, even those with austere economies or where globalization had retreated. To ensure superior mission execution as well as the relevance of the Coast Guard, participants foresaw the need not only to adapt to this media and information environment, but to embrace it as a necessary part of operations. Participants generally agreed that the Coast Guard would need a wholly different communications capability that could inform public/stakeholder perceptions, protect and advance the Coast Guard “brand,” and shape the environment in which the Service operates.

Potential drivers that necessitate this strategy include an extremely difficult/competitive budgetary climate, anticipated demographic changes, and decreasing public appreciation of military/government service. Several worlds introduced stressful environments where the public became “suspect” of who they could trust and where they could find necessary information. Here, a Coast Guard “brand” – its reputation for honesty combined with its distributed structure (field-units embedded throughout local communities) create an advantage in serving the public good. However, this advantage hinged on effective, clear, and timely communication.

Spring 2007 Workshop participants discussed the importance of branding (although the image the Coast Guard wished to project varied with each of the worlds), but no action items were recommended. Discussion regarding communications was more operationally focused (secure, interoperable communications systems needed to implement *The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security and Stewardship*) rather than in a broader, strategic context.

**Implementation Considerations**
The central proposition of this strategy is not “spin” or manipulation of messaging. At a much more basic level, implementation of this strategy will require all levels of the Coast Guard to understand and work within the future media and information environment in
order to accomplish mission success and ensure the enduring value and relevance of the Service.

“Branding,” however, is important. The service must strategically project, and then actively manage, an accurate, compelling, and positive image of the Coast Guard both internally to its workforce and externally to the public and an increasingly wider spectrum of U.S. and international stakeholders. The Coast Guard will have to identify those key enduring and valued characteristics that make it “The World’s Best Coast Guard” and consistently articulate these characteristics internally and externally. The goal is the development of a “brand” where the Coast Guard’s image is so closely associated with public value that any reference to a Coast Guard mission results in a positive image for the service. Critical to this goal are the perceptions of the Coast Guard brand by its own workforce – a feeling of pride in and commitment to the broad set of missions within the Service. Clear service identity is important, both externally and internally, because the image of the Coast Guard cannot be dependent on a single, charismatic leader, but must be sufficiently robust and enduring to transcend leadership and personality styles. Doctrine and ethos are supporting components in implementing such branding.

The strategy also recognizes that operating in future environments will require a more sophisticated internal communications mechanism that includes rapid networking outside of hierarchies, access to policy formulation information at multiple locations, and better sharing of information internally as well as externally. There is a risk that the Coast Guard’s own workforce could get its information and be shaped by external channels because internal information flow is not sufficiently accurate, meaningful, or rapid. Strategic, honest, and responsive external communications will have their roots in superior internal communications.

Implementation will also mean improving how all levels of the Coast Guard talk and listen to the workforce. A culture of transparency, responsiveness, and self-critique translate into a service “personality” whose positive image is resilient.

Other implementation considerations include:

- Communications and social networks that skip across hierarchies to move information accurately and quickly, both internally and externally, should be encouraged.
- The Service needs to develop more sophisticated communications systems. Information must be readily accessible. Transparency, while vital, can’t be achieved solely through unsophisticated “push” methods.
- There is a need to significantly increase the capacity and develop/grow the competencies to implement this strategy. This is linked to The Best Team and The Right Skills strategies.
- The Service must be able to clearly define/identify the potential audience(s), establish strong linkages, and have the capability to shape the message as appropriate (link to 21st Century Partnerships strategy).
- Identification of and access to the most current communications tools will be critical (linked to Intelligent Technology Acquisition strategy).
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- Improved communications training and education will be vital. This should not just be for full time or collateral duty public affairs personnel; professionalizing the Coast Guard’s communications capability must include improving communication skills of the entire workforce.

- The Coast Guard’s youngest members (e.g., young seamen, petty officers, and cadets) need to be involved, to help identify current trends in social/new media and to design a communication system that takes full advantage of media outlets used by their generation.

Lineage to Long View and Evergreen I

This strategy advances the Long View strategy below in articulating the need to have a professionalized capability that is utilized to shape the external strategic environment.

Long View (Strategy #10): Cultivate and manage a clear and commanding public image of the Coast Guard’s identity, missions, and the value the service delivers to U.S. citizens in the performance of its missions.
A Green Coast Guard

**Strategy:**
Identify and mitigate the environmental impacts of Coast Guard activities, creating a “green Coast Guard” that is the example for environmental stewardship.

**Future State:**
Coast Guard platforms, facilities, and activities are seen as environmentally friendly and the service reaps the benefits of reduced life-cycle costs and favorable public opinion.

**Strategic Rationale – Key Future Driving Factors**
Across varied worlds the workshop participants saw increased complexity and use of the maritime environment, especially the U.S. EEZ and outer continental shelf, and the global maritime commons. Demand for Coast Guard activity increased in many worlds, while internationally the competition for resources was universal. Distinct environmental concerns emerged in several worlds, and environmental themes were apparent in a number of core strategies. In one scenario in particular, “Be Careful What You Wish For,” the need for a “green” Coast Guard was discussed extensively and the team even developed a “green” Coast Guard strategy. In the end, however, that strategy was not chosen by the team as one of the strategies to stress-test across the other four scenarios. A “green Coast Guard” was also part of a strategy developed in Congagement that was relatively robust.

In reviewing the strategies, the Evergreen Core Team detected a common environmental theme. The theme was consistent and strong enough that the Team synthesized a “green Coast Guard” strategy from the ideas put forward by the workshop participants. Workshop members, in subsequent rounds of validation scoring, determined the A Green Coast Guard strategy to be strong enough to stand on its own as a robust core action strategy.

The core strategic concept is that the Coast Guard must become more environmentally friendly in its operations and activities. In its role of maritime stewardship, the Coast Guard should set a positive example for others to follow. This will not only improve operational efficiency and give the Coast Guard an advantage in competition for limited budgets, but it will also engender respect domestically and at the international negotiating table.

Given the service lifespan of Coast Guard platforms and facilities, workshop participants and core team members believed that the organization should become a leader in adopting “green” technology and practices into any new design and construction projects. It will be much cheaper to incorporate “green” equipment and systems into the design and construction of new platforms and facilities, than to try to retrofit “green” solutions after they are built.

Finally, there is a very real risk that not being “green” could have adverse effects on the Coast Guard’s ability to carry out its future missions. Possible imposed future limits on
greenhouse gas emissions and carbon footprint could result in the Coast Guard having to limit the use of its platforms and facilities that do not comply with future standards. This could make it very difficult for the Coast Guard to operate as it might wish. If waivers are given to public platforms and facilities, the Coast Guard would still be able to operate as before, but the service would lose an important opportunity to lead by example and establish itself as a world-class protector of the environment.

There was limited discussion on this topic during the Spring 2007 Workshops. This was largely due to the fact that these workshops were designed specifically to stress test the Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS), which has no “green” strategy. In addition, the scenarios used in the Spring did not include the impacts of climate change to the degree that the Fall workshop scenarios did. Those impacts were added later when it became increasingly clear that climate changes could, very plausibly, impact the Coast Guard’s operating environment in the future.

**Implementation Considerations**

Implementation will require the Coast Guard, first, to determine its current environmental footprint, and subsequently, to develop a plan to mitigate impacts towards achievable goals without degrading operational effectiveness. The plan should emphasize the need to include environmental considerations in acquisition and construction processes. Every effort should be made to identify potential “green” components and systems during the design phase prior to initial construction – this will likely be far less expensive than retrofitting platforms and infrastructure.

Although green technology and construction may increase up-front costs, the life-cycle costs should decrease and these efficiencies may yield a competitive advantage to the Coast Guard when compared to other less environmentally friendly organizations. The Coast Guard should also recognize and take advantages of favorable public opinion that could translate into additional political support. There should also be a positive impact on the Coast Guard’s workforce, as becoming a recognized leader in environmentally sound operations can translate into positive recruiting and retention.

This strategy is linked to the Intelligent Technology Acquisition strategy in that a preference for “green” technology should become part of the evaluation and selection process envisioned by that strategy. In addition, a culture must be institutionalized within the workforce that values Service as an example of environmental stewardship.

Additional implementation considerations include:

- Implementing this strategy may be critical to the Coast Guard’s future ability to operate in the Arctic and Antarctic (link to Polar Mission Capacity strategy). Consider the use of nuclear propulsion for the next class of heavy polar ice breakers.

- Implementing the Communications Excellence strategy will be important in building an organizational culture that seeks out and values “green” alternatives as well as in shaping public and stakeholder perceptions of the service’s environmental stewardship.

- Implementing this strategy may bolster the Coast Guard’s efforts and effectiveness in implementing the Maritime Policy Engagement and Advancing Global Maritime Governance strategies.
The Right Skills strategy should include components that train workers on the benefits of being “green” and gives them tools to help them seek out and implement “green” solutions. This will help to institutionalize a culture that values being part of a “green” organization.

The Service should be a “fast follower” in adopting new and emerging “green” technologies. Once a new technology is proven effective and reliable, the Coast Guard should be one of the first agencies in government to adopt it.

Rapid implementation of this strategy is critical as the Coast Guard completes the Deepwater acquisition plan and as the Service replaces or repairs other aging infrastructure and platforms.

The Service needs to look for process solutions to reduce the Coast Guard’s carbon footprint. For example, telecommuting or video teleconferencing may eliminate the need for members to commute to work or meeting sites. Other examples include the use of environmentally friendly cleaning products, recycling, and the use of hybrid or alternative fuel vehicles for motor pools or shuttles – to name only a few.

**Lineage to Long View and Evergreen I**
This is a brand new *Evergreen* strategy. It was not mentioned in *Long View* or *Evergreen I*. 
2008 Maritime Industry Stakeholder Workshop
The Coast Guard hosted its first ever Evergreen Stakeholder Workshop from September 29 – October 1, 2008, at the Georgetown University Conference Center in Washington, DC. Thirty-seven private sector participants, representing various aspects of maritime industry as well as environmental/non-governmental organizations, participated in the workshop. Twelve Coast Guard senior officers and civilian employees also participated. Due to space limitations, not all stakeholder groups could be included in this session. Therefore, this initial effort focused on key elements of the transportation industry. The Coast Guard expects to hold additional workshops with different stakeholders in the future.

The workshop sought individual stakeholder insights into the opportunities and challenges that the maritime industry may face in the future, and the consequent roles and responsibilities they anticipated for the Coast Guard or the Federal Government.

In order to follow Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) guidelines, this workshop used a variation to the Evergreen process to elicit future-oriented insights but not policy or consensus recommendations. The workshop also lasted only 2.5 days (half the normal time) and the scope of the inquiry was limited accordingly.

The summary below provides some of the many insights from the workshop. These insights have been divided into two categories: Stakeholder Insights into the Future Operating Environment – that is, insights into the nature, challenges, and opportunities in the future maritime domain; and Future Stakeholder Expectations for the Coast Guard or Federal Government – that is, insights into future government roles, and the needs of stakeholders.

I. Stakeholder Insights into the Future Operating Environment
Participants anticipated a tremendous increase in the complexity and volume of activities in the maritime environment. While that is not a surprising insight, the details in the discussions were informative. The complexity of industry and growing use of the oceans were also a common insight across very different operating environments. Whether participants were given intense security concerns or a new era of peace; regardless of weak or strong economy; and in both a globalized and radically regionalized international order – all “worlds” saw growing use of the ocean.

While considering the complexity and expansion of activities in the future maritime environment, several themes emerged, often across different scenario “worlds:”

- The emergence of a vast array of new types of vessels, platforms, facilities, infrastructure, and associated users. In many cases, activities and operations will
occur in extreme climate, weather, and sea conditions resulting in significant impact and stress to the nation’s ports, waterways, and transportation choke points.

- The appearance of new trade routes and shifting supply chains – particularly in the Arctic.
- A significant increase in off-shore infrastructure and activity in concentrated areas.
- A greater number and concentration of people in the maritime setting, with an increased risk of catastrophic maritime/coastal incidents.
- Coastal, Great Lakes, and inland shipping may increase dramatically under certain conditions.
- Mobile (or re-locatable) inter-modal connections may take on very different forms in response to environmental or economic factors.
- The expansion of offshore activities (fixed, mobile, and undersea) by traditional and new industry sectors.
- The control and management of living marine resources may emerge as a critical national security issue.
- Environmental concerns, including climate change and its impacts, will likely influence future marine operations.
  - The growing demand for resources will likely put additional stresses on the maritime environment
  - The full value of environmental protection may not be accurately understood
- The pace of change in global business models and technology could place enormous burdens on the regulatory processes. Government regulatory processes (nationally and internationally) risk falling behind industry or becoming completely inadequate.
- Gaps and conflicts in regimes/regulatory processes, and the lack of governmental coordination in the U.S. and abroad, could lead to geographic and operational “seams” – areas where users could take advantage of the lack of strong governance to advance their own interests.
- There will likely be a blurring of activities that traditionally have been seen as distinct or separate (complicating employment issues, training, regulatory actions, jurisdictions, etc):
  - Work-leisure
  - Public-private
  - Cargo-passenger
- Complex and dynamic partnerships will be crucial to global activities. The foundation of successful partnerships will be comprised of diverse elements, including:
  - Social networking and diplomacy skills
  - The retention of the expertise that partners expect
  - Varied culture and language skills
  - Business knowledge and acumen
  - Public policy knowledge and acumen
- International governance will grow in its importance but will be under stress to stay relevant given:
  - The pace of technological change
  - The opening and closing of new trade routes
  - Local and global conflicts over maritime jurisdictions
  - The effects of climate change
  - Stresses on the fish stocks
II. Future Stakeholder Expectations for the Coast Guard and Federal Government

From their individual insights about future operating environments, participants identified expectations they would have for the Coast Guard (or more generally, the Federal Government). What follows are highlights from workshop discussions. Some are specific to a single “world,” but noteworthy. Most are synthesized across very different “worlds,” suggesting robustness.

- The practice of risk management will be critical to all future operations, public and private. However, risk management should expand its scope to include business, social, psychological, political, and in some cases even community issues while being multi-disciplinary in its focus and in the tools it employs. It may evolve into multi-disciplinary risk and opportunity management.
- Stakeholders will need Coast Guard and Federal Government leaders with greater business understanding. Global logistics and the complexity of the global maritime commercial setting will require that federal authorities develop greater insight into business needs and practices. The Coast Guard will need better business acumen in order to effectively collaborate and oversee maritime activity.
- Public-private partnerships and collaborative planning will be crucial to effective management of the marine transportation system. The Coast Guard and Federal Government should anticipate, build and sustain partnerships in preparation for a much more networked and globalized future.
- Maritime infrastructure will need to be more resilient in the future to withstand the impacts of both manmade and natural events. Rapid, well planned, and well supported recovery capabilities must augment this increased resiliency. Planning must encompass the global system.
- Stakeholders will need regulatory processes and outcomes in the maritime domain that can accommodate a rapid pace of change and even anticipate stakeholder needs. The Federal Government should improve these processes and better coordinate them to be mutually supporting across safety, security, environmental, and economic interests.
- Through the use of technology (including unmanned aerial vehicles and sensors), the Coast Guard and the Federal Government should extend its situational awareness in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Arctic region.
- The Coast Guard should have the capability and capacity to conduct all its missions in the Polar Regions.
- The Coast Guard and the Federal Government will need to accommodate maritime activity that pushes farther and farther offshore, into the EEZ and beyond.
- In both private and public sector human resource management, the “generalist versus specialist” tension will likely become more acute. Advances in technology (among many other things) require a greater depth of expertise. However, future demands for deft partnership activities and dynamic global negotiations will require wide ranging knowledge and aptitudes. Stakeholders will need government entities with both attributes.
- The Coast Guard will need to balance its domestic and international roles. While national security and the global reach of the maritime system can lead to greater international activity, Coast Guard and federal maritime authorities must continue to
• The private sector will look to the Coast Guard for leadership and direction in the consistent and secure use of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). This will be driven by commercial applications of MDA information as well as government use of MDA to ensure regulatory compliance. Ensuring a fair competitive environment will be critical.

• Complexity in the maritime domain will demand new approaches to de-conflicting competing uses. They should be clear, fair, and easy to understand. Users will need timely access to reliable information regarding vessel, port, and waterway activities.

• As the maritime environment becomes increasingly complex, the Coast Guard may be required to have a more direct role in infrastructure, port, and coastal planning (nationally, regionally, internationally). This will require new, more expansive and flexible public-private partnerships.

• The Jones Act (i.e., the U.S. law requiring U.S. flag for domestic shipping) was discussed in several of the “worlds.” Discussions reflected on specific aspects of each “world,” and led to differing recommendations on its role and possible modification. The role of the Jones Act in today’s context was not the focus of discussion.

With careful attention to relevant laws, the Coast Guard believes that conducting regular stakeholder workshops will be useful in a number of ways. These include:

• Broadening insights into on-going strategic thinking in the Service
• Providing a “future users” perspective to the challenges and opportunities to be faced
• Indicating potential new strategic actions
• Suggesting individual insights for refinements to current strategies
• Improving near-term actions for strategies currently being implemented
• Enriching the scenario development process in the years ahead
• Linking Coast Guard strategic planning with similar efforts by stakeholders
Phase IV – Strategy Implementation and Embedding Strategic Intent

The primary objectives of the fourth phase of the *Evergreen* cycle are to drive strategy to action and instill strategic intent within the Coast Guard. As represented earlier in the Cycle of Strategic Renewal, this phase is a continuous effort. During *Evergreen II*, several initiatives were undertaken to instill strategic intent within the Service.

2007 Mid-Grade Personnel Workshops

Two workshops were held in the spring of 2007; these were attended by approximately 150 junior-to-mid-grade officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel, as well as several Coast Guard Auxiliarists. One objective was to introduce these members to the *Evergreen* methodology and to institutionalize strategic thinking within the organization. The particular focus of these workshops, however, was a review of the recently released *The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS)*, which had incorporated insights developed in *Evergreen I* and *Long View*. Specifically, the participants conducted an analysis of the CGS’s six strategic priorities within the context of the *Evergreen* future “worlds”.

While the strategic priorities generally held up well under this analysis, participants provided ideas and insight as to how to make the CGS a more robust document with an eye to the potential 2030 operating environment. There were a total of 94 implementation action items proposed during the two workshops. Many of these directly supported the six strategies delineated in the CGS. Some of the action items, however, fell into two broad categories that seemed to underlie all six of the CGS strategies. These two additional strategic areas involved underscoring the importance of human resources as an enabler for virtually all the Coast Guard efforts into the future, and also pointed to the criticality of linking acquisition of platforms and new technologies to Coast Guard strategy.

Below is a summary of the insights captured during the workshops for each of the six strategic priorities in the CGS.

*Strengthen Regimes for the U.S. Maritime Domain*

The participants universally supported the concept of more sophisticated regimes (rule sets) to help govern the maritime domain. While U.S. policies are only a part of these regimes, they can frame the context for how the regimes will be developed and be enforced. There was also much discussion of the need for improved regimes in three specific dimensions: international governance (to the regional and global level), new geography (to include underwater and polar portions of the maritime domain), and threat (to include all threats and hazards). The first step in developing these new or modified regimes may be to develop or modify U.S. policies that address these dimensions.
Participants also believed that regime development processes will have to be more anticipatory in order to stay relevant with the rapid pace of change. In addition, there will be a need for personnel with skills in negotiations, partnering, languages, cultural understanding, and business acumen.

**Achieving Awareness in the Maritime Domain**

MDA was seen as critical across the full range of Coast Guard missions (safety, security, stewardship) in all of the scenarios’ operating environments. The Spring workshop participants expressed concern with the proliferation of data and the resulting difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of information. They indicated that MDA needed to be raised to a significantly more mature level. This included having full underwater awareness, global reach, small vessel awareness, anticipatory capabilities, information assurance/management processes, and data fusion/analysis capabilities for improved decision making. Participants also emphasized the human component to MDA - developing cultural/language competencies and establishing relationships/partnerships (public/private sector; national and international) through exchanges, fellowships, and liaison positions as an essential means to collect information for MDA purposes.

**Enhancing Unity of Effort in Maritime Planning and Operations**

Workshop participants believed that the CGS’s concept of “unity of effort” must be expanded both in scope (more regional and/or global) and in breadth of partnerships (NGOs, industry, educational and scientific communities, all levels of government). Unity of effort moving forward is likely to be much more difficult, with a blurring of jurisdictions and domains. All of this requires better understanding of organizations outside of the Coast Guard. Across the five Evergreen scenarios, participants expected stakeholder interfaces to become increasingly complex, particularly with regard to integration of efforts/operations. Participants again articulated the need for developing workforce expertise – skills and understanding of partners – as being critical to enhancing unity of effort.

**Integrating Coast Guard Capabilities for National Defense**

Integrating Coast Guard capabilities for national defense was not unanimously supported across all scenario conditions. However, where circumstances supported the concept, they called for an even greater level of integration between the Coast Guard and a wider array of organizations that provide national defense capabilities. In these cases, a dynamic set of actors, an expanding set of resources and geographies of interest to the U.S., and an evolving concept of national security all gave rise to suggested actions that supplement those articulated in the CGS for integrating Coast Guard capabilities for national defense. Concepts of national security were increasingly expansive – encompassing, for example, Arctic sovereignty, the underwater domain, and the security of U.S. commercial interests across the globe. Potential challenges to posse comitatus and changes to levels of Coast Guard funding were also discussed.

**Develop a National Capacity for MTS Recovery**

The MTS Recovery strategic priority received a broad range of reactions and suggested action items from Evergreen workshop scenario teams. Two related themes arose.
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Building a system that would be more resilient (more easily recoverable), and developing the skills and resources required to engage in recovery efforts. Examples of this involved a reduction in requisite manual recovery through the use of more e-navigation. The workshop participants took an approach of ensuring that resiliency is built into the MTS (i.e., a primarily technological approach - being able to “reboot rather than rebuild”) in addition to the CGS’s emphasis on building capacity through established partnerships. Workshop participants also anticipated that, with increasing globalization, the U.S. must have a better understanding and interest in building resiliency internationally to minimize the impact of foreign disruptions on our economy.

Focusing International Engagement on Improving Maritime Governance

There was general agreement that the Coast Guard should play a significant role on improving international maritime governance (although for some “worlds”, this focus was more regional than global). In addition, the participants emphasized that ideally the Coast Guard would have more fiscal autonomy in its international engagement efforts. The development of the requisite competencies to support international engagement was considered critical to achieving this strategic priority (e.g., international law, negotiation skills, language skills, and cultural awareness).

2008 Chief Petty Officer Academy Workshop

The Chief Petty Officer (CPO) Academy, in Petaluma, CA, held an Evergreen Scenario Workshop on September 3-4, 2008. The 85 students and staff developed implementation actions for six of the Evergreen II strategies (21st Century Partnerships, Mission Portfolio Management, Underwater Mission Development, The Best Team, The Right Skills, and Intelligent Technology Acquisition) for the five Evergreen Scenario worlds. They then stress-tested these results in the other "worlds" to identify implementation actions that were robust across a broad range of plausible futures. Despite the short time period, this beta test was successful at identifying implementation considerations for the Evergreen Strategies, and in helping to instill strategic intent within the Coast Guard at the CPO level. The feedback from the new Chiefs was overwhelmingly positive and nearly all recommended making an Evergreen workshop part of the permanent CPO academy curriculum.

2008 Retired Reserve Flag and Master Chief Conference

The Office of Strategic Analysis was invited to present an Evergreen brief at the Retired Reserve Flag and Master Chief Petty Officer – Reserve Forces (MCPO-CGRF) Conference held September 23, 2008 at Coast Guard Headquarters. The brief included an overview of the Coast Guard’s history with Long View and Evergreen and a presentation on the 13 core action strategies that were developed during this iteration. Following the brief, the 18 participants were divided into three break-out groups to engage in a more focused discussion of a single strategy. The strategies selected for discussion within the three groups were 21st Century Partnerships, Polar Mission Capacity, and The Right Skills and the participants were asked to identify what the Coast Guard should consider in implementing the strategy. There was much discussion on required skill sets, budget requirements, potential new authorities, development of new
stakeholder relationships (or strengthening existing ones), and the need for new assets and processes. The insights collected from the breakout groups were very useful in developing the Implementation Considerations section earlier in this report for each of the core action strategies (see Phase II: Internal Core Strategy Development).

**Strategy Implementation**

One of the primary challenges for the Coast Guard following the development of new core action strategies has been driving the strategies to action – or implementation. However, this does not pertain only to Evergreen strategies: there is no defined organizational process in place within the Service to ensure that any enterprise-wide strategies move from development to deployment.

As a concluding step in the current Evergreen cycle, the Office of Strategic Analysis tasked the project contractor, The Futures Strategy Group LLC (FSG), with seeking insights from Coast Guard leadership about how to establish a more definitive linkage between Evergreen strategy concept origination and strategy execution. FSG subsequently conducted 15 interviews with active duty and civilian Coast Guard leaders seeking insight as to how the organization could systemically take strategy concepts from Evergreen through the Coast Guard budget to full execution, or more simply put, “how to implement Evergreen strategies.” All of these discussions yielded feedback and insights on the topic of how to implement Evergreen, but most interviewees shifted the topic of the interview to the larger issue of a new process for Coast Guard enterprise-wide strategy development process – one in which strategy drives the budget.

**Common Insights on Strategy Development Process**

There were some common themes that emerged during FSG’s interviews. Elements that were deemed critical by the interviewees for a redesign of the Coast Guard strategy development and implementation process included:

- Strategy should shape the service’s budget, not serve as a justification for a budget post-hoc.
- The sources and inputs to Coast Guard strategy are many and varied and include:
  - DHS
  - Commandant priorities
  - Partner and Stakeholder input
  - Administration Policy
  - Previous year’s strategic priorities
  - Congressional Priorities
  - Evergreen
- The “three-star” components of the new organizational structure (DCO, DCMS, FORCECOM, OPCOM) should synthesize long-range strategic insights (like Evergreen) with current operational needs through the yearly development of rolling five-year priorities.
• Annually, the priorities should become the draft Commander’s Intent that serves as the foundation document of the budget build that begins that year.

• Strategy should be top-down, in the sense that strategy must drive budget, but all acknowledge that bottom-up input is crucial.

• The process must be able to accommodate both strategic concepts derived from a long-range planning process and more near-term requirements attached to “hot” issues from external stakeholders – e.g., DHS, DOD, Congress - or from insights generated from Coast Guard operations.

• A cross-cutting horizontal mechanism must involve all “three-star” components (DCO, DCMS, FORCECOM, OPCOM) of the new organizational structure in joint strategy development.

• Planning should acknowledge risk and be specific about how it is being managed through strategic priorities (e.g., specifying areas of risk elimination, mitigation, and acceptance).

Clearly there is still much work to be done in order to create an enterprise-wide strategy development and implementation process. The insights gained during these interviews, however, should provide the Coast Guard and the next iteration of *Evergreen* with a solid foundation to advance towards the objective of driving strategy to action.
Next Steps – Establishing *Evergreen* within the Coast Guard

Making *Evergreen* a defining part of the Coast Guard way of doing business is the final phase of the process, and arguably the most important. The development of strategies or plans on paper will not accomplish this goal; nor will a scenario planning process confined to a limited number of officers or Headquarters planning units.

Critical actions to ingrain *Evergreen* in Coast Guard culture are driven by five key reinforcing principles:

- Decision-making processes up and down the organization are driven by a common understanding of long-term Coast Guard strategic priorities – strategic intent.
- A clear and unambiguous process translates strategy into priorities and actions.
- A culture of strategic awareness supports Coast Guard personnel, enabling superior insight and anticipation.
- Rigorous and continuous tracking of external conditions contributes to reevaluation of strategic direction.
- *Evergreen* learning is shared freely throughout the Department of Homeland Security and with stakeholders -- locally, nationally, and globally.

On an individual level, the goal of *Evergreen* is to change how people see their Service – to develop strategic thinking as a matter of cultural habit in Coast Guard men and women. This includes:

- an ability to think of problems in terms of integrated systems, rather than in isolation or in a linear fashion;
- an ability to think not just by reference to the past, but with anticipation of what the future could bring;
- an ability to think outside the Coast Guard, in terms of partnerships; and,
- an ability to think not just about current operational or unit performance, but about what it takes over time to sustain organizational excellence.

One challenge facing the Service as it tries to instill strategic intent in its people arises from its multi-mission nature. The Coast Guard must be efficient and effective at a large variety of tasks. That has forced a certain level of specialization onto the Service, which has historically led to pride in a particular specialty to which one has often devoted one’s career. Group loyalties and specialized focus sometimes limit systems thinking about what is best for the Service – and the nation – as a whole.

*Evergreen* helps identify common strategic objectives that bind the Service together, despite very different roles and missions. *Evergreen*’s success depends on embedding overarching strategic vision while maintaining flexibility to adapt to changing conditions. There are any number of “impact points” where *Evergreen* can be instrumental in improving decision making throughout the Service.
“Impact Points”
There are decisions and actions within the Coast Guard that have obvious strategic implications. Such decisions might involve acquiring assets with long service lives like a Coast Guard National Security Cutter; a Commander’s formulation of Intent upon a change of command; a set of decisions facing the Coast Guard Leadership Council; or selection panels for command. Some of these decisions have “long tails” that commit the Coast Guard to a specific strategic path over time.

There are other strategic decisions that, on the surface of day-to-day operations, have less obvious strategic implications. For some of them, the trade-off between the available options may not be very apparent. But some of these day-to-day, seemingly “coin flip” decisions could be significant “impact points” on other parts of the organization, on the future of the Coast Guard, or both. For example, the Coast Guard Academy may face the decision of selecting one qualified candidate over another. If both candidates satisfy currently articulated requirements, the ultimate decision would seem to have little long term impact. However, when this same decision is informed by a broader organizational strategic intent – that, for example, suggests a need for the Coast Guard’s future leaders to possess language and cultural skills for international engagement – choosing a prospect with such aptitudes might yield positive strategic results.

Decisions or activities that are carefully considered may still fall short of serving the full interests of the Coast Guard’s strategic vision. This does not represent a fault of Coast Guard personnel at any point in time, but rather limited awareness of organizational strategic intent. The specifications for a future Coast Guard vessel might be stringently set to accommodate capacity only for existing or projected Coast Guard missions. But these specifications may not envision the full range emerging needs from a range of possible futures. Thinking more broadly and imaginatively about the future might suggest that a capability that “didn’t make the cut” based on current missions might be worth reconsidering or at least hedging against based on strategic thinking.

A full list of “impact points” throughout the Coast Guard - an organization with a complex mission set and tightly inter-dependent organizational components - is likely to be quite lengthy, but other examples might include:

- Is the allocation of graduate school training allowance billets aligned with skill sets required of future Coast Guard leadership?
- Are decisions to defer maintenance on aged or legacy assets negatively affecting downstream mission execution?
- Do performance requirements for capital assets lead to undesirable reliance on potentially scarce resources during the useful life of the assets?
- Will decisions to decommission legacy assets and programs and reduce current capabilities limit future mission execution?
- Does the development of highly specialized assets and programs limit the Service’s agility and flexibility in the future?
- Do current specialty training and qualification standards prepare members for anticipated future work?
Personnel at all levels of the Coast Guard should develop a broad awareness of how their
decisions and actions may affect other parts of the organization and the Coast Guard’s
ability to accomplish its entire mission set. Additionally, personnel should be able to
reason how decisions and actions might have long-term implications for the Coast Guard
that will either position the Service well for the future, or result in unintended negative
consequences. Understanding the organization’s strategy empowers personnel to make
smarter decisions and deliver results that are appreciated across the organization, and are
also more likely to be aligned with the Coast Guard’s future.

*Evergreen* will have successfully instilled strategic intent within the organization when
leaders are able to “opportunistically” consider the broader, future-oriented strategic
intent while still responding to current emergencies and “fire drills.” The best way to
ensure that this will happen is to inject “*Evergreen* thinking” into training and education
from accession throughout the careers of all Coast Guard leaders.

**The Interface between *Evergreen* and the Budgeting Process**

Linking *Evergreen* thinking into planning and budgeting processes is difficult but
essential. While overseers and current events often set our priorities, *Evergreen* should
inform the budget process. It should be used for planning and budgeting where it can be.
Where current events and priorities are driving the budget, *Evergreen* can help the
Service think more systematically about how to use the present to shape future outcomes.

Although still at an early stage, the planning and budget processes have begun to include
*Evergreen* both directly and indirectly. The Coast Guard sets strategy and budget
guidance “themes,” each within overall budget constraints. The Administration and
Department priorities, Coast Guard planning, and *Evergreen* are inputs at this stage,
setting the strategic direction of the Coast Guard. When individual program resource
proposals are submitted, Project *Evergreen* and the Coast Guard Strategy have been used
to assess requests and show where expenditures will support specific strategies.

Budgeting against strategic priorities is a difficult undertaking, and will require continued
inclusion of budget and planning personnel in the *Evergreen* process, as well as the
inclusion of *Evergreen* core personnel in the strategic component of budget development
and communication.

**Management and Performance Evaluation**

For *Evergreen* to succeed, it must become a regular feature of the management
framework of the Service. *Evergreen* concepts and strategies should be part of the Coast
Guard organizational performance evaluation process. Organizational Performance
Consultants help units to evaluate their performance and provide assistance in
performance improvement efforts. Performance evaluation efforts can be used to ensure
alignment with *Evergreen* and other organizational strategies.

**Education**

It is critical to refresh the cadre of people in the Coast Guard who are trained to think
strategically and who understand the *Evergreen* cycle. The *Evergreen* process and
scenario planning should be introduced or taught at all appropriate levels of enlisted, civilian, and officer education and training. The Coast Guard Academy, OCS, Chief Petty Officers’ Academy, and the Leadership Development Center will be fruitful venues for Evergreen training and awareness activities. For example, an Evergreen workshop was conducted in January 2009 with the Coast Guard Auxiliary leadership at their National Training Conference.

It is crucial that the future leadership be grounded in the basics of Evergreen, be fully aware of the Evergreen strategies and how they were developed, and accustom themselves to thinking with strategic intent. A segment on Evergreen, and the scenario planning process, can be inserted into the Academy and other leadership curricula either in a course format or as Spotlight Lectures. The Leadership Development Center is a logical place to center these activities.

It is also vital that future Evergreen strategy exercises include emerging leadership in separate scenario workshops as a check on, and complement to, the strategic ideas of the senior leadership. The experience of Long View, in which a workshop at the Academy was included, demonstrated the value of getting a look at strategy through the eyes of people who will have to live with the long-term decisions of current leadership, and whose youth provides both diversity and fresh perspectives.

**Outreach: Field, DHS, Broader Government, Congress, the Public**

It is important that Evergreen continue to extend its reach to the field. This is already occurring through field workshops and the inclusion of a diverse workforce in the process. It must eventually become familiar thinking for leaders at all levels of the organization.

The Coast Guard must find opportunities to link upwards to DHS management and, to the extent possible and appropriate, use Evergreen output and process to enhance DHS strategy, budget, and decision processes.

The Coast Guard must also continue to find opportunities to introduce Evergreen and its strategic intent to our interagency partners and Congress. Evergreen has already helped the Chief of Naval Operation’s Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College, which used the Evergreen I and II scenarios to good effect in their studies. The Strategy division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS/J-5) of the Department of Defense has also used the Project Horizon scenarios, the basis of Evergreen II, for its own planning purposes, with Coast Guard participation. And Project Horizon itself benefited greatly from experienced Coast Guard representation in both its scenario development and workshop stages.

The Coast Guard is becoming known as a source of scenario planning expertise not only within the military, but also across civilian agencies and departments of government, and through civilian participation in planning projects, even across the private sector. Evergreen Stakeholders workshops will continue to be an integral part of the Evergreen cycle.
Finally, outreach to the general public via communications and continuing two-way dialogue will always be a critical way for the Coast Guard to accomplish its duties. That is as true of *Evergreen* as of any other Coast Guard initiative. Regular communication with the public will be an integral part of the *Evergreen* process as the Coast Guard moves forward.
For more information about Project *Evergreen*, please contact the
U.S. Coast Guard Office of Strategic Analysis