

	Commandant (G-MOR) United States Coast Guard	2100 Second Street, S.W. Washington, DC 20593-0001 Staff Symbol: G-MOR Phone:(202) 267-0518
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COMDTNOTE 16465
26 APR 1998
CANCELLED:
APR 29 1999

COMMANDANT NOTICE 16465

Subj: 1997 SPILL OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE EXERCISE (SONS 97)AFTER ACTION
REPORT

Ref: (a) Commandant Instruction 16465.1, Spills of National Significance Response Management
System

1. PURPOSE: This Notice distributes the subject report for review and information.
2. ACTION: Area and District Commanders, On-Scene Coordinators(OSCs), Assistant Commandants for Directorates, Chief Council, and special staff offices at Headquarters shall comply with the provisions of this notice as appropriate and give this report wide dissemination.
3. DISCUSSION: The primary purpose of SONS '97 was to evaluate the Coast Guard's ability to effectively respond to a Spill of National Significance. The response management organization that the Coast Guard would use for an event such as this is described in reference (a). The exercise employed this response management structure and explored key issues that might arise in a SONS scenario. The SONS After Action Report provides critical feedback which is essential to improve our response management structure as well as our effectiveness in responding to an event of this magnitude.

R. C. NORTH
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR MARINE SAFETY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Encl: (1) SONS '97 After Action Report

**SPILL
OF NATIONAL
SIGNIFICANCE 1997**
Seminar and Exercise

16 - 18 SEPTEMBER 1997

**USCG MARINE SAFETY OFFICE
PHILADELPHIA, PA
USCG HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, DC**

After Action Report

**Sponsored By:
Commandant (G-MOR)
United States Coast Guard**

Spill of National Significance (SONS) After-Action Report

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Spill of National Significance (SONS) After-Action Report

EXERCISE ORGANIZATION

Headquarters Staff

Program Director.....	RADM Robert North, Assistant Commandant, Marine Safety and Environmental Protection
Program Manager.....	CAPT Larry Hereth, Chief, Office of Response
Commanding Officer.....	CAPT Joseph Kuchin National Strike Force Coordination Center

Atlantic Area Staff

Commander Atlantic Area.....	VADM Roger Rufe
Commander First Coast Guard District.....	RADM Richard Larrabee
Atlantic Area Chief of Marine Safety.....	CAPT Anthony Regalbuto
Commanding Officer.....	CAPT John Veentjer MSO Philadelphia
Commanding Officer.....	CAPT Richard Bennis MSO Hampton Roads
Commander.....	CAPT Richard Vlaun Activities New York

Exercise Staff

Exercise Director.....	CDR Mark Johnson
Exercise Coordinator.....	LCDR Mark O'Malley
Exercise Facilitators.....	CAPT Dennis Sande, CO, RTC Yorktown Bud Hay & Staff of US Naval War College
Logistical Support.....	NSFCC PREP Staff

Industry Participants

Bouchard Transportation	Morton Bouchard, III President
Red Band A.S.....	Henning Poulsson Managing Director
Unicorn.....	Bob Hodgson Fleet Director

Spill of National Significance (SONS) After-Action Report

Executive Summary

Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the need for an effective organization to manage a spill of such magnitude was recognized. The publication of a revised National Contingency Plan (NCP), reflected this need by defining a Spill of National Significance (SONS) as a spill that due to its severity, size, location, actual or potential impact on the public health and welfare or the environment, or the necessary response effort, is so complex that it requires extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local and responsible party resources to contain and clean up the discharge.

The Coast Guard adopted the Incident Command System as the response management organization for oil and hazardous substance incidents in 1996. An integral part of ICS is the Area Command concept, which provides a level of strategic management and support for the existing Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) response organization. The Incident Area Command structure is intended to enhance the local response organization and relies upon the applicable Area Contingency Plan as the basis for strategic direction of response action. On 15 July 1997, Commandant Instruction 16465.1, Spill of National Significance Response Management System, was published adopting the Incident Area Command as the response organization for a SONS.

The first ever SONS exercise was held on 16-18 September 1997 in Philadelphia and Washington, DC. The exercise was designed to examine Commandant Instruction 16465.1 and in particular, to evaluate the Area Command Concept. Additionally, a need existed to assess interagency policy and cooperation with regard to emergency response. To accomplish this, a multifaceted approach was taken involving seminar discussions, existing exercise methods and video-teleconferencing.

A traditional Preparedness for Response Program Exercise (PREP) was integrated with a seminar discussion format to engage executive level representatives from eight federal agencies, six states and three industry participants. The seminar in Washington, DC was hosted by the Commandant and discussion focused on national level issues directly affecting federal response capabilities. The Secretary of Transportation, Mr. Rodney Slater and Congressman Bob Clement of Tennessee were among those who participated in the discussions.

In Philadelphia, the PREP exercise tested the Area Contingency Plans for the MSO Philadelphia, Activities New York, and MSO Hampton Roads zones. A separate seminar focused on issues pertinent to FOSC, state, and local authorities, as well as identifying industry roles in a catastrophic response effort. This seminar, hosted by Commander Atlantic Area, VADM Roger Rufe, was linked through video-teleconferencing with the Washington seminar, and the National Response Team.

The issues discussed, and those identified for future discussion, are reflected in this report and will be incorporated in subsequent changes to the SONS Commandant Instruction and the next SONS exercise scheduled to be held in 1999.

Spill of National Significance (SONS) After-Action Report

Introduction

The Coast Guard held its first-ever Spill of National Significance (SONS) Exercise on September 16-18, 1997. The Exercise was a three-part evolution that took place in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Washington, DC. It involved representatives from industry, local and state organizations, and over 12 different federal agencies. This SONS After-Action Report summarizes the design of the exercise, including the purpose and goals, the issues discussed, the areas for improvement, and how the Coast Guard plans to use this exercise to improve their response organization. The approximate cost of the exercise was \$175,000.

What is a SONS?

A SONS is a rare, catastrophic spill which greatly exceeds the response capabilities at the local and regional levels. The Commandant of the Coast Guard alone, is empowered to declare a SONS in the coastal zone, taking into account environmental risks, weather conditions, response capabilities, and the amount, or potential amount, of product spilled. Factors to be considered in declaring a SONS would include:

- Multiple OSC zones, districts, or international borders may be affected;
- Significant impact or threat to the public health and welfare, wildlife, population, economy and/or property over a broad geographic area;
- Protracted period of discharge and/or expected cleanup;
- Significant public concern and demand for action by parties associated with the event; and,
- The existence of, or the potential for, a high-level of political and media interest.

Origins of the Exercise

Following the T/V EXXON VALDEZ spill in March, 1989, (which was the largest oil spill in US waters), significant legislation occurred, initiating much more thorough spill response planning requirements. Additionally, the requirement for regular spill response exercises was implemented.

In 1996, the Coast Guard adopted the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) as the response management structure for oil and hazardous substance response. Following this formal adoption of ICS, a new SONS protocol, Spills of National Significance Response Management System, Commandant Instruction 16465.1, was published in July 1997, using the ICS Area Command concept to establish an effective response management organization to deal with nationally or regionally significant spills. The concept needed to be exercised to assess its effectiveness and value.

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Exercise Objectives

SONS 97 was designed to examine and develop agency specific, interagency, and industry critical issues, decisions, and options at senior executive and senior staff levels in responding to a catastrophic maritime oil spill. Within this general objective were several specific objectives, including:

- Gather senior executives from a wide spectrum of interests, responsibilities, and jurisdictions to discuss individual issues, discover commonalities, and plan for an orchestrated response to a Spill of National Significance.
- Exercise the integrated policy development process in a complex and dynamic incident environment involving the employment of private and public resources to resolve the outcome of a SONS.
- Introduce and evaluate the use of the National Interagency Incident Management System Area Command Concept for use as the Coast Guard response management organization for large or complex pollution responses.
- Assess the inter-relationship of three or more organizational levels (Commandant, Incident Area Command, FOOSC) and the aspects of authority, communication, and effectiveness in administering and mitigating the events involved in a Spill of National Significance.
- Develop an effective method for formulating operational guidance to field units and the elevation of recommendations to senior executives.
- Examine the operational implications of the protocol defining the responsibilities and roles to a SONS response.
- Develop a coordinated response to a nationally significant event and explore the problems of transitioning from immediate to sustained response, to demobilization from the event.
- Introduce participants to the techniques of interactive seminars as a method of decision making, education, and issue exchange.

Exercise Structure


The exercise had three parts that were interactive, yet separate. On the first day of the event there was a Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Exercise in Marine Safety Office Philadelphia's area of responsibility. Response equipment was deployed, and the unit and responsible parties established a unified command and exercised the Area Contingency Plan. (There is a separate report on this portion of the exercise available at the National Strike Force Coordination Center.) By the end of day one of the event, the spill scenario had escalated to a SONS level, and based on recommendation from Commander Atlantic Area, the Commandant declared the spill a SONS.

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On day two of the event, an ICS Area Command was established in a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania hotel to coordinate the strategic activities involved in the response. The ICS Area Command was set up as a facilitated, interactive seminar, and further broken down into work groups according to ICS positions. There were issues and problems laid out for each work group to discuss and resolve. Concurrently, there was a four hour long National Issues Executive Discussion Group at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, DC. This facilitated seminar was attended by senior agency policy makers from 14 different federal agencies potentially involved in a SONS response. This Executive Discussion Group conferred on national interagency issues that would arise during a SONS. Twice during the course of the day, the seminar groups (Washington and Philadelphia) established a video-teleconference link to share discussions and issues. This added considerable value to the exercise and allowed the seminar groups to feed their concerns and additional issues to each other.

On day three of the event, the ICS Area Command reconvened to continue their discussions. A video-teleconference with the National Response Team (NRT) was established to discuss specific spill issues of national concern. In the afternoon of the third day, the seminar session ended and an exercise debrief was held.

SONS 97 SEMINAR ORGANIZATION



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The format and choreography of the seminar sessions followed the design used by the Naval War College for their gaming exercises. The seminars were facilitated by trained moderators who kept the discussion groups focused on the most significant issues associated with the exercise and captured the discussions in writing. In Philadelphia, the seminar session was further broken down into seminar "moves." The moves were associated with a phase of the disaster -- immediate response (move 1) and sustained response and recovery (move 2). The work group sessions were organized by ICS section to facilitate the large number of people in attendance and to cover a wider range of issues. Each work group session had a facilitator and recorder.

The facilitated seminar format proved valuable in that it engaged executive level personnel in discussion regarding response organization and policy based on previously identified, and cooperatively developed issues. The experienced personnel from the Naval War College were able to remain objective during the discussions and posed probing questions that ensured all parties remained involved and their concerns addressed. The positive results of this exercise indicate that this approach should be considered for future exercises as it draws out policy from executive positions that is immediately discussed and evaluated in an open forum.

Exercise Play

Scenario

During the night, Monday, September 15, in calm seas at the mouth of the Delaware Bay, the Tank Vessel TROMSO RELIANCE experienced mechanical problems and rammed the Tank Vessel KNOCK AN on the port side rupturing the number 2 and 3 cargo tanks of the KNOCK AN. Shortly after the collision, an explosion on the TROMSO RELIANCE ruptured the vessel's number 1, 2, and 3 cargo tanks. Oil from both ships leaked into the open sea; over time, approximately 335,000 barrels of oil were discharged from the two vessels.

The KNOCK AN anchored at the collision site and TROMSO RELIANCE drifted south-southwest of the site. Total cargo capacity for both vessels was 1 million barrels. Cargo in the KNOCK AN was North Sea Brent Crude. TROMSO RELIANCE was carrying West African Cabinda Crude.

Six hours after the collision of the tank vessels, at dawn on Tuesday morning, September 16, Bouchard Barge No. 115, carrying 105,000 barrels of Arabian Crude oil towed by the Tug RHEA was struck on the port side by the fishing vessel JANET C. The tow was transiting south in Barnegat Traffic Lanes 80 miles south of New York City and 10 miles off the New Jersey coast at the time of the collision. Minor injuries were reported on the fishing vessel.

Over 8000 barrels of crude leaked into the sea from the barge's number 1, 2, and 3 port tanks. This later increased to approximately 12,000 barrels (504,000 gallons). Heavily damaged, the fishing vessel proceeded under its own power to Navesink River, NJ.

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The combined incidents involved the discharge of over 14 million gallons of oil. There were 3 different responsible parties, UNICOM, Red Band, and Bouchard, all of whom happened to share the same Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO), National Response Corporation of New York.

Highlighted Discussion Issues

The following is a brief synopsis of the most substantial issues discussed at the two interactive SONS Seminars, including the NRT issues discussed during the video-teleconference link, and the organizations responsible for further development. The primary issues include:

Depletion of Financial Resources.

This is a multifaceted issue as the responsible party has limits of liability and the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) could become depleted in a spill of this magnitude. The National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) has proposed several solutions to address this issue. These include raising the cap on the Emergency Fund from \$50 million to \$100 million, or alternately, making the full OSLTF available for removal, thereby eliminating the distinction between the Emergency Fund and the parent OSLTF and allowing the entire OSLTF to be accessible for cost removal and claims; reinstating the authority to tax; reinstating the authority to borrow from the Treasury's General Fund; raising the \$1 billion per incident cap; and providing a 2 cents per barrel tax without a limit on the OSLTF balance. Even this nominal tax would raise the OSLTF balance quickly.

Lead: NPFC

Support: G-CBU, G-LLX, G-CC

Role of the ICS Area Commander as Federal On Scene Coordinator.

A critical issue raised by the exercise is the role and function of the ICS Area Commander (IAC). Should that individual assume the FOSC role for directing spill response? Should that individual be concerned with strategic planning and coordination of the media and political issues, or will the demands of the incident drag the IAC into tactical decision making? If the latter, can the IAC sustain that full scope FOSC involvement without detriment to other Coast Guard Area Commander responsibilities? The NCP states that for a SONS a "National Incident Commander will assume the role of the OSC in communication with the affected parties and the public, and in coordinating federal, state, local, and international resources at the national level." Can the Area Commander's OSC responsibilities be limited to communication and strategic coordination with the local Captains of the Port retaining their pre-designated OSC responsibilities for the tactical decisions? If the IAC is the OSC, is the IAC the only one who can issue an administrative order, etc. Many of these complex issues have been addressed by the MLCLant Legal Officer; others require policy resolution. All issues will be clarified and incorporated into the next iteration of Commandant Instruction 16465.1

Lead: G-MOR

Support: G-LMI

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Stafford Act disaster declaration.

There was concern, prior to the exercise, that a SONS is a candidate for Federal Response Plan and Emergency Support Function 10 (ESF-10) activation. If the Stafford Act were invoked, FEMA would be the overall coordinator of the National effort. EPA would be the lead agency under ESF-10 and could assume direct control and oversight of the spill. Our roles and responsibilities could be a matter for negotiation. (A proposed change to ESF-10 has been drafted for submission to FEMA for inclusion in the update of the Federal Response Plan.) If the spill response and clean up was being adequately addressed by the Coast Guard, there is no requirement that ESF-10 be invoked. The Administration would not want to create any potential public disharmony or the appearance of lack of organization. Yet it is possible the states may press for the declaration for access to federal disaster resources, therefore, the Coast Guard should have a plan in place to deal with this scenario.

Lead: G-MOR

Support: NRT

Deviation from Vessel Response Plans (VRPs).

The Chafee Amendment to OPA 90 requires that the Responsible Party (RP) obtain approval of the FOSC before any "departure" &am their Vessel Response Plan. Voluntary sharing of resources by the RP could be potentially affected because of the Chafee Amendment; the sharing of resources could be interpreted as a departure from a VRP, thereby endangering their right to avail themselves of their OPA 90 established limit of liabilities. It was determined that there needs to be a clear FOSC policy developed for acceptable deviation from VRPs.

Lead: G-MOR

Support: G-MSR

Criminal Liability.

Coast Guard enforcement will eventually be considered during the response, but may well be affected by the actions of the local US Attorneys and state attorneys general/local prosecutor(s). The Coast Guard may be able to influence, but may not be able to control the action of these officials. As indicated by private counsel at the exercise, senior management of foreign shipping companies commonly spend very little time in the US following a spill in order to avoid arrest by local officials. Federal and state prosecutors may well attempt to take action prior to the departure of these corporate officials. It was the consensus of the Executive Discussion Group and the Philadelphia Seminar that the criminal investigation should not be allowed to interfere with the top priority, which is to proceed with the cleanup and stop additional oil discharge. In addition, the chilling effect of an aggressive, ill-timed, criminal investigation on the cooperative relationship desired for an effective crisis response is unfortunate. This issue requires more discussion and policy guidance.

Lead: G-MOR

Support: G-LMI

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Multiple Command Centers.

With an incident of this magnitude and use of the ICS Area Command structure, it is reasonable to expect that there will be more than one Command Center. However, it is important that the concerns of the states and RPs are realistically acknowledged and addressed as they may not have the resources to staff multiple command centers around the clock, and their input is crucial to a successful response.

Lead: G-MOR

Support: NSFCC

Joint Information Center (JIC).

Information management and coordination is critical to the success of the response. It was determined that, in order to satisfy the intense need for information and to ensure that the information presented to the Administration and the public is consistent among all federal agencies, it would be useful to establish a JIC in Washington, DC for the long term, in addition to a local JIG. Several functions of a Washington-based JIC were suggested, including establishing a referral hotline for the public and establishing a web site where press releases, fact sheets, background material, and frequently asked questions could be posted.

Lead: G-MOR/G-CP

Support: NSFCC(PIAT), NRT

Waiving Federal Acquisition Regulations.

The question arose of waiving the Federal Acquisition Regulations, and the extent of such waivers for response contracts. There is a need for a procurement law specialist to focus on the fiscal law/procurement law issues arising in the Finance Section of the IAC or other contracting activity needed when responding to the discharge.

Lead: G-CFP

Support: G-MOR

Public Health and Seafood Contamination.

Remaining in front of these issues and providing as much useful information to the public on what the issues are, is important. Establishing a single point of contact for coordinating all public health related issues would occur for a spill of this magnitude and it would likely be the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as is called out in the National Contingency Plan (NCP). These efforts may be best coordinated through the Area Command Staff. Planning guidelines should be established.

Lead: G-MOR

Support: NRT Preparedness Sub-Committee

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"Set-aside" Areas for Research and Development Purposes.

This issue was explored by the NRT as to whether or not "set-aside" areas could be established for research and development purposes to test new technology. It was determined that this was an issue for Regional Response Teams (RRTs) to resolve with adequate input from the state stakeholders. Planning guidelines should be provided to the RRTs.

Lead: NRT
Committee

Support: NRT Science & Tech Sub-

Conclusion

SONS 97 was a successful, valuable exercise as it allowed for close interaction among most of the federal agencies that likely would be involved in a large spill response, as well as executive involvement from state and industry representatives. It provided a forum for the discussion of many vital issues pertaining to all aspects of a nationally significant spill. The seminar session dialogue addressed many concerns and identified areas which need to be explored further for resolution.

Commandant Instruction 16465.1 requires SONS Exercises to be held on a biennial schedule. The next one is planned for 1999 on the west coast.

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Appendix A

Exercise Organization and Logistics

The setup of the SONS event involved attention to many details as well as meticulous coordination among Coast Guard Headquarters (USCG HQ), the National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC), the local Marine Safety Once, the seminar facilitators, and contacts at the various facilities that were used for the event. Early organization was key. Some of the detailed issues, and recommendations based on what was learned, follow:

- Linkage to a PREP Exercise. For the purposes of drawing participation, and the leveraging of resources, the SONS seminar was linked to a traditional PREP exercise. This linkage resulted in several hours of the SONS seminar being devoted to briefing the scenario and response actions taken in response to the PREP scenario. This in turn, reduced the attention put toward the pre-identified SONS issues. Additionally, the emphasis put on the SONS aspects of the PREP was seen by many of the participants as reducing the effectiveness of the PREP exercise. It is not recommended that future SONS seminars (i.e. the discussion of issues) be decoupled from a PREP scenario/exercise.
- Locating Adequate Facilities. Finding facilities with adequate space to accommodate the number of people who attended was vital. Ensuring that the facility has an appropriate number of breakout rooms for separate work group sessions as needed, must be considered. The facility will need to have adequate security in place or available if governors or other high level representatives are expected to attend. It is most efficient to find a facility with a full range of conferencing capabilities such as video-teleconferencing. This particular conferencing capability was used during SONS 97 with great success; however a great deal of extra work was required to establish this capability as it did not previously exist at the hotel where the ICS Area Command was established.
- Establishing Video-Teleconferencing (VTC) Capabilities - This took several months to set up for SONS 97. VTC capabilities already existed at Coast Guard Headquarters and at the Department of Energy Emergency Operations Center where the NRT convened. The hotel in Philadelphia had no VTC capabilities. To establish this, three special VTC phone lines were installed by the local phone company in the conference room where the Unified Area Command was to be assembled. Installation of the phone lines must be coordinated early with the hotel as they may have a steady stream of business for use of the conference room scheduled. A local phone account and a long distance phone account must be established for the phone lines. For SONS 97, FTS2000 (an AT&T subsidiary) was set up as the long distance carrier. In order to ensure FTS2000 as the long distance carrier it is important to get a request in early to the phone company as there is a queue for this service. Additionally, the phone companies will most likely only deal with a Designated Agency Representative (DAR). Special VTC equipment must be purchased or leased for use at the exercise. It is critical that the VTC system put in place be compatible with the already existing VTC systems that it will be linking with. Establishing all of this early and conducting several tests of the systems is important to assuring success.

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- **Sending Out Invitations To, and Obtaining RSVPs From, VIPs.** Preparing the invitations several months in advance is necessary to ensure that they are received in time to be put on VIP schedules. Additionally, a phone call to the VIPs announcing the event will avoid the invitation arriving 'cold.' Moreover, putting an RSVP date on the invite will help to eliminate follow-up phone calls. Because this doesn't completely eliminate the need for follow-up calls, it is important that the follow-up calls don't wait until the last minute so that everyone has adequate time to plan for the exercise.
- **Public Affairs For the Event.** This was coordinated several months before the exercise with CG Headquarters, Area, and the local representatives. Public Affairs representatives from both federal and RP interests attended key exercise planning meetings. A pre-exercise press release was prepared by CG Headquarters Public Affairs and the possibility of a high level post-exercise press conference was explored. Getting coverage for all participants; federal, state, local, and commercial is crucial.
- **Choreographing Issues to Maximize Discussion Value.** Carefully preparing a scenario that triggers discussion of key issues was important. There were several meetings among the seminar facilitators to ensure that the issue development and discussions would flow smoothly and remain focused, best utilizing everyone's time.
- **Parking and Security.** Obtaining adequate parking and making appropriate arrangements with building security was essential to successfully hosting the Executive Discussion Group at CG Headquarters. Coordinating with building security at the Department of Energy's Emergency Operations Center was equally important to ensure that all participants for the exercise gained access to attend.
- **Accurately Capturing Discussions and Other Logistics for the Different Work Groups.** A person with a computer was assigned to each break-out session to capture the discussions. This was necessary to accurately record what transpired. It is important that this person be acquainted with the subject matter so that meaningful points of discussion are not missed.
- **Feedback to Participants.** Significant efforts were made to consolidate the notes recorded from the discussions and provide copies to each of the attendees at the conclusion of the seminar. This was well received as it immediately presented the key issues and discussion points to the participants for reference and to allow/encourage continuing dialogue. The "Quick Look Report" (as it was called) approach is recommended for the next SONS exercise.

Spill of National Significance (SONS) After-Action Report**Appendix B**

WASHINGTON ATTENDEES	TITLE and AGENCY
Rodney E. Slater	Secretary of the Department of Transportation
Representative Bob Clement	Congressional Representative, Tennessee (D)
Mr. Michael Huerta	Chief of Staff, Department of Transportation
CDR Cynthia Coogan	Military Assistant to the Secretary Department of Transportation
Ms. Joan Bondareff	Acting Deputy Maritime Administrator and Chief Counsel, Department of Transportation
ADM Robert Kramek	Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
RADM Paul Blayney	Chief Counsel for the Commandant U.S. Coast Guard
RADM Robert North	Asst. Comdt. for Marine Safety and Environmental Protection, U.S. Coast Guard
RADM Ernest Riutta	Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard
RADM John Tozzi	Assistant Commandant for Systems, U.S. Coast Guard
CAPT Thomas Gilmour	Director of Field Activities Directorate, U.S. Coast Guard
CAPT Joseph Jones	Executive Asst. to the Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard
CDR Mark Johnson	Facilitator, U.S. Coast Guard
LCDR James Rendon	Aide to the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
Mr. Bill Campbell	Director of Finance and Procurement U.S. Coast Guard
Mr. John D'Aniello	Deputy Director of Civil Works, Army Corps of Engineers
Maj. General Edward Soriano	Director of Military Support for the Department of Defense
LTC Corey Langenwalter	Chief, Plans Branch; Director of Military Support for the Department of Defense
Mrs. Sherri W. Goodman	Deputy Under Sec. of Defense for Environmental Security, Department of Defense
Mr. Edmund Miller	Office of Deputy Under Sec. of Defense, Compliance Division Department of Defense
Ms. Jan Thorman	Environmental Protection Specialist, Department of the Interior

WASHINGTON ATTENDEES	TITLE and AGENCY
Mr. Ron Britton	National Fish and Wildlife Service Spill Response Coordinator, Department of the Interior
Mr. David Lopez	Oil Spill Manager, Office of Emergency Remedial Resp. EPA
Mr. Jim Makris	Dir. of Chem. Emergency Resp. Prep. And Prevention EPA
Ms. Patricia Stahlschmidt	Senior Policy Advisor, Response and recovery Directorate, FEMA
Ms. Rita A. Calvan	Regional Director of FEMA Region II
Mr. David Hall	Operations Chief, FEMA Region II
RADM John Totushek	Director of Environmental Protection, Safety and Occupational Health Division of OPNAV
CAPT Chip McCord	Supervisor of Salvage and Diving, U.S. Navy
Ms. Jan Lane	Deputy Director of the National Pollution Fund Center
Mr. Terry Garcia	Acting Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, NOAA
Mr. Dave Kennedy	Chief, HazMat Response and Assessment Division, NOAA
Ms. Kelly S. Coyner	Acting Administrator for, Research and Special Programs Administration
Mr. Ken McGruther	Facilitator, Naval War College, SONALYSTS
Mr. Don Estes	Facilitator, Naval War College, SONALYSTS

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PHILADELPHIA ATTENDEES	AGENCY
Morton Bouchard, III	Bouchard Shipping
Stash Pelkowski	Bouchard Shipping
Paul Preus	Clean Water Inc/Smit America
Bill Butler	Delaware Emergency Management
Bud Foster	Delaware Emergency Management
Millar Dawson	Delaware Emergency Management
John Mohrman	Emergency Response Program, Delaware
Jim Daloun	EPA Region II
Anne Spencer	EPA, Headquarters
Dennis Carney	EPA, Philadelphia
Ronald Van	FEMA Region III
David Barry	Gallagher Marine
John J. Gallagher	Gallagher Marine
Robert Carlin	Gallagher Marine
Michael Flanagan	Lanterea
John Fitzgerald	Lanterea PAO
George Harman	Maryland, DEP
Alan Williams	Maryland, MDE
Eleanor Deegan	MLCANT FCP
D.E. Matty	MLCANT
Steve Dorrier	MSRC, Eastern Operations
Rick Gale	National Park Service
John J. Ship	National Response Corp.
John Johnson	National Response Corp.
Mike Reese	National Response Corp.
Steven Candito	National Response Corp.
Bud Hay	Naval War College
Larry Crawford	Naval War College
Jeff Stieb	Naval War College
Richard Finn	Naval War College
Dennis Delfava	New Jersey State Police
Louis Mascioli	New Jersey State Police
Bob Van Fossen	New Jersey, DEP

PHILADELPHIA ATTENDEES	AGENCY
John Sacco	New Jersey, DEP
Mark Smith	New Jersey, DEP
Stan Delikat	New Jersey, DEP
Bob Pavia	NOAA
Frank Csulak	NOAA
Gary Ott	NOAA
Jim Morris	NOAA
Gary Petrae	NOAA/Hazmat
Heather Parker	NOAA/Hazmat
Jerry Gait	NOAA/Hazmat
Ed Levine	NOAA/SSC
Gary Reiter	OOPS
Jim O'Brien	OOPS
Fred Kuffler	Red Band
Henning Poulsson	Red Band
M. Kearney	Tech and Regulatory Services, MD
Kelly Wilson	The Wilson Group
Bob Hodgson	UNICOM
Charles Anderson	UNICOM
I. Duthrie	Unknown
Nick Dipasquale	Unknown
Ron Drake	Unknown
CAPT Larry Brooks	USCG Activities New York
CAPT Richard Vlaun	USCG Activities New York
LCDR Denise Matthews	USCG AST
LT John Flynn	USCG AST
CAPT Bud Schneeweis	USCG G-CP
Kathy McDermott	USCG G-CP2
Barbara Latvanis	USCG G-CPM-1
CAPT Larry Hereth	USCG G-MOR
LCDR Mark O'Malley	USCG G-MOR
LT Ed Finlay	USCG G-MOR
LT Tom Callahan	USCG G-MOR
CAPT Hank Blaney	USCG G-0-2a
Samuel Korson	USCG G-0-2a
CAPT Anthony Regalbuto	USCG LANT/District Five
VADM Roger Rufe	USCG LANT/District Five

PHILADELPHIA ATTENDEES	AGENCY
Chris Wethe	USCG LANTAREA
CAPT Richard Knee	USCG LANTAREA(I), Legal
David Gunderson	USCG MLC
Ray Hayden	USCG MLC
Larry Mellor	USCG MLCLANT
CAPT C.L. Miller	USCG MSO Baltimore
CAPT Richard Bennis	USCG MSO Hampton Roads
CAPT John Williams	USCG MSO Wilmington
LT Doug Dillon	USCG MSO/Group Philadelphia
CAPT Joseph Bridger	USCG NPFC
CDR Tim Eastman	USCG NPFC
Daniel Sheehan	USCG NPFC
Daryl Neily	USCG NPFC
Don Calkins	USCG NPFC
CAPT Joseph Kuchin	USCG NSFCC
Christine Burk	USCG NSFCC
CWO Chris Haley	USCG NSFCC
Kay Beazely	USCG NSFCC
LT Tina Burke	USCG NSFCC
PO Adam Wine	USCG NSFCC
CAPT Dennis Sande	USCG RESTRACEN, Yorktown
LCDR Gary Merrick	USCG RESTRACEN, Yorktown
CDR James Obemesser	USCG, District Five
Kevin Jones	USCG, District Five
CDR Stephen Garrity	USCG, District One
RADM Richard Larrabee	USCG, District One
Andy Hagelin	VA Spill and Response Remediation

Spill of National Significance (SONS) After-Action Report

NRT ACTIVATION ATTENDEES	AGENCY
Steven R. Baer	DOJ
Jean Snider	DOC/NOAA
Ninette Sadusky	DOD
Wade R. Townsend	DOE
Jan Thorman	DOI
Ken Hunt	DOL/OSHA
Dave Sargent	DOT RSPA
David Speights	EPA
Mark Mjoness	EPA OERR
Kyle W. Blackman	FEMA
Dr. Frederick Oelrich	FEMA
Dave Knorowski	HHS/ATSDR
Anita Kellogg	ICF for EPA
CDR Gerry Wheaton	NOAA HazMat
John Gustafson	NRT/EPA
CAPT Jim Crawford	USCG
CAPT Larry Hereth	USCG
LT Vickie Huyck	USCG
LCDR Bill Whitson	USCG
Blake Velde	USDA HWMG