U.S. Department of Homeland Security

United States Coast Guard

North Coast Mass Rescue 2011

Full-Scale Exercise (FSE)

After Action Report

May 24, 2011

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Synopsis

The North Coast Mass Rescue 2011 Full-Scale Exercise (FSE) was an unprecedented event in scope and stakeholder involvement across the Humboldt County response community. Exercise participants included 30 federal, state, and local first response agencies responding to a downed passenger aircraft with air assets, fire engines, ambulances, and USCG vessels as well as vessels from California's Department of Fish and Game and the Humboldt County Sheriff's Office. For the first time, in not only Humboldt County but across the USCG's Passenger Vessel Safety Program, a contingency exercise encompassed the complete response spectrum from passenger recovery on the water to patient care and treatment at local hospitals and finally to a Family Reunification Center established by the American Red Cross. Stakeholders working in partnership recovered, triaged, treated, and transported 80 victim volunteers while exercising the USCG District Eleven's Mass Rescue Operations (MRO) Plan and the North Coast Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) Plan.

Scenario

The foundation for the exercise scenario and catalyst for the response and exercise play was a downed passenger aircraft off the North Coast. Shortly after departing from Arcata/Eureka Airport (ACV) the aircraft, carrying 76 passengers and four crew members, reported a bird strike and that it was returning to ACV. After losing radar contact and communications with the aircraft, Seattle Center notified USCG's District 11 Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) in Alameda, CA which subsequently notified the Command Center at USCG Group Humboldt Bay.

Outcome and Areas for Improvement

Evaluation of agency actions identified several key strengths:

- Media Management: Media management and public outreach was a resounding success throughout the event. The Unified Command quickly established a Joint Information Center (JIC) that timely and accurately disseminated information to the press through two press releases and two press conferences.
- Community Commitment: Strong community pre-established working relationships fostered UC formation to manage a 30 agency response to ensure public safety.

In addition, several areas for improvements were also recognized:

- Communications: Various breakdowns in communications were identified during this exercise. Pre-established interoperable communications frequencies and capabilities were not used effectively. Routine operations communications procedures proved ineffective to manage a large scale

operation. It is recommended to improve interoperability amongst responders that Humboldt County develop a Coastal Incident Response Plan, modeled after the Mendocino County Coastal Incident Response Plan. This plan would identify stakeholders, command relationships and communications based on geographic zones, incorporating Federal and State Interoperable Field Communications plans.

- Information Flow: Numerous responders reported lacking information that would have improved their overall situational awareness. In many cases, this information was readily available; all they needed to do was ask. Responders and leaders within the response organization should take a more proactive stance toward requesting and distributing information. Examples include the number of victims aboard a response boat that is on its way to the triage site, the total number of victims aboard the aircraft, etc.

Additionally, many responders did not seek out the information they desired. Instead, responders waited for the information to come to them.

The complete results of the North Coast Mass Rescue FSE are discussed in the Issues and Improvement Plan section of this document. Additionally, recommended changes to the North Coast MCI plan and USCG MRO Plan, as well as a detailed list of participants, are included within this After Action Report.

The simulated downed aircraft (RV Coral Sea) with victims on board and an H-65 from USCG Group/Air Station Humboldt Bay
(Photo by USCG D11 PAO)

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NORTH COAST MASS RESCUE FSE OVERVIEW

Purpose & Scope

The purpose of the North Coast Mass Rescue Full-Scale Exercise was to test and validate current USCG Mass Rescue Operations and the North Coast Mass Casualty Incident plans as well as build on the recommendations and lessons learned from the 2009 Alaska National MRO Exercise and previous large scale MROs sponsored by the U. S. Coast Guard's Passenger Vessel Safety (PVS) program. The exercise was a one-day event designed to test:

- USCG Operational Maritime SAR capabilities & Mass Rescue Operations management (on-water & air ops)
- Shore-side Community Mass Casualty Incident capabilities
- Coordination of marine ops to shore ops to include landing site management, survivor handling and accountability
- USCG/Unified Command public affairs/media management

Background and General Description

The Exercise not only built on lessons learned from previous large scale MRO Exercises but on areas for improvement identified during a MRO Tabletop Exercise held in Humboldt County in October 2010 as well. The lessons learned and best practices from that discussion-based exercise were captured in an After Action Report, corrected, and implemented in this operationally-based event.

The event was a one-day Full-Scale Exercise that involved 30 federal, state, and local members of the Humboldt County response community responding to a downed passenger aircraft off the North Coast. Participants utilized two USCG helicopters to conduct SAR and MEDEVAC operations as well as a CALFIRE helicopter that conducted MEDEVAC operations. The USCGC Barracuda served as On Scene Coordinator for the event and controlled numerous USCG, California Department of Fish and Game, and Humboldt County Sheriff's vessels. Eighty volunteers from the California Conservation Corp and USCG Group Humboldt Bay were evacuated by sea and air to three sites where they were triaged then transported to local hospitals for treatment. In coordination with the response and Skywest Airlines, the American Red Cross established a Family Reunification Center providing victims with a complete continuum of care.

To manage the response, a Unified Command was established at USCG Group Humboldt Bay. The Unified Command immediately established a Joint Information Center (JIC) that drafted two press releases and conducted two press conferences for members of the local media who were participating in the SIMCELL as controllers.

Operational Data

Controllers and Evaluators tracked the times victims arrived and departed from critical locations and key milestones in the response. A detailed overview of this information is located in Appendix F.

Locations of Operations

- Unified Command: USCG Group Humboldt Bay
- Triage Site (Waterside): USCG Station Humboldt Bay
- Triage Site (Waterside): Eureka City Marina
- Triage Site (Airborne): Samoa Airport
- Exercise Staging: Samoa Cookhouse
- St Joseph's Hospital
- Redwood Memorial Hospital
- Mad River Hospital

Participating Agencies

- American Red Cross
- Arcata Fire
- Arcata-Mad River Ambulance
- Blue Lake Fire
- CALEMA
- CALFIRE
- California Conservation Corp
- California Department of Fish and Game
- California Department of Public Health
- CAL-ORE Life Flight
- City Ambulance
- City of Arcata
- City of Eureka
- Eureka Fire
- Harbor District
- Humboldt County Coroner
- Humboldt County Fire
- Humboldt County OES
- Humboldt County Public Health
- Humboldt County Sheriff Officer
- Humboldt Times Standard
- Humboldt Transit Authority
- Mad River Hospital
- Redwood Memorial Hospital
- Rio Dell V. Fire
- Samoa Fire

- Skywest Airlines
- St Joseph's Hospital
- USCG District Eleven
- USCG Group Humboldt Bay
- Willow Creek Volunteer

Exercise Limitations

In order to ensure exercise events progressed in a safe and semi-realistic manner several exercise limitations were imposed by the exercise planning team:

- Time compression at the start of the exercise was used to allow participants to respond from Samoa Cookhouse once notified by their respective agency.
- A Unified Command was established at USCG Group Humboldt Bay.
- Triage sites and staging areas were pre-designated.
- Due to safety concerns, the exercise crash site was within Humboldt Bay and not off the coast as described in initial reports.
- The Research Vessel Coral Sea represented the downed aircraft.
- Due to the location of the simulated downed aircraft, ALL vessels obeyed speed and wake restrictions within the bay to simulate transit time to an offshore crash.
- The design team pre-determined which assets would be available for exercise play.

A local first responder triaging a victim
(Photo by USCG D11 PAO)

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EXERCISE EVALUATION

Evaluation Criteria

Evaluation criteria is based on the two Mass Rescue plans being exercised; USCG's Mass Rescue section of District 11's 9800 plan and the North Coast EMS Mass Casualty Incident plan. Evaluators evaluated not only the prescribed exercise objectives but looked to answer the following questions as well:

- Did the agencies do what they said they were going to do?
- Were established plans, procedures, and protocols followed during the exercise?
- Were the plans procedures, and protocols effective?
- What level of capability do the plans, policies, and procedures establish?

Validating the above questions was accomplished by the following means:

- Observing the event and collecting support data.
- Analyzing the data to compare performance against support data.
- Determining what changes need to be made to plans, procedures, staffing equipment, communications, organizations, and interagency communication to ensure expected outcomes.

Exercise Objectives

The exercise objectives were derived from the USCG's suggested Incident/Unified Command objectives for a MRO. Exercise participants were expected to achieve specific measurable steps when accomplishing these objectives.

- Locate, identify, recover and account for all passengers/victims
- Triage, transport and treat injured people
- Maximize public and stakeholder outreach and information sharing
- Secure incident area
- Evaluate the efficacy of the North Coast EMS MCI plan and USCG D11 9800 and Group Humboldt Bay MRO plans

Evaluation Overview

Evaluators and Controllers were stationed throughout the various exercise locations to capture and observe exercise events and player actions. Each Evaluator hotwashed their respective locations immediately following the exercise. Once complete, all Evaluators and Controllers gathered for a comprehensive Controller and Evaluator Debrief. Facilitated by the Evaluator Coordinator, this two hour evolution allowed for each Controller and Evaluator to outbrief their findings as well as the results of the player Hotwash.

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ISSUES AND IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Introduction

The North Coast Mass Rescue FSE focused on the following Major Areas of Emphasis:

- USCG Operational Maritime SAR capabilities & Mass Rescue Operations management (on-water & air ops)
- Shore-side community Mass Casualty Incident capabilities
- Coordination of marine ops to shore ops to include landing site management, survivor handling and accountability
- USCG/Unified Command public affairs/media management

Evaluators were positioned throughout the exercise sites to capture notes on the key actions and issues identified during the exercise.

In keeping with the no-fault nature of this exercise, the evaluation embodied in this report examines the plans, procedures, and response systems utilized in this exercise. As an evaluated practice, agency performances were observed and documented in order to make recommendations for future improvements. Evaluator observations focus primarily on overall agency actions and the interaction between agencies, rather than on individual players.

The issues and recommended improvement actions that follow appear in two separate formats. The first format mirrors that used by the USCG's Contingency Preparedness System (CPS), and is designed to facilitate the incorporation of these After Action Report results into the system. The second format, the Improvement Plan Matrix, is an ICS-233 form (Incident Open Action Tracker) and is designed as a working document to be referenced and updated as action items are completed.

The Unified Command
(Photo by USCG D11 PAO)

Major Area of Emphasis: Coordination of marine ops to shore ops to include landing site management, survivor handling and accountability	
Supporting Objective: Maximize public and stakeholder outreach and information sharing.	*Issue #1*
Title of Lesson Learned	Multi-agency communication challenge - establishing a common operational picture and communication flow.
Observation	Agencies were quick to respond to the incident and communicated effectively within their environment (e.g., on-water marine units communicated well with other on-water units and landside EMS communicated well with EMS responders and hospitals) however, communication gaps occurred between differing agencies that do not regularly work together in dynamic incidents like an air/sea/land mass casualty response.
Discussion	Communication gaps occurred between differing agencies. a) There was a significant disconnect and lack of information passed from on-water ops to landside triage sites. Specifically, triage areas were not aware of the assets and number of victims enroute to site. This also occurred at the helispot/triage site between USCG helo and ground assets. There was also some difficulty in communication with USCG helos and other agency marine units. b) At one triage site there appeared to be a lack of communication between the three parties on site (USCG, City Fire and EMS). c) Incident Commanders at certain triage sites (that initially formed as an incident helispot/triage site/command post) had little situational awareness and did not realize they were one of three command posts/triage sites. This appeared to be due to a lack of information being pushed out (i.e., shared among USCG, City of Eureka and CALFIRE) as well as the local Incident Commanders not requesting the information they needed to establish a clear communication flow. d) Marine On Scene Coordinator (OSC) - There was some ambiguity of initial OSC command, control & objectives. Once CGC Barracuda came on scene and took and communicated affirmative command and control, the situation stabilized.

Lesson Learned	**1.** When a USCG led Unified Command is established for a maritime MRO/MCI incident, the USCG member assuming operational section chief should pair themselves with a Local First Responder to establish effective communications and response by proactively establishing a comms plan, ID field commanders and push out and down critical information. In the absence of a UC, this critical information must be coordinated and pushed out and down to the differing agency command personnel in the field. This may have to be done via close coordination between USCG Command Center and First Responder Dispatch Centers (or remote EOC management). **2.** USCG on-water assets are trained (for small incidents) to recover and treat victims and pass this information, in detail, up their chain of command and then on to supporting first responders*.* Too much time was spent treating and communicating detailed patient info from transport vessels. Under MRO conditions, as many survivors as possible should be recovered and triaged so critical information -- victim numbers and triage conditions (green, yellow, red, black) -- can be passed to victim tracking and landside triage. For example, comms should be simple, "OSC this is CG-4701. I have recovered 6 victims; 4 yellow, 2 red, and I am departing for triage site #1," rather than a detailed description of victim's injuries. **3.** The training room at GRU Humboldt Bay is insufficient as a Unified Command due to poor cell phone reception, lack of agency radio reception, lack of internet connectivity and limited telephone lines. **4.** Hospitals requested the size and scope of the MCI during the response in order to better prepare to receive patients. This indicated a possible communication/notification gap between the lead first responder agency and coordinating base hospital notification. **5.** North Coast EMS Multi-Casualty Incident (MCI) Plan appeared valid and effective for organizations included in the plan; particularly the communications and coordinating base hospital MCI guide sections (with the exception of #4 above). **6.** Both the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) produce Interoperable Field Operations Guides. These guides are pocket sized guides to interoperable communications.

Recommendations	Locally - Establish a workgroup to develop an all hazards sea/air/land multi-agency communication plan to include asset to asset communications (e.g., USCG vessel to first responder vehicle) and USCG Command Center to local responder dispatch centers. A limiting factor is that USCG command centers can only communicate via phone so additional means should be explored (e.g., email). Exercise the plan. Locally – Identify and implement information technology solutions to improve the Group Humboldt Bay training room's functionality as an Incident Command Post; including but not limited to wireless open access internet, cellular phone booster, and a base radio station. Locally - Identify the possible breakdown in MCI notification by first responders to the base coordinating hospital and its significance to the EMS/MCI plan. Nationally – USCG should incorporate triage training, using standard medical/first responder procedures, into boatswains mate development training (advancement practical factors). Nationally - USCG should develop On Scene Coordinator Standards/Practices and provide recurring training. Standards and practices can include resource management; critical communication, etc. (see Guidance for Good Samaritan Vessels at www.uscg.mil/pvs). Locally - USCG conduct helo hoist and comms training with other local maritime agencies (Humboldt County Sherriff and CA DFG). Individual agencies, Federal/State/Local, should incorporate the FEMA and CALEMA Interoperability Field Guides into routine operations, as well as emphasize the use of interoperable channels/frequencies during training.

Major Area of Emphasis: USCG/Unified Command public affairs/media management	
Supporting Objective: Maximize public and stakeholder outreach and information sharing	*Issue #2*
Title of Lesson Learned	National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)/American Red Cross - Lead agencies for family assistance during aviation disasters
Observation	The local American Red Cross (ARC) is a critical component in the continuum of care for victims (and their families) and are designated by the NTSB to act as a federal agency representative to establish

	family care centers in addition to a host of support services (family notifications for victim status/location, provide family support, etc.) in the event of an air disaster. (Ref. Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996)
Discussion	The American Red Cross shares responsibilities with NTSB and the air carrier to establish Family Reunification Centers. ARC was familiar with dealing with EOC's but did not know how to coordinate with the UC. NTSB is the lead federal agency to oversee victim and family care centers and would communicate with USCG via DHS (see Federal Family Assistance Plan for Aviation Disasters), but this process may be slow to start.
Lesson Learned	The American Red Cross can provide significant support in the event of an air disaster. Communicating with them and incorporating them early in a response is beneficial, particularly with protracted operations.
Recommendation	National/Sector/Local Level - Responders should incorporate the American Red Cross Family Reunification Center function into plans. At a minimum, have their contact information, and have ARC as a notification POC for aircraft disasters. ARC support will be critical for protracted operations. USCG National Level - USCG National Command Center should validate processes to ensure communications with NTSB via DHS in the event of an aviation disaster (e.g., quick response checklists) and ensure NTSB/USCG ability to contact each other in the event of an air carrier disaster. All - Review NTSB Federal Family Assistance Plan For Aviation Disasters (2008).

Major Area of Emphasis: Coordination of marine ops to shore ops to include landing site management, survivor handling and accountability	
Supporting Objective: Locate, Identify, recover and account for all passengers/victims.	*Issue #3*
Title of Lesson Learned	Using ICS organization for victim accountability validation.
Observation	The Unified Command (UC) was able to achieve victim accountability.
Discussion	UC established victim accountability landside, although challenged to do so, by having an understanding of local landside MCI EMS

	Plans/Processes and by communicating with appropriate parties (see issue #4 for alternative solution). This discovery occurred early in the exercise (seminar, TTX, exercise development meetings, etc.) In the State of CA via ICS, victims are tracked (landside) in the following "general" manner in accordance with their EMS MCI Plans: a. From the primary MCI triage site the Patient Transport Unit leader (working with the Medical Communications Coordinator) dispatches EMS ambulances with triaged victims to various hospitals. b. The Patient Transport Unit leader coordinates patient disbursement to various hospitals with a Coordinating Base Hospital (sometimes called a Jurisdictional Base Hospital). The main POC at the CBH is usually the MICN (Mobile Intensive Care Nurse) or an ER Nurse (Emergency Room Nurse). UC effectively tied into the Coordinating Base Hospital (who coordinated with various Patient Transport Unit Leaders) to track patients and validate their numbers and locations.
Lesson Learned	The ability to identify the number of passengers and crew and accurately account for them is a critical MRO operational driver. The process exists to accurately account for victims within the ICS structure but responders are not always trained to the process. NOTE: During previous events, a USCG on-water responder developed a quick and effective waterproof victim tracking card for on scene use. (refer to www.uscg.mil/pvs or george.r.lee@uscg.mil)
Recommendation	USCG National/Sector Level - USCG should meet with local EMS and review local EMS MCI plans. Incorporate information into plans and exercise with local agencies. USCG National - Explore the revision of the USCG Incident Management Handbook (IMH) to include recommended processes for accountability (e.g. ID accountability position and/or include accountability functions in a position duty) in the SAR and Multi-Casualty section. Consult with COMDT CG534 & District PVSS. Revise local plans to emphasize central accountability at the Operations Section Chief level. Incorporate this emphasis into routine training, seminars and exercises.

Major Area of Emphasis: Coordination of marine ops to shore ops to include landing site management, survivor handling and accountability	
Supporting Objective: Locate, identify, recover and account for all passengers/victims.	*Issue #4*

Title of Lesson Learned	Victim Accountability Management
Observation	Although the Unified Command achieved an accurate victim count, the process was challenging and slow to develop. De-conflicting and validating the information between the Group Humboldt Bay Command Center, field triage locations, hospitals, and law enforcement agencies was complex and difficult - delaying a verifiable final number count based on the airline passenger manifest list.
Discussion	Identifying a specific point of contact tasked with managing all aspects of accountability information coordination and verification for a mass victim casualty operation is essential to ensuring the Unified Command has an efficient and accurate accountability process. Acquiring valid and expeditious accountability information translates to enhanced command and control decision making, as well as optimizing response efforts at the scene and triage locations.
Lesson Learned	Establish an accountability mechanism and regional resource which can be utilized by the Unified Command during a Mass Rescue, Mass Casualty Operation.
Recommendation	See Issue #3 Recommendation. USCG National - USCG should adopt the use of industry standard Triage Tags and explore their use in victim accountability. USCG will also need to provide Triage Tag Training. This ties into Issue #1 LL#2 passage of critical information as well as the need for USCG training with regional first responders to have consistent triage assessments (Issue #1 recommendation).

Major Area of Emphasis: USCG Operational Maritime SAR capabilities & Mass Rescue Operations management (on-water & air ops)	
Supporting Objective: Evaluate the efficacy of the North Coast EMS MCI Plan, USCG D11 9800, and USCG GRU Humboldt Bay MRO Plans.	*Issue #5*

Title of Lesson Learned	Command Center Coordination. (USCG GROUP/AIRSTA H.Bay-Centric)
Observation	The Group Humboldt Bay Command Center, upon notification of the Mass Rescue Operation (plane crash), immediately designated/assigned a Lieutenant/O-3 to maintain oversight and management of operations within the Command Center. The Lieutenant's role was pivotal in contributing to operational success through coordinating internal and external information flow, inter/intra agency notifications, and response updates to senior USCG command staff members as well as the Unified Command.
Discussion	Designating a USCG CDO/Command Representative to maintain oversight and management of operations within the Command Center during a Mass Rescue Operation is a Best Practice which allows senior command staff members to more effectively manage overarching response and Unified Command responsibilities. The Command Rep also exists as the Command Center's Liaison and point of contact (POC) to the Unified Command, allowing watch standers to manage internal roles and responsibilities without interruption.
Lesson Learned	Although assigning a CDO to the Command Center is considered a Best Practice; the assignment, roles and responsibilities, and command authority and leadership parameters are not institutionalized in current Group Humboldt Bay SOP.
Recommendation	Update/amend existing Group Standard Operating Procedures to reflect the Best Practice. Define roles, responsibilities, and authority.

Major Area of Emphasis: USCG Operational Maritime SAR capabilities & Mass Rescue Operations management (on-water & air ops)	
Supporting Objective: Evaluate the efficacy of the North Coast EMS MCI Plan, USCG D11 9800, and USCG GRU Humboldt Bay MRO Plans.	*Issue #6*
Title of Lesson Learned	Command Center Electronic Status Board.
Observation	Although the Command Center has an Electronic Status Board for daily command/control and operational awareness, it could not be used as an effective resource during the Mass Rescue Operation.

Discussion	The Command Center's Electronic Status Board utilizes Microsoft Access which was not user friendly, and has been a challenge for Coast Guard units to use as an operational tool. During the exercise, the Commend Center was forced to use a dry erase board to maintain and update situational/response notes. Several times, updated information was requested by the Unified Command in "printed" format, which in turn was walked to the Unified Command for dissemination. Based on the amount of continuously received operational/response information, hand written notes copied from a hand written status board and finally translated to a computer for printing was very inefficient and distracted watch standers and the assigned Junior Officer from the response.
Lesson Learned	Identify a more efficient, effective, and user friendly Command Center Electronic Status Board, which can be used during daily operations, and during large scale Mass Rescue Operations. With existing technological resources available, improved methods/systems should be explored to mitigate future challenges in managing, maintaining, and disseminating real-time information from the Command Center to the Unified Command.
Recommendation	Identify a more effective and "flexible" Electronic Status Board for the Command Center. Recommend creating a shared Microsoft Excel Electronic Status Board, allowing for simultaneous situational awareness to the Unified Command and the Command Center during large scale response operations.

Major Area of Emphasis: Coordination of marine ops to shore ops to include landing site management, survivor handling and accountability	
Supporting Objective: Evaluate the efficacy of the North Coast EMS MCI Plan, USCG D11 9800, and USCG GRU Humboldt Bay MRO Plans.	*Issue #7*
Title of Lesson Learned	The establishment of Unified Command and transition of command and control responsibilities.

Observation	During the Mass Rescue Operation exercise, command and control was primarily managed by the Group Humboldt Bay Command Center prior to the arrival of an On Scene Coordinator (OSC). Upon the OSC assuming command and control responsibilities, the Command Center continued to extensively manage internal/external response coordination, notifications, and operational inquiries. These duties are traditionally the responsibility of the Unified Command once it is established. This effort continued through the entire exercise evolution (6+ hours).
Discussion	The absence of any distinct formal or informal transition notification of command and control to the Unified Command, once it was established, caused redundancy in effort.
Lesson Learned	Identify a specific turnover process and formal announcement by the OSC/UC that the Unified Command has officially been established, and transition of command and control rests with them under the ICS construct.
Recommendation	Update/amend Mass Rescue Operations SOP and MRO Plans to reflect "specific" transition and notification requirements once the Unified Command is established.

Major Area of Emphasis: USCG Operational Maritime SAR capabilities & Mass Rescue Operations management (on-water & air ops)	
Supporting Objective: Locate, identify, recover and account for all passengers/victims.	*Issue #8*
Title of Lesson Learned	Watch Quarter and Station Bill (WQSB)
Observation	The Unified Command's staff was not predefined.
Discussion	The Incident Command (IC)/Unified Command (UC) did not have predefined positions to fill ICS roles. This caused a delay in the UC establishing command which increased task saturation in the Command Center and did not identify who was managing the MRO to responding assets and resources.
Lesson Learned	Having personnel assigned to IC/UC positions by a WQSB would have enabled the UC to establish command quicker for responding assets and resources and relieved the Command Center from surge operations.

Recommendation	Create a Watch Quarter and Station Bill with predefined personnel with alternates for IC/UC positions.

Major Area of Emphasis: USCG Operational Maritime SAR capabilities & Mass Rescue Operations management	
Supporting Objective: Locate, identify, recover and account for all passengers/victims.	*Issue #9*
Title of Lesson Learned	Mass Rescue Life Raft Deployment and Use
Observation	 USCG rescue swimmer deployed MRO raft from CG H-65 helicopter. The rescue swimmer was put in the water with the raft and had to flip it up right after it deployed upside down possibly due to helo rotor wash while backing away from the raft. Due to water currents and prevailing winds, the raft drifted downstream of the drop zone requiring a vessel to tow it back into place. The vessel (USCG TANB) was only able to make approximately 1 knot with raft in tow.
Discussion	 It took the rescue swimmer 3-4 attempts to right the raft. The sheer size/weight of the raft made righting difficult, even for a trained/experienced swimmer. This would be a near impossible task for a cold/weak survivor with no training. Once the liferaft was in place, victims could enter the raft and be sheltered from the water. The raft was also an effective platform to cross deck victims to responding vessels.
Lesson Learned	The current had a much more significant impact on the movement of the raft then the wind.
Recommendation	Revise MRO liferaft deployment instructions in the CG helo flight manuals to deploy liferaft "upstream of the predominant force (wind, current, etc.)" vice just "upwind".

Major Area of Emphasis: Shore-side Community Mass Casualty Incident capabilities	
Supporting Objective: Secure Incident Area & Notifications/Info Sharing	*Issue #10*
Title of Lesson Learned	Humboldt County Sherriff Coroner
Observation	County Coroner notification.
Discussion	The protection of decedents and the role of the coroner plays a critical role in an MCI incident, subsequent investigations and events, and finally with family reunification Coroner Role: 1. In coordination with LE, ensure a secure area is established to hold decedents. 2. Ensure decedents and their property are secured. 3. Obtain Manifest information. 4. Obtain necessary ante mortem medical/dental records for unaccounted victims. 5. Prohibit viewing of decedents by survivors (relatives) or media.
Lesson Learned	Early and prompt coroner notification is critical and may not have happened as designed. Dispatch may not have made adequate notifications due to overwhelming nature of MCIs and dispatch center minimal manning and/or unsure of Coroner Departments play in the exercise.
Recommendation	Locally - In the event of an MCI (or any incident that overwhelms dispatch centers) explore need/feasibility for surge augmentation support personnel. During exercises, players should respond as they normally would to ensure proper testing of policy, plans and procedures.

APPENDIX A: EXERCISE AREA MAP



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APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS

ACRONYM	TERM
AAR	After Action Report
ACV	Arcata/Eureka Airport
AMS	Area Maritime Security
AMSC	Area Maritime Security Committee
AMSP	Area Maritime Security Plan
AMSTEP	Area Maritime Security Training and Exercise Plan
AOR	Area of Responsibility
C2	Command and Control
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCC	California Conservation Corp
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CG	Coast Guard
CPS	Contingency Preparedness System
CSO	Company Security Officer
DFG	Department of Fish and Game
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOT	Department of Transportation
EEG	Exercise Evaluation Guide
ENDEX	End of Exercise
EST	Exercise Support Team
ExPlan	Exercise Plan
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FE	Functional Exercise
FMSC	Federal Maritime Security Coordinator
FORCECOM	Force Readiness Command
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FPC	Final Planning Conference
FSE	Full-Scale Exercise
FSO	Facility Security Exercise
HCSO	Humboldt County Sherriff's Office
HOMEPORT	Coast Guard Internet portal providing access to security information
HQ	Headquarters
HSAS	Homeland Security Advisory System
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
IAIP	Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
IED	Improvised Explosive Device

ACRONYM	TERM
IPC	Initial Planning Conference
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
LANTAREA	Atlantic Area
MARSEC	Maritime Security
MCI	Mass Casualty Incident
MPC	Mid-Term Planning Conference
MRO	Mass Rescue Operations
MSRAM	Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model
MTS	Marine Transportation System
MTSA	Maritime Transportation Security Act
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NMSEP	National Maritime Security Exercise Program
NRC	National Response Center
NRF	National Response Framework
NTSB	National Transportation Safety Board
NVIC	Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
OEM	Office of Emergency Management
OSC	On Scene Coordinator
PACAREA	Pacific Area
POC	Point of Contact
QRC	Quick Response Card
RAMP	Remedial Action Management Program
RCC	Rescue Coordination Center
SAR	Search and Rescue
SitMan	Situation Manual
SITREP	Situation Report
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSI	Sensitive Security Information
STARTEX	Start of Exercise
TSI	Transportation Security Incident
TTX	Tabletop Exercise
UC	Unified Command
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCGC	United States Coast Guard Cutter

APPENDIX C: EXERCISE AGENDA

Time	Personnel	Activity	Location
April 12, 2011			
All Day	Exercise Staff and Exercise Coordinators	Site setup begins. Pre-exercise communications setup begins.	Exercise Site(s)
1300	Exercise Controllers, Evaluators, and Staff	Controller and Evaluator Orientation Briefing.	GRU Humboldt Bay
April 13, 2011			
0730	Volunteers and Selected Exercise Staff	Check-in and symptomology cards/badges distributed. Canteen arrives.	Samoa Cookhouse
0800	Victims/Actors and Selected Exercise Staff	Victim/Actor Briefing	Samoa Cookhouse
0800	Controllers and Evaluators	Check-in for final instructions	Samoa Cookhouse
0800	Response Units/Players	Apparatus arrive for pre-staging. Placed in proper response order.	Samoa Cookhouse
0815	All going to Coral Sea	Victim/Actors move to exercise start positions.	R/V Coral Sea
0830	Assembly Area Controller and Players	Players' Briefing	Samoa Cookhouse
TBD	Observers	Move to Observer viewing area.	TBD
0830	Controllers and Evaluators	Communications check.	Exercise Site (s)

Time	Personnel	Activity	Location
0845	Controllers and Evaluators	Controllers and Evaluators in starting positions. Final checks by Lead Controller.	Exercise Site (s)
0900	All	STARTEX	
TBD	All	ENDEX	
Immediately Following the Exercise	Participating Units	Participant Hotwash on scene. ***All transport units proceed to Samoa Cookhouse***	Functional Area Locations
Endex + 1 hr	Controllers and Evaluators	Controller and Evaluator Debrief	Samoa Cookhouse
April 14, 2011			
1300	Lead Evaluator, Lead Controller, and Command Staff	Command Outbrief	GRU Humboldt Bay

APPENDIX D: IMPROVEMENT PLAN MATRIX

1. Incident Name: North Coast Mass Rescue 2011 FSE					INCIDENT OPEN ACTION TRACKER ICS-233		
2. No.	**3. Item**	**4. For/POC**	**5. Briefed POC**	**6. Start Date**	**7. Status**	**8. Target Date**	**9. Actual Date**
#1	Multi-agency communication challenge - establishing a common operational picture and communication flow						
#2	NTSB/American Red Cross - Lead agencies for family assistance during aviation disasters						
#3	Using ICS organization for victim accountability validation						
#4	Victim Accountability Management						
#5	Command Center Coordination						

#6	Command Center Electronic Status Board						
#7	The establishment of Unified Command and transition of command and control responsibilities						
#8	Watch Quarter & Station Bill (WQSB)						
#9	Mass Rescue Life Raft Deployment and Use						
#10	Humboldt County Sherriff Coroner						

Taken from ICS233-CG OpenAction rev 10-05

APPENDIX E: VICTIM TRACKING

Victim Number	Time Entered Water	Time Recovered From Water	Time Arrived at Triage	Time Departed from Triage	Time Arrived at Hospital
1	1205		1250		
2	1048		1127		
3	1057		1140	1220	
4	1159		1250	1300	
5	1159		1250	1300	
6	1048		1127		
7	1132		1250	1257	
8	1132		1250	1328	1344
9	1132		1250	1328	1344
10	1132		1251	1328	1344
11	1057		1125	1220	
12	1023		1047	1120	
13	1023		1038	1100	1115
14	1159		1245	1249	1308
15	1048		1115	1205	1226
16	1048		1115	1145	
17	1132		1243	1257	
18	1132		1242	1249	1308
19	1132	1215	1255	1330	
20	1057		1125	1220	
21	1023		1038	1105	1115
22	1208		1247	1328	
23	939	954	1021	1052	1114
24	1023		1046	1100	
25	1048	1104	1118	1145	
26	1048		1120	1145	
27	1132		1253	1328	1344
28	1049		1132	1137	
29	1159		1250	1257	
30	1048		1118	1145	
31	1048		1122	1137	
32	1057		1125	1220	

Victim Number	Time Entered Water	Time Recovered From Water	Time Arrived at Triage	Time Departed from Triage	Time Arrived at Hospital
33	1048		1118	1205	1226
34	1051	1102	1132	1205	1226
35	1159	1224	1257		
36	1057		1140	1220	1301
37	1023	1026	1046	1145	
38	1205		1244	1328	1344
39	1108		1125	1143	1159
40	1132		1250	1328	1344
41	1048		1118	1145	
42	1132		1145	1220	
43	942	956	1000	1143	1159
44	1159		1243	1328	1344
45	1057		1155	1220	
46					
47	939	953	1024	1145	
48	1057		1140	1220	1300
49	1048		1118	1145	
50	1057		1140	1220	
51	1048		1120	1145	
52	1159	1222	1255	1340	
53	1023	1026	1046	1145	
54			1046	1145	
55			1255		
56			1253	1340	
57					
58	942	953	1000	1100	1115
59	939	952	1021	1102	
60	1048		1115	1205	1226
61	939	952	1023	1145	
62	1048		1125	1205	1226
63	1132		1230	1312	1332
64	1132		1254	1328	1344
65	1208		1247	1259	
66	1048		1120	1136	

Victim Number	Time Entered Water	Time Recovered From Water	Time Arrived at Triage	Time Departed from Triage	Time Arrived at Hospital
67	1132		1253	1312	1332
68	1023	1026	1050	1053	1113
69	1057		1135		
70	1057		1125		1300
71					
72	1159		1244	1249	1308
73	1132		1251	1328	1344
74	939	954	1022	1100	
75	1048		1116		
76					
77	1159		1250	1300	
78	1208	1212	1255	1312	1332
79	1132		1155		
80	1108	1116	1125		