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MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL

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Mention of source will be appreciated.

The Merchant Marine Council of the United States Coast Guard

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For each meeting two District Commanders and three Marine Inspection Officers are designated as members by the Commandant.

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Cover Picture: The Long Beach, California, harbor light, fog signal, and radiobeacon. The first light designed to withstand earthquake as well as wind and wave forces.

Distribution (SDL 38):
A: a, b, c, d (2 ea.); remainder (1 ea.).
B: c (14 ea.); g, l (5 ea.); f (4 ea.); e, h (3 ea.); d (2 ea.); remainder (1 ea.).
C: All (1 ea.).
D: All (1 ea.).
E: 1, m, n, o, (1 ea.).
List 141M.

RADAR AS A NAVIGATIONAL AID

The development of radar and its use as a navigational aid and a means to detect other vessels and thereby prevent collisions has been one of the major advancements made within the last decade. At the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea held in London in 1948, considerable discussion was had of the use of radar in the navigation of ships. This Conference did not write anything into the "Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1948" with respect to the use of radar. The Conference did make a recommendation, however. The attention of all navigators is called to Recommendation 19, Appendix 6, "International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, 1948," which reads as follows:

> 19. NAVIGATION OF SHIPS EQUIPPED WITH RADAR, ETC.
>
> The Conference, while recognizing that the recent advances in radar and electronic navigational aids are of great service to shipping, is of the opinion that the possession of any such device in no way relieves the master of a ship from his obligation strictly to observe the requirements laid down in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, and in particular, the obligations contained in Articles 15 and 16 of those Regulations.

Court decisions where one or more of the vessels involved in a collision were equipped with radar have been few. Some of these decisions have already been discussed in other articles in the "Proceedings."

The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit (172 F. 2d 472), handed down a decision in New York in a case arising out of a collision between two vessels running blacked out during the war. One of the vessels, *Australia Star*, had a radar in operation during the approach of the vessels. Extracts from the opinion as apply to radar navigation are quoted herein as a matter of interest.

"This complex litigation results from a collision in the Caribbean Sea, about 150 miles northeast of Cristobal, Panama Canal Zone, between the S. S. *Hindoo* and the S. S. *Australia Star*, on the night of September 9, 1944. The former, owned by the United States and escorted by the PC-616, a United States naval craft, was proceeding blacked out, at a speed of 10 knots, on a course 108° true, bound to Cartagena, Colombia; the latter, owned by Frederick Leyland & Co., Ltd., and unescorted, was proceeding at a speed of 15 knots on a course 237° true toward Cristobal. The *Australia Star* was originally also blacked out but having discovered by means of radar the presence of two vessels (which proved to be the *Hindoo* and her escort) on her starboard bow, her master turned on her navigation lights and they were clearly visible for

12 minutes before the collision. The *Hindoo*, which was not equipped with radar, did not turn on her lights until the moment of collision, nor did she keep out of the way. The bow of the *Australia Star* struck the port side of the *Hindoo* causing her to sink within a few minutes and to become, with her cargo, a total loss. The *Australia Star* and some of her cargo also suffered damage. Such, in brief, is the story of the collision. Further details may be found in the district court's opinion, 74 F. Supp. 145, and will be mentioned in discussing the various issues on appeal."

* * * * *

"The *Australia Star* seeks reversal of the decision that she was also at fault. This was based chiefly on a finding that her master was negligent in failing to call for further radar reports after turning on her navigation lights. The radar operator made his first report at 9:05 p. m. of two objects, which turned out to be the *Hindoo* and her escort, 25° on the starboard bow and distant respectively 16,000 and 14,000 yards. Five minutes later he reported that their angle was then 20° and the distance 14,000 and 9,000 yards. Shortly thereafter the PC–616 passed ahead of the *Australia Star*, from starboard to port, and by means of a flashing Morse lamp challenged her for identification. After the *Australia Star* had identified herself, the PC–616 commenced to signal a message to "keep clear," of which the *Australia Star's* watch officer, despite numerous repetitions, could read only the word "keep." At 9:20 the radar operator reported to the master an object 4° on the starboard bow distant 4,000 yards. It was then that the master switched on the navigation lights, including the white range lights. Thereafter he neither requested nor received any radar report. Although the radar operator took a reading at 9:24 which showed an object 2° on the starboard bow distant 2,000 yards, he thought it unnecessary to report it to the master when he discovered that the navigation lights were on. The *Australia Star* continued at full speed of 15 knots until she was in the jaws of collision, her master interpreting the failure of the *Hindoo* to display lights, after his own were switched on, to mean: "You carry on your course and speed. I do not want you to do anything. I am keeping clear of you." Upon these facts the trial court concluded that the *Australia Star* was negligent in failing to make proper use of its radar and in maintaining its course and speed after the PC–616 commenced signaling a message which the *Australia Star* was unable to read."

"(3) The *Australia Star* contends that she performed her full duty by switching on her lights when the 9:20 radar report showed that the *Hindoo* was only 4° on her starboard bow and more than 2 miles away. The *Hindoo* should have seen these lights and, if she thought danger existed, should have displayed her own lights. Her failure to do so during the 12 minutes before collision was reasonably interpreted by the master of the *Australia Star* to mean that the *Hindoo* expected to keep out of the way without any cooperating action by the lighted vessel. The failure of the *Hindoo* to identify the lights as those of an approaching vessel was so gross a fault that we are urged to apply the principle of *The City of New York*, 147 U. S. 72, 85, 13 S. Ct. 211, 37 L. Ed. 84, and to resolve any doubts as to the propriety of the navigation of the *Australia Star* in her favor. Despite the strong appeal of counsel's argument, we are not convinced that she was entirely blameless. Had her master continued to call for radar reports, the information so obtained should have suggested to him that his assumption that the *Hindoo* could and would keep out of the way was incorrect and might have enabled him to take some avoiding action.[2] Moreover, the master knew that the naval escort vessel was unsuccessfully endeavoring to send him some message. The district court was of opinion that this should have caused him to sense possible danger and to ask for further reports from the radar operator. With this we agree. Consequently we think the *Australia Star* was correctly held negligent in continuing ahead at full speed without using her radar to obtain further information."

The effect of the decision, together with that of the BARRY-MEDFORD case, is that the master of a radar equipped vessel is required to operate the radar and to apply the information supplied by a series of ranges and bearings in order that he can determine the proper avoiding action to prevent a collision.

[2] The district court's opinion, 74 F. Supp., at page 148 states: "By means of her radar the *Australia Star* could observe the *Hindoo* and determine her heading and speed with greater exactitude than if the *Hindoo* had shown her navigation lights."

We think this statement incorrect since radar can show only the distance and bearing of a vessel, not her heading at any moment. By successive radar readings the general direction in which the vessel has moved between them can be plotted, but her course will be discovered more promptly and more accurately by observing her navigation lights.

LONG BEACH HARBOR LIGHT

The Long Beach Harbor Light, Fog Signal and Radiobeacon, an unattended automatic aid remotely controlled by radio, was placed in operation April 22, 1949, to mark the easterly entrance to the Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor. This is the first light designed to withstand earthquake as well as wind and wave forces. The cover picture shows this light just previous to its being placed into official operation.

The Los Angeles Harbor, Calif., of which Long Beach Harbor is a part, has the distinction of being one of the largest man-made harbors in the world. This harbor has been formed by the construction of a rock breakwater extending easterly from Point Fermin, roughly parallel to the shore for a distance of about 9 miles. For the entrance of vessels two gaps were left in the length of the breakwater. The westerly opening is the closest entrance to the Los Angeles Inner Harbor and is marked by the Los Angeles Harbor Light Station. Long Beach Harbor Light was constructed to mark the easterly breakwater opening, which is the most convenient entrance to the Long Beach Harbor and to the Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

The growing importance of the Long Beach entrance is emphasized by recent monthly data showing the general cargo tonnage shipped through the Long Beach Harbor to have exceeded the tonnage shipped through the Los Angeles Harbor in the same period.

The new light structure, constructed of monolithic architectural concrete, presents a pleasing appearance but one considerably different from the usual conception of the traditional lighthouse. The massive concrete columns rising from the breakwater support the equipment rooms and the tower above. The contrast of the columns with the plain surfaces of the superstructure combine to make a utilitarian but modernistic design.

Fifty feet above water is the station light. This is a 36-inch diameter rotating lighthouse beacon similar to the type which has been extensively used across the country to mark the Nation's airways. A white beam of 140,000 candle power is delivered from a 1,000-watt lamp source by the beacon, which shows a flashing light of 1 second duration every 5 seconds. A blast 3 seconds long is sounded every 20 seconds by the 17-inch diameter diaphragm horn fog signal during fog or low visibility. The radiobeacon

(Class D) is low powered because of the nearby long-range beacon at the Los Angeles Harbor Light Station and is intended to guide ships from a distance of 10 miles or less into and through the narrow breakwater entrance. It operates continuously when the fog signal is sounding, transmitting group of 0.5-second dashes for 13.5 seconds, then silent for 1.5 seconds, on 296 kilocycles.

A timber crib measuring 20 by 30 feet in plan by 12 feet deep was set into the breakwater during its construction in 1942 at a site which was previously covered with 55 feet of water. This crib was divided into compartments of about 5 feet square, six of which were left empty to provide space for the future foundation of the Long Beach Harbor structure. Heavy column reinforcing steel extends continuously from the bottom of the crib pockets upward into the base of the superstructure 12 feet above the top of the breakwater. These six pockets are filled with concrete and 42-inch diameter concrete columns rise above the cribbing to support the building. Heavy seas are thus allowed to wash over the breakwater and pass under the building with only relatively small impact force to the structure.

Besides being strongly reinforced to withstand wind and wave action, the building was designed to resist earthquake stresses. The earthquake design load was assumed to be two-tenths of the combined live and dead weight of the building applied horizontally against the structure. Plywood form lumber was used to obtain a smooth concrete surface with a minimum of refinishing work. A grounded sheet copper roofing was applied which also acts as a ground plane for the various antennae. Erected above the beacon light, a vertical structural-steel radiator antennae, type LSR–1100, extends 103 feet above low water.

Power is furnished for operation of the station by two 5 kv.-a., 115-volt, a.c., 60 cycle, Kohler gasoline engine driven generators of the widely used emergency type which start automatically in case of power failure. Either one or the other of the generators run at all times. The two generators are cross-connected, so that if either generator is running the other cannot start. However, if the operating generator is stopped for any reason, the other generator immediately starts and assumes the load. Every 4 hours a time clock actuates time-delay relays to momentarily ground the magneto and stop the generator engine which has been running, thus shifting the station load to the other generator. If this other generator does not start for any reason the first generator restarts and continues to run. Constant control power for relay operation is supplied from the 32-volt starting batteries.

The station light is turned on at night and off in the morning by an astronomical time clock which automatically adjusts the lighted period to conform to the varying length of darkness from summer to winter. If the sun's rays strike the beacon at the proper angle the lenses concentrate them into a point of intense heat which would damage the interior mechanism and to avoid this the beacon is revolved continuously day and night.

The fog signal is operated by compressed air at about 34 pounds pressure. Sixty cubic feet of air per minute is delivered by the gasoline engine driven air compressor. These engines are battery started by remote control with Startix automatic starter control equipment. Because of the isolated location of the equipment, the problem of positive starting against load appeared very serious. The units, when first received, were equipped with manually operated twin-disk clutches which had to remain engaged at all times as the station was unattended. This was solved by two measures. First, the manual clutch was removed and a twin disk model HC–BR, 14.5-inch hydraulic coupling was installed with an outboard pillow block bearing to take the additional weight. This hydraulic clutch allows the engine to crank on starting with negligible resistance to free turning of the engine. As the engine fires and increases in speed the slip of the coupling diminishes rapidly and the engine picks up the compressor load automatically.

The second measure used to insure positive starting was to reduce the air compressor load by allowing it to discharge into the atmosphere until warmed up. A tee was placed in the 2-inch air line from the compressor to which a normally open bleeder valve was attached. The air from the compressor is then blown into the room until the valve closes. This device was necessary as the air pressure in the receiver would not usually be high enough to operate the unloading device in the compressor head. This bleeder valve, a 1-inch hydramotor, G–2 type, is electrically operated. In the forced feed oil system of the compressor a pressure switch is installed which operates a relay to close the valve when the oil pressure reaches 10 pounds per square inch. The time lag developed in the building up of the oil pressure and in the closing of the valve allows the compressor to turn over for almost 1 minute before pumping against pressure.

It was found that the Tyfon fog horns used a greater than normal amount of air at low pressures while the compressor was building up the receiver pressure thus causing an excessive delay before the sound signal was audible. To overcome this difficulty a pressure switch relay was installed at the air receiver which electrically stops the operation of the horn until the air pressure has reached the required 30 pounds.

The operation of the fog signal and radiobeacon is controlled by the personnel at the Los Angeles Harbor Light Station by high frequency radio. Anrac equipment is used, which was developed during the war to operate off-shore buoy lights for blackout control. Type TXC–116 C amplitude modulated VHF transmitters are installed at the Los Angeles Harbor Light Station and type R–127 A radio receiving controls are located at the Long Beach Harbor Station. Keying of the transmitter by type MC–163 Impulse Keying Units causes the receiver to actuate a sensitive relay which in turn operates relays controlling the air compressor, fog signal, radiobeacon, and frequency modulation ring-back transmitter. The man on watch at the Los Angeles Harbor Station hears what is happening in the engine room 4 miles away by a receiver tuned to the FM transmitter which transmits the sound of the operating engines and the fog signal.

All equipment is installed in duplicate to insure reliability. The station equipment was extensively tested before placing in official commission and has operated in a very satisfactory manner.

One Match

MIGHT SET THE SHIP ON FIRE!

Nothing is more devastating to the seaman than to stand helplessly by while flames destroy his ship and his job.

And the worst of it is, the hand of CARELESSNESS nearly always holds the torch.

MARINE INFORMATION BROADCASTS

The schedule of marine information broadcasts printed on page 64 of the March 1949 "Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council" has not been changed.

The schedule of weather announcements and marine reports published through the Bell System Harbor Stations has been revised and brought up to date. The following table shows the company, call letters, and stations which cooperate transmitting weather announcements, special marine reports, and advisory storm warnings:

Bell System Coastal Harbor Stations

Company	Call setters	Station	Transmitting frequency (kc)	Weather and marine repots		Special marine reports and advisory storm warnings [1]
A. T. & T. Co.	WAQ	Wilmington (Ocean Gate).	2558	10:50 a. m. (e. s. t.)	10:50 p. m.	On receipt and 30 minutes after the even hours.
Ches. & Pot. Tel. Co. of Va.	WGB WHF [2]	Norfolk Quantico	2538	Midnight 6:00 a. m.	12 noon (e. s. t.) 6:00 p. m.	On receipt and on the even hours.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co.	WAY	Chicago	12:02 a. m.—2514 6:02 a. m.—2514 and 4282.5 12:25 p. m.—2514 and 2550 6:02 p. m.—2514	12:02 a. m. (e. s. t.) 6:02 a. m.	12:25 p. m. 6:02 p. m.	On receipt and 45 minutes after the odd hours.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co.	WOU	Boston	2506	11:20 a. m. (e. s. t.) 5:20 a. m.	11:20 p. m. 5:20 p. m.	On receipt and 20 minutes after the odd hours.
New York Tel. Co.	WOX	New York (Staten Island).	2522 2590	10:50 a. m. (e. s. t.)	10:50 p. m.	On receipt and 50 minutes after the even hours.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.	KOW	Seattle	2522	9:00 a. m. (p. s. t.)	9:00 p. m.	On receipt and on the odd hours.
	KOX	Portland	2598	9:30 a. m.	9:30 p. m.	
	KFX	Astoria	2598	9:15 a. m.	9:15 p. m.	
	KOE	Eureka	2506	9:00 a. m.	9:00 p. m.	
	KLH	San Francisco	2506	8:30 a. m.	8:30 p. m.	
	KOU	San Pedro	2566	8:00 a. m.	8:00 p. m.	
Bell Tel. Co. of Penna.	WEH	Wilmington	2558	12:30 a. m. (e. s. t.)	12:30 p. m.	On receipt and 30 minutes after the odd hours.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.	WJO	Charleston	2566	11:30 a. m. (e. s. t.)	11:30 p. m.	On receipt and on odd hours.[3]
	WNJ	Jacksonville	2566	12:30 a. m. (e. s. t.)	12:30 p. m.	
	WDR	Miami	2514	11:00 a. m. (e. s. t.)	11:00 p. m.	
	WAK	New Orleans	2598	11:00 a. m. (e. s. t.)	11:00 p. m.	
	WFA	Tampa	2550	11:00 a. m. (e. s. t.)	11:00 p. m.	
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.	KQP	Galveston	2530	(e. s. t.)	12:30 p. m. 7:00 p. m.	On receipt and 15 minutes after the odd hours.

[1] The announcements are made at the time shown in the above schedule and will continue for as many periods as the Coast Guard may specify.
[2] After transmission from WGB at Norfolk the report is immediately repeated over WHF at Quantico.
[3] After transmission from WNJ at Jacksonville the report is immediately repeated over WJO at Charleston.

INTERNATIONAL SAFETY CONVENTION RATIFIED BY SENATE

The United States Senate has ratified the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1948, without amendment. This Convention, however, will not become effective until after a proclamation by the President of the United States is issued indicating that not less than 15 acceptances, including 7 by countries with at least one million gross tons of shipping each, have been deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain.

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1948, together with other various reports and letter of transmittal, is set forth in the Department of State Publication 3282, "International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, April 23–June 10, 1948." This publication is obtainable from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., at a cost of 55 cents per copy.

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1948, is an outgrowth of the sinking of the steamship *Titanic* in 1912. The first International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea was held in London in 1914 and was attended by 13 of the principal maritime nations. World War I prevented this Convention from coming into force, but parts of it were enacted into Federal legislation. A second Conference on Safety of Life at Sea was held in London in 1929. This Convention was ratified by the United States in 1936, but was marked by three reservations.

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1948, as ratified by the United States Senate, is composed of 15 articles and 6 chapters of technical regulations dealing with general provisions, construction of vessels, lifesaving appliances, radiotelegraphy and radiotelephony, safety of navigation, and carriage of grain and dangerous goods.

Delegates were present from the following nations:

Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Denmark
Egypt
Finland
France
Greece
Iceland
India
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Republic of the Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Sweden
Union of South Africa
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
United States
Yugoslavia

Observers were present and represented Ceylon, Mexico, Rumania, and Turkey. The following international organizations were also represented by observers:

International Civil Aviation Organization
International Hydrographic Bureau
International Labor Organization
International Meteorological Organization
International Telecommunication Union
United Nations
World Health Organization

At this Conference the International Rules for Navigation at Sea were also considered and the Conference approved the "Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1948," but decided not to annex the revised regulations to the "International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1948." Therefore, the ratification of the Convention by the United States will not make effective the "Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea" as set forth in Appendix 5 of the pamphlet "International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, April 23–June 10, 1948." The 1948 Convention differs considerably in form when compared with the 1929 Convention.

Share YOUR SAFETY knowledge with others for the benefit of all.

LESSONS FROM CASUALTIES

SAILING VESSELS ON INDIAN WATERS

An American merchant vessel proceeding at a speed of 14 knots on a clear day in the Arabian Sea on a run from Bombay to Colombo collided with an Indian sailing vessel. In consequence of the collision the sailing vessel sank. The master of the merchant vessel stated that the impact of collision was very slight in that the sailing craft merely grazed the starboard side of his ship.

No effort was made to ascertain if the sailing vessel which had the right of way was damaged and in need of assistance, nor was any report of the casualty made as required.

At the suggestion of the Indian Government masters of United States merchant ships are advised that when in Indian waters they should give open deck sailing craft a wide berth, bearing in mind that even the wash and stern waves of a large and fast vessel would cause such a sailing vessel to roll violently and cause damage to craft and cargo even when the steamship is past and clear.

LIFEBOAT DROPPED!

In the article "Another Lifeboat Dropped," published in the May 1949 "Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council," page 98, were recommendations to reduce lifeboat casualties of this type. Among the recommendations it was stated that where possible the persons in charge of lifeboats should be licensed deck or engineering officers. This recommendation is qualified by the requirement of law and regulations that a licensed deck officer or a certificated lifeboatman or able seaman shall be placed in charge of each lifeboat or life raft by the master of an ocean-going vessel. An engineering officer must, therefore, be a certificated lifeboatman before being placed in charge of a lifeboat or life raft.

The manning of lifeboats is very important. The persons in charge should be competent men who remain cool in an emergency. Provisions in R. S. 4488 regarding manning of lifeboats specify the number of certificated lifeboatmen required as well as that a licensed officer or able seaman shall be placed in charge of each lifeboat or pontoon raft who shall see that the men under his orders are acquainted with their duties and stations. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1929, under Regulation XLII, and section 59.54 of the General Rules and Regulations for vessel inspection of ocean vessels, require a licensed deck officer or certificated lifeboatman shall be placed in charge of each lifeboat or lift raft. In sections 60.47, 76.51, and 94.51 in the General Rules and Regulations for vessel inspection of vessels navigating coastwise, Great Lakes, and bays, sounds, and lakes other than the Great Lakes, it is also required that lifeboats shall be manned with qualified personnel under the charge of a licensed officer or certificated able seaman.

Care in handling lifeboats is most important. Since the publication of the article "Another Lifeboat Dropped," another lifeboat was dropped! This time from a vessel under construction in a shipyard, resulting in the death of a shipyard workman. This accident occurred shortly after the shipyard employee entered the lifeboat. For some reason the lifeboat releasing gear was tripped causing the lifeboat to drop. It is possible that the employee was cleaning or painting around the lifeboat releasing gear and somehow moved the releasing lever. After lifeboats are installed on new construction or when lifeboats of vessels on drydock can be entered by shipyard employees or others not familiar with the releasing gear, it is recommended that preventer gripes should be so rigged that they will prevent the dropping of a lifeboat should the releasing gear be tripped or tampered with or otherwise worked by someone who is probably unfamiliar with their operation.

DUTIES OF SHIP'S OFFICERS WHEN A PILOT IS ABOARD

Two recent groundings, caused in each case by the negligence of the pilot and the officer of the watch, indicate ignorance or disregard by ship's officers of their duties while the ship is being navigated by a pilot.

In the first case the vessel was proceeding at night in an inland bay with a pilot at the conn. When the vessel was abeam of a buoy at which the course was normally changed, the mate on watch asked the pilot if he intended to change course. The pilot replied, "not yet." Half an hour later the chief mate took over the watch, having been told of the pilot's answer to the question about changing the course. The chief mate noted the dead reckoning position of the ship at the time he took over the watch. About 15 minutes later it was found that the ship was aground. She had grounded gradually with no vibration. The vessel was not damaged; however, she remained aground for several days with a consequent loss of approximately $50,000 to her owners in delay of the vessel and in cargo handling costs. After the grounding the pilot admitted that he had fallen asleep while sitting on a stool in the pilot house and had failed to change course at the buoy, thus permitting the ship to ground. There was no doubt as to the negligence of the pilot. The chief mate was equally negligent and the officer whom the chief mate relieved was not wholly free from fault, as will be shown. It should have been obvious to the mate on watch when the buoy was abeam that if the vessel continued on the same course for 45 minutes she would ground. Yet he failed to notify the master, failed to ascertain the position of the ship, and failed to question the pilot concerning the course. The chief mate was similarly negligent after relieving the watch. His fault is the greater because he could have averted the grounding by taking prompt action. He should have known that the ship would ground in a matter of minutes unless the course was changed and should have insisted on a change of course or at least have notified the master.

The facts in the second case were similar to those in the first. The vessel was proceeding in an inland bay on a clear night. The vessel was being set to the right by wind and current. Some allowance was made for leeway,

but not enough—as the ship grounded on the right-hand side of the channel. At the time of grounding the pilot was sitting in a chair in the wheelhouse. The chair was in such a position that the pilot could not see ahead. The grounding was caused by the negligence of the pilot in that he was inattentive and failed to change the course of the vessel to keep her in the channel. On the other hand, the mate on watch was also negligent in that he failed to check the position of the ship and to take proper action to prevent her from going aground.

In each case the master was asleep in his cabin. Both cases occurred near the end of the mid-watch when the pilots were fatigued and were sitting down.

It appears from the record of the two foregoing cases either (1) that the ship's officers placed too great reliance on the pilot and thus consciously neglected their own duties, or (2) that the ship's officers did not know their duties when the vessel was being navigated by a pilot. In either event it would be well to review the duties of ship's officers in such a situation. The following excerpts from court decisions set forth responsibilities of ships' officers:

"The authority of the master of a vessel is not in complete abeyance while a pilot, who is required by law to be accepted, is in discharge of his functions. The China, 7 Wall. 53. With reference to such a situation the following was said in the opinion in that case: 'It is the duty of the master to interfere in cases of the pilot's intoxication or manifest incapacity, in cases of danger which he does not foresee, and in all cases of great necessity. The master has the same power to displace the pilot that he has to remove any subordinate officer of the vessel. He may exercise it, or not, according to his discretion'." *Jure* v. *United Fruit Co.*, 6 F2d 6.

"The responsibility for the safety of the ship rests upon the master. The pilot, because of his superior knowledge of the depth of water and location of the channel, has charge of the navigation of the vessel, but even then the master is not absolved from his duties, but may advise the pilot, and even displace him in case of manifest incompetency. * * * The master ought not to substitute his judgment for that of the pilot except in cases of obvious necessity, or * * * where danger is apparent and avoidable. But we think a proper case for the master's assertion of authority for the safety of his ship presents itself where it is obvious or apparent that danger from some cause is imminent, though the particular cause of danger may not be appreciated." *Charente S. S.* v. *United States*, 12 F2d 412.

It has been held that if a situation arises where the master exercising reasonable vigilance observes or should observe that the pilot is so navigating the vessel that she is going or likely to go into danger, and there is opportunity for the master to intervene to save the ship from danger, he should do so.

It would seem that, in cases where the master places an officer in charge of the watch, the officer has the duty to interfere when the vessel, being navigated by the pilot, is standing into danger. The minimum requirement would appear to be for the watch officer to call the pilot's attention to the hazard and, if the pilot took no action, to notify the master.

For maximum safety the ship's officers should keep a check on the ship's position and also should insure that all orders of the pilot for changes of rudder and engines are promptly obeyed. In one instance during the war a United States vessel was entering a very narrow foreign channel with a pilot. His dialect was not very intelligible to those in the ship. Apparently the opposite was also true for he gave an order of left rudder which was repeated by the helmsman as right rudder and so executed. The pilot apparently believed his order was being correctly carried out. The officer of the watch was listening carefully to the orders and requested a verification from the pilot. The error was quickly discovered and rectified, thereby saving the vessel from a possible grounding on the side of the channel.

HOW MEN GET HURT

The Accident Prevention Bureau of Pacific Maritime Association, San Francisco, California, in its "Marine Safe Practices Pamphlet," dated June 1949, published certain percentage figures based on reports of injuries submitted to the Bureau by 173 vessels in 10 companies. In the report a total of 1,020 injuries is considered. These represent all the cases which occurred aboard ship, whether in connection with ship's work or not, and injuries sustained on the dock while engaged in ship's work. Injuries sustained ashore are not included since the ship's officers can have no control over them. Because the various sources of injuries are common to all types of vessels, no segregation was made of passenger and freight vessels. The following tables gives the percentage of injuries by causes:

	Percent
Slipping, tripping, falling:	
Slipping	19.2
Tripping—stepping on	8.2
Falling	7.6
Total	35.0
Handling objects other than machinery:	
Strain & sprains from lifting	7.7
Using hand tools	7.7
Other cuts and bruises	6.8
Dropped while handling	3.5
Total	25.7
Moving objects other than machinery:	
Parted or running lines	2.6
Doors and ports	4.0
Miscellaneous	2.1
Total	8.7
Flying objects, steam, hot water:	
Goggles not worn	1.9
Other chips and scales	1.3
Steam or hot liquid from open lines, urns, etc	2.6
Miscellaneous	.7
Total	6.5
Bumping into objects:	
Hot pipes, fixed objects, etc	6.0
Falling objects:	
Cargo	1.8
Stores	1.3
Gear (coffee makers, etc.)	1.5
Miscellaneous	1.3
Total	5.9
Machinery:	
Galley and shop power tools	1.1
Gears and belts	0.8
Pressure vessels and lines (flarebacks and failures)	1.0
Winches, engines, hoists	1.6
Electric burns and shock	0.2
Total	4.7
Miscellaneous:	
Fights	2.8
Caused primarily by intoxication	1.8
Others	1.9
Not stated	1.0
Total	6.5

It will be noted that more than one-third of all injuries arise from slipping, tripping, and falling. Under falls are included only those cases, such as stepping into an open floor plate or falling from a ladder or scaffold, where slipping or tripping was not the basic accident. With the great similarity among the majority of vessels in the fleets today, there are few hazards which are not common to vessels. As someone said, "Learn from the experience of others since you won't live long enough to make all the mistakes yourself."

WATCH for these hazards:

1. Slippery, wet, or oily decks.
2. Ice and snow on catwalks and platforms.
3. Stumbling hazards.
4. Loose material under foot.
5. Worn or broken treads on stairs.
6. Stairs, scaffolds, or platforms without guard rails.
7. Insecure platforms or scaffolds.
8. Defective ladders or ladders not suited for job.
9. Open hatches.

APPENDIX

Amendments to Regulations

TITLE 33—NAVIGATION AND NAVIGABLE WATERS

Chapter I—Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury

Subchapter E—Navigation Requirements for the Great Lakes and St. Marys River

[CGFR 49-11]

PART 90—PILOT RULES FOR THE GREAT LAKES

MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS

The purpose of the following miscellaneous amendments is to delete from the Code of Federal Regulations those sections which paraphrase the statute. Since all the requirements in §§ 90.9, 90.11, 90.13, and 90.14 are contained in Rules 25, 19, 14, and 15, respectively, as set forth in the act of February 8, 1895, as amended, the cancellation of §§ 90.9, 90.11, 90.13, and 90.14 does not change the statutory requirements which must be followed.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commandant, United States Coast Guard, by R. S. 4405, as amended, Sections 1, 3, 28 Stat. 646, 649, as amended, Public Law 448, 80th Congress, and section 101 of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, 33 U. S. C. 243, 256, 46 U. S. C. 1, 375, the following amendments to the regulations are prescribed:

1. Section 90.9 *Passing in channels less than 500 feet wide* is deleted.
2. Section 90.11 *Meeting of steamer and sailing vessels; right of way* is deleted.
3. Section 90.13 *Fog signals* is deleted.
4. Section 90.14 *Moderate speed in fog* is deleted.

Dated: May 5, 1949.

MERLIN O'NEILL,
Real Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,
Acting Commandant.

[F. R. Doc. 49-3752; Filed, May 10, 1949; 8:50 a. m., May 11, 1949, 14 F. R. 2508]

TITLE 46—SHIPPING

Chapter I—Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury

[CGFR 49-22]

LIFEBOATS ON FERRYBOATS

The requirement that ferryboats of 50 and not over 300 gross tons shall be equipped with lifeboats having a capacity of not less than 120 cubic feet was promulgated in 1905. At that time not many ferryboats were less than 150 gross tons. In recent years many ferryboats have been designed to be between 50 and 150 gross tons and to require either two 60 cubic feet lifeboats or one 120 cubic feet lifeboat has been found impracticable on such ferryboats due to limitations of stowage space and facilities for handling lifeboats by the smaller crews available. One lifeboat of not less than 60 cubic feet capacity is deemed sufficient for rescue purposes on ferryboats within this tonnage. The amendments to the regulations, as contained in this document, change only the lifeboat requirements for ferryboats of 50 and not over 150 gross tons by reducing the minimum capacity of lifeboats from 120 cubic feet to 60 cubic feet. The requirements for lifeboats on ferryboats of over 150 gross tons remain the same as before. Since these amendments are relaxations of the present regulations, the notice and public rule making procedure required by the Administrative Procedure Act (60 Stat. 237, 5 U. S. C. 1001 et seq.) are hereby found to be impracticable and the effective date requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commandant, United States Coast Guard, by R. S. 4405 and 4426, as amended, 46 U. S. C. 375, 404, and section 101 of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, 11 F. R. 7875, 60 Stat. 1097, 46 U. S. C. 1, the following amendments to the regulations are prescribed which shall become effective on the date of publication of this document in the Federal Register:

Subchapter H—Great Lakes: General Rules and Regulations

PART 80—FERRYBOATS

Section 80.3 is amended to read as follows:

§ 80.3 *Lifesaving equipment.* (a) All ferryboats of 50 gross tons or over shall be equipped with such lifeboats, life rafts, outside ladders, and other means of escape, in case of disaster, as, in the opinion of the inspectors, shall meet the requirements of each particular case. In no case shall the cubic feet of lifeboat capacity be less than that provided in the table following:

Ferryboats	*Cubic feet*
50 and not over 150 gross tons	60
Over 150 and not over 300 gross tons	120
Over 300 and not over 600 gross tons	240
Over 600 gross tons	360

(b) On ferryboats of more than 300 gross tons one-half of the lifeboat capacity required by paragraph (a) of this section may be substituted by its equivalent in approved life rafts.

(c) Ferryboats of less than 50 gross tons shall be equipped with lifeboats or life rafts as in the opinion of the inspectors may be necessary in case of disaster to secure the safety of all

persons on board. (R. S. 4405, 4426, as amended, 46 U. S. C. 375, 404.)

Subchapter I—Bays, Sounds, and Lakes Other Than the Great Lakes: General Rules and Regulations

PART 98—FERRYBOATS

Section 98.3 is amended to read as follows:

§ 98.3 *Lifesaving equipment.* (See § 80.3 of this chapter, as amended, which is identical with this section.)

Subchapter J—Rivers: General Rules and Regulations

PART 117—FERRYBOATS

Section 117.3 is amended to read as follows:

§ 117.3 *Lifesaving equipment.* (See § 80.3 of this chapter, as amended, which is identical with this section.)

Dated: June 16, 1949.

J. F. FARLEY,
Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,
Commandant.

[F. R. Doc. 49-4985; Filed, June 21, 1949; 8:58 a. m.; F. R., June 22, 1949, 14 F. R. 3379.]

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

United States Coast Guard

[CGFR 49-14]

THIRD COAST GUARD DISTRICT OFFICE AND MARINE INSPECTION OFFICE AT NEW YORK

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

The notice containing the description of organization and functions of the United States Coast Guard, published in the Federal Register December 30, 1948, 13 F. R. 8815-8818, is amended in section 4 *Field organization* as follows:

The address of the Coast Guard District Office for the Third Coast Guard District in the table in paragraph (b) was changed from "42 Broadway, New York 4, N. Y." to "80 Lafayette Street, New York 13, N. Y.," effective April 1, 1949.

The address for the Marine Inspection Office at New York in paragraph (d), under the Third Coast Guard District, was changed from "42 Broadway, New York 4, N. Y.," to "80 Lafayette Street, New York 13, N. Y.," effective April 1, 1949.

Dated: April 26, 1949.

J. F. FARLEY,
Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,
Commandant.

[F. R. Doc. 49-3403; Filed, Apr. 29, 1949; 8:54 a. m., Apr. 30, 1949, 14 F. R. 2149]

Equipment Approved by the Commandant

APPROVAL OF EQUIPMENT

[CGFR 49-23]

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commandant, United States Coast Guard, by R. S. 4405 and 4491, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 375, 489, and section 101 of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946 (11 F. R. 7875, 60 Stat. 1097, 46 U. S. C. 1), as well as the additional authorities cited with specific items below, the following approvals of equipment are prescribed and shall be effective for a period of five years from date of publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER unless sooner canceled or suspended by proper authority:

CLEANING PROCESSES FOR LIFE PRESERVERS

NOTE: Where buoyancy fillers are not removed from envelope covers during cleaning process.

Approval No. 160.006/17/0, Castle cleaning process for kapok life preservers, specifications dated May 4, 1949, submitted by Castle Carpet Cleaning Corp., 36-21 Thirty-third Street, Long Island City, N. Y.

(R. S. 4417a, 4426, 4488, 4492, 35 Stat. 428, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 164, 166, 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 396, 404, 481, 490, 526e, 526p, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 160.006-4)

BUOYANT CUSHIONS, KAPOK, STANDARD

NOTE: Cushions are for use on motorboats of classes A, 1, or 2 not carrying pasengers for hire.

Approval No. 160.007/81/0, standard kapok buoyant cushion, U. S. C. G. Specification 160.007, manufactured by Flamingo Textiles, Inc., 6001 Northwest Seventh Avenue, Miami, Fla.

Approval No. 160.007/82/0, standard kapok buoyant cushion, U. S. C. G. Specification 160.007, manufactured by Hillsboro Transportation Co., Hillsboro, Ohio.

(54 Stat. 164, 166; 46 U. S. C. 526e, 526p; 46 CFR 25.4-1, 160.007)

BUOYANT CUSHIONS, NON-STANDARD

NOTE: Cushions are for use on motorboats of classes A, 1, and 2 not carrying passengers for hire.

Approval No. 160.008/378/2, 15" x 15" x 2 rectangular buoyant cushion, 20 oz. kapok, plastic film cover, plastic straps, heat-sealed seams, specifications dated May 23, 1949, manufactured by the Watertight Slide Fastener Corp., 15 Whitehall Street, New York 4, N. Y. (This approval supersedes Approval No. 160.008/378/1 published in the FEDERAL REGISTER of May 1, 1948.)

Approval No. 160.008/411/0, 17½" x 17½" x 2½" rectangular buoyant cushion, 38 oz. kapok, Dwg. No. SK 8167, dated April 27, 1949, manufactured by Chris-Craft Corp., Algonac, Mich.

Approval No. 160.008/412/0, 17½" x 20½" x 2½" rectangular buoyant cushion, 44 oz. kapok, Dwg. No. SK 8168, dated April 27, 1949, manufactured by Chris-Craft Corp, Algonac, Mich.

(54 Stat. 164, 166; 46 U. S. C. 526e, 526p; 46 CFR 25.4-1, 160.008.)

BUOYS, LIFE, RING, CORK OR BALSA WOOD

Approval No. 160.009/32/0, 30-inch cork ring life buoy, U. S. C. G. Specification 160.009, manufactured by Seaway Manufacturing Co., Inc., 511 North Solomon Street, New Orleans 19, La.

(R. S. 4417a, 4426, 4482, 4488, sec. 11, 35 Stat. 428, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 164, 166, 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 396, 404, 475, 481, 526e, 526p, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 25.4-1, 33.7-1, 59.56, 60.49, 76.53, 94.53, 113.46, 160.009)

BUOYANT APPARATUS

Approval No. 160.010/17/0, buoyant apparatus 5'0" x 2'6" elliptical shape, 7½" x 9" elliptical section, flush-net platform, solid balsa wood, 5-person capacity, Dwg. No. 3-25-49, Rev. April 20, 1949, and specifications dated March 25, 1949, Rev. April 20, 1949, manufactured by Atlantic-Pacific Manufacturing Corp., 124 Atlantic Avenue, Brooklyn 2, N. Y.

SIGNALS, DISTRESS, FLARE, RED, HAND

Approval No. 160.021/4/0, Jackson's superior, hand red flare distress signal, Dwg. No. 506, dated October 25, 1948, and revised February 17, 1949, specification dated February 17, 1949, manufactured by Samuel Jackson's Sons, Inc., Bristol, Pa.

(R. S. 4417a, 4426, 4488, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 404, 481, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 160.021)

DAVITS, LIFEBOAT

Approval No. 160.032/105/0, mechanical davit, Type 24-40, inboard sheath screw, approved for a maximum working load of 11,500 pounds per set (5,750 pounds per arm), using 5-part falls, identified by General Arrangement Dwg. No. DI-201-1 dated June 4, 1948 and revised April 11,

1949, manufactured by Marine Safety Equipment Corp., Point Pleasant, N. J.

Approval No. 160.032/114/0, mechanical davit, crescent sheath screw Type C-51, approval for maximum working load of 10,230 pounds per set (5,115 pounds per arm), identified by General Arrangement Dwg. No. 2614 dated April 12, 1949, manufactured by Welin Davit and Boat Division of Continental Copper & Steel Industries, Inc., Perth Amboy, N. J.

(R. S. 4417a, 4426, 4481, 4488, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 404, 474, 481, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 37.1-4, 59.3, 60.21, 76.15, 94.14, 113.23)

TELEPHONE SYSTEMS, SOUND POWERED

Approval No. 161.005/37/2, sound powered telephone stations, selective ringing, common talking, drip-proof, bulkhead mounting, Dwg. No. 70-525, Alt. 5, manufactured by Henschel Corp., Amesbury, Mass. (Supersedes Approval No. 161.005/37/1 published in the Federal Register February 19, 1949.)

(R. S. 4417a, 4418, 4426, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended, 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 392, 404, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 32.9-4, 63.11, 79.12, 97.14, 116.10)

FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, PORTABLE, HAND, CARBON-TETRACHLORIDE TYPE

Approval No. 162.004/34/1, Pyrene 1-quart carbon tetrachloride type hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly Dwg. No. B-7992 dated July 28, 1938, Change No. 13, dated October 27, 1947, name plate Dwg. No. A-9069, dated January 17, 1940, Change No. 6, dated January 23, 1948, manufactured by Pyrene Manufacturing Co., Newark 8, N. J. (This approval supersedes Approval No. 162.004/34/0 published in the Federal Register July 31, 1947.)

(R. S. 4417a, 4426, 4479, 4492, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 165, 166, 346, 1028, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 404, 463a, 472, 490, 526g, 526p, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 25.5-1, 26.3-1, 27.3-1, 34.5-1, 61.13, 77.13, 95.13, 114.15)

VALVES, PRESSURE VACUUM RELIEF

Approval No. 162.017/62/0, VAREC 6" Fig. 35D, pressure vacuum relief valve, single unit, open atmospheric pattern, spring loaded pressure and vacuum pallets, bronze body; Dwg. No. C-1195-A, rev. May 11, 1949, approved for 6" inlet size for use with inflammable and combustible liquids of Grade A or lower, manufactured by The Vapor Recovery Systems Co., 2820 North Alameda Street, Compton, Calif.

(R. S. 4417a, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 391a, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 32.7-4)

RANGES, LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS BURNING

Approval No. 162.020/13/0, Magic Chef Hot Plate and Griddle, Model No. 810, approved by the American Gas Association, Inc., under Certificate No. 14-12-3.001 and Serial No. 1, for Liquefied Petroleum Gas Service, manufactured by the American Stove Co., 4931 Daggett Avenue, St. Louis 10, Mo.

(R. S. 4417a, 4426, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 1028, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 404, 463a, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 32.9-11, 61.25, 95.24, 114.25)

Dated: June 17, 1949.

J. F. FARLEY,
Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,
Commandant.

[F. R. Doc. 49-5019; Filed, June 22, 1949, 8:53 a. m.; F. R. June 23, 1949, 14 F. R. 3417.]

FUSIBLE PLUGS

The Marine Engineering Regulations and Material Specifications require that manufacturers submit samples from each heat of fusible plugs to the Commandant for test prior to plugs manufactured from the heat being used on vessels subject to inspection by the Coast Guard. A list of approved heats which have been tested and found acceptable during the period from May 15 to June 15, 1949, is as follows:

The Lunkenheimer Co., P. O. Box 360, Annex Station, Cincinnati 14, Ohio. Heats Nos. 336 through 341.

AFFIDAVITS

The following affidavits were accepted during the period from May 15 to June 15, 1949:

Frank McWilliams, Inc., 1435 Richmond Terrace, Staten Island 10, N. Y. Valves.

Hyde Windlass Co., Bath, Maine. Flanges.

Security Locknut Corp., 1815 North Long Avenue, Chicago 39, Ill. Bolting.

CERTIFICATION OF ARTICLES OF SHIPS' STORES AND SUPPLIES

Articles of ships' stores and supplies certificated from May 25 to June 25, 1949, inclusive, for use on board vessels in accordance with the provisions of Part 147 of the Regulations Governing Explosives or Other Dangerous Articles on Board Vessels are as follows:

Xzit Sales Co., 158 Fourteenth St., Hoboken, N. J. Certificate No. 285, dated June 16, 1949, "Vantri Fuel Oil Heater Cleaner."

Uncle Sam Chemical Co., Inc., 575 West 131st St., New York 27, N. Y. Certificate No. 286, dated June 23, 1949, "Germall Disinfectant."

TERMINATION OF APPROVAL OF EQUIPMENT

[CGFR 49-24]

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commandant, United States Coast Guard, by R. S. 4405 and 4491, as amended, 46 U. S. C. 375, 489; and section 101 of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, 11 F. R. 7875, 60 Stat. 1097, 46 U. S. C. 1; as well as the additional authorities cited with specific items below, the following approvals of equipment are terminated because the items of equipment covered are now manufactured under other approvals issued by the Coast Guard:

TELEPHONE SYSTEMS, SOUND POWERED

Termination of Approval No. 161.005/1/1, sound powered telephone station, selective ringing, common talking, 17 stations maximum, bulkhead mounting, splashproof, Dwg. No. 70-523-1, Alt. 3, manufactured by Henschel Corp., Amesbury, Mass. (Approved in Federal Register on August 6, 1948.) (Current equipment approved under Approval No. 161.005/37/2.)

Termination of Approval No. 161.005/2/1, sound powered telephone station, selective ringing, common talking, 8 stations maximum, bulkhead mounting, splashproof, Dwg. No. 70-523, Alt. 4, manufactured by Henschel Corp., Amesbury, Mass. (Approved in Federal Register on August 6, 1948.) (Current equipment approved under Approval No. 161.005/37/2.)

(R. S. 4417a, 4418, 4426, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended, 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 392, 404, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 32.9-4, 63.11, 79.12, 97.14, 116.10)

CONDITIONS OF TERMINATION OF APPROVALS

The termination of approvals of equipment made by this document shall be made effective upon the thirty-first day after the date of publication of this document in the Federal Register. Notwithstanding this termination of approval on any item of equipment, such equipment manufactured before the effective date of termination of approval may be used on merchant vessels so long as it is in good and serviceable condition.

Dated: June 17, 1949.

J. F. FARLEY,
Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,
Commandant.

[F. R. Doc. 49-5018; Filed, June 22, 1949; 8:52 a. m.; F. R. June 23, 1949, 14 F. R. 3416.]

MERCHANT MARINE PERSONNEL STATISTICS

MERCHANT MARINE LICENSES ISSUED DURING MAY 1949

DECK OFFICERS

		Region								Total	
		Atlantic coast		Gulf coast		Great Lakes and rivers		Pacific coast			
		O	R	O	R	O	R	O	R	O	R
Master	Ocean	15	93	12	43	0	2	11	61	38	199
	Coastwise	3	13	6	2	0	0	0	1	9	16
	Great Lakes	0	1	0	0	1	8	0	0	1	9
	B. S. & L.	11	35	2	7	0	0	1	7	14	49
	Rivers	1	0	1	9	0	33	0	1	2	43
Chief mate	Ocean	13	23	4	10	0	0	5	25	22	58
	Coastwise	0	3	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	6
Second mate	Ocean	18	31	9	8	0	3	6	23	33	65
	Coastwise	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Third mate	Ocean	5	29	8	7	0	3	4	22	17	61
	Coastwise	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
Mate	Great Lakes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	B. S. & L.	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	5	2	7
	Rivers	0	0	1	0	5	7	0	0	6	7
Pilots	B. S. L. & R.	55	107	21	43	34	52	17	44	127	246
Master	Uninspected vessels	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Mate	Uninspected vessels	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total		121	340	65	133	40	108	46	189	272	769
Grand total		461		198		148		235		1041	

ENGINEER OFFICERS

Steam	Chief engineer:										
	Unlimited	16	72	3	38	1	7	6	45	25	162
	Limited	1	54	0	5	5	25	0	6	6	90
	First assistant engineer:										
	Unlimited	13	21	5	8	2	3	6	21	26	53
	Limited	0	0	0	0	1	10	0	1	1	11
	Second assistant engineer:										
	Unlimited	25	36	5	17	1	6	8	40	39	99
	Limited	0	0	0	0	3	8	0	0	3	8
	Third assistant engineer:										
	Unlimited	8	33	2	12	1	17	7	27	18	89
	Limited	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	1	6
Motor	Chief engineer:										
	Unlimited	1	20	0	7	2	5	9	13	12	45
	Limited	10	23	0	7	3	5	4	5	17	40
	First assistant engineer:										
	Unlimited	5	2	2	5	0	1	0	2	7	10
	Limited	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	1
	Second assistant engineer:										
	Unlimited	2	3	0	1	0	1	0	8	2	13
	Limited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Third assistant engineer:										
	Unlimited	6	48	0	20	0	15	3	35	9	118
	Limited	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Uninspected vessels	Chief engineer	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3	0
	Assistant engineer	1	0	0	0	0	0	9	1	10	1
Total		90	313	19	120	20	104	54	210	183	747
Grand total		403		139		124		264		930	

NEGLIGENCE is the attribute which is deficient of FORETHOUGHT!

ORIGINAL SEAMEN'S DOCUMENTS ISSUED MONTH OF MAY 1949

Region	(1) Staff officer	(2) Continuous discharge book	(3) United States merchant mariner's documents	(4) AB any waters unlimited	(5) AB any waters 12 months	(6) AB Great Lakes 18 months	(7) AB tugs and towboats any waters	(8) AB bays and sounds [1]	(9) AB seagoing barges	(10) Lifeboatman	(11) Q. M. E. D.	(12) Radio operators	(13) Certificate of service	(14) Tankerman
Atlantic coast	37	3	498	179	82	3	1		1	366	105	3	405	11
Gulf coast	4	2	238	55	19	7				84	81	1	186	23
Pacific coast	15		234	71	46	1				253	70	1	186	5
Great Lakes and rivers	2		489	21	71	44				71	88	1	418	28
Total	58	5	1,459	326	218	55	1	0	1	774	344	6	1,195	67

[1] 12 months, vessels 500 gross tons or under not carrying passengers.

NOTE: Columns 4 through 14 indicate endorsements made on U. S. merchant mariner's documents.

WAIVERS OF MANNING REQUIREMENTS FROM MAY 1 TO MAY 31, 1949

Region	Number of vessels	Deck officers substituted for higher ratings	Engineer officers substituted for higher ratings	Able seaman substituted for deck officers	Ordinary seamen substituted for able seamen	Qualified members of engine department substituted for engineer officers	Wipers or coal passers substituted for qualified members of engine department	Wipers, coal passers or cadets substituted for engineer officers	Ordinary seamen or cadets substituted for deck officers	Total
Atlantic coast	2	2			2					4
Gulf coast										
Pacific coast										
Great Lakes										
Total	2	2			2					4

NOTE: In addition, individual waivers were granted to permit the employment of 1 able seaman holding certificate for "any water—12 months" in excess of the 50 percent authorized by general waiver.

CREW SHORTAGE REPORTS FROM MAY 1 TO MAY 31, 1949

Region	Number of vessels	Ratings in which shortages occurred												Total
		Chief mate	Second mate	Third mate	Radio	Able seamen	Ordinary seamen	Chief engineer	First engineer	Second engineer	Third engineer	Qualified member engine department	Wiper or coal passer	
Atlantic coast	3											2		2
Gulf coast														
Pacific coast														
Great Lakes	86	4	3	15		20	2		5	5	11	39	9	113
Total	89	4	3	15		20	2		5	5	11	41	9	115

INVESTIGATING UNITS

Coast Guard Merchant Marine Investigating Units and Merchant Marine Details investigated a total of 577 cases during the month of April 1949. From this number, hearings resulted involving 25 officers and 102 unlicensed men. In the case of officers, 2 licenses were revoked, 6 were suspended, 9 were suspended with probation granted, none were voluntarily surrendered, and 4 were dismissed. Of the unlicensed personnel, 14 certificates were revoked, 20 were suspended, 40 were suspended with probation granted, 7 were voluntarily surrendered, 9 were closed with admonition, and 11 were dismissed after hearing.

Coast Guard Merchant Marine Investigating Units and Merchant Marine Details investigated a total of 554 cases during the month of May 1949. From this number, hearings resulted involving 28 officers and 89 unlicensed men. In the case of officers, 2 licenses were revoked, 6 were suspended, 6 were suspended with probation granted, 1 was voluntarily surrendered, and 4 cases were dismissed. Of the unlicensed personnel, 11 certificates were revoked, 18 were suspended, 25 were suspended with probation granted, 7 were voluntarily surrendered, 10 were closed with admonition, and 16 were dismissed after hearing.

If you permit SAFETY to go on vacation, will you be able to go?

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