

1           USCG/MMS MARINE BOARD OF INVESTIGATION  
2           INTO THE MARINE CASUALTY, EXPLOSION, FIRE,  
3           POLLUTION, AND SINKING  
4           OF MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNIT  
5           DEEPWATER HORIZON, WITH LOSS OF LIFE  
6           IN THE GULF OF MEXICO 21-22 APRIL 2010  
7           Friday, May 28, 2010

8                           \* \* \* \* \*

9                           The transcript of The Joint United  
10                          States Coast Guard Minerals Management Service  
11                          Investigation of the above-entitled cause,  
12                          before Dorothy N. Gros, a Certified Court  
13                          Reporter, authorized to administer oaths of  
14                          witnesses pursuant to Section 961.1 of Title  
15                          13 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950,  
16                          as amended, reported at the Radisson Hotel,  
17                          2150 Veterans Memorial Boulevard, Kenner,  
18                          Louisiana, 70062, on Friday, May 28, 2010,  
19                          beginning at 8:00 a.m.

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1 APPEARANCES:

2 MEMBERS OF THE BOARD:

3 CAPT HUNG M. NGUYEN, CO-CHAIR  
4 UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

5 DAVID DYKES, CO-CHAIR  
6 MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE

7 JASON MATHEWS  
8 MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE

9 JOHN McCARROLL  
10 MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE

11 ROSS WHEATLEY  
12 UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

13 LTR ROBERT BUTTS, COURT RECORDER  
14 UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

15 REPORTED BY: DOROTHY N. GROS, CCR  
16 CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER  
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1                   P R O C E E D I N G S  
2           C A P T N G U Y E N :  
3                   Please be seated so we can re-start  
4                   the hearings. Court reporter, let's go  
5           on the record. Before we start the  
6           hearing this morning I would like to  
7           make a couple of comments. To maintain  
8           the dignity and efficiency of these  
9           hearings, I respectfully request that  
10          all Parties In Interest not to engage  
11          in conversations just like the one at  
12          the end of yesterday's hearings. Clear  
13          guidance on the rights of the Parties  
14          In Interest are in the regulations and  
15          Coast Guard marine safety manual.  
16          Particularly if you have witnesses or  
17          evidence that you would like to -- for  
18          the board to consider please do so in  
19          writing. When a witness is subpoenaed  
20          by the board, as with all U.S.  
21          citizens, they have the right to  
22          exercise their constitutional rights.  
23          There is no presumption of innocence or  
24          guilt. We have other means to gather  
25          information and the other information



1           that we have would allow us to make  
2           proper conclusions and  
3           recommendations.

4                        So, with that, our first witness  
5                        this morning is Mr. Mark Hafle of BP.  
6           Mr. Hafle, please rise so I can put you  
7           under oath.

8                        THE WITNESS:

9                        (Witness complies.)

10                      \* \* \* \* \*

11                      MARK HAFLE,

12           after being first duly sworn in the cause,  
13           testified as follows:

14                      CAPT NGUYEN:

15                      Thank you, sir, for being here.

16                      Please be seated.

17                      THE WITNESS:

18                      (Witness complies.)

19                      E X A M I N A T I O N

20           BY MR. MATHEWS:

21           Q. Mr. Hafle, for the record can you state  
22           your full name and spell your last name?

23           A. Mark Edwin Hafle, H--A-F, like in  
24           "Friday", L-E.

25           Q. And by whom are you employed, sir?



1 A. BP.

2 Q. What position do you currently hold  
3 within BP?

4 A. Drilling engineer.

5 Q. How long have you had that position as  
6 drilling engineer?

7 A. 23 years and a few months.

8 Q. All with BP?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. What is your educational background,  
11 sir?

12 A. I have a bachelor of science in  
13 petroleum engineering.

14 Q. From where?

15 A. Marietta College, Marietta, Ohio.

16 Q. Do you have any special certifications  
17 as being a qualified engineer? License?

18 A. No, no.

19 Q. Can you please briefly describe your  
20 job responsibilities as BP as a drilling  
21 engineer?

22 A. We take -- drilling engineers, myself  
23 included, take all the geologic data that gets  
24 generated by the geology department, as well  
25 as all of the offset information from wells in



1 the area where we would be drilling a well,  
2 take that data, come up with a reasonable  
3 assumption going into the well from a pore  
4 pressure frac gradient standpoint and design  
5 how many strings of casing it's likely to take  
6 to drill that well. We put together drilling  
7 plans, we do the permits, we do cost  
8 estimates. During the drilling operations we  
9 answer day to day questions from operations.  
10 We write in the well reports, capture lessons  
11 learned, transfer those onto the next well.

12 Q. So you do review the daily reports that  
13 are submitted to you?

14 A. Everyday.

15 Q. Have you had any special subsea  
16 operations and deep water drilling experience?

17 A. I've been involved in deep water since  
18 1993.

19 Q. And what is your experience -- about  
20 how many wells have y'all drilled since that,  
21 1993?

22 A. Wells that I've personally involved in?

23 Q. Yes, sir.

24 A. I've lost track of the numbers. It's  
25 somewhere probably between 20 and 50, but I



1 don't recall the exact number.

2 Q. Thank you. When the original Macondo  
3 well was being drilled with the MARIANAS, did  
4 you ever visit the MARIANAS during that time?

5 A. I visited the MARIANAS when it was  
6 dockside in Galveston.

7 Q. Did you visit it during the drilling  
8 process?

9 A. No, sir. I don't think I did, I'm  
10 pretty sure.

11 Q. What problems did BP run into on the  
12 Macondo original wellbore to bypass it?

13 A. On the original wellbore?

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. With the DEEPWATER HORIZON?

16 Q. THE MARIANAS.

17 A. THE MARIANAS did not do a bypass.

18 Q. No, the MARIANAS wellbore that you came  
19 back and later bypassed with the DEEPWATER  
20 HORIZON?

21 A. I'm not sure I understand the question.

22 Q. Did BP arrive with the MARIANAS in  
23 November, remove off location in November  
24 drilling the wellbore for Mississippi Canyon-  
25 252 and then come back in February with the



1 DEEPWATER HORIZON to complete the bypass?

2 A. No, we came back and reestablished the  
3 wellbore and continued drilling, but we were  
4 not in the bypass phase.

5 Q. Then you got stuck with THE HORIZON?

6 A. When the HORIZON came on location in  
7 February that was to resume drilling  
8 operations because we had released the

9 MARIANAS from contract obligations to BP.

10 Q. So, how many times did you visit the  
11 HORIZON at the current location?

12 A. One time.

13 Q. And when was that?

14 A. During the month of March.

15 Q. And was that for a special reason?

16 A. I went offshore for -- I'm not sure  
17 exactly what was the primaries when I went  
18 offshore, but we were going to do a squeeze  
19 job on one of the casing shoes, I went out  
20 there to oversee that. It had been quite a  
21 while since I had been on the HORIZON, several  
22 years prior, and went out there with the  
23 assumption I was going to be there a weekend  
24 and I end up spending ten days there.

25 Q. Okay. What is your specific authority



1 to make revisions to casing programs in deep  
2 water wells?

3 A. It's the engineer's job that if a  
4 casing change is needed we engineer that  
5 change, make that proposal and get it approved  
6 through the proper channels at BP.

7 Q. Is that approved by you or somebody  
8 above you?

9 A. It's recommended by me, approved by  
10 somebody above me.

11 Q. Can you briefly define what "fracture  
12 gradient" is, sir?

13 A. Fracture gradient is the strength of  
14 the rock. All rock has a kind of a given  
15 strength under certain constraining forces.

16 Q. And, also, can you give me a brief  
17 definition of pore pressure?

18 A. Pore pressure is in a rock that has  
19 pore spaces it would be the pressure that is  
20 contained in those pore spaces.

21 Q. Can you explain the relationship  
22 between the two in deep water drilling?

23 A. So, pore pressure is always less than  
24 or equal to frac gradient. Frac gradient is  
25 the higher number in most cases. There are



1 very, very rare instances that pore pressure  
2 and frac gradient can be not exactly the same  
3 number, but close enough that for all  
4 practical purposes it would be the same  
5 number.

6 Q. During the design of your well, does BP  
7 take in any consideration for risk?

8 A. Every well has risks.

9 Q. Do you take into consideration the  
10 location of casing?

11 A. Absolutely.

12 Q. How about shallow gas?

13 A. All the time.

14 Q. Ballooning?

15 A. Ballooning is kind of a result of  
16 drilling. It's not something that exist  
17 naturally.

18 Q. How about cement jobs? Do you take  
19 poor cement into any type of risk  
20 calculations?

21 A. Absolutely.

22 Q. How about station keeping of a MODU?

23 A. Absolutely.

24 Q. And how do you evaluate and manage that  
25 risk?



1           A. It's done at all different levels.  
2 From the well side we do a risk management  
3 kind of plan and then we put together a risk  
4 management document, capture all of the risks  
5 that we think exist going into a well. We --  
6 we -- we take previous wells risk, look at how  
7 those turn out, learn from them. But we have  
8 a risk register. It's kind of the official  
9 terminology that you might find within BP.

10          Q. Did you design the casing program for  
11 Mississippi Canyon-252?

12          A. I came up with the basis of design and  
13 then we have that design validated by our  
14 technology group.

15          Q. And who's on that technology group,  
16 sir?

17          A. Specifically for this well would be  
18 Steve More (phonetic).

19          Q. Just one person? Okay.

20          A. Yeah, other people involved in that  
21 casing design would be Rich Miller and Mike  
22 Payne and Phil Patillo, Sr., Phil Patillo, Jr.

23          Q. Do you recall how many times you  
24 revised the casing program for this specific  
25 well?



1           A. Not specifically, no, but it was  
2 multiple.

3           Q. If I told you there was four changes to  
4 the casing program submitted to the MMS is  
5 that accurate?

6           A. It's possible.

7           Q. Is it possible or do you not know?

8           A. Well, I would say that when we set out  
9 to drill the well we thought it was going to  
10 take six strings to drill the well. It ended  
11 up taking eight strings to drill the well.  
12 Some of those strings were shortened and some  
13 of them were deepened. As all expiration  
14 wells, when you go into an expiration well you  
15 have a plan and there's going to be changes to  
16 that plan because of the nature of the type of  
17 well you're drilling.

18          Q. So, in the initial casing program you  
19 submitted, there was seven casings and it was  
20 changed to nine?

21          A. No, the initial permit had six strings  
22 of casings.

23          Q. So, you talked about why those changes  
24 were needed. Why specifically in this well  
25 were those changes needed to go from different



1 strings?

2 A. So when you start the well you have a  
3 pore pressure frac gradient implied with some  
4 assumptions based on offset information,  
5 seismic data calculations. So, when you  
6 actually drill the well, you essentially prove  
7 or disprove that prediction. And the  
8 prediction in this case was not accurate, as  
9 it is in most expiration wells. So the plan  
10 initially had six strings of casing, but we  
11 know that we have two, three or four  
12 contingency strings that are available. We  
13 don't permit those contingency strings, it's  
14 not required to permit contingency strings.  
15 Sometimes they show up on wellbore diagrams  
16 that the MMS has to kind of identify where  
17 potential contingency strings are. But, in  
18 drilling an expiration well, as you drill  
19 along and, depending on where you are  
20 according to the plan, you will then begin  
21 start adjusting the plan mobilizing those  
22 contingency strings.

23 Q. Okay, thank you. What was your  
24 interaction with the MMS drilling engineer?

25 A. Which drilling engineer would that be?



1 Q. Frank Patton or whoever's in the New  
2 Orleans District?

3 A. I had no one on one interaction with  
4 Mr. Patton.

5 Q. Do you normally have any interaction  
6 with the MMS drilling engineer or is that  
7 solely through your regulatory department?

8 A. That's usually through our regulatory  
9 department.

10 Q. Prior to the drilling of the Macondo  
11 well, did anyone from BP or yourself go visit  
12 with the New Orleans District about the  
13 exploratory well?

14 A. For the Macondo well?

15 Q. Yes, sir.

16 A. I did not participate in any meeting.  
17 In the past we have had meetings when we drill  
18 really special wells we'll go and inform the  
19 MMS personally. I've been involved in those  
20 in the past.

21 Q. Why did you add the -- in that casing  
22 program, why did you specifically add the 11  
23 7/8ths and the 9 7/8ths liners to the casing  
24 program?

25 A. Those casings were going to required to



1 reach the objective depth due to the pore  
2 pressure frac gradient.

3 Q. Are you familiar with BP's management  
4 of change program, sir?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Is the program that you use in the  
7 engineering department the same that's  
8 outlined in their HSE manual?

9 A. I'm not sure what's in the HSE manual.

10 Q. Would you mind if I just showed it to  
11 you real quick?

12 A. Sure. I would say that the drilling  
13 department's MOC is -- this is what it's  
14 talking about, yeah.

15 Q. Okay. So --

16 A. But I have not personally -- I do not  
17 personally have a copy of this document or --

18 Q. Oh, no problem. I'm just trying to see  
19 if -- I was going to ask you some general  
20 questions about the management of change  
21 process and it might not be that one. That's  
22 why I asked if it was similar.

23 A. Right.

24 Q. When you change an APD, application  
25 permit to drill, with the specific casings, do



1 you go through a management of change process  
2 that's initiated by someone?

3 A. We do go through a management of change  
4 process.

5 Q. And how often does that -- how long  
6 does that take?

7 A. It depends on the nature of the change.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Depends how many risks there are with  
10 the change, how much -- you know, how much  
11 time's going to be involved with the change.  
12 There's a lot of various factors.

13 Q. So, a casing program change does  
14 actually initiate a management of change  
15 process?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And who verifies that process?

18 A. There's -- there's multiple people  
19 involved in both the review and approval of  
20 management of change.

21 Q. And who would review such a change of  
22 the casing program and actually sign off on  
23 it?

24 A. It would depend on the scope of the  
25 change, the level would change -- the level of



1 approval would change depending on what the  
2 exact change that you want to know about. You  
3 know, if it's -- if it's -- if it is setting a  
4 casing string shower by 300 feet because of  
5 pore pressure frac gradient does not allow you  
6 to get to the original planned depth, that  
7 management of change is a much different scale  
8 than trying to deepen a casing string by 3,000  
9 feet.

10 Q. Okay. Do you recall why you use a 7  
11 inch casing in the hole at the very end of the  
12 production casing?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Can you please elaborate on why?

15 A. Well, 7 inch fits inside an 8 and «  
16 inch hole. We had to run the 9 and 7/8ths  
17 contingency liner, so the original plan was to  
18 run a 9 and 7/8ths long string due to the fact  
19 we were in a 9 and 7/8ths contingency string  
20 it's unable to get a full 9 and 7/8ths inch  
21 long string to the reservoir.

22 Q. But you still have the option to run a  
23 5 inch casing if you wanted?

24 A. You can run any size casing that will  
25 fit in that 8 and a half inch hole, yes.



1 Q. Are you familiar with the economics  
2 between a 5 inch and a 7 inch casing, the flow  
3 rate?

4 A. I don't run economics and I don't do  
5 flow rate calculations.

6 Q. Earlier we talked about ballooning, can  
7 you inform me or give me a brief definition of  
8 what formation ballooning is, sir?

9 A. So, while you're drilling the hole  
10 section, you have a certain mud weight in the  
11 hole and you know prior to drilling -- prior  
12 to drilling out -- when you drill out that  
13 casing string you get a frac gradient  
14 estimation by doing a leak off test or a  
15 formation integrity test and then you have a  
16 mud weight that you're drilling ahead with.  
17 In a ballooning situation you will start  
18 losing mud or, you know, you're pumping --  
19 let's just use for example 1,000 gallons a  
20 minute in the hole and you may be getting 900  
21 or 800 back. So, you're having loss  
22 circulation event, you're not getting full  
23 returns. So, you would shut the pumps down,  
24 monitor the hole and perhaps during a  
25 ballooning event the formation is either



1 swelled or fractured. It's not an exact  
2 science. You don't really know what's going  
3 on down in a hole. The ballooning is given in  
4 the fact that if you expand the hole then the  
5 hole contracts when you turn the pumps off and  
6 gives the mud back.

7 Q. During the Macondo well, were there any  
8 ballooning incidents that you were aware of?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And what were your recommendations to  
11 address those ballooning incidents?

12 A. Well, we have many different ways to  
13 combat ballooning.

14 Q. Can you elaborate?

15 A. In one instance we slowed down the pump  
16 rate, which lowers the ECD or equivalent  
17 circulating density. You can also cut the mud  
18 weight back. You can pump lost circulation  
19 materials to help bridge off any fractures or  
20 permeable zones that may be causing the  
21 ballooning. We actually did all three of  
22 those in multiple hole sections, as well.

23 Q. At any time did BP consider using  
24 managed pressure drilling?

25 A. No.



1 Q. Did you encounter any other  
2 abnormalities during the drilling of this  
3 well?

4 A. We had major lost circulation events,  
5 we had well control events.

6 Q. Did you have any swabbing?

7 A. Not to my knowledge.

8 Q. Did you pull any drill pipe wet?

9 A. Not to my knowledge.

10 Q. Were there any tight spots in this  
11 well?

12 A. I can't recall specifically.

13 Q. Was there a stuck bottom hole assembly?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What was the maximum background gas  
16 that you received when drilling this  
17 production casing?

18 A. While drilling the last hole section I  
19 don't recall that number exactly, but it was  
20 not the highest background gas we had seen  
21 while drilling this well.

22 Q. Not the highest. Do you have a range  
23 or --

24 A. Well, when you use the units it's  
25 either zero and the maximum's 3,000.



1 Q. While you were drilling that production  
2 section, did you have any gas cut mud due to  
3 high drilling gas?

4 A. I'm not -- not sure.

5 Q. Did you have a detailed procedure for  
6 performing a negative test on the production  
7 casing?

8 A. I wrote the permit for that temporary  
9 abandonment.

10 Q. Yes, sir.

11 A. Which included the negative test.

12 Q. Yes, sir.

13 A. The detailed procedures are generated  
14 at the rig site.

15 Q. And those are sent to the rig?

16 A. The permit's sent to the rig.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. The detailed procedure is created on  
19 the rig site.

20 Q. And that procedure, did it say  
21 "Negative test casing to sea water gradient  
22 equivalent for 30 minutes with the kill line"?

23 A. I believe that's what the permit said.

24 Q. And there was no other permit that was  
25 submitted to the rig other than this one?



1           A. There's only one permit for the  
2 temporary abandonment.

3           Q. Thank you. I'm just trying to clarify  
4 something that was told to me yesterday.

5           A. Yeah.

6           Q. Do you know if the DEEPWATER HORIZON  
7 crew set the top plug before they circulated  
8 the riser?

9           A. The top plug --

10          Q. Yes, sir.

11          A. -- or the surface plug?

12          Q. Top plug, did I say surface?

13          A. Well, it is the surface plug. Was not  
14 set.

15          Q. Oh, sorry. We have different  
16 terminology in the MMS, we call it a top plug.  
17 He was talking to me when you answered my  
18 question, I'm sorry.

19          A. Well, in the CFRs I thought it was  
20 known as a surface plug, sorry. But that plug  
21 was not set.

22          Q. Okay. Do you think they should have  
23 set that plug before they started circulating  
24 out the riser?

25          A. No.



1 Q. In your opinion would it have reduced  
2 the risk of that operation?

3 A. I don't know. I don't believe so.

4 Q. Did you -- are you involved with the  
5 procedure of how to route the mud when you're  
6 circulating out the riser?

7 A. No, sir.

8 Q. Were you aware if they -- who was  
9 responsible to monitor the circulating of the  
10 riser? Do you know if anybody at BP removed  
11 someone from monitoring levels on the well?

12 A. The monitoring is all done at the rig  
13 site. I'm not sure who -- there's multiple  
14 people from all parties that monitor that mud  
15 flow.

16 Q. Is it common for BP, from reading the  
17 morning reports, to remove someone from  
18 monitoring a mud logger from monitoring the  
19 returns?

20 A. If they made a decision on the rig site  
21 to change people I'm not aware of that.

22 Q. Do you have any specific well control  
23 training, sir?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. And what is that?



1           A. I've been, per kind of BP's plan with  
2 the MMS, we do recurring well control  
3 training. My last school was kind of within  
4 the last two years with wild well control.

5           Q. Have you ever witnessed a BOP test on  
6 the DEEPWATER HORIZON?

7           A. I have not like personally overseen a  
8 complete BOP test.

9           Q. Were you aware of any BOP problems  
10 while they were drilling that well?

11          A. No. Every test had been satisfactory  
12 during the drilling of this well to my  
13 knowledge.

14          Q. Were you aware --

15          A. The MARIANAS had BOP problems while we  
16 were drilling the first section with that --  
17 you know, the first section of The MARIANAS.  
18 In fact, the BOP problems was why that rig was  
19 kind of on standby when Hurricane Ida  
20 occurred. So --

21          Q. So, you weren't aware of any problems  
22 before they splashed that BOP stack of any  
23 leaks?

24          A. On the HORIZON?

25          Q. Yes, sir.



1 A. No, nope.

2 Q. Can you please explain what a dead man  
3 function on a BOP stack is?

4 A. It is if you lose full communications  
5 with the stack for whatever reason the stack  
6 has power and hydraulic capabilities to close  
7 in certain functions automatically.

8 Q. How about an auto shear, can you  
9 explain that too?

10 A. That's part of the dead man system that  
11 the shear rams would close.

12 Q. Does BP require any testing on those  
13 systems?

14 A. I'm not aware of any requirement, but I  
15 don't -- I don't get involved in the BOP  
16 testing. That's something that's done with  
17 Transocean and the well site leaders.

18 Q. So, you're not familiar with any of the  
19 BOP functionalities? Like you're not familiar  
20 with any of the type of components of the  
21 stack and what roles they play in and what  
22 types of lock outs or any type of bypasses or  
23 anything that they can have on it?

24 A. I have a general knowledge of subsea  
25 BOP systems, but that is not one of my primary



1 duties.

2 Q. I'm going to take some notes here.

3 According to the mud log on the DEEPWATER

4 HORIZON, the drilled the formation just below

5 the productive zone and lost full returns when

6 they weighed up to 14.4 pounds per gallons.

7 Did you take this lost circulation zone into

8 consideration when you were designing the

9 cement job for this well?

10 A. Absolutely.

11 Q. And what did you take into

12 consideration? What was the end result of

13 what happened with your work on that? Did you

14 continue to go forward with the --

15 A. I'm not sure what specific part you're

16 asking about.

17 Q. You design a cement job and you had

18 full loss returns in that zone, did you change

19 your cement job at that time?

20 A. We never -- we designed the cement job

21 after we had the real well data to give us the

22 best chance of giving a successful cement job

23 with the actual well data that was given to us

24 both pressures and lost circulation.

25 Q. And who was giving that to you?



1 A. Who gave us that cement design?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. Halliburton, we worked with Halliburton  
4 to design that. Halliburton has the piece of  
5 software. They run the model, we review the  
6 model, we adjust the model parameters until  
7 we're satisfied that the model has been  
8 prepared as well as possible.

9 Q. Do you know if they had any specific  
10 additives in that cement that would mitigate  
11 loss returns?

12 A. I believe they had planned to use lost  
13 circulation material in that cement, yes.

14 Q. How about hydrocarbon influx, was there  
15 any special additives for that, do you know?

16 A. I'm not sure.

17 Q. Reduced annular space?

18 A. Don't understand what that means.

19 Q. Do you -- yeah, the friction reduction  
20 of the -- on the cement job?

21 A. I'm not sure.

22 Q. Why was specifically nitrogen used on  
23 this job?

24 A. Nitrogen is used to lighten the weight  
25 of the cement.



1 Q. And who approved the -- did you approve  
2 the use of the nitrogen in the job or was that  
3 Halliburton?

4 A. The recommendations were from both the  
5 drilling engineering department and  
6 Halliburton. The approval process would be  
7 the people above us.

8 Q. How many previous nitrogen jobs had you  
9 reviewed or approved?

10 A. Two on this particular well.

11 Q. Two on this well?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. And those were the first two?

14 A. The 28 inch and the 22 inch casing.  
15 Nitrogen jobs are used primarily on those two  
16 strings on every deep water well because it's  
17 the best way to combat shallow water flow.

18 Q. Did you have any loss returns while  
19 displacing that nitrified cement?

20 A. Not to --

21 Q. For the production casing?

22 A. I was not made aware of any.

23 Q. Did you look at any data that would  
24 indicate that there was loss returns?

25 A. No, sir.



1 Q. Did you run any bond or temperature  
2 logs?

3 A. No, sir.

4 Q. Why not?

5 A. We had not gotten to that point in the  
6 well plan before the incident occurred.

7 Q. Did you have a good cement job on that  
8 9 and 7/8th by 7 inch casing?

9 A. All the indicators that I was told  
10 about would indicate that it was a good cement  
11 job.

12 Q. And what data did you review to get  
13 that assessment?

14 A. I was given verbal communications that  
15 we had full returns, that we had cement lift  
16 pressure and that we had bumped the plug. All  
17 of which those three parameters are very  
18 important to get a primary cement job.

19 Q. And whose verbal indication did that  
20 come from?

21 A. Brian Morrel.

22 Q. Who?

23 A. Brian Morrel.

24 Q. And who does he work with?

25 A. He's a BP drilling engineer.



1 Q. Do you feel that the failure of the  
2 possible nitrogen cement job possibly led to  
3 -- was directly related to this blow out?

4 A. I can't speculate on that because the  
5 investigation's not complete.

6 MR. MATHEWS:

7 That's all I have, sir.

8 THE WITNESS:

9 Thank you.

10 E X A M I N A T I O N

11 BY MR. McCARROLL:

12 Q. Can we go back and just cover a couple  
13 of items real quick. Specifically the pore  
14 pressure frac gradient, can you elaborate how  
15 that is effected in a deep water well for the  
16 shallow casings? Is there something specific  
17 that needs to be looked at for deep water  
18 drilling for pore pressure frac gradient for  
19 shallow casing?

20 A. Because you've got -- the deeper the  
21 water the lower those frac gradients are in  
22 the shallow strings. So, occasionally, you  
23 know, you have to take that into consideration  
24 when you plan your casing points.

25 Q. So, how's that different than a shelf



1 well?

2 A. A shelf well you would have very high  
3 frac gradients, very shallow. In deep water  
4 you have very low frac gradients.

5 Q. And what does that mean in plain  
6 English? Do you wind out setting more casing  
7 strings in deep water than you do in the  
8 shelf?

9 A. It's not necessarily always the case,  
10 but kind of generally speaking deep water  
11 wells going to an equivalent depth probably  
12 would require more casing strings than an  
13 equivalent depth in the shelf.

14 Q. So, does that bring the possibility of  
15 casing yourself out of the hole in drilling  
16 terms in deep water?

17 A. I've never heard the term "Casing  
18 yourself out", but --

19 Q. Well --

20 A. Running out of strings of pipe not  
21 reaching your objectives, absolutely.

22 Q. When you get so small at the bottom  
23 it's not productive to produce the well?

24 A. It's never happened to BP in our deep  
25 water group, but I can imagine that case



1 happening.

2 Q. Isn't that what you have to be careful  
3 for in deep water though?

4 A. Well, I think that's what you have to  
5 be careful for in any well.

6 Q. Well, in deep water the cost is a lot  
7 more expensive than it is for shallow wells.  
8 You need a higher flow rate to justify those  
9 wells.

10 A. I don't get involved in the economics.

11 Q. Well, I mean I would think you would be  
12 involved in the casing design and the casing  
13 design leads to the economics.

14 A. When we're -- when we're doing the  
15 objectives for a well we're given a minimum  
16 hole size that we're expected to deliver.

17 Q. And what was that minimum hole size in  
18 this case?

19 A. 8 and a half inch hole.

20 Q. With a production casing of what?

21 A. 7 inch.

22 Q. Okay. And you delivered that?

23 A. We delivered that.

24 Q. Don't you think that for that size  
25 casing and that small a hole that you



1 essentially set up your Halliburton cementer  
2 for failure?

3 A. Not at all.

4 Q. Especially when you have a loss return  
5 zone right below the productive zone?

6 A. Not at all.

7 Q. Do you think that's normal to expect  
8 someone to be able to cement 7 inch casing  
9 inside an 8 and a half inch hole with a severe  
10 loss return below the production zone?

11 A. I believe it is possible to get a  
12 successful cement job in that casing.

13 Q. Do you think that is a good idea?

14 A. I think that it's done everyday on  
15 wells --

16 Q. Is that a good engineering practice?

17 A. I believe it is a sound engineering  
18 practice.

19 Q. Okay. Personally I would not want to  
20 try to attempt that myself.

21 A. Understood.

22 Q. And what was the result of this  
23 particular job when you did that?

24 A. All indications were that we had an  
25 adequate cement job.



1 Q. What was the ultimate result?

2 A. I'm not sure I understand the question.

3 Q. What happened to the well?

4 A. I'm not sure what conclusion you're  
5 trying to draw.

6 Q. Well, in order for the well to flow the  
7 cement has to fail; is that correct?

8 A. That's not entirely correct in my  
9 opinion.

10 Q. So, you think the cement job was  
11 successful, but then the well flowed --

12 A. The indications that I have were --

13 Q. -- 11 people were killed, but you still  
14 think the cement job was successful?

15 A. I don't have any data that says that  
16 the cement job was not successful.

17 Q. The fact that the well flowed doesn't  
18 tell you something?

19 A. The fact that the well flowed tells me  
20 that the well became out of control at some  
21 point after the cement job and that the data  
22 from the investigation has not yet proven why  
23 the well became out of control.

24 Q. So, what is the purpose of the cement  
25 job if not to control the flow from the



1 productive interval?

2 A. The purpose of the cement job is to  
3 isolate the reservoir for future production.

4 Q. And control the flow until you  
5 perforate, correct?

6 A. The cement, the mud, the seal assembly  
7 all control the flow of the well after the  
8 cement job.

9 Q. The cement and the mud controls the  
10 flow before you perforate?

11 A. The cement, the mud and the seal  
12 assembly control the flow.

13 Q. Okay. Then why do you need cement at  
14 all?

15 A. Because you're going to do a completion  
16 and you couldn't isolate the various  
17 reservoirs for perforating without the cement  
18 in place.

19 Q. Right. So, essentially the cement  
20 prevents the flow until you perforate?

21 A. It is one of the mechanisms.

22 Q. Right. So, if the well flowed it would  
23 be logical to I think everybody here that the  
24 cement didn't do that?

25 A. I will wait for the conclusion of the



1 investigation to prove that.

2 Q. That would be my logic that the cement  
3 didn't work.

4 MR. LANSDEN:

5 I'm going to object. I understand  
6 that you're asking questions --

7 MR. McCARROLL:

8 Yes. I agree with you Counselor.

9 BY MR. McCARROLL:

10 Q. Let me just check my notes here real  
11 quick. The ballooning, do you think the  
12 ballooning had something to do with the fact  
13 that you set two extra casing strings?

14 A. No, sir.

15 Q. So, why did you have to set two extra  
16 casing strings that wasn't in your original  
17 plan if it wasn't because of the ballooning?  
18 I mean ballooning -- I read the daily reports  
19 and it looks like to me the trouble you had  
20 besides the kicks was ballooning.

21 A. I cannot recall every section of the  
22 well that had ballooning.

23 Q. Well, you are the drilling engineer,  
24 aren't you?

25 A. Yes, I am one of the drilling



1 engineers.

2 Q. One of the drilling engineers?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Who is the other drilling engineer?

5 A. Brian Morrel.

6 Q. And does he write or design the casing?

7 A. He's involved in that process also.

8 Q. And is he a senior drilling engineer

9 and you're a junior drilling engineer?

10 A. The opposite is true.

11 Q. Oh, you're the senior?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And he's like the trainee?

14 A. He is not a trainee. He is a junior

15 drilling engineer.

16 Q. Okay. Do you get calls from the rig

17 directly?

18 A. Occasionally.

19 Q. Occasionally. Do you get calls in the

20 middle of the night?

21 A. Occasionally.

22 Q. And do they call you when they have

23 trouble?

24 A. Depending on the type of trouble, yes.

25 Q. So, if they'd have a severe ballooning



1 problem, would the rig call you and ask you  
2 for advice?

3 A. Possibly.

4 Q. Okay. Would your advice be to set  
5 casing?

6 A. No.

7 Q. What would your advice be?

8 A. Let's find out why the wellbore is  
9 ballooning and what we can do to fix that  
10 ballooning to still reach the objective casing  
11 points.

12 Q. And then ultimately, if you cannot fix  
13 it through loss control material or some other  
14 means cutting back mud weight, then what would  
15 your suggestion be?

16 A. You would have to set a string of  
17 casing.

18 Q. And you did set two extra strings of  
19 casing in this well?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. Okay. So, my assumption from looking  
22 at that and reading the daily reports is  
23 ballooning resulted in you setting these two  
24 extra casing strings directly --

25 A. I -- I would not go to the same



1 conclusion.

2 Q. Okay. Thank you.

3 A. If you're using ballooning and loss  
4 circulation events as the same terminology  
5 then possibly, but we had major loss  
6 circulation events up the hole and in multiple  
7 hole sections.

8 Q. Alright.

9 A. So, those were not ballooning events  
10 because we lost thousands of barrels of mud  
11 that never came back.

12 Q. So, could you tell me the most severe  
13 formation in this well where you had a loss  
14 returns problem?

15 A. I can't remember the exact hole  
16 section, but it was way up the hole. The  
17 productive interval was not the worst lost  
18 circulation event.

19 Q. Okay. How about the second to worst?

20 A. Second to worst I cannot recall exactly  
21 which hole section that was, but it may be  
22 kind of a tie between the productive interval  
23 and one up the hole.

24 Q. Okay. So, you did have severe loss  
25 returns near the productive interval?



1 A. 3,000 barrels.

2 Q. Okay. And how did you address that?

3 A. Loss circulation material, cutting the  
4 mud weight, reducing ECD through lower  
5 circulation rates.

6 Q. Do you think the loss circulation  
7 material for addressing it's rear loss returns  
8 is a permanent fix?

9 A. It depends on the material and how it's  
10 applied, it can be a permanent fix.

11 Q. Or is it just a temporary fix?

12 A. It can be both.

13 Q. Okay. Loss returns material invades  
14 the formation or does it just plaster on the  
15 face of the formation?

16 A. It depends on the material pump.

17 Q. Okay. And what material did you pump?

18 A. We pump our standard 84 pound per  
19 barrel kind of a 200 barrel of loss  
20 circulation material that has a variety of  
21 products in it. Then we pump an MI product  
22 called Forma Squeeze Forma Set, which is kind  
23 of a two stage process. That -- the last part  
24 of that is actually kind of a product that  
25 goes from a liquid to a semi-solid state that



1 does both, attach to the outside of the  
2 wellbore as well as go into the potential  
3 fracture or permeable zone to seal that up.

4 Q. Okay. When you got to the very bottom  
5 of the hole and you decide to cement, did you  
6 inform Halliburton about the severe loss  
7 returns?

8 A. Halliburton was aware of the loss  
9 circulation in that hole section.

10 Q. And who in Halliburton did you inform  
11 specifically?

12 A. In BP's office we have a desk engineer  
13 from Halliburton, Jessie Gagliano.

14 Q. And what's his name?

15 A. Jessie Gagliano.

16 Q. Jessie Gagliano?

17 A. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

18 Q. Okay. And did he design the cement job  
19 specifically with that in mind?

20 A. I believe that the model was created  
21 with that in mind, yes.

22 Q. And did he come back and discuss that  
23 with you in detail?

24 A. He discussed that with several groups  
25 of people over that week while we were



1 wireline

2 Q. Did he discuss that with you?

3 A. Yes, I was in those meetings with those  
4 discussions.

5 Q. And did you have any concerns?

6 A. Not specifically.

7 Q. Did anybody have any concerns?

8 A. We were concerned that the pore  
9 pressure and frac gradient window for that  
10 cement job was going to be a narrow window to  
11 execute that cement job. That's why we spent  
12 five days --

13 Q. Did anybody consider stopping, you  
14 know, because of safety and not proceeding?

15 A. No one believed that there was going to  
16 be a safety issue with pumping that cement  
17 job.

18 Q. Okay. So, y'all did discuss your  
19 concerns, right?

20 A. Absolutely.

21 Q. Alright. And you went ahead and  
22 proceeded with the job anyway?

23 A. All of the risks had been addressed,  
24 all of the concerns had been addressed. We  
25 had a model that suggested that if executed



1 properly we would be able to get a successful  
2 cement job on this string of pipe.

3 Q. Did anyone in the group express any  
4 concerns to you after the meeting?

5 A. Not that I can recall.

6 Q. Okay. Anyone on the rig express any  
7 concerns to you after you sent the procedure  
8 out there?

9 A. Not that I recall.

10 Q. Okay. So, when the job was pumped and  
11 they had some loss returns, did anyone  
12 consider running cement bond logs or  
13 temperature logs to find out where the top of  
14 the cement was?

15 A. I was not made aware of any losses  
16 during the cement job.

17 Q. Well, the data we received from BP  
18 showed that you had some loss returns.

19 A. I don't -- I have not seen that data.  
20 I've not been shown that data.

21 Q. So, did anyone from the rig talk to you  
22 about running a cement bond log or a  
23 temperature log?

24 A. No one from the rig discussed that.

25 Q. Thank you.



1 EXAMINATION

2 BY MR. MATHEWS:

3 Q. I just have one question: Earlier in  
4 your testimony you said that you had visited  
5 the DEEPWATER HORIZON in March for what you  
6 thought was going to be a weekend trip and  
7 actually turned out to be a week. Why did it  
8 take so long and what happened for that to --

9 A. Well, the problem I went out there to  
10 kind of oversee the correction was done  
11 successfully. I like to be offshore, it had  
12 been two or three years since I had been on  
13 the rig previously. Engineers don't get the  
14 opportunity to go offshore that often and I  
15 know -- I mean I've known a bunch of the guys  
16 that died a long time. And, you know, it's  
17 kind of a reunion if you will. Those guys  
18 spend half their lives offshore. And many of  
19 those people were involved in a big kind of  
20 pre-job meeting three or four years ago for a  
21 well that I was engineer on. So, I have a  
22 personal tie with some of those people. And,  
23 once you're out there, it's easy to stay.  
24 People don't really want you to go in. When  
25 the engineer comes out they give you plenty of



1 things to do because they like having you  
2 around. You're part of the team.

3 Q. Okay. So, there was no problem with  
4 the well?

5 A. I did not stay because of additional  
6 problems.

7 Q. I know. I was trying to get a  
8 clarification earlier. Thank you.

9 A. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

10 E X A M I N A T I O N

11 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

12 Q. Mr. Hafle, I have a couple of questions  
13 for you. Did you review the case file for the  
14 DEEPWATER HORIZON before you came here to  
15 testify?

16 A. I'm not sure I understand the question.

17 Q. Did you review the case file, the BP  
18 case file, on the design case file for the  
19 DEEPWATER HORIZON in terms of this particular  
20 drilling operation?

21 A. Are you talking about the casing  
22 design?

23 Q. Whatever files you have, engineering  
24 files, design files, you have on the drilling  
25 operation there.



1 A. Sorry, I'm not sure what --

2 Q. You drill a hole --

3 MR. LANSDEN:

4 Excuse me, with all due respect,  
5 this is delicate information. I'm  
6 going to object to you asking him about  
7 anything that he discussed with me, any  
8 documents I went through with him. So,  
9 I'm not sure really --

10 CAPT NGUYEN:

11 No, no. My question is that he  
12 works for BP. He's a design engineer.  
13 We have a situation here and he come  
14 here to testify. Did he review the  
15 case file for this particular job  
16 before he came here to testify.

17 THE WITNESS:

18 I'm familiar with all of the  
19 design aspects of the well. Did I  
20 review those prior to coming here? I  
21 mean people in the BP office have been  
22 asking me questions since the hour the  
23 incident occurred. So, I've reviewed  
24 various aspects of the well  
25 absolutely.



1 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

2 Q. Because -- is BP certified ISO--9000,  
3 9001?

4 A. I believe they are, yes.

5 Q. Okay. So, I want to make a linkage --  
6 well, my understanding is that one of the  
7 questions that Mr. Mathews had for you was  
8 that -- I believe it was a revision change to  
9 some procedure.

10 CAPT NGUYEN:

11 Is that correct, Mr. Mathews?

12 MR. MATHEWS:

13 Yes.

14 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

15 Q. And you didn't remember what the latest  
16 version was for that particular procedure.

17 A. Do you have that procedure that has the  
18 revision? I mean there are dozens of  
19 procedures that have revisions during the  
20 drilling of a well.

21 CAPT NGUYEN:

22 Mr. Mathews, can you clarify which  
23 procedure you were talking about and  
24 what revision?

25 MR. MATHEWS:



1           There was multiple revisions  
2           submitted to the MMS through March and  
3           April. Four revisions to the original  
4           approved APD and the last six days  
5           there was actually three  
6           revisions submitted to changing the  
7           program. Unfortunately I can't release  
8           that because it has proprietary  
9           information in it, but the prognosis  
10          was changed and I'll give you the dates  
11          if you want to go back and -- we  
12          can call you back to testify upon --

13          THE WITNESS:

14                I can summarize what --

15          MR. MATHEWS:

16                Okay.

17          THE WITNESS:

18                You know, you're describing the  
19                changes what I would describe as  
20                additions to the permit.

21          BY CAPT NGUYEN:

22                Q. No, I was just looking at -- BP's ISO-  
23                9000, 9001 certified organization. And you,  
24                as a design engineer, and you cannot -- oh,  
25                well maybe -- I would think that you would



1 have the latest -- what the latest revision to  
2 a particular procedure that Mr. Mathews talked  
3 about.

4 A. I probably wrote all of those EPD  
5 additions, but, you know, if you want to ask  
6 me about a specific one I can answer a  
7 question. But if there's seven or eight of  
8 them there --

9 MR. MATHEWS:

10 I can touch on just really some of  
11 the stuff, just a synopsis of what  
12 happened. On March 26th after the  
13 original approval you revised the  
14 casing program which changed to  
15 include an 9 and 7/8ths liner. You  
16 then came back and revised your casing  
17 program again on April 14th to include  
18 a 7 inch production casing. Then you  
19 came in on April 15th to correct the  
20 casing program again to 7 and 9 and  
21 7/8th inch and 7 inch are actually  
22 tapered casing. And you corrected your  
23 well design information on that  
24 application. And then on the same day  
25 it came back that you inadvertently



1 removed the 9 and 7/8th inch liner from  
2 the well design information in the  
3 earlier one that you submitted on the  
4 15th and you have reincorporated it in  
5 the two applications submitted to the  
6 MMS on 4/15.

7 THE WITNESS:

8 I'm familiar with every one of  
9 those.

10 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

11 Q. You what?

12 A. I'm familiar with every one of those  
13 changes. You call them changes, I would call  
14 them additions to the permit. Some of those  
15 repeats were because of the person actually  
16 entering into the well, e-wells, in the MMS  
17 system. That person is new to the system.  
18 Sherrie Douglas is the primary person that  
19 inputs that data. I believe these were being  
20 input by Heather Powell and, just due to the  
21 nature of the additions, she made some typos  
22 that we corrected. There is no substantial  
23 change to the well program. These were  
24 additional casing strings that were required  
25 to reach objective depths. The 7 by 9 and



1 7/8ths casing was the planned production  
2 casing that you have to permit before you run  
3 it on the well type. So, there's not changes.  
4 They are additional permit steps that are  
5 required to complete the well.

6 Q. I just want to make sure that whatever  
7 the design engineer changed his modification,  
8 addition, whatever you've done, that same  
9 version is on the rig itself for execution?

10 That's all I'm trying to get to.

11 A. Absolutely.

12 Q. That's what I'm trying to get to here.  
13 And when you answer is that you don't remember  
14 which revision --

15 A. Well, I'm not at the rig site.

16 Q. That's what I want to get  
17 clarification.

18 A. I don't know what version they have at  
19 the rig site, but I know our regulatory  
20 department is responsible for insuring that  
21 they have that right version on the rig site.

22 Q. Yes, sir. As you can see with my  
23 uniform you know I'm in the Coast Guard.

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. But I'm also a marine technical



1 officer. And the Coast Guard approves vessel  
2 designs and our engineer, such as myself in my  
3 younger days, deal directly with the engineer  
4 of the vessel owner. I was surprised to hear  
5 that in this case you are a design engineer  
6 for BP, but didn't you have to go through your  
7 regulatory people to get the MMS drilling  
8 engineer? I'm just surprised that -- not  
9 surprised, but that's just a little bit  
10 different than what I'm familiar with without  
11 process. Can you tell me something about  
12 qualifications of your regulatory people who  
13 act in the intermediary between you and the  
14 regulatory folks? What are their capability?

15 A. So, due to the size of BP we are given  
16 the luxury of having somebody that facilitates  
17 that conversation between drilling at BP and  
18 drilling at the MMS. Sherrie Douglas is like  
19 that single point of contact so that you don't  
20 have multiple people talking to the MMS  
21 without everybody knowing who's talking to MMS  
22 and then you don't end up with two different  
23 stories if I talk to John versus if I talk to  
24 Frank versus if I talk to David at the MMS.  
25 And then I fail to tell somebody else within



1 the organization. So, that person is a single  
2 point contact that we're given that luxury of  
3 having at BP.

4 Q. What is her technical qualifications?

5 A. She does not have any technical  
6 qualification nor does she need any because  
7 the drilling engineer supplies the data for  
8 the permit, the permit is transferred  
9 electronically to the engineer in MMS, they  
10 review it. Either approve it or disapprove  
11 it. She is a liaison, if you will, between  
12 those two drilling engineers.

13 Q. So, she has no role in reviewing or  
14 approving your proposal?

15 A. No. She knows the regulations, so if  
16 she sees a blatant error in something that one  
17 of the engineers proposes she can -- through  
18 her knowledge of the regulations. She's been  
19 in regulatory for a long, long time. She  
20 would know some of the CFR regulations to be  
21 able to say 'Hey, you know, that's not right.'

22 Q. But the regulations have technical  
23 aspects to it and if she does not have any  
24 technical qualifications how can she ensure  
25 compliance with the technical aspect of the



1 regulation?

2 A. She has her work history and years of  
3 experience.

4 Q. What would those be?

5 A. She's been in regulatory for probably a  
6 couple of decades, without giving away her  
7 age. I'm not sure how old she is and how many  
8 years she's worked, but she's got a lot of  
9 experience in regulatory both within BP and  
10 prior to her work at BP.

11 Q. My line of questioning is I want to  
12 make sure that this process is different than  
13 the process that I'm used to. And I want to  
14 make sure that -- that the linkage -- the  
15 critical linkage between you and the  
16 government reviewer that performs some  
17 function not just, you know, handing off the  
18 information without any additional review for  
19 regulatory compliance.

20 A. Okay. So, when I do a permit or any  
21 engineer does a permit, it gets submitted  
22 through the e-wells system. If we know  
23 there's going to be some issue that perhaps  
24 the engineer at the regulatory department at  
25 the MMS would not be aware of, we would have a



1 face to face or a phone conference with myself  
2 in the meeting, with Sherrie in the meeting or  
3 Heather. We have talked -- I have personally  
4 talked to many of the drilling engineers at  
5 the MMS, both face to face and over the phone,  
6 when there's issues that need to have  
7 technical discussions about.

8 Q. Okay. So, you know, for our own  
9 knowledge here: So, you are the senior well  
10 design engineer; is that right?

11 A. I've never had the title of well design  
12 engineer, but senior drilling engineer, yes.

13 Q. Senior engineer. So, who's above you?  
14 I'm just trying to look at the review and  
15 approval process here.

16 A. I report -- I mean if you want to see  
17 the org chart, I'm sure somebody can provide  
18 you with that. But I report to a engineering  
19 team leader who reports to an engineering  
20 manager who reports to, you know, a vice  
21 president of drilling I believe.

22 Q. Okay. From that -- so, if a project,  
23 just as the one that the DEEPWATER HORIZON was  
24 involved in, you design the well, you send it  
25 up and how many levels of review and approval



1 -- is that what you just described? Is that  
2 the various level review and approval?

3 A. It's also reviewed, in addition to  
4 the engineering review side, there would be an  
5 operation review side. The people that report  
6 to the rig side is operations. So, the well  
7 site leaders get a chance to review the  
8 drilling program. The wells team leader gets  
9 a chance to review and approve the drilling  
10 program. The drilling operations manager gets  
11 to approve the drilling program and those two  
12 sides kind of meet at a few levels above me to  
13 the vice president of drilling at BP.

14 Q. Are there independent safety review  
15 within BP to ensure that -- it sounds to me  
16 that's a technical reviewing chain. Are there  
17 also safety reviewing chain that would provide  
18 input to the process?

19 A. Absolutely. During the design phase of  
20 the well both the casing design is reviewed by  
21 independent folks. Most of those work in the  
22 technology department in the other building at  
23 BP. So, there's casing, there's cement  
24 experts that check the cement designs, there's  
25 fluid experts that check the mud designs,



1 there's rock strength experts that check kind  
2 of the geo--mechanics aspects of the well,  
3 there's loss circulation specialists within BP  
4 that review the plans. All the -- in fact,  
5 all these people were involved in this Macondo  
6 well.

7 Q. Yes, sir. Okay, thank you.

8 EXAMINATION

9 BY LT BUTTS:

10 Q. Sir, you said this was an exploratory  
11 well?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What -- again, I think you mentioned  
14 two criteria that you use in the plan. What  
15 were those two criteria again?

16 A. The pore pressure and fracture  
17 gradient.

18 Q. I think you said something like geology  
19 data in a nearby well --

20 A. So, offset information, geologic  
21 predictions, if you will. When you first  
22 obtain a lease from the U.S. Government  
23 they've shot seismic across that lease,  
24 somebody had shot spec seismic across that  
25 lease. BP has acquired that seismic. The



1 geologists and geophysicists have to analyze  
2 that data and determine that there's a viable  
3 prospect on that block, so we acquire that  
4 block.

5 Q. And how old is that data? In this area  
6 in Mississippi Canyon-252?

7 A. Some of it's very new, but I don't know  
8 the exact vintage. But, yeah, I know that --  
9 I mean while the well is drilling there's a  
10 seismic boat shooting new seismic right on  
11 location.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. So, there's a lot of new technology in  
14 seismic that's being done as we're drilling  
15 wells even.

16 Q. Okay. And nearby wells, how many  
17 nearby wells do you have that you actually  
18 looked back to to

19 A. Multiple. In fact, on this block  
20 there's two wells.

21 Q. Two wells?

22 A. Drilled many years ago, but at much  
23 shallower depth. There's actually a producing  
24 gas field on this block.

25 Q. Alright.



1           A. So, we had some good offset information  
2 for the upper hole sections. The deeper hole  
3 sections you then are stretching, you know,  
4 tens and twenty miles away for the nearest  
5 wellbore.

6           Q. Okay, thank you.

7                   E X A M I N A T I O N

8 BY MR. MATHEWS:

9           Q. Just for the record, earlier I heard  
10 you say that you've been doing day to day  
11 reviews and internal talks with BP. You've  
12 never looked at the cement information on that  
13 casing string?

14          A. Not specifically, no. Not that I can  
15 recall. I mean --

16          Q. You don't recall, yes or no, if you've  
17 looked at any type of logs on the cement --

18          A. Post job data?

19          Q. Yes, sir.

20          A. No, I don't recall.

21          Q. Thank you.

22                   CAPT NGUYEN:

23                   Flag state?

24                   MR. LINSIN:

25                   No questions, thank you, Captain.



1 CAPT NGUYEN:

2 Yes, sir. BP, do you have  
3 questions for your witness?

4 MR. GODFREY:

5 No questions at this time.

6 CAPT NGUYEN:

7 Yes, sir. Transocean?

8 MR. KOHNKE:

9 Thank you.

10 E X A M I N A T I O N

11 BY MR. KOHNKE:

12 Q. Good morning, Mr. Hafle. You said that  
13 you had extended your stay when you visited  
14 the HORIZON. You extended it to a week.

15 A. Ten days actually.

16 Q. How many?

17 A. Ten days.

18 Q. Ten days. And, when asked the reason  
19 for that, you said that you had come to know  
20 some of the deceased by the well and you  
21 enjoyed being around them and I understand I  
22 think what you mean. But let me ask you this:  
23 Which of the deceased were you particularly  
24 referring to? Which ones were you closest to?

25 A. The people that I knew from the meeting



1 in Galveston several years ago: Jason, Dewey.

2 Q. Was -- Jason Anderson the toolpusher,  
3 correct?

4 A. I believe. I'm not sure exactly his  
5 title.

6 Q. Alright.

7 A. But I believe he was the toolpusher,  
8 yes.

9 Q. And Dewey, do you know Dewey's last  
10 name?

11 A. Revette.

12 Q. And he was the driller, was he not?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay. These were good men, weren't  
15 they?

16 A. Very good.

17 Q. They knew their job?

18 A. Absolutely.

19 Q. And you knew that -- you knew that they  
20 knew their job? There was no doubt in your  
21 mind about that?

22 A. No doubt.

23 Q. Okay. And they perished in this  
24 accident trying to do their job; isn't that  
25 correct?



1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. You don't criticize them for any of the  
3 things that they were trying to do, do you?

4 A. No, sir.

5 Q. Okay. Now --

6 CAPT NGUYEN:

7 Mr. Kohnke, I'm not sure Mr. Hafle  
8 has knowledge of what these crew  
9 members did on the HORIZON during the  
10 casualty. So, I don't think that he  
11 can confirm that they can confirm that  
12 they did everything right. I just want  
13 to make sure of that. Is that --

14 MR. KOHNKE:

15 Well, I'm not asking if they did  
16 everything right. I'm saying does he  
17 have any criticisms of what they did.

18 CAPT NGUYEN:

19 Based on what -- we don't know  
20 what they did.

21 MR. KOHNKE:

22 Right.

23 CAPT NGUYEN:

24 He just --

25 THE WITNESS:



1           In the general terms I know those  
2 gentlemen and during the ten days I  
3           was out there I can say that they were  
4 doing the job that they were out there  
5 to do.

6           CAPT NGUYEN:

7           Okay. So, you feel that they are  
8 qualified to do the job, based on your  
9 experience?

10          THE WITNESS:

11          I feel they did their job. I don't  
12          know their background and  
13 qualifications.

14          CAPT NGUYEN:

15          But not specifically to this  
16          particular casualty? You have no  
17 knowledge of what happened?

18          THE WITNESS:

19          I have no knowledge of what  
20          happened --

21          CAPT NGUYEN:

22          Alright. Thanks, sir.

23          THE WITNESS:

24          -- while that event was going on  
25          on the rig that night.



1 BY MR. KOHNKE:

2 Q. Now, at the time of this blowout, let  
3 me get this clear: All of the casing that was  
4 to be run had been run; is that correct?

5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. And all of the cementing of that casing  
7 that was to be cemented had been completed; is  
8 that correct?

9 A. That is not correct. We still had to  
10 set a surface cement plug.

11 Q. Okay. With respect to the surface  
12 plug, other than that, all of the down hole  
13 below that surface plug that was to be at what  
14 depth?

15 A. The surface cement plug?

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. I don't remember the exact depth, but  
18 it's permitted roughly 3,000 feet below the  
19 mud line.

20 Q. Okay. And so everything below what was  
21 to be the location of the surface plug had  
22 been cemented; is that correct?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Okay. The seal assembly at the well  
25 head had been set?



1 A. To my knowledge, yes.

2 Q. Alright. And then at that point you  
3 had a sealed wellbore; is that correct?

4 A. The information that I was given is  
5 that that wellbore had been pressure tested  
6 successfully to 2500 PSI, which would indicate  
7 it sealed because that would be well above the  
8 fracture gradient of any of the formations  
9 that would be exposed, yes.

10 Q. And, in addition to the pressure  
11 testing which seeks to determine if you have  
12 in fact a sealed wellbore, there were also two  
13 negative tests, are you aware of that today?

14 A. I'm aware that they were going to be  
15 doing negative tests. I'm not sure if they  
16 did two or if they did one or if they did  
17 three, to be honest.

18 Q. And the testimony on this record has  
19 been that the negative tests, both of them,  
20 were successful?

21 A. That is my indication from the  
22 information that I was given from the rig  
23 also.

24 Q. So, in this point, in BP's judgement it  
25 was -- because it's a sealed wellbore, because



1 it's been tested it's safe to displace the mud  
2 with seawater on the riser?

3 A. That's why we do those tests.

4 Q. That's correct, alright. Now, the next  
5 step in this process after displacing the mud  
6 in the riser was to set the surface plug;  
7 isn't that correct?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Alright. And, when you set the surface  
10 plug, that is a cement plug or filler of what  
11 dimension? How long or deep would this cement  
12 plug be?

13 A. This plug was planned to be 300 feet  
14 long.

15 Q. Okay. And it would have been how many  
16 feet below the mud line?

17 A. Approximately 3,000.

18 Q. And how many feet above the total  
19 vertical depth?

20 A. Roughly 10,000.

21 Q. Okay. And at some point you said --  
22 you were asked a question about the CBL and  
23 the temperature log. How is a CBL run?

24 A. On wire line.

25 Q. And how do you get the wire line down



1 to the bottom?

2 A. You rig up the equipment in the derrick  
3 and it goes over a set of shivs and the wire  
4 line operator allows it to free fall into the  
5 wellbore.

6 Q. Do you need an open wellbore to get  
7 down to the bottom in order to run a CBL?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Were y'all planning to drill a separate  
10 parallel hole to get down or were you planning  
11 to go down through the existing wellbore?

12 A. You run a CBL on the cement job that  
13 you just performed inside of that casing. You  
14 would go directly inside that.

15 Q. Alright. Well, what were you going to  
16 do about the surface plug that they were about  
17 to set through several hundred feet of cement  
18 and how were you going to get passed that?

19 A. Because of the conditions of the cement  
20 job there's not a requirement to run a CBL.

21 Q. That's not my questions.

22 A. There was no plans to run a CBL.

23 Q. Well, you said earlier that the CBL was  
24 in waiting -- I thought you said -- those  
25 weren't your words, those are my words. That



1 the CBL was something that you were  
2 considering doing, but this blowout occurred  
3 before it could be done, didn't you say that?

4 A. I don't recall saying that.

5 Q. Okay. Well, the fact is that once the  
6 surface plug is set there's no plan to run a  
7 CBL, is there?

8 A. That surface plug will be removed in  
9 the future and a CBL will be run in the  
10 future.

11 Q. Well, we're talking about a year from  
12 now or whenever BP decides to produce the  
13 well?

14 A. Some date in the future, yes.

15 Q. Well, I'm talking about in terms of  
16 this well, this well. Up until the blowout  
17 was there a plan to run a CBL?

18 A. If the cement job was unsuccessful --

19 Q. The cement job for the plug --

20 A. For the casing, for the casing. The  
21 cement job for the 7 inch casing if that  
22 cement job had been deemed unsuccessful there  
23 is a decision tree process that has conditions  
24 that which we perhaps would have run a CBL.  
25 If you don't have those documents I'm sure



1 somebody can supply those to you.

2 Q. Isn't the CBL a means for determining  
3 if the cement job is successful? Isn't that  
4 what it does?

5 A. It's one of the methods.

6 Q. Okay. And so why did BP have the  
7 equipment sent out to the rig if it didn't  
8 intend to use that equipment?

9 A. It's my belief and knowledge that there  
10 was no equipment at the rig site to run that.

11 Q. Okay. There has been a report in the  
12 Times Picayune, the local paper, that there  
13 was a -- the equipment necessary to do the log  
14 and that the workers were sent back to the  
15 shore some hours before it, do you have any  
16 knowledge of that?

17 A. I believe that's inaccurate.

18 Q. Okay. So, you do not believe that  
19 there was any equipment to run the CBL on the  
20 rig at the time of this blowout?

21 A. I'm unaware of whether there was or was  
22 not to be honest.

23 Q. Okay. But the purpose of a CBL, let's  
24 be clear about this, what does a CBL give you?  
25 What information with respect to the quality



1 and sufficiency of a cement job?

2 A. So, CBL is an abbreviation for cement  
3 bond log.

4 Q. Alright.

5 A. It gives you some indication of whether  
6 or not there is cement to casing contact,  
7 cement bonding to the pipe.

8 Q. In other words: Whether it's holding,  
9 correct?

10 A. It's a qualitative not a quantitative  
11 means of determining whether or not that  
12 cement has completely sealed against the  
13 casing.

14 Q. So, you determine from a qualitative  
15 standpoint whether or not the job that you  
16 intended the cement to perform is going to be  
17 performed?

18 A. You're going to have to repeat that  
19 question.

20 Q. Sure. Qualitatively you want to know  
21 is this cement, which is meant to be a  
22 barrier, is it going to work? That's what  
23 qualitative means, doesn't it?

24 A. Possibly.

25 Q. Possibly you said?



1 A. Well, I'm still not sure I understand  
2 your question.

3 Q. Okay. You want the cement to be a  
4 barrier, don't you?

5 A. Cement is put in every casing string to  
6 be a barrier, yes.

7 Q. Okay. So, for it to be a barrier, it's  
8 got to work?

9 A. It has to be in place above the zone  
10 that you're trying to isolate, absolutely.

11 Q. So, you would agree that it has to  
12 work? It has to be fulfilling it's intended  
13 purpose?

14 A. It is one of the barrier methods, yes.

15 Q. And the cement bond log gives you that  
16 information qualitatively?

17 A. Sometimes.

18 Q. It doesn't give it to you  
19 quantitatively, it gives it to you  
20 qualitatively as I appreciate your testimony?

21 A. Yes. I'm not a cement bond log expert.

22 Q. Now, wouldn't it always be a good idea  
23 to do a cement bond log?

24 A. It depends on whose opinion you're  
25 asking.



1 Q. I'm asking yours.

2 A. In my opinion it's not always necessary  
3 to run a cement bond log.

4 Q. Not always necessary, alright. Well,  
5 you had some -- let me see if I can get the  
6 right language here. You had some loss return  
7 at the production interval, did you not?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Now, loss return at the production  
10 interval, what does that mean in plain  
11 everyday English?

12 A. While drilling that hole section we  
13 lost over 3,000 barrels of mud while drilling.

14 Q. Okay. Now, when you're using nitrified  
15 cement it makes the cement lighter, doesn't  
16 it?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Was there any concern that some of that  
19 cement may have been lost at this interval?

20 A. The model that was done would indicate  
21 that it could all be put in place without  
22 losses.

23 Q. When was that model done?

24 A. The week prior to running casing.

25 Q. Okay. But that's a model. That only



1 gives you a hypothetical or a projection, if  
2 you will.

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. The reality can only be determined by  
5 running a cement bond log; isn't that correct?

6 A. That's not correct.

7 Q. Temperature log, is that part of the  
8 cement bond log or is that a separate log?

9 A. Some say that bond logs probably have a  
10 temperature function built into them. I'm not  
11 sure what logging tool would have actually  
12 been run on this well, but both those tools  
13 are both -- you can have a cement bond log  
14 with temperature measurements more than likely  
15 and you can have just a single temperature log  
16 also.

17 Q. Now, you said the cement bond log was  
18 under consideration when the blow out  
19 occurred. Tell me: What was the  
20 consideration?

21 A. I did not say that.

22 Q. Oh, I'm sorry. I thought you said it  
23 was still under consideration. Had it been  
24 ruled out? Had BP decided "We don't need a  
25 cement bond log for this well"?



1       A. I believe that decision had been made  
2 based on the management of change document  
3 that has a decision tree path depending on how  
4 the cement job execution occurred that a bond  
5 log was not required for this well.

6       Q. Not required by MMS or not required by  
7 BP?

8       A. Both.

9       Q. Okay. Now, for this well to have begun  
10 to flow, what had to happen? What had to  
11 fail, in other words?

12      A. I'm not sure.

13      Q. Well, let's talk about the  
14 possibilities. There are only a couple; isn't  
15 that correct?

16      A. There's multiple failure points. Every  
17 joint of casing is screwed together and  
18 there's several hundred joints of casing that  
19 have a thread that any of those threads could  
20 leak.

21      Q. Okay. Well, let's -- for hydrocarbons  
22 to enter there has to be a failure at a point,  
23 at some point, correct?

24      A. When the investigation's finished we'll  
25 perhaps know. I don't believe you're going to



1 ever find out exactly how the hydrocarbons got  
2 in the wellbore.

3 Q. Well, if I ask you "How did it get in?"  
4 that will be your answer, but that wasn't my  
5 question. My question was: There has to be a  
6 failure at some point for this well to flow;  
7 isn't that correct?

8 A. Not necessarily.

9 Q. Excuse me?

10 A. Not necessarily.

11 Q. So, I guess this well didn't flow and  
12 it didn't blowout?

13 A. The well did flow and blow out, yes,  
14 sir.

15 Q. Well, there had to be a failure at some  
16 location; isn't that correct?

17 A. It is a possibility that the initial  
18 flow and expiration was not caused by a  
19 failure of any of the tubulars or cement.

20 Q. Okay. Well, let's -- then let me get  
21 back to my original question: Give me the  
22 different possibilities that would have  
23 allowed this well to flow. What failures  
24 would have occurred?

25 A. I am not going to speculate on all of



1 the mechanisms of the failure.

2 Q. Mr. Hafle, I'm not asking --

3 A. There will be an official  
4 investigation, which is on going, which is why  
5 we're here to answer questions to try to find  
6 out what happened on this well.

7 Q. Mr. Hafle, I'm not asking you to  
8 speculate about the cause. Do you understand  
9 that? That's not my question. My question  
10 is: Among the causes, what are they? For  
11 example: A cement failure, that's one of the  
12 causes; isn't that correct?

13 A. Possibly.

14 Q. Alright. It could have been a collapse  
15 of the casing?

16 A. Possibly.

17 Q. Okay. And if -- what are the other  
18 possible causes down hole for the hydrocarbons  
19 to enter this drill string?

20 A. The hydrocarbons could have been in the  
21 wellbore prior to the casing being run.

22 Q. Okay. And, if that's the case, then  
23 there would have to be a failure of the seal,  
24 the well head seal; isn't that correct?

25 A. No.



1 Q. Okay. Now, were you and are you now or  
2 have you been a part of the BP investigation  
3 team looking into the actual causes of this  
4 failure?

5 A. I'm not part of the investigation team.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. I've been interviewed by one. I mean  
8 I'm not part of the investigation team.

9 Q. Okay. Let me ask you about these  
10 casing strings. We've established that the  
11 original APD called for I think you said six  
12 strings; is that correct, and that it  
13 ultimately had eight?

14 A. The original design back in January of  
15 2009 --

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. -- is when we started working earnest  
18 on this wellbore, wellbore design. Probably  
19 prior to 2009. The original design had seven  
20 strings. Upon review in the process that we  
21 go through about planning a well within the  
22 expiration department and within BP's drilling  
23 department we go through a series of peer  
24 reviews, peer assists, technical data reviews,  
25 risk assessments. The design changed from



1 seven strings to six strings based on our  
2 understanding.

3 Q. I just want the number. You can  
4 shorten it if you wish.

5 A. Six strings was what was permitted  
6 initially.

7 Q. And ultimately how many were run? How  
8 many strings?

9 A. Eight strings were required to reach  
10 the objective depth.

11 Q. And each string has a certain length or  
12 distance that each string covers; is that  
13 correct?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. And how are they -- within a given  
16 string, a given diameter of casing, how are  
17 these casings put together? Are they  
18 threaded?

19 A. Every string is threaded, yes, sir.

20 Q. Okay. And then it ultimately looks  
21 like -- if you look at the well diagram it  
22 ultimately looks like an old 19th century  
23 pirate's spy glass or telescope. It's larger  
24 and then it gets smaller and smaller and  
25 smaller; isn't that correct?



1 A. Somebody might infer that's what it  
2 looks like, yes.

3 Q. Somebody who's not a petroleum engineer  
4 might make that conclusion?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Alright. And the widest is at the top  
7 and then it gets smaller and smaller. And  
8 where these overlaps occur as it comes down  
9 it's wider and then it's -- there's a narrower  
10 or smaller diameter casing string inside that,  
11 the one above it; isn't that the way it works?

12 A. Yes, yes.

13 Q. And part of the cementing that takes  
14 place that we've been talking about, cement at  
15 -- every time a casing string is run cement is  
16 then run out of a shoe at the bottom and  
17 hopefully run up the sides; isn't that  
18 correct?

19 A. That's always the plan, yes.

20 Q. Alright. And my question to you now  
21 is: The last -- the very last of these casing  
22 strings that -- the tapered string down to the  
23 7 inch string --

24 A. -- the production casing string, yes.

25 Q. Correct. Where it fitted into the



1 casing string above it was cement run up into  
2 that interval?

3 A. There was no plans to bring cement back  
4 inside of the 9 and 7/8ths liner.

5 Q. But there was above that, correct?

6 A. No, I don't believe so. Only on the  
7 surface casing is it required to bring cement  
8 back to the surface.

9 Q. And the cementing that took place was  
10 down at the production interval at the bottom,  
11 cement was run out of the very bottom and up  
12 the sides to cover or close off the production  
13 interval; is that right?

14 A. That was part of the job of cement. It  
15 also covered up additional sands that were in  
16 that hole section.

17 Q. And by regulation the cement has to  
18 extent 500 feet above the upper limits of that  
19 production zone?

20 A. If that's the only hydrocarbon zone in  
21 the wellbore, yes, that would be correct.

22 Q. And in this case was that deemed to be  
23 the only hydrocarbons and did the cement go  
24 500 feet above the production zone?

25 A. There was actually a higher hydrocarbon



1 zone in the wellbore that we brought cement  
2 much higher above --

3 Q. At a much higher level?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. Now, between that top of the  
6 cement and the next section where casing met  
7 -- excuse me, where it joined, was there any  
8 cement in that joint?

9 A. This long string of casing does not  
10 touch the other strings of casing until you're  
11 back to the mud line at the water depth.  
12 There's no hang off procedures, there's no  
13 additional equipment. It's a long string you  
14 hang off at the well head.

15 Q. Do you have a copy of the -- the  
16 drilling program for this well in front of  
17 you?

18 A. No, sir.

19 Q. Let me hand you a copy and ask if you  
20 can identify this. I don't know if the board  
21 has this or not, but this is what I'm showing  
22 him (indicating). I guess MMS has this in  
23 their files. And quite frankly I think we got  
24 this from MMS.

25 Q. This is the drilling program that we --



1 LT BUTTS:

2 It's dated January 10th?

3 MR. KOHNKE:

4 Yes, well January -- it doesn't

5 have a day. January 10, 2010 I should

6 say.

7 MR. LINSIN:

8 Captain, may I inquire: Is there a

9 Bates number on this document? It

10 would be very helpful if --

11 MR. KOHNKE:

12 No, there isn't.

13 MR. LINSIN:

14 -- we had some way of identifying

15 this document.

16 MR. KOHNKE:

17 Unfortunately there are no Bates

18 numbers.

19 BY MR. KOHNKE:

20 Q. Okay. This is a document you've seen

21 before?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. And you have signed it I believe as

24 "Senior drilling engineer" --

25 MR. MATHEWS:



1           Mr. Kohnke, before we go further  
2           I'm sorry, but you asserted that you  
3           got that from the MMS.

4           MR. KOHNKE:

5           No, I said "I think". I'm not  
6           sure --

7           MR. MATHEWS:

8           Okay.

9           MR. KOHNKE:

10          -- where we got it.

11          MR. MATHEWS:

12          Okay. We just want to clarify that  
13          we never released that for the record.

14          THE WITNESS:

15          Well, for the record this document  
16          was not given to the MMS. It's not  
17          required to be given to the MMS, so you  
18          got it from another source.

19          BY MR. KOHNKE:

20          Q. Perhaps so. That's why I said "I  
21          believe". I don't know the source, but that's  
22          your signature indicating that it was prepared  
23          by Brian Morrel and reviewed by you, among  
24          others?

25          A. Absolutely.



1 Q. In addition to being reviewed by you  
2 it's reviewed by Brett Cocollas (phonetic), is  
3 that his --

4 A. It's reviewed by Brett Cocollas, it's  
5 approved by David Sims, it's approved by John  
6 Guy (phonetic) and it's approved by Ian Lill  
7 (phonetic), who was the drilling manager at  
8 the time.

9 Q. Alright. And in this document there is  
10 an indication on the second page, if you'll  
11 turn to it please.

12 A. (Witness complies.)

13 CAPT NGUYEN:

14 Mr. Kohnke, you know, with my MMS  
15 counterparts that are right here, the  
16 board has never seen this document.

17 So, in order to address this document,  
18 you need to, you know, submit it to the  
19 board for consideration before we  
20 discuss it here. Because the Parties  
21 In Interest, I don't know whether they  
22 have received it from the board or not  
23 and we haven't received it so  
24 therefore we shouldn't be talking about  
25 this document which we have no idea



1           what you're referring to.

2           MR. KOHNKE:

3                 Well, can we take a break and I'll  
4                 get some copies made?

5           CAPT NGUYEN:

6                 That's not going to give us  
7                 enough --

8           THE WITNESS:

9                 It's a lot of pages in length.

10          CAPT NGUYEN:

11                -- opportunity. We will have  
12                additional hearings on this and we can  
13                do this properly in terms of providing  
14                it to the board and --

15          MR. KOHNKE:

16                As long as Mr. Hafle or one of the  
17                individuals who signed this is back  
18                and I can cross examine them, that's  
19                fine.

20          CAPT NGUYEN:

21                You can request a witness to the  
22                board and we can consider it with  
23                appropriate evidence to discuss this  
24                matter. Thank you, sir.

25          MR. KOHNKE:



1 I will do that then. Let me make  
2 sure I understand what you're saying.

3 When we resume and one of these  
4 witnesses are here and I have made  
5 copies of this BP document and given it  
6 to the board then I'll be permitted to  
7 cross examine the witness at that time?

8 CAPT NGUYEN:

9 You can request the board to  
10 consider witnesses and evidence and if  
11 we believe that the witnesses that you  
12 offer or the evidence that you offer  
13 have relevance to this investigation we  
14 will provide that to the PII's and we  
15 can have this discussion during this  
16 hearing.

17 MR. KOHNKE:

18 Alright.

19 CAPT NGUYEN:

20 Yes, sir.

21 BY MR. KOHNKE:

22 Q. Just for purposes of identification  
23 and for the board's understanding this is the  
24 drilling program for this well and it says  
25 "Final drilling program" on it, does it not?



1       A. This document may in fact not be a  
2 complete copy of the drilling program. This  
3 is the second drilling program created for the  
4 well specific for the DEEPWATER HORIZON.  
5 There's another version of this program that  
6 was created for the MARIANAS back in 2009.

7       Q. Alright. But -- and I understand there  
8 may be an earlier version created for the  
9 MARIANAS. To understand: Is this the version  
10 that was created for when the HORIZON came on  
11 location?

12      A. The cover page appears to --

13      Q. Okay.

14      A. -- warrant that statement.

15      Q. So, if we wanted to know what  
16 directions BP had given it's company men and  
17 Transocean, it would be found -- Transocean  
18 for the work of the HORIZON it would be found  
19 in this document or it's ultimate version; is  
20 that correct?

21      A. That would be correct.

22      Q. Alright. Okay. Most of my questions  
23 were going to be derived from this document.  
24 So, let me -- I just have a few more and then  
25 I'll sit down. The production zone was



1 between what depth and what depth? Can you  
2 give me the perimeters or the dimensions of  
3 it?

4 A. I cannot give you the exact depths, but  
5 roughly it's in the last hole section at or  
6 about 18,200 feet plus or minus.

7 Q. The shoe on the very bottom string of  
8 casing, did that extend down below the  
9 production zone?

10 A. Yes, it did.

11 Q. It did. How far below?

12 A. I'm not exactly sure how many feet, but  
13 several feet below the production zone.

14 Q. Okay. And what's the reason for doing  
15 that?

16 A. When you go to complete a well you need  
17 -- you need casing below the bottom  
18 perforation so that when you perforate the  
19 well you get perforation debris that falls in.  
20 This is commonly known as rat hole. And this  
21 rat hole you like to have as much as possible  
22 so you try to set that casing as deep as  
23 possible below the productive interval.

24 Q. Do you know how long the shoe track was  
25 on that 7 inch casing?



1 A. Approximately 200 feet.

2 Q. Excuse me?

3 A. Approximately 200 feet.

4 Q. 200 feet, okay. And what was the  
5 pressure rating of the float equipment?

6 A. I don't recall the exact rating.

7 Q. Alright. One second please. Now,  
8 there was a question or two from the board  
9 dealing with BOPs and BOP testing. Do you  
10 understand that when a BOP is tested that the  
11 company men onboard sign off on that test, you  
12 know that don't you?

13 A. I'm aware of that, yes.

14 Q. Okay. So, that test when it's  
15 performed and the pressures that are read on  
16 that test are then signed off by a variety of  
17 people in addition to whoever performs the  
18 test on the BOP and that would include the rig  
19 management and the BP company men?

20 A. I've never signed off on one of those  
21 tests, so I don't know exactly who does sign  
22 off on those tests, but I'm sure that there is  
23 a set of Transocean people and BP folks that  
24 sign off on that test.

25 Q. And, in looking at the daily reports



1 that are coming from the rig, you see when  
2 those tests are performed yourself? You may  
3 not track it, but you see --

4 A. I see that there's been BOP test done,  
5 we know that we're required to test at least  
6 every 14 days, so it's a date that's kept  
7 track of very closely during the drilling of a  
8 well.

9 Q. Now, you indicated you were given some  
10 sort of a verbal communication from Brian  
11 Morrel and I don't -- and I'm not sure what  
12 that verbal communication included. Can you  
13 repeat what you said earlier?

14 A. You're going to have to tell me. I  
15 talked to Brian a lot on this well. It was a  
16 160 plus days. So --

17 Q. I thought it had something to do with  
18 the surface plug.

19 A. I don't recall.

20 Q. Okay. Okay, thank you.

21 A. Your welcome.

22 CAPT NGUYEN:

23 Thank you, sir.

24 MR. DYKES:

25 I've got a couple of follow up



1                    questions to Mr. Kohnke.

2                    E X A M I N A T I O N

3                    BY MR. DYKES:

4                    Q. With respect to the cement bond log,  
5                    would a cement bond log tell you where the top  
6                    of the cement was?

7                    A. Possibly.

8                    Q. If it was good or if it was bad or  
9                    would it show up?

10                  A. Cement bond logs are often times very  
11                  inconclusive. So, it is likely that you might  
12                  get a top of cement, but it's not guaranteed.

13                  Q. Okay. But in an 8 and a half inch hole  
14                  with 7 inch casing it would probably be a  
15                  pretty good indication that you would see the  
16                  top of the cement?

17                  A. I think from my experience having run  
18                  less than a handful of cement bond logs. But,  
19                  with my knowledge, I would say that you would  
20                  be able to tell where the top of the cement  
21                  was, yes.

22                  Q. Okay, thank you.

23                  MR. McCARROLL:

24                  Can I follow up on that, too?

25                  E X A M I N A T I O N



1 BY MR. McCARROLL:

2 Q. I just want to clarify your testimony  
3 when you were being questioned about a  
4 decision to run or not run a bond log. You  
5 said that BP and MMS both had concurred, is  
6 that your testimony?

7 A. I don't recall saying that, but I don't  
8 believe there's anything in the CFRs that say  
9 that a cement bond log is required.

10 Q. But I want you to clarify: To my  
11 knowledge MMS was not involved in any decision  
12 to run or not run a bond log or temperature  
13 log.

14 A. That is correct. We never requested  
15 permission nor do I think we have to request  
16 permission to run a bond log.

17 Q. Okay, thank you.

18 EXAMINATION

19 BY LT BUTTS:

20 Q. And that's a good point. If it's not  
21 in the CFRs then perhaps it does need to be.  
22 Is this CBL is it an integrity test? I  
23 understand there's pressure negative and I  
24 guess you bump it actually with pressure.  
25 What exactly is this telling us?



1       A. A CBL is run most usually -- when you  
2       have a production casing you run a CBL. A CBL  
3       would have been run on this well. Some day in  
4       the future when we bring another rig out to do  
5       the completion you would run a cement bond log  
6       to find out if the cement across the  
7       productive interval had enough integrity to  
8       warrant perforating the casing during the  
9       completion and allowing this well to flow back  
10      to a platform. If that cement bond log in the  
11      future showed that there was poor cement you  
12      would do a remedial cement job because you  
13      have to have a good cement job for a  
14      production. So, that cement bond log is an  
15      evaluation tool that is not always 100 percent  
16      right. There's many factors that can effect  
17      it's quality. It's not a quantitative tool.  
18      It does not tell you the exact percentage of  
19      cement at any given point. So, it's kind of  
20      like it's a tool in the engineering tool box  
21      that has to be used with a bit of caution.  
22      But if it shows there's no cement two or three  
23      years from now when we come to do the  
24      completion we will do a remedial cement job on  
25      that casing.



1 Q. And forgive me I don't know of this  
2 tool or it's purpose and I was just kind of  
3 trying to relate it to perhaps a weld  
4 procedure. When there's a bonding moment  
5 between two plates we can no destructively  
6 test through non-particle or we could test  
7 radiography and then we can actually determine  
8 if a weld was in fact bonded and I didn't know  
9 if this was a tool similar to radiography  
10 where we could determine 'Wow, this cement job  
11 was good deal' and then move on.

12 A. I think if it's a really good cement  
13 job a cement bond log tells you it's a really  
14 good cement job. It doesn't -- it's not very  
15 good at telling you if it's less than a good  
16 cement job.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. It kind of is up to the experience of  
19 the people reading it, the conditions the tool  
20 was run in, how long the cement has had to  
21 cure.

22 Q. Okay. Thanks for the education.

23 CAPT NGUYEN:

24 Cameron?

25 COUNSEL REPRESENTING CAMERON, INC.:



1           No questions.

2           CAPT NGUYEN:

3           Thank you. Halliburton?

4           MR. GODWIN:

5           Yes.

6           CAPT NGUYEN:

7           Yes, sir.

8           E X A M I N A T I O N

9           BY MR. GODWIN:

10          Q. Good morning, Mr. Hafle.

11          A. Good morning.

12          Q. My name is Don Godwin. I represent  
13 Halliburton. We've never spoken before have  
14 we, sir?

15          A. No, sir.

16          Q. Let me clarify something if I can. The  
17 decision about running the cement bond log was  
18 not a decision that Halliburton was involved  
19 in, was it?

20          A. Halliburton does not direct what  
21 logging tools we run on a well. They can make  
22 recommendations.

23          Q. Right. That was BP's decision as to  
24 whether or not to run a cement bond log,  
25 correct?



1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Thank you. And, sir, are you aware  
3 that Schlumberger actually had a crew out on  
4 the rig to run the cement bond log, are you  
5 not, sir?

6 A. I am not aware if that crew was on the  
7 rig.

8 Q. Okay, sir. In terms of the  
9 centralizers, let me go back there again. You  
10 talked about that.

11 A. I have not talked about centralizers  
12 today, sir.

13 Q. Okay. Sir, well let me talk with you a  
14 little bit about it briefly if I might please.  
15 You said -- you talked about gas flow  
16 pressures and you mentioned that Jessie  
17 Gagliano knew about the gas flow pressures in  
18 the well, did you not?

19 A. I have not talked about gas flow  
20 pressures today either.

21 Q. Okay, sir. Do you know Jessie  
22 Gagliano?

23 A. I do.

24 Q. Okay, sir. Are you aware that Jessie  
25 Gagliano and others at Halliburton designed a



1 plan with regard to the cement job?

2 A. Jessie Gagliano was the primary desk  
3 engineer for Halliburton that did the model  
4 runs, yes.

5 Q. Alright, sir. And are you aware that  
6 Halliburton recommended 21 centralizers be  
7 used in this well?

8 A. I'm aware that the final model that was  
9 agreed upon had perhaps 21 centralizers. I  
10 can't remember the exact number, but it was in  
11 that ballpark.

12 Q. Okay. Halliburton recommended the use  
13 of 21 centralizers, how many centralizers were  
14 actually in the well at the time that it blew  
15 out?

16 A. To be honest I'm not sure how many  
17 centralizers they ran.

18 Q. Are you aware that that number was 6?

19 A. I've heard various discussions that  
20 that is the case, yes.

21 Q. Thank you, sir.

22 MR. GODWIN:

23 Nothing further, Captain.

24 CAPT NGUYEN:

25 Thank you, sir. M-I SWACO?



1 COUNSEL REPRESENTING M-I SWACO:

2 No questions.

3 CAPT NGUYEN:

4 Yes, sir. Dril-Quip?

5 MR. KAPLAN:

6 Just a few questions, Captain.

7 CAPT NGUYEN:

8 Yes, sir.

9 E X A M I N A T I O N

10 BY MR. KAPLAN:

11 Q. Good morning, sir.

12 A. Morning.

13 Q. My name is Lee Kaplan. I represent  
14 Dril-Quip. Do you know what a lock down  
15 sleeve is?

16 A. I'm familiar with it, but I've never  
17 run one.

18 Q. Do you know what it does?

19 A. It's part of the equipment that gets  
20 run in the well prior to doing a tree  
21 installation for completions.

22 Q. Do you know how it works in conjunction  
23 with the casing hanger and the seal assembly?

24 A. Not the details of that equipment, no.

25 Q. Do you know if a lock down sleeve was



1 part of the design for this well?

2 A. It was.

3 Q. And do you know if it had been  
4 installed at the time of the accident?

5 A. It had not been installed.

6 Q. Thank you. No further questions.

7 MR. KAPLAN:

8 Thank you, Captain.

9 CAPT NGUYEN:

10 Yes, sir. Thank you. Weatherford?

11 COUNSEL REPRESENTING WEATHERFORD,

12 INC.:

13 No thank you, Captain.

14 CAPT NGUYEN:

15 Yes, sir. Anadarko?

16 COUNSEL REPRESENTING ANADARKO

17 PETROLEUM CORPORATION:

18 No questions, Captain.

19 CAPT NGUYEN:

20 Yes, sir. MOEX?

21 COUNSEL REPRESENTING MOEX USA:

22 (No response.)

23 CAPT NGUYEN:

24 Douglas Brown?

25 MR. SEELY:



1 No questions.

2 CAPT NGUYEN:

3 Okay, thank you. Any additional  
4 questions from the board?

5 E X A M I N A T I O N

6 BY MR. DYKES:

7 Q. Mr. Hafle, in general terms back to the  
8 centralizers, who makes the final decision on  
9 deviations and changes to that well design?

10 A. It's a team decision on engineering  
11 decisions. We make recommendations and people  
12 sign off on that, approve those design  
13 changes.

14 Q. Okay. But I guess my question is: It's  
15 a group of you? It's a team?

16 A. I would say it's always not -- it's  
17 usually not a single person making a decision  
18 for a change on a well of this magnitude.  
19 Ultimately there is a top signature, but on  
20 this procedure here, for instance, there's  
21 three approvals.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. There's not a top approval. If you  
24 look at the org chart I guess you could say  
25 the highest ranking BP official would be the



1 top approver of that change.

2 Q. Who would be looking at the daily  
3 drilling reports, either the IADC reports or  
4 the BP daily reports to make sure that the  
5 well is going as planned according to the  
6 procedures?

7 A. There'd be fifteen or twenty people  
8 that would be looking at that report.

9 Q. So, who would have the ultimate  
10 decision in when you removed certain things or  
11 add certain things, such as centralizers,  
12 where you reduce it from 21 down to 6?

13 A. I'm not sure who would have the  
14 ultimate. It depends on at the time who  
15 decided that a change was required. I'm not  
16 sure why a change was required. I mean  
17 somebody made that determination. I don't  
18 believe it was made by a single person, but I  
19 really don't have the facts as to who made  
20 that decision that day.

21 Q. Okay, thank you.

22 A. Yep.

23 MR. McCARROLL:

24 Can I do a follow up on the --

25 EXAMINATION



1 BY MR. McCARROLL:

2 Q. And I don't want to stay on this bond  
3 log too long, but I think it is a critical  
4 part of the decision making here as to why the  
5 well blew out. So, I would like to just go  
6 back over it just briefly. You stated that  
7 you would run a cement bond log or a  
8 temperature log as part of the evaluation of  
9 perforation and producing the well; is that  
10 correct?

11 A. I've never run a cement bond log  
12 personally for that purpose, but I know that  
13 cement bond logs are used to evaluate the  
14 production casing cement prior to doing the  
15 perforating completion, yes.

16 Q. I thought your testimony was that you  
17 were planning to run one in the future before  
18 you completed the --

19 A. Someone that's going to complete this  
20 well will run a bond long on this well in the  
21 future.

22 Q. That wasn't your testimony that you  
23 were planning to --

24 A. Not me personally. I will not be  
25 involved in the completion of this well



1 because I'm in the exploration drilling  
2 department.

3 Q. Okay. Let me get to my question and  
4 maybe you can help me with this: If you're  
5 going to run a temperature bond log before you  
6 produce a well, wouldn't you also want to run  
7 a temperature bond log to make sure it's safe  
8 to leave the well in the current condition?

9 A. No, sir. We have never done that.  
10 We've suspended hundreds and hundreds of  
11 wells. Every operator in the Gulf of Mexico  
12 does that without running a bond log.

13 Q. Even in a well that had a severe loss  
14 return zone that, by your own testimony, took  
15 3,000 barrels of mud and you had to pump loss  
16 returns material so you had a severe condition  
17 here, you had a very technical cement job with  
18 nitrogen, which I don't think is a standard  
19 cement design for production casing. So, you  
20 had some clues here that you may have a  
21 cementing problem and to me to be safe as an  
22 operator you should then take some steps to  
23 make sure it's safe to leave the well in that  
24 condition. Do you feel like BP did that?

25 MR. LANSDEN:



1 I'm going to object. You've  
2 included a whole -- with all due  
3 respect, your own facts, your own  
4 testimony. He's given facts, he's  
5 given facts, he's come here  
6 today --  
7 MR. McCARROLL:  
8 I'm asking for his conclusion.  
9 MR. LANSDEN:  
10 Well, I think you've --  
11 MR. McCARROLL:  
12 His recommendation as a drilling  
13 engineer for the rig.  
14 MR. LANSDEN:  
15 You've added so many things and  
16 it's so convoluted I don't think he can  
17 answer it. If you want to ask the  
18 question by steps I will ask him to  
19 answer it. We want to cooperate, but I  
20 think your question is just over broad  
21 asking for conclusions on which he  
22 hasn't testified on this entire basis  
23 for answering. Could you break it down  
24 a little bit?  
25 MR. McCARROLL:



1 I'll withdraw the question. Thank  
2 you.

3 MR. LANSDEN:

4 Thank you.

5 CAPT NGUYEN:

6 Mr. Hafle, thank you very much for  
7 being here.

8 THE WITNESS:

9 Thank you.

10 CAPT NGUYEN:

11 Are there any questions that we  
12 didn't ask or any information with  
13 relevance to the investigation that you  
14 think we should know?

15 THE WITNESS:

16 I'm sure the gentleman from  
17 Transocean will have additional  
18 questions, but I have nothing. I have  
19 nothing to add.

20 CAPT NGUYEN:

21 Okay. If we need you to come back  
22 to -- if we need some additional  
23 information, will you make yourself  
24 available to the board?

25 THE WITNESS:



1 I'm fully available. Yes, sir.

2 CAPT NGUYEN:

3 Yes, sir. Thank you very much.

4 THE WITNESS:

5 Thank you.

6 CAPT NGUYEN:

7 You are dismissed. We will take a  
8 break. We will resume at 9:45. Thank  
9 you.

10 (Whereupon, a short break was taken off the  
11 record.)

12 CAPT NGUYEN:

13 The board will now call on Mr.

14 Christopher Pleasant with Transocean.

15 Mr. Pleasant, please rise and raise  
16 your right hand so I can put you under  
17 oath.

18 MR. PLEASANT:

19 (Witness complies.)

20 \* \* \* \* \*

21 CHRISTOPHER PLEASANT,

22 after being first duly sworn in the cause,

23 testified as follows:

24 CAPT NGUYEN:

25 Thank you, sir, for being here.



1           Please be seated.

2           THE WITNESS:

3           (Witness complies.)

4           E X A M I N A T I O N

5           BY MR. MATHEWS:

6           Q. Mr. Pleasant, before we begin are you  
7 being represented by Transocean?

8           A. Yes, sir.

9           Q. For the record, can you please state --

10          MR. KOHNKE:

11                 Just to be clear. I'm representing  
12 Transocean. I'm not representing Mr.  
13 Pleasant.

14          THE WITNESS:

15                 That's correct.

16          MR. MATHEWS:

17                 Thank you. Sorry, thank you.

18          CAPT NGUYEN:

19                 Mr. Pleasant, do you wish to have  
20 Transocean's counsel to sit next to you  
21 or --

22          THE WITNESS:

23                 Yes, I do.

24          CAPT NGUYEN:

25                 Okay.



1 BY MR. MATHEWS:

2 Q. For the record, can you please state  
3 your full name and spell your last?

4 A. Christopher Bernard Pleasant.

5 Q. Is your microphone on, sir?

6 A. Christopher Bernard Pleasant,

7 P-L-E-A-S-A-N-T.

8 Q. By whom are you employed, sir?

9 A. Transocean.

10 Q. And what position do you hold with  
11 them?

12 A. Subsea supervisor.

13 Q. And how long have you been the subsea  
14 supervisor?

15 A. Approximately three years.

16 Q. And, prior to being a subsea  
17 supervisor, was there any other positions that  
18 you held?

19 A. Yes, sir. I started at the bottom and  
20 I worked my way up from a roustabout. I  
21 worked floors, shakerhand, mud pits.

22 Q. And how long have you been with  
23 Transocean?

24 A. Approximately ten years.

25 Q. Did you stay on site after the incident



1 in well control response with the BOP stack?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. For how long did you stay out there?

4 A. We came in Friday evening.

5 Q. Were you able to identify any problems  
6 with the stack after the incident?

7 A. No, sir.

8 Q. Have you been contacted by the  
9 Transocean investigation team concerning the  
10 BOP stack?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Can you please tell me what your  
13 educational background is?

14 A. I graduated from high school. I got a  
15 year and a half of college.

16 Q. Did you have any well control training  
17 when you were with Transocean?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. And can you please elaborate on what  
20 you were taught in well control training?

21 A. Yes, sir. I went -- we was taught by  
22 foremans, you know, how to determine pressure  
23 gradients, mud weight, you know, different  
24 stuff like how long it takes to circulate  
25 different things around.



1 Q. Can you please briefly inform the board  
2 what your job responsibilities were as a  
3 subsea supervisor?

4 A. Yes, sir. As a subsea supervisor my  
5 main duties are, you know, well control.  
6 While the BOPs are deployed on the sea floor,  
7 you know, we do PMs, preventive maintenance,  
8 on all our surface equipment.

9 Q. And "PM" you mean preventative  
10 maintenance?

11 A. Preventative maintenance.

12 Q. Yes, sir. How long had you been on  
13 your hitch prior to the incident, sir?

14 A. I arrived April the 20th.

15 Q. So, you arrived the day of the  
16 incident?

17 A. The day of the incident.

18 Q. Were you on the rig the day that the  
19 BOP was splashed?

20 A. Yes, I was.

21 Q. Was there any leaks on that BOP before  
22 it was splashed?

23 A. None.

24 Q. Were you aware of any problems on the  
25 DEEPWATER HORIZON well prior to the incident?



1 A. Could you say that again?

2 Q. Were you aware of any problems on the  
3 DEEPWATER HORIZON well at the time of the  
4 incident?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Did you participate in any daily  
7 meetings with the management, the OIM or  
8 Transocean or BP company men?

9 A. Yes, yes. I go to the meetings.

10 Q. Did they discuss any problems with loss  
11 returns or kicks or anything else the day of  
12 the incident?

13 A. The day of the incident?

14 Q. I'm sorry, what was that?

15 A. You said the day of the incident?

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. Well, I arrived on the rig that day.

18 And the first thing I do is go to sleep. I

19 don't work. I work nights.

20 Q. Okay. Well, let's take a step back.  
21 Can you please tell me from the time you  
22 arrived on the rig on the 20th what happened up  
23 until the time of the incident?

24 A. Yes, I can.

25 Q. Can you?



1 A. I arrived on the rig approximately  
2 11:00, 11:00 a.m. I went to bed. I woke up  
3 around 5:00 p.m. I got dressed, went to eat.  
4 Approximately 5:30, you know, I went outside,  
5 made some rounds to the rig floor.

6 Q. Did you have a pre-tour meeting?

7 A. No, sir. Pre-tour meetings are, you  
8 know, noon to midnight, midnight to noon.

9 Q. Okay. And after 5:30 what happened?

10 A. I made relief at 5:30 in the drill  
11 shack. And basically, you know, I was talking  
12 to my supervisor which is Mark Hay. And he  
13 was explaining to me that they had just  
14 finished a negative test. During the negative  
15 test they felt like they lost approximately 60  
16 barrels of mud through the annular. They  
17 increased the regulator pressure to 1900 and  
18 it stopped leaking. Wyman at the same time,  
19 you know, Wyman Wheeler, which is the  
20 toolpusher, he's talking to Bob Kaluza, which  
21 is a BP company man, and Wyman is convincing  
22 them that -- they were saying that it was U-  
23 tubing and Bob Kaluza and then was saying it  
24 was U-tubing and Wyman was convinced that  
25 something wasn't right. He left. He went



1 outside. By that time Wyman worked 6:00 a.m.  
2 to 6:00 p.m. By that time his relief comes  
3 up, which is Jason Anderson, which is a  
4 toolpusher as well. So, you know, just  
5 listening to them talk, you know, Jason he was  
6 telling Wyman the same thing that -- that it  
7 U-tubed. And Wyman, you know, he was still  
8 like he couldn't believe that it U-tubed back  
9 out the hole, you know. But, you know, I  
10 guess we never really had a clear  
11 understanding where the fluid went to. But  
12 now it's approximately ten minutes till 6:00.  
13 Bob Kaluza, the BP company man, tells Jason  
14 Anderson "We're at an all stop." He said "Don  
15 Vidrine is coming on at 6:00 p.m." and that he  
16 was going to discuss with Don what was going  
17 on. So, Bob leaves, you know, Jason and  
18 Wyman's still talking. I really wasn't paying  
19 any more attention to them about it because I  
20 was still talking to Mark about the upcoming  
21 rig move that we was planning for the next  
22 couple of days ahead. Anyway, Bob comes back  
23 up to the rig floor and he tells Jason that  
24 this is the way Don wants to do it. I really  
25 don't know what way Don wanted to do it. Don



1 is the BP company man, but -- so Jason says  
2 "No, we need to do it the way" -- Jason  
3 Anderson said "We need to do it the way Murray  
4 Sapalvado (phonetic) does it."  
5 Q. I'm sorry, who is Murray?  
6 A. Murray is a BP company man.  
7 Q. And was he supposed to be on the rig  
8 that day or was he not?  
9 A. No. He -- he wasn't on the rig that  
10 day, but his procedure worked better than any  
11 other procedure. So, you know, he was just  
12 telling that's the way that he wanted to do  
13 it. Well, anyway Bob tells Don -- Bob tells  
14 Jason "No, Don's going to be on tour. We're  
15 going to have to do it the way Don wants to do  
16 it." So, probably five minutes after 6:00 or  
17 something Don comes to the rig floor, him and  
18 Bob talks back and forth for approximately a  
19 good hour. Don asking Bob 'Did you do this',  
20 you know, 'This and that' and, you know, the  
21 only thing that I really gathered out of it is  
22 that Bob Kaluza he wanted to do it according  
23 to the APD. And so Don, Don the company man,  
24 he told him "No, we're going to do something  
25 else." So, him and Jason went on -- went on



1 talking and finally Don told Jason "We're  
2 going to do it the way Murray wants to do it."  
3 And so Don tells Bob to go call their boss in  
4 Houston and tell him we're going to do a  
5 second negative test. Okay. So, Bob goes to  
6 do it, he comes back to the rig floor. Don  
7 says "Bob, what are you doing here?" And he  
8 said "You've go to --" You know, they was  
9 short changed. He said "Go to bed, you've got  
10 to get up." And whoever his supervisor was  
11 said "No, he told me to come back and stay  
12 with you for the negative test. He wanted  
13 both of us up here." So, we performed the  
14 negative test. During the negative test we  
15 didn't see any -- anything flow back. So,  
16 after the negative test, Don told Bob "To go  
17 call the office. Tell them we're going to  
18 displace the well." Bob said "Okay." So,  
19 Jason Anderson we got everybody back together  
20 for displacing to have a pre-job meeting on  
21 it. Just before we started displacing Jason  
22 asked me he said "Chris" -- he said "Can I put  
23 1,000 PSI on the annular before you open it?"  
24 I said "No, man." I said "We can't open it --  
25 can't put no pressure on that and open it up."



1 So, he said "Alright." He said "Let me get  
2 one or two strokes on it." I said "I can go  
3 for that. I'll give you one or two strokes."  
4 Well, after everything got lined up and Don  
5 said we was ready to go and start displacing  
6 the well and everybody got into position, we  
7 started displacing the well to sea water. As  
8 they was displacing the well to sea water, you  
9 know, it took 9600 strokes and for the mud  
10 weight we had in there the KIPs was like 17 --  
11 17 -- approximately 1750 and my job was to  
12 bring the KIPs down to sea water where we  
13 don't have over pull on the well head to  
14 compensate for that. So, you know, every  
15 quarter I would vent off the tensions in the  
16 moon pool. So, we got the strokes. Like I  
17 said, 9600 we got all the strokes just like we  
18 were supposed to. And it was 9:10. I looked  
19 at my watch, it was 9:10 when I left the rig  
20 floor. And I told Jason I said "Jason, I'm  
21 done." I said "I need to go work on the BOP  
22 crane and get it ready and inspect it to pick  
23 up the BOPs before -- before, you know, we  
24 unlatch." He said "Okay." He said "You got  
25 your tensions where they need to be?" I said



1 "Everything is perfect." He said "Alright.  
2 Well, you can leave the well." The next ten  
3 to fifteen minutes I spent in the moon pool,  
4 you know, inspecting everything, venting off  
5 tensions because them valves never get work.  
6 Sometimes they don't close all the way or  
7 whatever. So, you know, I go check all my  
8 fluid levels and at the process I go in the  
9 CCU and check all my regulators out. The  
10 lower annular was at 1900. I dropped it back  
11 to 1500, you know, back to 1500 PSI is normal  
12 operating pressure. Alright. So, I get all  
13 that done, I go up to the BOP house, that's  
14 where the BOP crane at for picking up the BOP  
15 stack. And I'm writing a pump card for this  
16 next job that I'm about to do to inspect it.  
17 And at that time I heard Jimmy Harrell, the  
18 OIM, page the deck foreman. And I said "Man,  
19 what he still doing up?" And I thought about  
20 it I said "I need to -- That evening Mark told  
21 me to get the charts for the casing test, take  
22 them and get them typed up and signed. So,  
23 after I heard him up I goes to my office, type  
24 up the paperwork, I took it to Jimmy Harrell,  
25 OIM, he was in his office talking to the deck



1 foreman, Dennis Martinez --

2 Q. And what time was that?

3 A. What time was this here?

4 Q. Yes, sir. Around?

5 A. Probably around approximately 9:30.

6 So, I'm talking to Jimmy. You know, I talked  
7 to him five or ten minutes. And, you know, he  
8 was asking me about the upcoming rig move and  
9 how long it was going to take to change the  
10 tension valve. So, you know, we chit chatted  
11 about the rig move. So, I had his signature.  
12 So, I went to the company man's office, he  
13 wasn't in there. I went to the bathroom, come  
14 out, I finished in the bathroom, I come back  
15 to the company man's office. He wasn't in  
16 there again. So, I went back to my office  
17 and, as I sat down in my -- in my chair in the  
18 office to save all the paperwork to the  
19 computer to the folder. I had an AD sitting  
20 next to me. He was in the chair and he was  
21 looking at TV and he was flipping through the  
22 channels. He said "Chris, what's that water?"  
23 I said "They're probably coming out the hole."  
24 Normally when you got water in there, you  
25 know, and you break a joint water comes out.



1 I said "They're probably coming out the hole  
2 probably. A minute later Boogie said "I see  
3 mud", so I picked up the phone in my office, I  
4 called the rig floor, no answer. I called all  
5 three lines, I got no answer. I see Buddy  
6 Trahan right there at my door he said "What's  
7 going on?" I said "I don't know." I said "We  
8 got to go." I took off running trying to get  
9 to the -- go through the moon pool to check my  
10 packer down there to make sure it was alright,  
11 you know, and everything and, when I got in  
12 the hallway, I seen the electrician, Chad  
13 Murray, and Chad said "Don't go that way." He  
14 said "Something bad just happened in there."  
15 I said "What?" He never said what happened,  
16 so I didn't go that way. So, I ran back up top  
17 to the main deck, which is a starboard forward  
18 trying to get to the rig floor and that's  
19 where I saw the fire. At the same time I saw  
20 Dave, Dave Young, the chief mate. He asked  
21 me, he said "Send me some help." Well, he  
22 asked me, he said "I need some help." I said  
23 "I can send you some help." I said "I got to  
24 go." I ran instantly to the bridge, I was  
25 coming through the door on the bridge. I said



1 "I'm EDSing." And captain -- the captain told  
2 me he said "Calm down, we're not EDSing." I  
3 go to the panel, Don the company man is  
4 standing by the panel. He said "They got the  
5 well shut in." I said "Yeah, the lower  
6 annular closed, the vertical closed and I had  
7 alarms going off, lower accumulator alarm",  
8 you know, just alarms flashing. But I said  
9 "I'm getting off here." And Don said "Yeah,  
10 hit the button." You know, I hit the EDS and  
11 everything in the panel did like it was  
12 supposed to at the panel, but it never left  
13 the panel. You know, I had no hydraulics and  
14 at the same time, you know, the captain he's  
15 over in another area and I heard him ask Daun  
16 Winslow "Could we EDS?" And Daun said "Yeah."  
17 Daun said "You hadn't already?" And the  
18 captain come back over to me not knowing that  
19 I already had hit the button and said "We can  
20 EDS." I said "I already did." And I looked  
21 at Steve Bertone, I said "Steve Bertone, I  
22 need Mark Hay", which is my supervisor. Steve  
23 said "Do you really need him?" I said "No,  
24 there's nothing he can do." I mean, you know,  
25 after I hit it and so, you know, we stood



1 around, you know, and eventually the captain  
2 said "Abandon ship", you know, and that's when  
3 I went to a lifeboat.

4 Q. On the EDS control panel you said that  
5 everything looked normal on it?

6 A. When I hit the button --

7 Q. Outside the hydraulic --

8 A. Yes, it went through the sequence at  
9 the panel.

10 Q. Was this before or after the  
11 explosions?

12 A. It's after the explosions.

13 Q. Okay. Can you please, just to get some  
14 -- you said that the captain said "Calm down.  
15 We're not EDSing." Can you please give me  
16 some type of policies or anything where you're  
17 addressed and what authorities you have in  
18 activating the emergency disconnect system?

19 A. Well, I am the authority.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. It's my equipment. You know, you know,  
22 in a normal circumstance the captain, you  
23 know, in a watch circle he can say "No."

24 Q. Right.

25 A. You know, we got different watch



1 circles out there, you know, if you're in EDS-  
2 1 or EDS--2. But, as far as authority, I am  
3 the authority.

4 Q. And how much time had elapsed after the  
5 explosions that the captain had told you "Calm  
6 down. Don't activate the EDS"?

7 A. I would say probably five minutes.

8 Q. To your knowledge is there any policy  
9 within Transocean to lock out any portion of  
10 the BOP stack at any time in the well?

11 A. Yes, you can lock out different things,  
12 but you've got to have approval through MMS.  
13 I mean you got to submit a form to them to  
14 lock out something. And they have to agree on  
15 it.

16 Q. Were you aware of any time during this  
17 well that the BOP stack was locked out --

18 A. No.

19 Q. -- or bypassed?

20 A. It was never locked out during this  
21 well.

22 Q. Do you know if the dead man or auto  
23 shear can be disabled?

24 A. Yes, it can be disabled. You've got an  
25 arm and a disarm.



1 Q. Okay. Was it disabled?

2 A. No, it was armed.

3 Q. Earlier you said you were there when  
4 they splashed the BOP stack and I just want to  
5 make sure that there was no leaks on the  
6 accumulator system at that time.

7 A. We had no leaks what so ever when we  
8 splashed -- splashed it.

9 Q. Are you familiar with the logic  
10 associated with a BOP stack --

11 A. Don't understand the question.

12 Q. The logic that's entailed in the BOP  
13 from the rig to activate certain things when  
14 you hit certain buttons and do certain  
15 electronics from the rig. There's a logic  
16 entailed in the BOP stack that tells the stack  
17 to do something, close it's shears --

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. -- and it's rams. Do you know if there  
20 was any modifications to the logic of that  
21 stack?

22 MR. KOHNKE:

23 Do you understand "Logic", do you  
24 understand that term?

25 BY MR. MATHEWS:



1 Q. The electronic logic.

2 A. Yeah. I don't know.

3 Q. Okay, thank you. At any time did  
4 Cameron come to the rig and pull the BOP stack  
5 or look at the BOP stack or inspect it?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And what did that -- what did they do  
8 when they come to the rig normally?

9 A. Well, I mean they come to the rig for  
10 different problems. You know, like if we had  
11 something we deemed them necessary to come out  
12 for, you know, we'll get them out. You know,  
13 they didn't come out for every rig move. Just  
14 -- just when we had a problem.

15 Q. To your knowledge or recollection I  
16 know you arrived on the 20th. Did Cameron come  
17 up in your previous hitch to the rig for any  
18 BOP issues?

19 A. No, sir. We -- no, they didn't.

20 Q. Were your responsibility -- earlier you  
21 said you had the preventative maintenance on  
22 the BOP stack and the equipment associated  
23 with it. Can you please tell me what you did?  
24 Did you inspect certain components or the  
25 functions of the stack?



1 A. Well, I mean, as far as the components  
2 of the stack, you can't inspect them until you  
3 have them back on the surface. I mean you got  
4 like your HPU pumps --

5 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

6 A. -- you know, stuff like -- you inspect  
7 that. You do a little PMs, change your oil  
8 out, you know, greasing everything up, your  
9 BOP crane, just checking your cables make sure  
10 you don't see any burs or anything in them.

11 Q. Okay. Are you familiar with API Spec-  
12 16D?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Do you know if that stack by chance was  
15 certified through the API Spec-16D process?

16 A. No, 'cause I'm not familiar with it.

17 Q. Okay. Are you familiar with the BOP  
18 assurance analysis on the DEEPWATER HORIZON  
19 stack?

20 A. Don't understand the question.

21 Q. There was a study done by RB Falcon  
22 back in 2001 on the BOP assurance of that  
23 stack. They did some analysis on BOP  
24 assurance, are you familiar with that study?

25 A. No, sir.



1 Q. Is that copy on the rig?

2 A. I'm not familiar with it.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. I mean I never seen it.

5 Q. Just for the -- saying if the hazards  
6 identified in this hazard analysis it said  
7 that "This report should be issued to the rig  
8 so that all individuals responsible for  
9 running the BOP can be reminded of the hazards  
10 and critical steps associated with running the  
11 BOP", are you not familiar with this document?

12 A. I'm not familiar with it.

13 MR. KOHNKE:

14 What is it?

15 MR. MATHEWS:

16 I'll come walk it over there.

17 THE WITNESS:

18 Okay.

19 MR. LINSIN:

20 Captain, can I ask that Mr. Mathews  
21 to identify the document he's reading  
22 from?

23 MR. MATHEWS:

24 RB Falcon DEEPWATER HORIZON BOP  
25 assurance analysis.



1 MR. LINSIN:

2 Is there a Bates number, sir?

3 MR. MATHEWS:

4 Transocean it's a document

5 submitted under then TRN-HCEC--

6 0016648.

7 MR. LINSIN:

8 Thank you.

9 BY MR. MATHEWS:

10 Q. Are you familiar with that, sir?

11 A. I've never seen this document before.

12 Q. Okay, thank you. Had you ever in your  
13 career with Transocean been involved with a  
14 subsea well intervention?

15 A. No, sir.

16 Q. Earlier in your testimony you had  
17 discussed that you had been contacted by the  
18 Transocean investigation team on this  
19 incident. Had there been any type of  
20 information transferred of any problems with  
21 that stack to that team?

22 A. Investigation team basically asked me  
23 just what you asked me.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. I mean that's the only investigation



1 I've been through.

2 Q. Okay. Thanks a lot, sir.

3 E X A M I N A T I O N

4 BY MR. McCARROLL:

5 Q. I just have a couple follow up  
6 questions. I know it may be difficult to go  
7 back through this process, but could you just  
8 go back briefly to where the event started and  
9 maybe give us a little bit slower account of  
10 what happened?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Because I got lost in a little bit of  
13 what were telling me there. So, I just want  
14 to go back over it again.

15 A. Yes, sir. That's no problem.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 A. At approximately 5:30 I was on the rig  
18 floor. When I walked into the drill shack,  
19 you know, I seen my relief over there, Mark  
20 Hay, and I went to talk to him. At the same  
21 time Wyman and Bob Kaluza was talking about  
22 the negative test, this is the first negative  
23 test. And Wyman was convinced that we lost 60  
24 barrels of mud through an annular. They  
25 bumped the annular up to 1900, they wasn't



1 losing any mud. Then --

2 Q. So, that's the pressure to keep the  
3 annular closed? I don't mean to interrupt  
4 you, but I just want to make sure I  
5 understand.

6 A. Well, it takes 1500 PSI. Normal  
7 operating pressure's 1500 PSI.

8 Q. To keep the annular closed?

9 A. Or open.

10 Q. Or open, right.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Okay. So, you increase the pressure to  
13 keep the annular closed; is that what you're  
14 saying?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you. Would you continue?

17 A. You said that we increased the  
18 pressures to keep it -- it was closed at 1500.

19 Q. Oh, okay. But you increased the  
20 pressure more, is that what you did?

21 A. They just increased the pressure more.

22 Q. Okay, alright. A little bit more.

23 A. Yeah. But not to keep it closed. It  
24 was already closed.

25 Q. It was already closed?



1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. Just preventing mud from getting lost?

3 A. In one theory.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. You know, everybody didn't have the  
6 same theory --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- that that's where the mud went to.

9 Q. So, that's what they tried?

10 A. That's what they tried.

11 Q. Okay, alright. Thank you.

12 A. And after that, you know, Bob Kaluza,  
13 you know, he said he was going to talk to Don,  
14 the BP company man, Don Vidrine. And he come  
15 back to the rig floor and, you know, he  
16 telling Jason. And Jason convinced -- Jason  
17 Anderson he's convinced that we didn't lose no  
18 mud through the annular. He said U-tube.  
19 Where that U-tube's at, I don't know. But  
20 anyway Jason is telling Bob that "We want to  
21 do this negative test the way Ronnie Sapalvado  
22 does it." And Bobs tells Jason "No, we're  
23 going to do it the way Don want to do it."  
24 Because --

25 Q. Sir, can I ask you one question: Is



1       there a difference in that one person test  
2       down the string that's running the hole and  
3       the other one tests on the kill line? Is that  
4       the difference?

5       A. It's really not my area of expertise --

6       Q. Okay.

7       A. -- of how they do it. I just know what  
8       I heard, you know.

9       Q. Okay, thank you.

10      A. So, I don't even know where I was at.

11      Q. They were discussing -- I don't want to  
12      say arguing, they were discussing how they  
13      were going to do the kill the negative test.

14      They had two different opinions.

15      A. Yeah, they had two different opinions  
16      about the negative test.

17      Q. Right, right.

18      A. That was going on. Well, anyway Don is  
19      up there now and he's talking to Bob for about  
20      an hour, you know. You know, at the same  
21      time, you know, he's discussing it, you know,  
22      he's getting aggravated about the negative  
23      test, as well. Don is.

24      Q. Okay.

25      A. Because he said "You should have did



1 this, you should have did that." And Bob said

2 "I want to do it according to APD."

3 Q. Right.

4 A. So -- well, anyway, Don and Jason talks

5 and they finally come up that they was going

6 to do it the way Murray wants to do it.

7 Q. And Murray is who?

8 A. BP company man.

9 Q. Oh, okay. Thank you.

10 A. And so Don tells Bob to go call the

11 office, their supervisor, and tell them we're

12 doing another negative test. It's

13 approximately 10 after 7:00 or right in there.

14 And so lined up, we do another negative test.

15 We had no flow whatsoever. You know, in the

16 process Bob shows back up to the rig floor and

17 Don asks him what is he doing up, coming back

18 up. 'Cause they're making a short change.

19 One of them was going home.

20 Q. And a short change is he's coming back

21 at 2 o'clock and relieving John?

22 A. Yeah. One of them was going home the

23 next morning.

24 Q. Right.

25 A. I don't know which one.



1 Q. So, he didn't have much -- he wasn't  
2 going to get much rest if he's up there on the  
3 rig floor?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Okay, thank you.

6 A. And -- well, anyway, Bob tells him that  
7 whoever their boss was said for both of them  
8 to be up there for the negative test. So --  
9 and that's what we did. Well, after the  
10 negative test Don told Bob to call the office  
11 and tell them we continue on displacing the  
12 well, that he was satisfied with the negative  
13 test and we had a pre-job meeting. We line up  
14 to displaced the well to the sea water.

15 Q. Do you know where they were displacing  
16 the well to, to the pits or to the boat or you  
17 don't know?

18 A. Well, when you're displacing the well,  
19 there's no way you can displace the well to  
20 the boat. It has to come to the pits.

21 Q. Okay. Alright, thank you. So, y'all  
22 were displacing the well and you went back  
23 down to the CC Shack, is that what you call  
24 it?

25 A. No, sir. As we're displacing the well



1 I'm on the rig floor.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. I'm on the rig floor compensating my  
4 tensioners, my over pull on the well head.

5 Q. Alright.

6 A. Once we finished that job I looked at  
7 my watch -- I look at my watch it's 9:10. And  
8 I told Jason I said "I'm done." I said "I got  
9 to go work on the BOP crane to get it ready."  
10 Because, you know, there's some paperwork that  
11 we have to sign and send in that we inspected  
12 it before we can pick up the BOPs. And he  
13 said "That's fine." I went through the moon  
14 pool checking everything, all the valves  
15 that's on the tensioner skid. Because you  
16 never vent them off. Sometimes they don't  
17 close all the way.

18 Q. Right.

19 A. And, you know, you may have to just  
20 bump them just to get them closed. But,  
21 anyway, I did that. I went into the HPU room,  
22 looked at my pumps, I went into the CCU room  
23 and that's where I adjusted the regulator back  
24 to 1500 PSI.

25 Q. Could you explain what the CCU room is



1 for?

2 A. Just central control unit.

3 Q. Central control. Okay, thank you.

4 A. And I adjusted my regulators and then I

5 zeroed all my flow meters back to zero. I

6 finished that job. I went to the BOP house,

7 which is a flight of stairs up. I started

8 writing a pump card on inspecting the BOP

9 crane. At that time I heard Jimmy Harrell,

10 the OIM, page Dennis Martinez, the deck

11 foreman, to come to his office. And I said

12 "Well, I got to get this casing test signed."

13 I need to go get the casing test and type it.

14 So, I went and got the casing test, got it all

15 typed up, official paperwork for it, took it

16 to him. He signed it, we talked for about ten

17 minutes.

18 MR. MATHEWS:

19 Who is "He"?

20 THE WITNESS:

21 Jimmy Harrell.

22 BY MR. McCARROLL:

23 Q. So, Dennis Martinez is the deck

24 foreman?

25 A. That's correct.



1 Q. And that's who Jimmy Harrell was paging  
2 at the time?

3 A. That's correct. Dennis was in his  
4 office --

5 Q. Okay, thank you. Go ahead.

6 A. -- when I went there. So, you know, we  
7 chit chatted about the upcoming rig move. He  
8 asked me, he said "How long do you think it's  
9 going to take to change that tension out?"

10 You know, I said "A day and a half." He said  
11 "Well, that's 36 hours. That's what the paper  
12 says." I said "Yeah." I said "Well, I ain't  
13 looked at how many hours it was going to take.  
14 That's how long it's going to take a day and a  
15 half to change it." So, we talk about a few  
16 other things, you know, just about the rig  
17 move. So, I said "Well, Mr. Jimmy, I got to  
18 go." So, I went back to the company man's  
19 office --

20 MR. MATHEWS:

21 What time was that conversation?

22 THE WITNESS:

23 With Jimmy Harrell?

24 MR. MATHEWS:

25 Yes, sir.



1 THE WITNESS:

2 Roughly about 9:30.

3 BY MR. McCARROLL:

4 Q. When it started?

5 A. Who?

6 Q. 9:30 is when it started or ended?

7 A. I figure --

8 MR. MATHEWS:

9 Just for clarification --

10 THE WITNESS:

11 -- 9:30, 9:30 that's when it

12 started. You know, I stayed in there

13 about five or ten minutes.

14 MR. MATHEWS:

15 So, roughly to about -- your

16 conversation with Mr. Harrell could

17 have went from 9:30, 9:35 to 9:40?

18 THE WITNESS:

19 Yeah, something like that.

20 MR. MATHEWS:

21 Okay.

22 THE WITNESS:

23 Approximately.

24 BY MR. McCARROLL:

25 Q. Go ahead. Thank you.



1       A. I left his office, went down the  
2 hallway looking for Don Vidrine. He wasn't in  
3 his office. I went to the bathroom. Come  
4 back out the bathroom, go back into the  
5 company man's office, he's still not there.  
6 So, I go to my office because I still got it  
7 pulled up on my computer.

8       Q. And where's your office located? Next  
9 to Don's office?

10      A. Well, just right around the corner from  
11 Don's.

12      Q. Okay, alright.

13      A. And Jimmy's office is all the way on  
14 the other end of the hallway.

15      Q. Alright.

16      A. So, I just walk around the hallway back  
17 to my office. I sit at my desk, I started  
18 saving the casing test to the appropriate  
19 file.

20      Q. Yes, sir.

21      A. And at that time the AD, which was Alex  
22 Arrayo, (phonetic) was sitting next to me in a  
23 chair. He was watching TV and he was flipping  
24 channels. He said "Chris, what's that water?"

25      Q. What was he looking at at the time? Do



1 you know, the shaker house?

2 A. I don't know.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. You know, I never looked at it. You  
5 know, I was saving some document. He said  
6 "What's that water?" And I said "Man, they're  
7 probably coming out the hole." When you got  
8 water in it in the drill string --

9 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

10 A. -- and you break a joint you're going  
11 to get -- you know, you can't pump a slug in  
12 other words.

13 Q. You get flow back?

14 A. Yeah, the water is there because you  
15 can't slug it, slug the pipe.

16 Q. Right.

17 A. So, I said "They're probably coming out  
18 the hole, you know." And then probably like  
19 -- you know, man, just right away he's  
20 flipping through the channels he said "I see  
21 some mud now." I said "You see some mud?"  
22 So, I turned -- you know, I turned back and  
23 look at the TV because the TV is behind me.

24 Q. Right.

25 A. I turn back and you can see the rig



1 floor. So, I picked up the phone. Buddy  
2 Trahan is at my door now, you know, asking  
3 what's going on. I pick up the phone and I  
4 dial 2-1-1, 2-1-1-0 and 2-1-1-2 and nobody  
5 answered the phone. I said "Buddy, we got to  
6 go." We took off running. You know, I was  
7 going through the moon pool to see what was  
8 going on and --

9 Q. Was there any liquid or mud or anything  
10 in the moon pool?

11 A. I never made it to the moon pool.

12 Q. Oh, okay.

13 A. As I was trying to get into the moon  
14 pool I met the electrician, Chad Murray, and  
15 he says -- to get into the moon pool in the  
16 pump room, you know, the doors are right there  
17 together in the hallway. And Chad said "Man,  
18 I wouldn't go that way. Something bad just  
19 happened." I said "What?" He never said  
20 what. You know, so I take back off to the --  
21 take off running to the main deck up top. And  
22 that's where I saw the fire.

23 Q. Did you hear any explosions or noise in  
24 the process?

25 A. I heard popping, but to this day I



1 still can't remember the big boom that a lot  
2 of people heard. You know, I heard poppings,  
3 you know, I see ceilings and, you know, all  
4 that kind of stuff. But I never heard the big  
5 boom. You know, I don't know if my adrenalin  
6 was going or what.

7 Q. Yeah, I understand. Thank you. And  
8 from there you proceeded to the bridge; is  
9 that correct?

10 A. That's correct. Well, from there  
11 where?

12 Q. When you ran into Chad Murray --

13 A. No, when I ran into Chad Murray I ran  
14 back up to the deck trying to get to the rig  
15 floor. From there that's when I -- when I got  
16 on the main deck that's actually when I saw  
17 fire. And David Young was right there and he  
18 said "I need some help." I said "I can send  
19 you some help." And I ran to the bridge  
20 through the door and said that "I'm hitting  
21 EDS." As I said that the captain was right  
22 there. He said "No, calm down. We're not  
23 hitting EDS." He went one way, I went  
24 straight to the panel, to my panel over there  
25 and Don Vidrine was standing by the panel. He



1 said "They got the well shut in." I looked at  
2 it, the lower annular was closed, the diverter  
3 was closed and I had a lot of alarms going  
4 off, lower accumulator alarms and all that.  
5 And I said "Don, I'm getting off here." And  
6 Don said "Get off here." Approximately four  
7 or five minutes later, you know, the captain  
8 he told me to EDS. I said "I already hit it",  
9 you know.

10 Q. Thank you. I appreciate you repeating  
11 it for me.

12 EXAMINATION

13 BY MR. MATHEWS:

14 Q. I just have some follow up questions  
15 just to clear a time frame in my mind. You  
16 said that you had met with Jimmy Harrell  
17 around 9:30 to 9:40 sign off on some  
18 paperwork.

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. Did you see him after that?

21 A. No -- I saw him on the bridge.

22 Q. And how long after was it after he  
23 signed the paperwork that you saw him on the  
24 bridge?

25 A. I don't know.



1 Q. Ballpark, do you have any idea?

2 A. I mean it had to be approximately from  
3 9:40 to probably somewhere five minutes till  
4 10:00 or something.

5 Q. Okay. So, around ten or fifteen  
6 minutes probably?

7 A. Yeah, ten or fifteen minutes.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Approximately. I mean that's just a  
10 speculation, you know.

11 Q. Okay. I understand. I'm just asking  
12 for ballparks. I'm not trying to ask for  
13 exact times. When you were on the rig doing  
14 the stump test, what type of preventative  
15 maintenance did you do to the BOP stack prior  
16 to splashing it?

17 A. Prior to splashing?

18 Q. Yes, sir.

19 A. We changed out -- on a normal rig move  
20 we change out all the rubber goods and the  
21 BOPs, we check the pre-charge on all the  
22 bottles. You know, you have to adjust them  
23 for different water depths. We meg the ETs,  
24 they meg the cables. Make all of your  
25 electronic cables and make sure we're not



1 getting any water ingress in it. We --  
2 this rig move here we changed out all the half  
3 inch hoses on the BOP stack. The last rig  
4 move we made all new hoses and -- and tested  
5 them. You know, we change out all the  
6 gaskets, all the filters in the rigid conduit  
7 manifold. We -- I mean you just want to know  
8 everything?

9 Q. Well, I understand what you --

10 A. That's the biggest part of it.

11 Q. Is there any type of documentation or a  
12 check list that's done by you or anybody that  
13 you work with on that testing or whatever you  
14 repair preventative maintenance?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay. Are you familiar with the logic  
17 of the EDS system? Could -- the logic I was  
18 referring to earlier, the electronic systems  
19 that once you hit certain buttons on your  
20 control panel what happens?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Is there any way to manipulate the  
23 logic on the emergency disconnect system to  
24 delay a disconnect in case you accidentally  
25 hit the disconnect?



1 A. No, if you hit the button, that's what  
2 it does.

3 Q. Okay. Thank you.

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. DYKES:

7 Q. I've got a couple of follow ups. Could  
8 you explain on this BOP stack exactly how the  
9 auto shear functions?

10 A. The auto shear has got to be separation  
11 from the BOP from -- it's got to be -- the  
12 LMRP got to separate, it's got to lift off the  
13 stack.

14 Q. And then the auto shear takes over?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. And what does the auto shear function?

17 A. The blind shear ram.

18 Q. Just the blind shear?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. Now, could you explain to me  
21 exactly how the dead man system works?

22 A. Yes. The dead man system you've got to  
23 lose communication in both pods and the  
24 hydraulics.

25 Q. Communication with the rig or --



- 1 A. No, that's communications with the  
2 pods.
- 3 Q. Communication --
- 4 A. The pods got to lose communication.
- 5 Q. With the BOP stack?
- 6 A. That's correct, with the controls.
- 7 Q. With the controls?
- 8 A. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).
- 9 Q. So, the controls on the rig and the  
10 communication between the pods and the rig; is  
11 that what I'm understanding?
- 12 A. When you say "Rig" I mean I don't  
13 understand.
- 14 Q. Where the rig floor is, the HORIZON,  
15 the vessel. I mean the pods are located on  
16 the BOP stack, correct?
- 17 A. That's correct.
- 18 Q. Okay. So, I'm losing communication  
19 between the pod --
- 20 A. And it's controls.
- 21 Q. Say that again, I'm sorry.
- 22 A. And the controls, yes.
- 23 Q. And the controls?
- 24 A. Yeah.
- 25 Q. And that's the controls that you would



1 have at your panels?

2 A. That's correct. It's got to lose that  
3 power at the panels.

4 Q. Okay, alright. In your CCU unit, do  
5 you have BOP function capability in the CCU  
6 unit?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. When you splash the stack, what  
9 position are the rams in when you splash a  
10 stack?

11 A. When we splash it? They're open.

12 Q. They're all open?

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Are they in the open position or is the  
15 BOP in the neutral position?

16 A. They're in the open position.

17 Q. Okay. During normal drilling  
18 operations, what position do you maintain that  
19 BOP in?

20 A. Open.

21 Q. The open?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Not in the neutral?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Okay. From your CCU unit, do you have



1 the capability of putting the BOP into the  
2 neutral position?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Alright. When it's placed in the  
5 neutral position at that location, does it  
6 have any effect on the functionality of the  
7 control panel on the bridge and the control  
8 panel on the floor?

9 A. Neutral position, with you say "Neutral  
10 position", is that like putting a pod in vent?

11 Q. I don't know. I'm going by what Mr.  
12 Harrell told me yesterday was that you have on  
13 your control panels you have indicator lights  
14 that indicate that the BOP is in the open  
15 position --

16 A. The closed position.

17 Q. -- the closed position and then a  
18 neutral position.

19 A. Well, the neutral position is called  
20 "Vent".

21 Q. Okay. It's called "Vent", alright.  
22 From the CCU unit, if you place the CCU unit  
23 controls in the vent position does it have any  
24 effect on the control functions from the  
25 bridge and the --



1 A. No, sir.

2 Q. -- the rig floor?

3 A. They're independent stations.

4 Q. They're independent of each other,

5 okay. Thank you. Follow up: So, if we lose --

6 if we have the muck line severed or

7 disconnected, that would activate the dead man

8 on the BOP stack?

9 A. To activate the dead man you got to

10 lose electronics and the hydraulics.

11 Q. Both?

12 A. Both.

13 Q. So, if we had the mucks line and the

14 hydraulic line severed, then it would activate

15 the dead man?

16 A. Yes, but it's got to lose communication

17 in both pods.

18 Q. Communication back to the rig floor I'm

19 assuming?

20 A. Well, communication back to that panel.

21 Q. Okay. So, if I sever all surface

22 activity down that riser, the mucks lines, the

23 hydraulic lines, that BOP system should

24 activate and close?

25 A. The dead man system --



1 Q. The dead man system.

2 A. -- should activate and close.

3 Q. Now, what on the dead man -- what  
4 functions on the BOP stack does the dead man  
5 function?

6 A. The blind shear ram.

7 Q. The blind shear only?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Okay. Thank you.

10 E X A M I N A T I O N

11 BY MR. WHEATLEY:

12 Q. Mr. Pleasant, I have a couple of real  
13 quick clarification questions here. During  
14 previous testimony yesterday in talking with  
15 Chief Mate Young, I believe he indicated that  
16 some time prior to the actual explosion that  
17 he and you had a discussion or conversation in  
18 and around the subsea office, do you recall  
19 that?

20 A. I don't recall it.

21 Q. Okay. And then let me go back to the  
22 activation of the EDS system. When you went  
23 to the bridge you indicated that you basically  
24 activated the EDS on your own; is that  
25 correct?



1 A. That's correct because, you know, I am  
2 the authority.

3 Q. So, is it your understanding that you  
4 don't need to ask the permission of the  
5 captain to do that?

6 A. It depends on what the situation is.  
7 You know, if it's just for a watch circle,  
8 we're getting outside of our watch circle,  
9 yes. Yes, you need permission. But --

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. -- no, go ahead.

12 Q. Was it your understanding, based upon  
13 what you knew about the incident that it  
14 happened, that you had direct authority to  
15 execute the EDS without asking anybody else?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Okay. Did you ask the OIM for  
18 permission or did you discuss it with him?

19 A. No, I didn't.

20 Q. When you went up there were you aware  
21 of any ongoing discussion between possibly the  
22 master and the OIM concerning activation of  
23 the EDS?

24 A. No, I wasn't aware of it. I mean my  
25 mind was focused on getting off the well.



1 Q. Now, if I understood your previous  
2 testimony correctly, you indicated you hit the  
3 EDS panel and the lights that you expected to  
4 come on activated; is that correct?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. I also believe you said but you had no  
7 hydraulics?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. What did you mean by that?

10 A. No flow. I had no pressure in the  
11 system that allowed those functions to work.

12 Q. So, would it be fair to assume that  
13 basically when the lights came on you had no  
14 verification that anything had actually  
15 happened?

16 A. I had no verification that nothing  
17 happened because I had no flow, no hydraulic  
18 flow.

19 Q. Thank you, I have no further questions.

20 EXAMINATION

21 BY LT BUTTS:

22 Q. Good morning, Mr. Pleasant.

23 A. Good morning.

24 Q. Thanks for the clarity of your  
25 testimony. It sounds like you recount almost



1 every detail and we greatly appreciate it  
2 because this is a fact finding body. Can you  
3 -- when did you hear the announcement to  
4 abandon the rig?

5 A. I was still on the bridge. I just  
6 heard the captain in there "Abandon ship". He  
7 was talking to us in there because everybody  
8 else was already abandoned. They was already  
9 in lifeboats.

10 Q. Okay. What lifeboat -- what muster  
11 station were you assigned?

12 A. 1.

13 Q. Lifeboat Number 1?

14 A. Lifeboat Number 1.

15 Q. When did you go to Lifeboat Station  
16 Number 1?

17 A. When the captain gave the orders to  
18 abandon ship.

19 Q. Okay. And, when you got to your  
20 lifeboat station, what happened?

21 A. The lifeboat was still there. You  
22 know, I mean they was getting ready to leave,  
23 but --

24 Q. Okay. And can you kind of explain.  
25 You know, the Coast Guard when we come out and



1 do these inspections on the MODUs we want to  
2 see you all going through your muster  
3 stations, see the activation of the lifeboats  
4 and the competencies of the people who are  
5 running it. So, that's why I'm going with  
6 this line of questioning. So, when you got  
7 there, who was in charge of the muster  
8 station?

9 A. Well, it really wasn't a muster station  
10 when I got there. When I got there everybody  
11 was in the boat.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. You know, I never seen them -- you  
14 know, as far as the lifeboat deck, I never was  
15 down there.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. I was on the bridge. When I got to the  
18 lifeboat everybody was in that boat.

19 Q. Okay. And then you got in?

20 A. Me and Daun Winslow got in.

21 Q. Daun Winslow, okay. And was the  
22 lifeboat -- how many -- can you just estimate  
23 or, if you do know, how many people were  
24 actually in the lifeboat?

25 A. I don't know.



1 Q. Okay. Who was in charge of the  
2 lifeboat?

3 A. In charge of it was one of the guys off  
4 the bridge. You know, I really can't even  
5 remember his name, but --

6 Q. Okay, that's fine. That's fine. And  
7 was it orderly? Was there a lot of discussion  
8 and -- what was going on inside the lifeboat?  
9 It's a really confined space, so can you kind  
10 of describe that environment for us?

11 A. Well, I mean inside the lifeboat I mean  
12 -- when I got there, as soon as I got in, you  
13 know, they was launching the boat. And, once  
14 we hit the water and we got unhooked, I mean  
15 to me it was just normal.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. I mean under the circumstances. Wasn't  
18 nobody panicking, hollering or --

19 Q. Good.

20 A. -- you know, crying or anything like  
21 that.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. You know, it was just they wanted to  
24 get away from the rig.

25 Q. Okay. And have you ever ridden a



1 lifeboat down before from the upper station

2 down to the water and --

3 A. Not a lifeboat. A fast rescue boat,

4 but not a lifeboat.

5 Q. Okay, alright. Okay. Do you know who

6 made the determination to go ahead and lower

7 the boat? Was it the coxswain or was there

8 someone in the boat that said 'Hey, let's get

9 away from here' or any tasking like that going

10 to the coxswain? The coxswain is the person

11 sitting, you know, in the --

12 A. I don't know. You know, like I said,

13 when I got there they was ready to go then and

14 I told them to let me in.

15 Q. Okay. I'm with you, I'm with you. And

16 I was just curious if there was someone other

17 than the coxswain saying 'Let's go, let's go,

18 let's go' or anything like that?

19 A. I don't know.

20 Q. Okay. And, when the lifeboat did meet

21 to the water and I suppose someone gave

22 tasking or direction to the coxswain telling

23 them where to go, were you close enough to the

24 coxswain to hear that?

25 A. I was standing by the coxswain.



1 Q. Oh, okay.

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. And did he say anything like 'I don't  
4 know where to go' or 'Where should I go' to  
5 anyone?

6 A. No, he had somebody up front looking  
7 out, you know, and they was telling him which  
8 way to steer to the DAMON BANKSTON.

9 Q. Why is that? I mean isn't there a  
10 window right there for the coxswain?

11 A. Yeah, I mean it is a window but any  
12 time you, you know, another set of eyes is  
13 better than one set. You know, in this  
14 situation if you've got somebody that can help  
15 you --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. -- you know, let's get all the help we  
18 can.

19 Q. Yep, I completely agree. Did anyone  
20 leave the lifeboat or go outside the lifeboat?  
21 You said they were looking out for it. How  
22 were they looking out for it?

23 A. Well, there's a hatch up there or  
24 something.

25 Q. Okay. So, someone was peeking out?



1 A. Yeah, peeking out.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. You know, 'cause we -- and that was  
4 only when we got close to the DAMON BANKSTON  
5 where we didn't just ram the boat, you know?

6 Q. Got you, got you. Going back to Chad  
7 Murray, when you got down there and you met  
8 with Chad he said what? "Don't go through  
9 there?"

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. How --

12 A. He said "Don't go through there.  
13 Something bad just happened." I said "What"  
14 and he was gone.

15 Q. What did you see when you were standing  
16 next to Chad Murray?

17 A. I didn't see anything 'cause I didn't  
18 go that way. I went another way.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. You know, I took his word. You know,  
21 other than that, you know, I seen in the  
22 ceiling --

23 Q. Yeah, that's what I'm talking about.

24 A. -- there was tiles popping, but --

25 Q. Okay, alright. And, when you made your



1 way around, what was the condition of the  
2 walls, the bulkheads and the doors? Were they  
3 blown apart or were they open or were they in  
4 tact as they normally were when you walked  
5 around on the rig?

6 A. I was wide open running.

7 Q. I understand.

8 A. You know, I wasn't looking, inspecting.  
9 I was trying to get to the rig floor.

10 Q. I understand, thank you. When you  
11 talked to Mr. Anderson, why did he ask you to  
12 bump up the annular? That seemed like kind of  
13 a side discussion between you and Mr.  
14 Anderson.

15 A. No, I mean he just asked me.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. And I said "No, I can't do it." And he  
18 said "Okay." You know, that's as far as it  
19 went.

20 Q. Okay, alright. Do you do normal  
21 maintenance on the BOP?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Okay. When I was assigned to a cutter  
24 it was my job to do maintenance on the gun  
25 systems. But there was a certain level of



1 maintenance I could actually do on that, are  
2 you restricted by the type of maintenance you  
3 can do on the BOP?

4 A. Well, I mean I'm not an electronic  
5 technician.

6 Q. Nor am I.

7 A. Anything electronic I don't work on.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. You know, I'm there with the electronic  
10 technician learning --

11 Q. Sure.

12 A. -- but, as far as doing it, no.

13 Q. Okay. So, you perform normal planned  
14 maintenance that's identified by Transocean to  
15 do?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Okay. When you splashed -- I think Mr.  
18 Mathews was talking about what type of  
19 maintenance you did. When you splashed the  
20 BOP originally when you came on location, was  
21 the planned maintenance up to date on the BOP?  
22 In other words: Were there any maintenance  
23 requirements that were deferred until later?

24 A. I don't know.

25 Q. Okay, good enough. When you got to the



1 bridge -- and just finally I'm trying to  
2 capture a sense of the environment up on the  
3 bridge. Who was in control on the bridge?  
4 Who was giving tasking for people to do  
5 things?

6 A. I don't know.

7 Q. I mean it sounds like you were. I mean  
8 you knew your job.

9 A. I mean I don't know what was going on.  
10 You know, you hear people talking, but my mind  
11 frame was set on my job, my responsibilities  
12 of what I had to do.

13 Q. I understand, I understand. Okay,  
14 thank you very much. I appreciate you being  
15 with us.

16 EXAMINATION

17 BY MR. DYKES:

18 Q. Mr. Pleasant, I want to back up to when  
19 you arrived at the panel on the bridge. When  
20 you first observed the panel I believe you  
21 said you noticed that the lower annular was  
22 closed and the diverter?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. That's the diverter at the rig  
25 floor?



1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Okay. So, you have that -- you have  
3 that indication on that panel as well?

4 A. Electronically. I didn't close them,  
5 so electronically.

6 Q. But that's what you saw?

7 A. That's what I saw.

8 Q. Alright. When you function the EDS  
9 what is the sequencing of valve closures when  
10 you function the EDS?

11 A. Alright. The sequence of valve  
12 closing, when you hit -- when you hit EDS  
13 everything on the stack goes to vent. The  
14 blind shear rams closes, once the blind shear  
15 rams closes, your pod receptacles they  
16 retract, de-energize, retract up. Once that  
17 does, your choke and kill connectors they  
18 unlatch and then your LMRP unlatches.

19 Q. And then it lifts free?

20 A. It lifts free.

21 Q. Okay. When you got to the panel and  
22 you noticed that the lower annular was closed,  
23 did you notice any of the other rams'  
24 positions on the BOP stack? Was there any  
25 indication that there may have been an



1 intervention by the rig floor?

2 A. When I got to the panel I looked at the  
3 panel and the only things closed were the  
4 lower annular and the diverter packer.

5 Q. Okay, alright. Would it give you an  
6 indication that they may have tried to  
7 intervene from the rig floor? Would it give  
8 you that indication on your panel as well?

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Okay. When you made -- when you  
11 activated the EDS and you said you got "No  
12 flow", would that indicate to you that you had  
13 lost hydraulic control?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. At the same time I turned over to Don  
17 Vidrine, the BP company man, was standing  
18 right there, you know, and I told him, I said,  
19 I said "Don, look at this panel. Do you see  
20 it says "EDS activated" and everything's in  
21 vent."

22 Q. But for it to work you've got to have  
23 hydraulic control?

24 A. You've got to have some fluid.

25 Q. Okay, thank you. I have no other



1 questions.

2 EXAMINATION

3 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

4 Q. Just a couple of questions for you, Mr.

5 Pleasant. Who manufactured the BOP?

6 A. Cameron.

7 Q. Did you receive any training from

8 Cameron on how to maintain the BOP?

9 A. I went to just a school with them. You

10 know, it's more electronics than actual

11 hydraulics of it.

12 Q. Okay. So, this is a Cameron training

13 course that you went to?

14 A. Yes, yes.

15 Q. And it's more on electronics than --

16 A. The one that I went to. They offer

17 several courses.

18 Q. And you're not responsible for the

19 electronics on the BOP?

20 A. Yeah, I'm responsible. I mean it's my

21 equipment regardless of who works on it I'm

22 responsible for it.

23 Q. Okay. So, you only received training

24 from Cameron on the electronic --

25 A. Yes.



1 Q. -- portion of it? Okay. But you're  
2 not responsible for the preventive maintenance  
3 on the electronic components of the BOP?

4 A. Yeah, I'm responsible. It's my  
5 equipment. Just because I have somebody else  
6 working on it I can't -- I can't go tell  
7 management that I don't know nothing about it.  
8 I'm responsible.

9 Q. Okay, okay. Now, but you don't do the  
10 preventive maintenance yourself on the  
11 electronics even though you received training  
12 on the electronics?

13 A. No, I don't do it myself, but I'm there  
14 with him the whole time that he's doing it.  
15 You know.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. And, you know, after time you learn  
18 what he's talking about where they can't tell  
19 you anything.

20 Q. For the things that you actually do  
21 preventive maintenance on, do you know if  
22 Cameron provides training for that purpose?

23 A. I'm sure they does. I mean I never  
24 researched it.

25 Q. Right, okay. Now, when I was on the



1 DEEPWATER NAUTILUS there was a BOP event

2 logger down in the subsea engineer room?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Is there such equipment on the HORIZON?

5 A. Yes, we have a data logger.

6 Q. Okay. The data logger, is the data

7 only stored on that computer down in the

8 subsea engineer room or --

9 A. Only in the CCU.

10 Q. Also in the CCU?

11 A. Only in the CCU.

12 Q. Okay. Now, so does that data get

13 transmitted to shore?

14 A. No.

15 Q. So, it only stays onboard the vessel?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Okay. So, with all the activities that

18 was going on at the time of the casualty or

19 before that, we don't have any of that data in

20 terms of the BOP events?

21 A. All the data stays on the rig.

22 Q. Okay.

23 CAPT NGUYEN:

24 Flag state?

25 MR. LINSIN:



1 I have no questions. Thank you,  
2 Captain.

3 CAPT NGUYEN:

4 Thank you, sir. Transocean, do  
5 you have any questions for the witness?

6 COUNSEL REPRESENTING TRANSOCEAN, INC.:

7 No questions.

8 CAPT NGUYEN:

9 Cameron?

10 MR. JONES:

11 Yes.

12 E X A M I N A T I O N

13 BY MR. JONES:

14 Q. Good morning, Mr. Pleasant. My name is  
15 David Jones. I represent Cameron.

16 A. Good morning.

17 Q. Did you give a statement on the  
18 BANKSTON after the accident?

19 A. No, sir.

20 Q. (Whereupon the witness is handed a  
21 statement.)

22 A. I gave that statement in Kenner,  
23 Louisiana.

24 Q. That was going to be my next question.  
25 You gave this statement when?



1 A. Whatever that Friday was.

2 Q. I have just a couple of questions about  
3 this statement. The first line says that you  
4 heard a hissing noise and thought maybe the  
5 valves of the tensioner bleed down got stuck.

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Where were you when you heard that  
8 hissing noise?

9 A. In my office.

10 Q. Okay. And then later in that statement  
11 you say that you immediately went to the  
12 bridge and fired the EDS sequence. And I want  
13 to focus on when you got to the bridge. I  
14 believe you said you went immediately to the  
15 panel; is that correct?

16 A. Well, I said I tried to get to the rig  
17 floor to see what was going on and I didn't  
18 make it and then it went to the bridge.

19 Q. Okay. I understand. I just want to go  
20 from the time you got to the bridge --

21 A. Okay.

22 Q. -- I understood you to say that you  
23 went then immediately to the BOP panel; is  
24 that correct?

25 A. That's correct.



1 Q. Alright. Yesterday we heard some  
2 testimony that the panel, the control panel  
3 for the BOP, and the other subsea equipment  
4 that it looked abnormal. That there were some  
5 lights on that weren't normally on.

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. When you got to the panel did it appear  
8 to be abnormal to you?

9 A. Yes, 'cause you had low accumulator  
10 alarms on, that told me that our system has  
11 5,000 PSI and that tells me right there the  
12 pressure has dropped below our set point, you  
13 know. And we normally get that around 3500  
14 PSI.

15 Q. Okay. Was there any abnormal lights on  
16 the various buttons to actuate the rams?

17 A. No.

18 Q. It appeared to you as it normally does  
19 when you would see the panel?

20 A. The panel appeared normal, other than  
21 the alarms going off.

22 Q. Okay. So, there were lights on for  
23 both of the annulars, correct?

24 A. Lights on for both of the annulars?

25 Q. Sure. To operate the annulars there



1 are various buttons underneath, correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And those buttons are in effect lights,  
4 correct?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Alright. And there were -- those  
7 buttons were lit up under both annulars; is  
8 that right?

9 A. One was showing closed and one was  
10 showing open.

11 Q. Okay. But both of them had lights on  
12 and the lower one was showing what color?

13 A. Green.

14 Q. And the upper one was showing what  
15 color?

16 A. No, the lower annular was showing red  
17 because it was closed. The upper annular was  
18 showing green.

19 Q. Okay. And neither of those were  
20 showing vent or yellow?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Alright. And then, as you move down  
23 the stack, the various buttons for the rams  
24 what were they showing?

25 A. Everything was showing open in the



1 green position.

2 Q. Okay. Was there a light on under the  
3 EDS button?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. What color was the light under the EDS  
6 button?

7 A. Red for normal.

8 Q. Was there a light on under the dead  
9 man?

10 A. Yes, it was on.

11 Q. Well, what color was that light? Do  
12 you recall?

13 A. I don't recall, but when I come on tour  
14 I checked that panel and it was on.

15 Q. Okay. Now, when you hit the EDS  
16 well, first let me ask this: Have you ever hit  
17 an EDS button before?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. When?

20 A. Hit it every time we're on the surface.

21 Q. Just for testing?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay. In deployment have you ever hit  
24 an EDS button before?

25 A. No.



1 Q. Alright. How mechanically did you go  
2 about activating the EDS?

3 A. I don't understand the question.

4 Q. Alright. Do you push one button to  
5 activate the EDS?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. You never push one button on a Cameron  
9 system.

10 Q. And that's my question: How do you  
11 mechanically go about pushing buttons to  
12 activate the EDS?

13 A. You've got to push -- you've got to  
14 push an enable button, you've got to hold it  
15 down as you're holding down the function you  
16 want to fire.

17 Q. Okay. And that's what you did when  
18 you --

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Alright. When you hit the button, hit  
21 the enable, hit the EDS button, describe for  
22 me what you witnessed happen on the panel.

23 A. As I hit the button, you know, I'm  
24 looking at everything go to vent like it's  
25 supposed to on the stack, but -- you know, and



1 I glance up at the flow. I got no flow. I  
2 turned my head from the panel, look over to my  
3 other panel, you know, to see what's still  
4 going on. You know, and still had nothing  
5 over there. You know, looking at my  
6 regulators, my read back on my regulators and  
7 stuff. You know, nothing fell off, nothing  
8 moved or nothing. You know, I come back to  
9 the panel, you know, just turn my head back to  
10 the panel and look at the top and it showed  
11 "EDS activated". You know, and I looked down  
12 it and it showed where it had picked up my  
13 receptacles, my power receptacles. It showed  
14 the lights where the blind shear rams was  
15 closed and the LMRP was unlocked and  
16 everything. Let me be clear: I believe you  
17 said everything was on vent. Were some things  
18 not on vent?

19 A. Everything on the stack has to be in  
20 vent because if you don't -- if it doesn't go  
21 to vent when those receptacles come up you  
22 still got fluid trying to go through there.  
23 So, you know, your pumps are steady running.  
24 That's when the valves on the stack go to  
25 vent.



1 Q. Alright. And you know it's in vent  
2 because the light is yellow, correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Was there a yellow light on for the  
5 blind shear ram?

6 A. I don't know.

7 Q. Do you recall after you activated the  
8 EDS what color light was on under the blind  
9 shear ram?

10 A. What -- the green light. I looked at  
11 it and it was green.

12 Q. This is --

13 A. You know, at the same time after I see  
14 I got no flow, you know. I didn't sit there  
15 and just confirm which light is which. My  
16 next thing was we had to leave.

17 Q. Okay. So, just so I'm clear though,  
18 when you look down after executing the EDS  
19 sequence, it's your best recollection that you  
20 had a green light on for the blind shear ram?

21 A. No, that's not my best recollection.  
22 My best recollection is that I seen it go to  
23 close and I saw no flow and I was moving  
24 around looking through that panel trying to  
25 see what was going on. After I saw that I had



1 no hydraulics I knew it was time to leave.

2 Q. And all I'm trying to do is just get  
3 your --

4 A. Well, I can't answer your question. I  
5 mean I'm giving you the best answer that I  
6 know that's a fact.

7 Q. Okay. And do you recall what color  
8 lights were on under the blind shear ram --

9 A. No.

10 Q. -- okay, you do not. You do not? I'm  
11 sorry.

12 A. I seen -- I seen the blind shear rams  
13 go to close. I seen them go to close, but I  
14 didn't just focus my time on them to see that  
15 the light changed from green to orange or back  
16 to red.

17 Q. Okay. How do you know that it went to  
18 close on the panel?

19 A. Because I'm looking at it. That's what  
20 I told you, I looked at it go to close.

21 Q. What specifically on the panel tells  
22 you that it went to close?

23 A. It goes from green to red.

24 Q. Okay. So, that's all I'm trying to get  
25 at.



1 A. Okay.

2 Q. You saw the red light come on under the  
3 blind shear ram?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. And what you're telling me is you don't  
6 know whether or not it went to some other  
7 color after you saw that?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Okay. The flow meters that you're  
10 talking about, those are where on the panel?

11 A. They're at your top right hand -- you  
12 got two panels. You got a left cabinet and a  
13 right cabinet.

14 Q. Right.

15 A. Your flow meters are in your left  
16 cabinet top right.

17 Q. Which flow meters, if you recall, on  
18 the left side control panel top right were you  
19 looking at?

20 A. The top one is your surface flow meter.

21 Q. And did you have movement on the  
22 surface flow meter?

23 A. I had no movement in none of them.

24 Q. Okay. None of those flow meters that  
25 are on the top right showed movement?



1 A. Well, you got a surface flow meter, you  
2 got your blue pod flow meter and your yellow  
3 pod flow meter under it. I seen no flow.

4 Q. Okay. After you hit the EDS sequence,  
5 the EDS button armed -- hit -- I guess enable  
6 EDS did you see any lights blinking?

7 A. Did I see -- say that again.

8 Q. When you activated the EDS by hitting  
9 enable and pushing the EDS button, did you see  
10 lights blink?

11 A. I seen them change colors.

12 Q. Was there any period of time when  
13 lights were flashing like this (indicating) or  
14 did it just stay solid and then switch color?

15 A. I don't know.

16 Q. You don't recall?

17 A. I don't know. When I didn't see flow I  
18 knew something was going -- I knew it wasn't  
19 working.

20 Q. Was Mr. Harrell present when you  
21 activated the EDS?

22 A. I don't know. I mean at some point in  
23 time he was up there, but I don't know who was  
24 up there. All I know is the captain, Don  
25 Vidrine and me when I hit the EDS. I know



1 there was other people up there, but who I  
2 don't know.

3 Q. That was a bad question. Was Mr.  
4 Harrell next to you when you first operated  
5 the EDS?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Okay. He came up after it had gone  
8 through the sequence?

9 A. If he did, I didn't see him.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. I saw him up there, you know, at some  
12 point in time. But, you know, I don't  
13 remember him coming and standing next to me at  
14 the panel.

15 Q. I may have misunderstood your earlier  
16 testimony. I thought he came up to you and  
17 said "EDS" and you said "It's already done."

18 A. No, I did not say that. I said that  
19 when I walked into the bridge I said "I'm  
20 EDSing." The captain told me "Calm down,  
21 Chris. We're not EDSing." I went to the  
22 panel, Don Vidrine, the BP company man, was  
23 standing by the panel.

24 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

25 A. He said "They got the well shut in?" I



1 said "Yeah, Don, they got it shut in. I'm  
2 getting off here." He said "Get off here."  
3 And that's when I hit the EDS. Approximately  
4 four to five minutes later the captain come  
5 back to me and told me to EDS and I told him "I  
6 already have."

7 Q. Alright. That's what I misunderstood.  
8 It was the captain who came back to you, not  
9 Mr. Harrell?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Okay. Thank you for your time.

12 A. Your welcome.

13 EXAMINATION

14 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

15 Q. Just one clarification here: So, Mr.  
16 Don Vidrine told you to get off, so that means  
17 to activate the EDS?

18 A. Don Vidrine didn't tell me to get off.  
19 I told them I was getting off and he just said  
20 "Get off."

21 Q. Okay. So, you would have done it  
22 anyway whether he said get off or don't?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Okay.

25 CAPT NGUYEN:



1 Halliburton?  
2 COUNSEL REPRESENTING HALLIBURTON,  
3 INC.:  
4 No questions, Captain.  
5 CAPT NGUYEN:  
6 Thank you, sir. M-I SWACO?  
7 COUNSEL REPRESENTING M-I SWACO:  
8 No questions.  
9 CAPT NGUYEN:  
10 Dril-Quip?  
11 COUNSEL REPRESENTING DRIL-QUIP, INC.:  
12 No questions.  
13 CAPT NGUYEN:  
14 Weatherford?  
15 COUNSEL REPRESENTING WEATHERFORD,  
16 INC.:  
17 No questions.  
18 CAPT NGUYEN:  
19 Anadarko?  
20 COUNSEL  
21 REPRESENTING ANADARKO  
22 PETROLEUM CORPORATION:  
23 No questions.  
24 CAPT NGUYEN:  
25 MOEX?  
26 COUNSEL REPRESENTING MOEX USA:



1 (No response.)

2 CAPT NGUYEN:

3 Douglas Brown?

4 E X A M I N A T I O N

5 BY MR. SEELY:

6 Q. Jeff Seely, how are you sir?

7 A. I'm fine. How are you?

8 Q. I want to pick up kind of where you  
9 left off and I think you answered it, but I  
10 want to be clear. As I understand it you get  
11 to the bridge, you say you're going to EDS,  
12 captain says "Hold on, let's not do it right  
13 now", right?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. And then I think fairly soon thereafter  
16 you did hit it, right?

17 A. Probably 30 seconds 'cause I mean we're  
18 right there by the panel. You know, as I tell  
19 him he says "Chris, calm down. We're not  
20 EDSing yet." And he left and went over there  
21 talking to whoever was up front, you know,  
22 doing their job. You know, and I did mine.

23 Q. Did you ever observe the OIM  
24 subsequently hitting the EDS?

25 A. No.



1 Q. Now, as I understand it, four to five  
2 minutes later the captain came back to you and  
3 said to EDS; is that right?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. So, am I right to say that you never  
6 informed him prior to that that you had hit  
7 the EDS?

8 A. No. No, I didn't inform him.

9 Q. And I also infer that for that four or  
10 five minute period you would have been up at  
11 the bridge the entire time?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What were you doing?

14 A. What was I doing --

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. -- up on the bridge?

17 Q. Yeah, during that four or five minute  
18 time between the time you activated it and  
19 then the captain came up to you what were you  
20 doing?

21 A. Well, what happened was I turned around  
22 and I seen Steve Bertone. I don't know which  
23 way he came in. I said "Steve Bertone, get  
24 Mark Hay up here. I need Mark Hay." Steve  
25 Bertone, he turned around and looked at me and



1 he said "Do you really need him?" I said "No.  
2 There ain't nothing that he can do." I said  
3 "We ain't got no fluid." Alright. So, you  
4 know, I done walked off from the panel. I  
5 come back to the panel and that's when I told  
6 Don Vidrine, I said "Don, look at this panel  
7 again." Steve Bertone then he turns away and  
8 he said "I'm going to the emergency generator  
9 room." Like that. I said "You need me to go  
10 with you?" And he didn't say nothing, but I  
11 looked out that door and I said "I ain't  
12 going." And then the captain come back and he  
13 said "We're EDSing." And I told him "I  
14 already have."

15 Q. Did you observe what the captain was  
16 doing during that four to five minute period?

17 A. Wasn't focused on him.

18 Q. And I infer from your testimony that --  
19 was it after the captain came up to you or you  
20 came up to him and the captain told you to not  
21 EDS was it after that that he said "Abandon  
22 ship" to everybody or was it before that?

23 A. When he said "Abandon ship" that was  
24 after he told me to EDS.

25 Q. How long after -- so, this would have



1       been, again, four to five minutes after he  
2       originally told you not to do it? It was some  
3       point after he came to you that he said this.  
4       Do you know how long?

5       A. It was quick. I mean I don't -- I  
6       don't know the time, but it was quick.

7       Q. And was it at that point when you first  
8       left the bridge to go to the lifeboats or put  
9       differently: How long after he said "Abandon  
10      ship" did you leave the bridge?

11      A. It was quick.

12      Q. Have you been told about how long  
13      before water started coming out and mud  
14      started coming out that they were experiencing  
15      well control issues?

16      A. Had I been told that?

17      Q. Yes.

18      A. I mean I don't understand the question  
19      there. I mean --

20      Q. Well, obviously at some point prior to  
21      this incident they were experiencing well  
22      control issues; is that fair?

23      A. I mean we had well control issues  
24      throughout the well. I mean what -- what  
25      point are you talking about?



1 Q. Well, do you know -- for the time frame  
2 of about twenty minutes prior to when the mud  
3 started coming out, do you know what  
4 operations were underway at that time or do  
5 you know if people were dealing with well  
6 control issues at the time?

7 A. No, don't.

8 Q. And has anybody told you what the cause  
9 of this incident is?

10 A. I'm not here to speculate. You know,  
11 just the facts.

12 Q. I'm not asking that. I'm asking you  
13 has anybody told you what the cause of this  
14 incident is?

15 A. No.

16 Q. When you were up in the bridge did you  
17 view that the captain was panicked or calm or  
18 somewhere in between?

19 A. I wasn't focused on the captain. I was  
20 focused on getting off this well.

21 Q. So, you don't know one way or the other  
22 whether he was panicked or not?

23 A. No, 'cause I wasn't -- my attention was  
24 not at the captain.

25 Q. Have you heard from anybody that at any



1 point the captain was playing video games up  
2 at the bridge around the time that this  
3 incident occurred?

4 MR. KOHNKE:

5 By "Video games" the simulator that  
6 he described that --

7 MR. SEELY:

8 Right. Or any -- frankly I don't  
9 know yet, counsel. That he was playing  
10 video games.

11 MR. KOHNKE:

12 Do you know if he was in the  
13 simulator?

14 THE WITNESS:

15 Again, I don't know what they were  
16 doing.

17 MR. SEELY:

18 Thank you.

19 THE WITNESS:

20 Thank you.

21 CAPT NGUYEN:

22 Thank you, sir. BP?

23 MR. GODFREY:

24 Thank you, Captain. May I proceed,  
25 Captain?



1 CAPT NGUYEN:

2 Yes, sir.

3 MR. GODFREY:

4 Thank you.

5 EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. GODFREY:

7 Q. Now, Mr. Pleasant, my name is Rick  
8 Godfrey. It's a pleasure to meet you, sir. I  
9 appreciate very much of your earlier detail in  
10 the rendition of the chronology on two  
11 occasions. So, I'm going to try and fill in  
12 some gaps. I'm not going to ask you to do it a  
13 third time, okay.

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. At any time in the evening of April the  
16 20, 2010 did you hear gas alarms go off?

17 A. I don't know.

18 Q. Okay. At any time did the sprinkler  
19 system activate?

20 A. I don't know.

21 Q. Did you ever hear any radio  
22 communications between the DEEPWATER HORIZON  
23 to the DAMON BANKSTON to move away or move off  
24 from where they were located?

25 A. I don't know.



1 Q. Okay. Prior to going to the bridge,  
2 did you ever run into David Young?

3 A. On the deck.

4 Q. Okay. Had he ever come, as far as you  
5 can recall, to visit you in your subsea  
6 office?

7 A. As far as I recall I don't remember  
8 seeing him.

9 Q. Okay. Now, you testified that you went  
10 and saw the OIM, Mr. Harrell, between  
11 approximately 9:30 and 9:40 on the evening of  
12 April the 20th, do you recall that?

13 A. Yeah, I recall that.

14 Q. Now, is Mr. Harrell's office where his  
15 accommodations are or is his office somewhere  
16 else?

17 A. His office and accommodations -- I mean  
18 his office is right across from his bedroom.

19 Q. Okay. And what's your best  
20 recollection of the time that you left Mr.  
21 Harrell's office?

22 A. My best recollection, you know, like I  
23 said earlier I was -- it was between 9:30 and  
24 9:40. You know, I can't -- I can't pin it  
25 down to a certain time because I wasn't



1 watching.

2 Q. Okay. When you ran into Mr. Murray  
3 when he told you that something bad had  
4 happened, do you recall or do you have an  
5 estimate of approximate time when you  
6 encountered Mr. Murray?

7 A. It would have to be approximately 9:45,  
8 you know.

9 Q. Okay. When you saw the --

10 CAPT NGUYEN:

11 Counsel?

12 MR. GODFREY:

13 Yes.

14 CAPT NGUYEN:

15 Can I just interrupt real quickly?

16 MR. GODFREY:

17 Yes.

18 CAPT NGUYEN:

19 Back to the initial couple of  
20 questions that Mr. Godfrey asked you  
21 with regard to did you hear alarms or  
22 did you see something. And your  
23 response was "I don't know" was that  
24 because you didn't hear it or --

25 THE WITNESS:



1           That's because I -- I mean -- I  
2           mean stuff was happening so fast I  
3           don't know what I heard and what I  
4           didn't hear. I don't know. I mean --

5           CAPT NGUYEN:

6           Yes. I just want to make sure.

7           THE WITNESS:

8           I don't know.

9           CAPT NGUYEN:

10          His question was, you know, a yes  
11          or no answer. And I just wanted to  
12          clarify what you meant by "I don't  
13          know." That's all.

14          THE WITNESS:

15          Well, you know, yes and no to me,  
16          you know, if I know. I don't know is I  
17          don't know the answer. I mean.

18          MR. GODFREY:

19          I appreciate that very much.

20          CAPT NGUYEN:

21          I'm not trying to help out counsel.

22          I'm just trying to make sure I  
23          understood.

24          MR. GODFREY:

25          I'll take all the help I can get.



1 Thank you.

2 THE WITNESS:

3 I mean it's not that you're helping  
4 him out. I'm under oath. If I don't  
5 know, I don't know.

6 MR. GODFREY:

7 But I'll take the help anyway,  
8 thank you, Captain.

9 BY MR. GODFREY:

10 Q. I want to turn for just a minute or so  
11 when you looked at the TV monitor and when you  
12 were sitting there doing your paperwork.  
13 First your colleague said that there was water  
14 on the floor?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. Do you know approximately what time  
17 that was? Do you have an estimate?

18 A. I don't -- I mean I guess 9:43.

19 Q. You got me there, okay. Fair enough.  
20 You then saw or he saw mud on the floor,  
21 right?

22 A. Yeah. He said "I see mud."

23 Q. Could you see any people around the mud  
24 or you just saw mud on the floor?

25 A. I turned -- the TV is behind me and I



1 turned back to look at the TV and I picked up  
2 the phone instantly. You know, I didn't sit  
3 there and watch the TV. I dialed the rig  
4 floor to see what's going on. Nobody answered  
5 the phone. That's when I took out and seen  
6 Mr. Murray in the hallway.

7 Q. Okay. Then I think we've covered the  
8 bridge. Let me go to earlier in the day. I  
9 think I've filled in the chronology questions  
10 that I had. You came on duty around 5:30 or  
11 6:00 and you --

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. -- and you saw a discussion between a  
14 number of people regarding a negative test,  
15 right?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Was that the first negative test?

18 A. That was the first negative test.

19 Q. And was the conclusion reached by the  
20 crew at the time that the first negative test  
21 had been passed successfully?

22 MR. KOHNKE:

23 When you say "crew", would you  
24 define -- You mean BP and Transocean or  
25 just Transocean --



1 MR. GODFREY:

2 Well, I'll be more specific. Thank  
3 you.

4 BY MR. GODFREY:

5 Q. Was the conclusion that you heard at  
6 the time reached by the Transocean crew was  
7 that the first negative test passed  
8 successfully?

9 A. What I heard was Bob Kaluza say that,  
10 according to the APD, that we didn't get a  
11 negative test and he was going to talk to Don  
12 about it.

13 Q. Mr. Kaluza wanted another negative test  
14 done; is that right?

15 A. I don't know if he wanted another one  
16 or not. All I know is he said "According to  
17 APD we didn't achieve the results."

18 Q. From your observation did the  
19 Transocean crew appear to conclude that the  
20 first negative test had been passed  
21 successfully?

22 A. I mean I was making relief with my  
23 relief. They was over there talking, you  
24 know. You can hear bits and pieces of it, but  
25 I don't know what they determined.



1 Q. Was a second negative test then done?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And was that passed successfully to  
4 your knowledge?

5 A. To my knowledge it passed successfully.

6 Q. Now, you had said something about --  
7 and I apologize if I misheard this. You said  
8 something about a U-tube?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. Did you know what they were  
11 referring to?

12 A. Well, they was saying that -- that it  
13 didn't -- the mud didn't go through the  
14 annular by the U-tube. What is a U-tube, I  
15 have no idea.

16 Q. Okay. And that was before the second  
17 negative pressure test?

18 A. That was before the second one.

19 Q. And then the second one was done?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. And then it was passed?

22 A. As far as we know it passed.

23 Q. Okay. Just final questions about BOP  
24 maintenance. Who does or who performed the  
25 electronic maintenance on the BOP onboard the



1 DEEPWATER HORIZON?

2 A. Well, it just depends on what kind of  
3 electronics it is. We got electronic  
4 technicians. You know, if they can do it. If  
5 not we call Cameron.

6 Q. Okay. You also testified that there  
7 were a number of maintenance items that were  
8 done prior to the BOP splash, do you recall  
9 that?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Okay. Do you have a list of the  
12 maintenance items that were done prior to the  
13 BOP splash for this well?

14 A. Do I have one with me?

15 Q. No. A list in your mind perhaps?

16 A. Yes. I mean basically it's standard  
17 procedures that when we retrieve the BOPs we  
18 change out all the rubber goods. We change  
19 out all the rubber goods. As far as, you  
20 know, any annulars we change the rubber goods.  
21 As far as going into the piston that depends  
22 on if, you know, if we have something leaking  
23 or -- or if we cut a window in the casing or  
24 something like that. You know, a lot of  
25 things depends on what happened in that well.



1 But, you know, like I said the normal things  
2 are checking the accumulator bottles. You  
3 have to adjust them for different water depth.  
4 You change out all your filters and your pods.  
5 You check all your precharges. You grease all  
6 your valves. Check -- grease all your  
7 operating valves. You check all of your  
8 hoses. You inspect your connectors, change  
9 out the gaskets in those. That's normal. I  
10 mean there's several other things, you know.  
11 If we have any issues with pods or something,  
12 you know, we'll work on them, if a valve needs  
13 rebuilding.

14 Q. Prior to the BOP splash for this well,  
15 Macondo-252, did you change the hoses --

16 A. Yes, we did.

17 Q. -- on the BOP?

18 A. Half inch.

19 Q. Who changed the hoses?

20 A. Subsea engineers, subsea support team.

21 Q. From Transocean?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Did you change the batteries?

24 A. No, sir.

25 Q. Did you change the hydraulic lines?



1 A. Hoses are the hydraulic lines.

2 Q. Okay. Did you change any of the  
3 electrical equipment?

4 A. No. And when you say "Batteries" which  
5 batteries are you referring to?

6 Q. Well, let's take the pods. Did you do  
7 anything with respect to maintenance with  
8 either of the pods, the blue pod or the yellow  
9 pod?

10 A. As far as going into the seams?

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. No. That was done by Cameron.

13 Q. Okay. Are there records of what you  
14 did with respect to the maintenance of the BOP  
15 prior to the splash for Macondo Well--252?

16 A. I don't know. I hadn't talked to  
17 anybody if Houston got them or not. I mean it  
18 was on the DEEPWATER HORIZON.

19 Q. Would the records of maintenance for  
20 the BOP be kept both on the rig itself and in  
21 Houston?

22 A. I don't -- I don't know.

23 Q. Thank you very much. We really  
24 appreciate your testimony, sir.

25 A. Thank you.



1 CAPT NGUYEN:

2 Thank you, sir. Mr. Pleasant,  
3 thank you for coming here today to give  
4 us your testimony. Are there any  
5 questions that we didn't ask you or any  
6 information that we should be aware of  
7 that has relevance to this  
8 investigation that you would like to  
9 tell us?

10 THE WITNESS:

11 I have no information. I mean I  
12 gave you everything I knew today.

13 CAPT NGUYEN:

14 Yes, sir. Thank you. In the  
15 future if we need additional  
16 information from you would you make  
17 yourself available to the board?

18 THE WITNESS:

19 I'm available 24/7.

20 CAPT NGUYEN:

21 Thank you, sir. You're dismissed.  
22 I appreciate it. We're going to go ahead  
23 and take a break and reconvene at  
24 11:30.

25 (Whereupon, a short break was taken off the



1 record.)

2 CAPT NGUYEN:

3 The board now calls on Mr. Greg

4 Meche with M-I SWACO. Mr. Meche,

5 please stand and raise your right hand.

6 MR. MECHE:

7 (Witness complies.)

8 \* \* \* \* \*

9 GREGORY MECHE,

10 after being first duly sworn in the cause,

11 testified as follows:

12 E X A M I N A T I O N

13 BY MR. MATHEWS:

14 Q. Mr. Meche, can you please state your

15 full name and spell your last name?

16 A. Gregory Luke Meche, E-C-H-E.

17 Q. And by whom are you currently employed?

18 A. M-I SWACO.

19 Q. And what position do you hold with M-I

20 SWACO?

21 A. Compliance specialist.

22 Q. How long have you held that position,

23 sir?

24 A. Just a little over three years.

25 Q. Did you have any other experience with



1 M-I SWACO before becoming a compliance  
2 specialist?

3 A. No, sir.

4 Q. Did you have any other oilfield  
5 experience prior?

6 A. Yes, sir. I worked for Weatherford for  
7 one year besides that.

8 Q. One year?

9 A. One year.

10 Q. Did you have any special training for  
11 your job, sir?

12 A. No.

13 Q. What is your educational background?

14 A. I have a bachelor's degree in  
15 industrial technology.

16 Q. Did M-I SWACO provide any training to  
17 become a compliance specialist after --

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Can you please elaborate on what that  
20 was?

21 A. It was about a week long training  
22 process where we stayed in the office  
23 environment. It pretty much simulates a hitch  
24 offshore for paperwork purposes.

25 Q. Okay. Talking about a "Hitch" when did



1 you arrive on the DEEPWATER HORIZON?

2 A. The very first time was around about  
3 March, March 15th to 18th, 2007.

4 Q. And, at the time of the incident, were  
5 you on the rig?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And how long had you been on your hitch  
8 prior to that incident?

9 A. I had got on the rig on April 20th that  
10 day at about 10:00, 10:30 a.m.

11 Q. What was your job responsibilities? I  
12 know you weren't there that day, but what was  
13 your responsibilities at the DEEPWATER  
14 HORIZON?

15 A. My main responsibility is to monitor  
16 discharge that goes into the Gulf. Primarily  
17 drill cuttings and anything that is going to  
18 go into the water that, you know, has to be  
19 either tested or approved I guess by me.

20 Q. Okay. What time did you arrive on the  
21 20th?

22 A. Approximately 10:00, 10:30 maybe.

23 Q. And did you arrive on a Transocean  
24 helicopter out of PHI?

25 A. Yes, sir. PHI.



1 Q. From that point on in the day, can you  
2 please take me up to the time of the incident  
3 with your best recollection of what took  
4 place?

5 A. From when I flew on?

6 Q. Yes, sir.

7 A. Okay. I arrived, as I said, I arrived  
8 on the rig at approximately 10:00 or 10:30.  
9 The first thing I did was I got a bite to eat  
10 because they start serving at 10:30. So, I  
11 ate lunch and then I started to unpack my  
12 bags. A quick briefing with some of our guys  
13 on what, you know, is going on.

14 Q. And who was that? M-I SWACO guys?

15 A. Yes, sir. I got up to speed with what  
16 was happening, what my next move was going to  
17 be as far as, you know, what I needed to do  
18 for that day because, you know, usually my  
19 first day is really -- I have time to get  
20 unpacked and, you know, it's kind of a relaxed  
21 type of day for -- at least for my job. This  
22 particular day we were displacing the well, so  
23 I -- I unpacked my bags, I got the briefing.  
24 They told me we were displacing. You know, I  
25 was told what time around the time that I



1 needed to be, where I needed to be to do my  
2 job.

3 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

4 A. And, from that point on, you know,  
5 10:30, 11:00, 12:00 till 6:00 or 7:00 or 8:00  
6 that night I just -- I pretty much just hung  
7 around and waited on this stroke count, which  
8 I'm sure we'll get to later, for me to go up  
9 and collect my sample. So, basically, you  
10 know, unpacked, got my computer, got  
11 everything ready and just kind of got caught  
12 up with -- I had been off the rig for 22 days.  
13 So, I had a lot of stuff to catch up on.  
14 Electronic files, my binder, which is, you  
15 know, fairly thick. I had to go through some  
16 things. So, yeah, basically from when I got  
17 there until 5:00 or 6:00 I basically was  
18 sitting at my desk and just catching up,  
19 computer stuff, you know.

20 Q. And, after 5:00 or 6:00 -- are you  
21 alright to -- are you okay?

22 A. Oh, sure. Yes.

23 Q. After 5:00 or 6:00 what happened after  
24 that, after you got caught up with all your  
25 paperwork?



1       A. We had our dinner, which was about  
2       5:30-ish. At this point I'm watching our  
3       drill screen, which, you know, gives the  
4       information that I need for me to go outside  
5       and, like I said, do what I needed to do. So,  
6       from 5:30 until I guess it was about close to  
7       9:00 p.m. I noticed that the stroke count,  
8       which is the number I was looking for, was at  
9       -- was at -- I a range where I needed to go  
10      outside and be present.

11      Q. Can you just explain what a stroke  
12      count is for the purpose of this panel?

13      A. The stroke count, as far as I'm -- as  
14      far as I'm concerned is a -- it's a pump like  
15      pumps -- a pump has a certain amount of --  
16      amount of strokes, which in our case is a --  
17      you know, we calculate the stroke count. It's  
18      moving a fluid, as far as I -- as far as I  
19      know. As far as I'm concerned, you know.  
20      Okay.

21      Q. So, you got your stroke count  
22      information and you went back outside?

23      A. Yes. Well, once my -- once my drill  
24      screen showed I was at about 13 or 14,000  
25      strokes, which is what I was told 'Hey, once



1 we get to this point, make your way up and  
2 we'll be close to displacing' where I'm  
3 needed.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. So, I looked up and it was about 13 --  
6 I can't remember the exact number, but it was  
7 where it was supposed to be. So, I made my  
8 way outside and I met with a couple of guys  
9 that were at the -- we call it the gumbo box.  
10 It's in the shaker house.

11 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

12 A. And I actually got up there almost  
13 perfect timing. It was -- within ten minutes  
14 we actually -- actually caught my sample and  
15 moved from there. And I'll let you --

16 Q. No, no. That's fine. I just want to  
17 try to get you to elaborate up to the time of  
18 the incident.

19 A. Well, basically I caught a sample. I  
20 had a small test to do on it in our mud lab,  
21 which is the next door over. Once that --  
22 once that test was done, I walked back into  
23 the shaker house and I had another -- I had to  
24 mud scale weigh a sample.

25 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).



1       A. The same sample. From there I walked  
2 into our -- talked to one of our guys. So,  
3 pretty much after I caught the sample within  
4 ten to twelve to fifteen minutes I was back  
5 inside the living quarters. So, I had about  
6 -- and my sample was caught at 2116, 9:16 p.m.  
7 And I was back inside and I had about fifteen,  
8 twenty minutes of paperwork to do on the  
9 displacement and my other tests that I did.  
10 So, I did my paperwork and I had a minute to  
11 sit back and, when I sat back, that's whenever  
12 we heard the first explosion. The first -- to  
13 me the first explosion sounded like something  
14 -- something fell more than something actually  
15 exploding. Like we had dropped a heavy -- we  
16 knew it wasn't good, you know, but we --

17       Q. Do you know which direction that came  
18 from on the vessel?

19       A. From my perspective it would have been  
20 -- it came from the rig floor area, you know.

21       Q. Okay. Can you continue after the first  
22 explosion?

23       A. After the first explosion I -- the  
24 lights went out and the only lighting that we  
25 had was like our computer screens that went



1 onto battery power. So, I stood up and I  
2 walked to the -- well, walked, ran or whatever  
3 to the next office talking to our dispatcher.  
4 You know, just "Man, what's going on? What do  
5 we need to do?" And that's whenever we had  
6 the second explosion, which is the one that  
7 ripped through the living quarters. That was  
8 a pretty -- pretty good explosion, a pretty  
9 good blast. So, from there I ran to my  
10 bedroom, which is the hallway across. I got  
11 my life jacket and I made my way outside.  
12 Once I was on the lifeboat deck we -- you  
13 know, we had -- and the flames are, you know,  
14 2 and 300 feet above the derrick in my  
15 opinion. I mean it was a pretty -- pretty big  
16 ball of fire. And we -- the muster -- the  
17 muster situation was, you know, as controlled  
18 as it could be. In my opinion it looked like  
19 a fire drill, but everybody was involved as  
20 opposed to one guy doing the -- you know, like  
21 in a fire drill he checks hard hats, all your  
22 name tags and in this case it's, you know, the  
23 same thing just a little more chaotic. You  
24 can imagine I'm sure. I -- within five  
25 minutes of being on that lifeboat deck I



1 decided to run to the next level lower. It's  
2 the smoking, like a cigarette smoking deck.  
3 And I ran down to that level and I -- I jumped  
4 off into the water.

5 Q. And why did you jump, sir? Was there  
6 not enough space on the life vessel?

7 A. No, there's plenty of space. A couple  
8 of reasons I guess. I am kind of  
9 claustrophobic. I didn't really -- and I  
10 don't think I was thinking of that at the  
11 time, but it was afterthought. It seemed like  
12 it wasn't -- might have not been happening  
13 fast enough, the muster maybe. I just -- I  
14 got impatient. I mean it's -- it's a lot of  
15 things going on.

16 Q. Fair enough. Now, when you were in  
17 your engine -- in sorry, your computer room  
18 looking at some stuff and you said you sat  
19 back, prior to that did you hear any gas  
20 alarms or any type of indication that  
21 something was going on on the rig?

22 A. No.

23 Q. What was your relationship with the BP  
24 drilling department? Anyone on the rig that  
25 represented BP? Did you have any relationship



1 or communication with them?

2 A. It was very minimal. I would describe  
3 my job as quality assurance, kind of out of  
4 sight out of mind kind of deal. Of course  
5 being on the rig for three years I knew  
6 everybody.

7 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

8 A. Relationship was just as business, you  
9 know, pretty simple.

10 Q. Do you know the process of displacing  
11 the riser, how it comes from the riser and off  
12 and to possibly where it goes out of the  
13 riser?

14 A. I couldn't explain it 100 percent.

15 Q. Okay. Were you monitoring any returns  
16 at any time of the day? Is it your job to  
17 monitor the returns?

18 A. No.

19 Q. No. Were you aware of any wells -- I  
20 know you arrived on the 20th. Were you aware  
21 of any problems with any type of loss returns  
22 prior to setting that production casing that  
23 might have been brought to your attention on  
24 the 20th?

25 A. Not in particular on the 20th. I knew



1 -- well, I had been on the rig in the past on  
2 this particular well where we had loss  
3 returns. I can't remember if it was once or  
4 twice?

5 Q. Okay. But when you arrived that day on  
6 the rig I was wondering if there was any  
7 information from that day or maybe the day  
8 before?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Nothing special on that day, no.

12 Q. Do you know what a "Pill" is?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Can you tell me what the function of a  
15 pill is?

16 A. A pill -- well, I --

17 Q. Is that part of your job? I'm sorry.

18 A. No, not really.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. I know, but I'm not going to --

21 Q. Do you know if they used any pills in  
22 the process of this job?

23 A. In the process of the entire well?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. Yes, they did.



1 Q. Do y'all have any records, does M-I  
2 SWACO have any records, on what was actually  
3 put into the well? Pills?

4 A. I don't.

5 Q. Is that something that's kept on the  
6 rig or is it something you transferred to the  
7 shore?

8 A. The pill material?

9 Q. No, no. What actually went into the  
10 well, what you did with M-I SWACO material.

11 A. Yeah, there's a record. We have a  
12 software that keeps those records. I don't  
13 have it obviously and it may have been lost.

14 Q. Were you aware of any formation  
15 ballooning that was brought to your attention  
16 outside of the loss returns?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Was there ever a kick on this well  
19 prior to the 20th that you may have been aware  
20 of?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. And when was that?

23 A. That would be a guess at best. It  
24 happened I know and that's it.

25 Q. I'm sorry, I have no more further



1 questions for him.

2 MR. MATHEWS:

3 Do you have any?

4 MR. McCARROLL:

5 Yes.

6 MR. MATHEWS:

7 Thank you.

8 E X A M I N A T I O N

9 BY MR. McCARROLL:

10 Q. Could I just follow up briefly on you  
11 were waiting for the stroke count you said  
12 around 13,000 or 14,000 and then at the stroke  
13 count you were going to up and take a sample  
14 -- you were going to take a sample of the mud  
15 or you were going to take a sample of the loss  
16 return material or -- what specifically were  
17 you waiting for at the 13,000 stroke count?

18 A. I'm waiting for the -- the very top of  
19 the 16 pound water base spacer.

20 Q. Okay. The 16 pound water base spacer.  
21 Would you call that a pill?

22 A. No. We call it a spacer.

23 Q. Okay, alright. That's fair enough.

24 And do you know the size of that spacer? Did  
25 you need to take more than one sample because



1 it's a big spacer? It's 200 feet or 50 feet

2 or --

3 A. No, sir. All I -- all the sample

4 represents is to make sure that we -- we

5 caught -- instead of catching the mud prior --

6 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

7 A. -- or the water after --

8 Q. Right.

9 A. -- we caught the spacer.

10 Q. And you were going to go back and tell

11 the driller or the toolpusher something about

12 the sample. That it's okay to what?

13 Anything?

14 A. Discharge.

15 Q. It's okay to pump that overboard?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Is that what you mean by "Discharge"?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So, you caught a sample and -- I'm

20 summarizing here. If I'm wrong tell me. You

21 caught a sample, you went down and ran a test

22 and then you came back and told the driller or

23 toolpusher?

24 A. I didn't make any calls. Someone did

25 make a call obviously to the rig floor to let



1       them know that my -- 'cause my -- my sample  
2       was to be done -- I don't want to use the word  
3       "Quickly" because I don't want it to be --

4       Q. That's fine.

5       A. -- misconstrued, but --

6       Q. That's fine. I'm just trying to get to  
7       the facts of what happened.

8       A. My sample was to be done like run down  
9       there --

10      Q. Right.

11      A. -- if it passes --

12      Q. Right.

13      A. -- they were going to start pumping  
14      again.

15      Q. And you were going to pump the pill or  
16      the --

17      A. -- the spacer.

18      Q. -- spacer overboard?

19      A. Overboard, yes, sir.

20      Q. Because you don't want the pill or  
21      spacer -- and if I'm misleading you let me  
22      know, You don't want it to go to the boat?

23      A. If -- yes. Exactly. We don't -- we  
24      don't want it. It's a water based --

25      Q. -- spacer.



1 A. -- it's dischargable material, yeah.

2 We don't need it.

3 Q. But your job is to make sure it's safe  
4 to pump that spacer overboard?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay. And you didn't report to someone  
7 that it was safe, but somebody else did?  
8 Could you elaborate on that a little bit?

9 A. Yeah. In most -- in most cases I have  
10 a -- you know, we displace riser to sea water  
11 back to synthetic mud all the time. I mean we  
12 do this, it's a pretty regular thing. I'm  
13 sorry.

14 Q. I was just trying to find out --

15 A. No, I just lost my train of thought.

16 Q. That's okay. I was just trying to help  
17 you. I'm just trying to find out who  
18 transferred the information from you to  
19 someone else that it was safe to pump it  
20 overboard?

21 A. Thank you. What I was going to say was  
22 this -- this test that I was doing was a --  
23 it's not -- it's not required because of my --  
24 the EPA rules that my job goes by, I'm allowed  
25 to discharge this spacer as a whole.



1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And take it what I call, what we call,  
3 a small volume discharge --

4 Q. Right.

5 A. -- at a 25 percent retention. I may be  
6 speaking foreign --

7 Q. That's fine. Go ahead, I understand.

8 A. So, in other words the static sheen  
9 test that I did, the little sample that I  
10 caught and ran it to the lab --

11 Q. Right.

12 A. -- to give the rig floor a call, which  
13 like I said I didn't make the call. But for  
14 them to continue to -- continue the  
15 displacement.

16 Q. Right.

17 A. I don't think that was completely  
18 necessary because of my default number.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. It covers that. It was just -- I guess  
21 it was a good faith kind of test.

22 Q. Did you have to follow up with anything  
23 after that? Like after they finish displacing  
24 to verify that they were finished displacing  
25 or anything else related to the pumping?



1 A. Uh --

2 Q. No?

3 A. No. I caught the sample.

4 Q. And that's all you had to do?

5 A. And I left.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And that was it.

8 Q. Okay. Thank you.

9 EXAMINATION

10 BY MR. DYKES:

11 Q. Mr. Meche, who is designed as the mud  
12 engineer on this crew?

13 MR. EASON:

14 At the time?

15 BY MR. DYKES:

16 Q. At the time.

17 A. At the time of --

18 Q. The explosion.

19 A. The explosion. It would have been  
20 Gordon Jones and we had Blair Manuel was --  
21 the normal guy would have been Gordon Jones.  
22 Blair Manuel was there for the next well just  
23 familiarizing himself with the rig.

24 Q. Okay, alright. I have no questions.

25 Thank you.



1 EXAMINATION

2 BY MR. WHEATLEY:

3 Q. Good afternoon, no it's not. It's  
4 still morning, good. I just have a couple of  
5 clarification questions about the lifeboats,  
6 which is of particular interest. We've heard  
7 a variety of testimony. If I'm correct you  
8 said that you'd been on the HORIZON for about  
9 three years?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Do you recall ballpark how many hitches  
12 had you done?

13 A. Twelve a year. Probably average one  
14 less than twelve a year. So, 33 maybe.

15 Q. Okay. And could you estimate during  
16 that time you're doing those hitches how many  
17 lifeboat drills had you done?

18 A. Every Sunday at 10:00 or 10:30 in the  
19 morning, every Sunday.

20 Q. And, based upon those experiences and  
21 practice doing those drills, did you feel  
22 comfortable in the way things would proceed if  
23 there was a need to abandon ship?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. I guess my question, sir, kind of



1 focuses upon, you know, if you had been  
2 through all those drills and you had  
3 confidence that you thought basically the  
4 folks knew what they were doing, what was it  
5 that basically made you decide to go one deck  
6 down and jump? Were you frustrated, were you,  
7 you know, overly concerned? Was it getting  
8 hot? I'm just really kind of curious.

9 A. It was a decision that I made because I  
10 didn't think we had time to wait.

11 Q. You thought it was taking too long to  
12 get the boat out?

13 A. I just -- they had a series of  
14 explosions, it's time to go. That was my  
15 thought process.

16 Q. Can you estimate for us from the time  
17 that you heard the first explosion, you went  
18 to the boat deck, before you made your  
19 decision to go down and jump how much time  
20 elapsed?

21 A. Fifteen minutes maybe.

22 Q. Thank you, sir. I have no further  
23 questions.

24 EXAMINATION

25 BY LT BUTTS:



1 Q. Good morning. Thanks for your  
2 testimony. Just to continue on with Mr.  
3 Wheatley, how were you recovered from the  
4 water?

5 A. I was -- I was picked up by the DAMON  
6 BANKSTON's -- I guess it's a fast rescue boat.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. You know. I was picked up by them  
9 about 200 yards from the rig I would estimate.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And from there they brought me in that  
12 boat to the DAMON BANKSTON where we ended up.

13 Q. Okay. And, when you were on that fast  
14 rescue boat, did they retrieve other people  
15 from the water or did they rescue you and take  
16 you back over?

17 A. There were four guys that had jumped.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. While I was on that boat.

20 Q. Alright. And they collected all four  
21 of you and brought you back to the BANKSTON?

22 A. To the BANKSTON. Yes, sir.

23 Q. Do you recall as the gentlemen in the  
24 fast rescue boat were collecting the people  
25 and bringing them back, had the lifeboats



1 left --

2 A. No.

3 Q. -- the MODU?

4 A. No.

5 Q. So, you were actually recovered faster

6 than the people that actually evacuated the

7 rig?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. Okay. What was your muster point? I

10 don't know if we asked you: Which lifeboat you

11 were supposed to go to?

12 A. I am in Lifeboat 1.

13 Q. Number 1?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. When you got to Lifeboat Number

16 1, who was in charge or who was typically in

17 charge?

18 A. In this -- normally it's the assistant

19 driller.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. On Lifeboat 1 at least.

22 Q. Yep, yep.

23 A. It's the guy Patrick Morgan.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And he -- he usually does an excellent



1 job and in my opinion he was doing a good job  
2 that night. It was the chaos going on around  
3 him.

4 Q. Oh, I understand.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. I understand. I'm not trying to place  
7 blame by any stretch of the imagination. So,  
8 were they taking muster at that time?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. Okay. Were they waiting for anybody?

11 A. That -- I can't tell you that.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. I don't know.

14 Q. Alright. Did you hear Mr. Pat or  
15 anyone in the immediate area there give an  
16 order to go ahead and put people in the  
17 lifeboats?

18 A. I wasn't there long enough.

19 Q. Okay. So, they were still taking  
20 muster?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. Okay. Good enough. When you were  
23 coming back through the accommodations, if you  
24 could kind of go back and think back. You  
25 said you went in and grabbed your life jacket.



1 A. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

2 Q. Is that something you typically train  
3 every week, every Sunday at 10:00 to do grab  
4 your life jacket?

5 A. Well, I normally don't get the life  
6 jacket from my bedroom because of our sleeping  
7 conditions. There's four guys that sleep in  
8 that room.

9 Q. Right.

10 A. And everybody works a different shift.

11 Q. Sure.

12 A. So, there's always somebody sleeping.  
13 Now, of course, on a fire drill everybody's  
14 awake.

15 Q. Right.

16 A. But I just -- I -- there are two life  
17 vest boxes --

18 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

19 A. -- by each set of lifeboats.

20 Q. Yeah.

21 A. So, I -- 95 percent of the time I'll  
22 get my life jacket out of those boxes as  
23 opposed to getting it out of my room.

24 Q. Sure. So, this time why did you go  
25 back inside the accommodations?



- 1 A. I didn't go back inside.
- 2 Q. Oh, okay.
- 3 A. I was inside.
- 4 Q. I beg your pardon.
- 5 A. You know, I was inside and a couple of
- 6 explosions and I think I was told "Go get your
- 7 life vests" 'cause these guys are used to
- 8 getting the life vest out of their bedroom.
- 9 Q. Yeah.
- 10 A. I'm not. I go to the box and there's
- 11 no difference.
- 12 Q. Sure.
- 13 A. And it doesn't matter. If you get it
- 14 there or here it doesn't matter.
- 15 Q. I agree, I agree.
- 16 A. And in this case I went to my bedroom
- 17 and got it there, which it's kind of on the --
- 18 my bedroom's on the way outside. So --
- 19 Q. Okay. And what's your room number?
- 20 A. 237.
- 21 Q. So, you're on the second deck?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. Is that the deck of the muster station
- 24 and lifeboat deck?
- 25 A. Yes.



1 Q. Okay. And, when you left there you  
2 went -- how did you get out to the lifeboat  
3 deck? Did you go out through the back door or  
4 the staircase?

5 A. Well, the -- as you -- as we just said,  
6 the lifeboat deck is on the same level --

7 Q. Yeah.

8 A. -- as my room. My office is on the  
9 same level as my room. And I just  
10 basically --

11 Q. -- just went right out?

12 A. -- from my room -- yeah. And, you  
13 know, we had -- rubble -- a couple of -- a  
14 little bit of rubble to go through, but --

15 Q. Yeah. Please explain that. When you  
16 were leaving your room going out to the  
17 lifeboat deck, where you're going to be  
18 leaving the deck, can you explain -- can you  
19 describe what you were seeing, what you were  
20 smelling, what you were hearing in the  
21 accommodations area there? I mean the walls  
22 that you typically walk by, how were they, and  
23 the doors, the overhead ceilings, the tile and  
24 -- you know, was there any insulation falling  
25 down on you? Things like that, can you



1 explain to us that thing?

2 A. My side -- my office is on the forward  
3 side.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. On our deck the aft portion of the  
6 living quarters --

7 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

8 A. -- which is where Transocean's main  
9 offices are on that floor. The explosion  
10 happened from the aft towards the forward side  
11 of the rig.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. So, my -- my office and bedroom and  
14 everything -- 'cause basically the galley --  
15 you've got it over here on the schematic, but  
16 the galley is the center point.

17 Q. Do you want to look at to help you  
18 explain it?

19 A. It might help, it might help me to  
20 explain it. Yeah.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. For visual effect I guess.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

24 Deck 2?

25 THE WITNESS:



1 Yes, sir. Deck 2.

2 BY LT BUTTS:

3 Q. Yeah, go ahead.

4 A. I'm here (indicating) in the third  
5 party office.

6 Q. If you don't mind, just pop that  
7 (indicating) in there right where you were at.

8 A. Okay. (Witness complies.) Okay. I was  
9 in the third party office --

10 Q. Sorry.

11 A. I was in the third party office when  
12 the explosion happened. I mentioned that I  
13 walked into the dispatcher's office after the  
14 second explosion.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. This is where I was. From there my  
17 bedroom is this black dot right here  
18 (indicating).

19 Q. Okay. And what number is that again?

20 A. 237.

21 Q. 237.

22 A. I ran from here into my room, got my  
23 life vest, ran out here (indicating) and when  
24 I got right here (indicating), like I said,  
25 the galley, as you can see, it's kind of the



1     halfway point.

2     Q. Yeah.

3     A. Actually this hallway right here  
4     (indicating) right here would be the halfway  
5     point. But from here and -- I can't see right  
6     here -- from here (indicating) all the way to  
7     here (indicating) to me was where the  
8     explosion happened.

9     Q. Okay.

10    A. These walls -- all of these walls here  
11    (indicating) all of these rooms were all  
12    destroyed. The walls were laying down.

13    Q. Now, did you walk down that way or did  
14    you just look in that general direction as you  
15    were leaving?

16    A. As I -- as I looked up the hallway,  
17    yes.

18    Q. Okay. Now, if I could ask you one  
19    question there: When you're looking at that  
20    did it look like it was blow towards your  
21    location as you're going out there?

22    A. I can't say that.

23    Q. Okay.

24    A. All I can say is that the walls were --

25    Q. Collapsed?



1 A. The walls were collapsed and on top of  
2 each other.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Some of the ceiling tiles and in that  
5 area the insulation was kind of flying around.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. There was smoke and you asked about  
8 sounds?

9 Q. Yes, sir.

10 A. The general alarm was sounding at this  
11 point.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. And they were telling us to go to the  
14 galley, but that's our secondary muster  
15 station would be the galley and the cinema  
16 room.

17 Q. Okay. And that's an interesting point.  
18 So, when the GA, the general alarm, did go off  
19 is it normal practice to go to your primary or  
20 your secondary muster location?

21 A. Primary.

22 Q. And what's the primary?

23 A. Primary would be Lifeboat 1.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And Lifeboat 2.



1 Q. Now, you said that you heard "Go to  
2 secondary"; is that right?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. And that's where you guys were heading?

5 A. Well, yeah. Whenever we got -- for me  
6 my secondary is the galley. For people in  
7 Lifeboat 2 would be the cinema room.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Once we got to this point it was  
10 obvious that the galley was not the place to  
11 be. But the bridge, who's making the  
12 announcement, they can't see this.

13 Q. Sure.

14 A. So, they didn't know -- I mean no fault  
15 on them, but they had no clue that the galley  
16 was completely collapsed.

17 Q. Yeah.

18 A. At this point I stood there for ten  
19 seconds because there were people that were  
20 trying to muster. They were only doing what  
21 they were told to do. And I stood there for  
22 maybe ten seconds and we -- the door -- this  
23 water-tight door that comes out to the  
24 lifeboat deck was opened. Somebody opened it.

25 Q. Okay.



1 A. And I saw that there were people  
2 standing outside and then that's whenever  
3 pretty much everybody made a decision that  
4 that's the best place to be.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Not in here (indicating).

7 Q. And let me understand: When you get the  
8 general alarm, does that mean go to the  
9 lifeboat station or does that -- is that -- I  
10 see you nodding.

11 A. Your primary -- primary muster -- I  
12 mean primary muster station is Lifeboat 1 and  
13 2.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. The general alarm with no -- if there's  
16 no -- if they don't tell you where to go  
17 that's where you go.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. So, someone did say go inside the --

21 A. Do not go -- "Go to secondary muster  
22 stations." It's "Fire, fire, fire."

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. You know and it's a standard -- you  
25 know, like our fire drill sounds like "This is



1 a drill, this is a drill, this is a drill.

2 Fire, fire, fire. Simulated fire on such and

3 such."

4 Q. Right.

5 A. "Report to first muster station."

6 Q. Yeah.

7 A. Or "Primary muster station."

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. "Lifeboats 1 and 2 will be used today."

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And that's a drill.

12 Q. So, this time you heard "Fire, fire,

13 fire" --

14 A. "This is not a drill, this is not a

15 drill, this is not a drill. Report to

16 secondary muster stations, do not go outside"

17 is what I heard.

18 Q. Got you, got you. Perfect, thanks.

19 A. Once we got there we -- as I said we

20 knew that it was not the place to be.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. So --

23 Q. Alright. Thank you very much. I

24 appreciate it.

25 CAPT NGUYEN:



1           Flag state, do you have any  
2           questions?

3           MR. LINSIN:

4           Thank you, Captain.

5           E X A M I N A T I O N

6           BY MR. LINSIN:

7           Q. Good morning, Mr. Meche. I just have a  
8           couple of questions for you, sir. You lost a  
9           couple of colleagues in this casualty; is that  
10          correct?

11          A. Yes, sir.

12          Q. You gave a statement the day after the  
13          incident? You wrote out a statement and  
14          signed it recounting your best memory of the  
15          events of the incident; is that right?

16          A. On the DAMON BANKSTON.

17          Q. Yes.

18          A. Yes, sir.

19          Q. Alright. The only thing I would like  
20          to clarify, sir, is this: You referenced in  
21          your statement and touched on it here in your  
22          testimony that you saw Gordon Jones and Blair  
23          Manuel in the shaker house; is that correct?

24          A. Yes, sir.

25          Q. And you then proceeded to test the



1 sample that you had taken; is that correct?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. And the -- the explosion, the first  
4 explosion, that you experienced occurred about  
5 fifteen minutes after you last saw Mr. Jones  
6 and Mr. Manuel; is that correct?

7 A. Fifteen to twenty minutes. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Alright. But the last place you had  
9 seen them was in the shaker house on the main  
10 deck; is that correct?

11 A. Well, the last place I saw Gordon Jones  
12 was in his mud shack, which -- I forget --  
13 well, what I wrote in the statement was --  
14 what I -- what I did was I did the static  
15 sheen test. I came back into the shaker house  
16 to weigh the sample and I only weigh it for my  
17 -- for my program that I have to enter it  
18 into. From there Gordon Jones and Blair  
19 Manuel separated. Gordon Jones went back to  
20 his -- what we call his mud shack, which is  
21 just a little small pod. A one man deal where  
22 the mud engineer sits.

23 Q. Is that on the main deck, as well, sir?

24 A. The main deck, yeah.

25 Q. Alright.



1 A. It would be on the port aft side of the  
2 rig.

3 Q. Alright.

4 A. That's the last place that I talked to  
5 him. And the only reason why I went to talk  
6 to him was to let him know what weight I got  
7 on the spacer.

8 Q. Alright.

9 A. And we agreed that it was what it was  
10 supposed to be, good to go. And that was the  
11 last I saw of him. So, that was the -- it was  
12 the last contact that I had.

13 Q. Alright. And that was fifteen or  
14 twenty minutes you said --

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. -- before the explosion?

17 A. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

18 Q. Thank you.

19 MR. LINSIN:

20 No further questions, Captain.

21 CAPT NGUYEN:

22 Thank you, sir. M-I SWACO, do you  
23 have any questions?

24 COUNSEL REPRESENTING M-I SWACO, INC.:

25 (No questions.)



1 CAPT NGUYEN:

2 Thank you, sir. Halliburton?

3 COUNSEL REPRESENTING HALLIBURTON:

4 No questions, Captain.

5 CAPT NGUYEN:

6 Thank you, sir. Dril-Quip?

7 COUNSEL REPRESENTING DRIL-QUIP, INC.:

8 No questions.

9 CAPT NGUYEN:

10 Weatherford?

11 COUNSEL REPRESENTING WEATHERFORD,

12 INC.:

13 No questions.

14 CAPT NGUYEN:

15 Anadarko?

16 COUNSEL REPRESENTING ANADARKO

17 PETROLEUM CORPORATION:

18 No questions.

19 CAPT NGUYEN:

20 MOEX?

21 COUNSEL REPRESENTING MOEX USA:

22 (No response.)

23 CAPT NGUYEN:

24 Douglas Brown?

25 COUNSEL REPRESENTING DOUGLAS BROWN:



1           No questions, Captain.

2           CAPT NGUYEN:

3           Thank you. BP?

4           MR. GODFREY:

5           Thank you, Captain. No questions.

6           CAPT NGUYEN:

7           Thank you. Transocean?

8           MR. KOHNKE:

9           I have just a couple of questions.

10          CAPT NGUYEN:

11          Yes.

12          E X A M I N A T I O N

13          BY MR. KOHNKE:

14          Q. Mr. Meche, I just have a couple of  
15          questions that I would like to ask you. I  
16          know that the displacement had finished and  
17          you were engaged in taking the sheen test or  
18          doing the sheen test; is that correct?

19          A. Yes, sir.

20          Q. My question is: How did you decide when  
21          to commence the sheen test? Was it based on  
22          the number of strokes or the return of the  
23          spacer?

24          A. It was -- it's always a combination of  
25          both. In this case it came back on time.



1 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

2 A. But more important than strokes are --  
3 in my opinion it's what you see. Whenever you  
4 see it coming back it's a pretty distinct  
5 difference. It was a visual, more visual.

6 Q. So, the spacer did come up as  
7 calculated?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Okay. Now, last question: I know that  
10 the spacer, being a water based spacer, was  
11 going to be pumped overboard. How were you  
12 wind up to do that?

13 A. I can't answer that.

14 Q. Okay. And was there some method by  
15 which you had prepared to monitor the volume  
16 of what would be going overboard? How much  
17 spacer would be going over?

18 A. Not that I know of. No, there's no way  
19 to monitor the amount. It was within --  
20 within reason. You know, within dischargable  
21 reason, as far as I knew.

22 Q. Did you have a written procedure for  
23 the -- for the displacement? For the pump  
24 schedule as to tell you what to do and when to  
25 do it and how to do it?



1       A. Yes, sir. Our mud engineers write one  
2 for each displacement.

3       Q. Okay. Thank you. That's all I have.

4       CAPT NGUYEN:

5             Thank you, sir. Cameron?

6       COUNSEL REPRESENTING CAMERON, INC.:

7             No questions.

8       CAPT NGUYEN:

9             Thank you. Mr. Meche, are there

10            any questions that we haven't asked you

11            or any information that you think is

12            relevant to the investigation that we

13            should know?

14       THE WITNESS:

15            No, sir.

16       CAPT NGUYEN:

17            Okay. Thank you very much for your

18            time and if we need for you to come

19            back in the future for us to get

20            additional information will you make

21            yourself available?

22       THE WITNESS:

23            I'll do my best.

24       CAPT NGUYEN:

25            Yes, sir. Thank you very much.



1           You are dismissed.

2           THE WITNESS:

3           Thank you.

4           CAPT NGUYEN:

5           The board will take a one hour  
6           break. We will resume at 1:10. Thank  
7           you.

8           (Whereupon a recess was taken.)

9           CAPT NGUYEN:

10          Mr. Haire, please rise and raise  
11          your right hand.

12          MR. HAIRE:

13          (Witness complies.)

14          \* \* \* \* \*

15                                   CHRISTOPHER HAIRE,

16          after being first duly sworn in the cause,  
17          testified as follows:

18          CAPT NGUYEN:

19          Thank you, sir. Please be seated.

20          THE WITNESS:

21          (Witness complies.)

22                                   E X A M I N A T I O N

23          BY MR. MATHEWS:

24          Q. Mr. Haire, for the record could you  
25          state your full name and spell your last?



1 A. Christopher Haire. Last name H-A-I-R-

2 E.

3 Q. And by whom are you employed, sir?

4 A. Halliburton.

5 Q. And what position do you hold with

6 Halliburton?

7 A. Service supervisor.

8 Q. I'm sorry, what was that?

9 A. Service supervisor.

10 Q. And how long have you held that

11 position?

12 A. For two years.

13 Q. Two years?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Had you had any previous oil and gas

16 experience prior to that?

17 A. No, sir.

18 Q. What is your educational background?

19 A. High school graduate and two years of

20 college.

21 Q. Can you please just briefly describe

22 your day to day operations on the DEEPWATER

23 HORIZON, what you're responsible for?

24 A. We do high pressure monitoring, fluid

25 pumping, cement and, you know, various pumping



1 operations.

2 Q. Have you had any -- did you actually do  
3 the cement on the 9 and 7/8ths production  
4 casing?

5 A. No, sir. I was not on the rig.

6 Q. Have you had any special cement  
7 training? Are you responsible for any cement  
8 of any production casing or any casing in the  
9 well?

10 A. No, sir. I'm sorry. Could you repeat  
11 the question?

12 Q. Are you responsible for any cementing  
13 of any casing within the well?

14 A. Yes, sir. I did do a couple of cement  
15 jobs for the well.

16 Q. Which ones were those?

17 A. I did the 13 and 5/8ths, 11 and 7/8ths  
18 and the 9 and 7/8ths.

19 Q. Do you know who did the production  
20 casing cement job?

21 A. Yes. That was my co-worker, Vince  
22 Tabler.

23 Q. Vince Haywood?

24 A. Tabler.

25 Q. Tabler. How long had you been your



1 hitch at the DEEPWATER HORIZON the day of the  
2 incident?

3 A. That was my first day.

4 Q. Alright. What time did you arrive,  
5 sir?

6 A. Around 11:00.

7 Q. Okay. Can you briefly take me through  
8 your day up to the time of the incident?

9 A. Let's see, I arrived on the rig at  
10 around 11:00 a.m. At the time they were  
11 finishing up a positive test. I made my way  
12 to the cement room and helped finish cleaning  
13 up from the casing test. Let's see, after  
14 that we -- probably around 2:00 that afternoon  
15 we displaced the cement and the choke line  
16 with seawater just to clean it out. And  
17 tested our lines for the negative test to  
18 3,000 PSI. Around 5:00 we were requested on  
19 our cement unit for the negative test to  
20 monitor the well. After the first attempt we  
21 were unsatisfied with it. We were still  
22 getting flow. I was directed to shut in from  
23 the well. At that point pressure increased to  
24 1400 PSI. Around five minutes later I was  
25 instructed by the driller to open up from the



1 well. I got about fifteen barrels back and  
2 was instructed to shut in from the well again.  
3 Pressure --

4 Q. What time was that around? Just to  
5 give me a time frame.

6 A. Probably around 7:00. After shutting  
7 in for the second time some 45 minutes had  
8 passed. At this point I made my way up to the  
9 rig floor just to bring some equipment for the  
10 cement job that would be needed up there. It  
11 was the next operation that would take place.  
12 At that point I was instructed by the driller  
13 and toolpusher that they had achieved a  
14 successful negative test on the rig floor and  
15 to go ahead and get our job procedure ready  
16 for the surface plug. At that point we made  
17 our way down to our office and the living  
18 quarters. And started a revision on the  
19 cement job procedure. During the process of  
20 printing that out we lost power from the first  
21 explosion. A fire alarm went off. At that  
22 point I grabbed my boots and hard hat and  
23 started my way out the door when the second  
24 bigger explosion occurred. And, you know,  
25 just got knocked down the hallway into the



1 galley. You know, at that point it's a little  
2 fuzzy, you know, I don't remember much, but we  
3 made our way out to the muster station. And  
4 just awaited for further instructions from  
5 there.

6 Q. Alright.

7 A. We --

8 Q. I'm sorry, did someone say something?

9 A. I just -- we then boarded the  
10 lifeboats.

11 Q. Okay. Were you onboard when they  
12 actually did the production casing cement job?

13 A. No, sir. I was not.

14 Q. But Vince was?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Alright. Had he discussed anything  
17 about that casing job, cement job on that  
18 casing, with you?

19 A. No, sir. He had not. No, sir.

20 Q. In your day to day operations did the  
21 BP company man -- was Vince your boss, I'm  
22 sorry?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Or was he -- did they have any day to  
25 day communication with each other to your



1 recollection?

2 A. Between the BP well site leader and --

3 Q. Yeah. Not just the date of the 20th,  
4 but in your duration at the well site?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. They did. And who was that person that  
7 met with your boss from BP?

8 A. I'm sorry?

9 Q. Who was the company representative from  
10 BP that dealt with the cementing procedures?

11 A. I do not know that.

12 Q. Were you aware of any changes that  
13 might have happened during the duration of the  
14 well on any cement jobs?

15 A. No, sir.

16 Q. Were you aware of any issues with the  
17 well during the duration of your time out at  
18 the DEEPWATER HORIZON? Loss returns?

19 A. Yes, sir. There were a couple of -- a  
20 couple of sections there where we lost  
21 returns.

22 Q. Was there any sections where they had  
23 gas cut mud?

24 A. I do not know.

25 Q. You said you were working on procedure



1 I guess to set the surface plug. Did you  
2 normally review the procedure or did you just  
3 implement the procedure that was given to you?

4 A. We would review the procedure, double  
5 check calculations and then go over it with  
6 the BP well site leader.

7 Q. And that procedure was solely for the  
8 surface bug?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. In that procedure, was there any  
11 mention of displacing the riser?

12 A. No, sir.

13 Q. So, you were just solely going to be  
14 setting the cement plug?

15 A. That's correct.

16 MR. MATHEWS:

17 I have no further questions.

18 EXAMINATION

19 BY MR. McCARROLL:

20 Q. I just want to ask you a couple of  
21 questions about the cement strings you did  
22 set, the 9 and 7/8ths, which is a liner,  
23 right?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. 11 and 7/8ths, 13 and 5/8ths, were they



1 all liners?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. And I assume they all had the check  
4 valves in the bottom, you know, where you run  
5 the cement?

6 A. Yes, yes, sir. They did.

7 Q. Did you run them in because valve's  
8 pinned open so that you can feel the liners?

9 A. At -- I do not know. That varies.

10 Q. Do you have to pump something before  
11 you start cementing to shear those pins?

12 A. Yes, sir. They do.

13 Q. Okay. And the ones that you have  
14 experience with, these liners, when you drop  
15 the ball or dart, whatever it is, you shear  
16 those pins did you have any difficulty  
17 shearing the pins?

18 A. No, sir. I do not carry out those  
19 operations. I'm not --

20 Q. You weren't aware of the operations on  
21 shearing the pins?

22 A. No, sir.

23 Q. Okay. Thank you.

24 EXAMINATION

25 BY MR. WHEATLEY:



1 Q. Good afternoon, sir. I just have a  
2 couple of questions. In particular I would  
3 like to ask you a little bit about when you  
4 went through and started to prepare for  
5 abandon ship. Now, you indicated that you had  
6 just gotten onboard that morning; is that  
7 correct?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. How many hitches prior to that had you  
10 had on the HORIZON?

11 A. I had been out there for about 18  
12 months. So --

13 Q. And, during the course of those 18  
14 months, did you participate in fire and  
15 abandon ship drills?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Okay. On the day in question here, as  
18 you proceeded to your lifeboat station, which  
19 one was that?

20 A. Lifeboat Number 1.

21 Q. Okay. Could you describe for us what  
22 you saw, what you experienced? Was there  
23 confusion, what was going on?

24 A. When I got out to the lifeboats there  
25 was panic, a little bit of confusion. Some



1 people wanted to just get on the boats and go.  
2 Others wanted to collect a muster and find out  
3 if a search and rescue would be needed. I  
4 mean it was just panic really. You know, but  
5 we got 115 people off the rig safely. So, I  
6 mean --

7 Q. In your opinion then lifeboat drills  
8 were typically conducted pretty much the same  
9 time all the time?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Based on your experience the same type  
12 of day, the same day?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Do you think that helped you in  
15 preparing for this particular evacuation or do  
16 you think it would have been better to  
17 possibly vary it and have unannounced times  
18 for lifeboat drills?

19 A. I believe maybe some unannounced times  
20 for the lifeboat drills, but I felt that, you  
21 know, that training did contribute to getting  
22 everybody off of the rig safely or as many  
23 people as we did.

24 Q. During the course in which you had that  
25 training, did you ever participate in actually



1 loading the lifeboats at all?

2 A. Yes, sir. We did.

3 Q. You did. Do you recall how many times  
4 possibly?

5 A. I believe just once that I can recall.

6 Q. Did you practice lowering the  
7 lifeboats?

8 A. I personally did not. No, sir.

9 Q. Did you witness them actually being  
10 lowered?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Did you feel comfortable with the  
13 procedures and your responsibilities, as far  
14 as getting to the lifeboat station and getting  
15 onboard the boat?

16 A. Yes, sir. I did.

17 Q. On this particular occasion do you  
18 recall who was in charge of your lifeboat on  
19 that day?

20 A. I do not recall.

21 Q. Now, according to your statement here  
22 you indicated that the lifeboat was in the  
23 water at approximately 10:15. Most of the  
24 testimony we have here indicates the first  
25 explosion likely took place roughly at 2145.



1 So, approximately within 30 minutes of the  
2 lifeboat was launched, is that your  
3 recollection as well?

4 A. I don't believe it took that long. You  
5 know, we were maybe out there for ten minutes,  
6 maybe fifteen at the most.

7 Q. Would you describe it as proceeding,  
8 despite the chaos, somewhat orderly?

9 A. I wouldn't call it orderly, but close  
10 to.

11 Q. Thank you. I have no further  
12 questions.

13 EXAMINATION

14 BY LT BUTTS:

15 Q. Good afternoon. The statement that Mr.  
16 Wheatley is referring to you also mentioned in  
17 there and I think you just said a few minutes  
18 ago that you went back to your -- you were up  
19 on the rig floor. And what exactly were you  
20 doing on the rig floor there? I think you  
21 mentioned some -- you were instructed to do  
22 some things?

23 A. That's correct. We were checking on  
24 the status of a negative test that the rig  
25 floor had performed and, at that point, they



1 instructed us to go down to our room to revise  
2 our cement procedures.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. And get those ready for the operation  
5 to begin.

6 Q. Okay. So, you were in your state room  
7 printing of the procedures. Is that the  
8 procedures that comes from the cement plan --

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. -- or is that something different?

11 A. That's a procedure that comes from a  
12 cement plan.

13 Q. Okay. And what's your knowledge of the  
14 cement plan? I mean do you know the details  
15 of it prior to hitting print and then  
16 reviewing it? Is that something that's given  
17 to you well in advance?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. I mean I realize you were just there  
20 that day, so --

21 A. Right. For that particular job we --  
22 you know, we double check calculations and  
23 volumes, go back and revise our procedure as  
24 needed, print it out, let the BP well site  
25 leader double check it and, if they're okay



1 with it, we'll use that. But if they want to  
2 make any revisions that's where we go back and  
3 make our corrections.

4 Q. Okay. So, you print out -- you get  
5 together as a group then and have some type of  
6 safety meeting or something. Is that where  
7 you go through that review?

8 A. Yes, sir. That's correct.

9 Q. Okay. Can you -- have you participated  
10 in one of those reviews before?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Can you just kind of generally tell us  
13 what it's like? I mean do you lead that  
14 discussion?

15 A. Yes, sir. I do lead that discussion.

16 Q. Okay. Just generally how's that go?

17 A. Basically we meet in a BP well site  
18 leader office --

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. -- where we discuss the sequence of  
21 steps and between fluids that we're going to  
22 pump, rates that we'll be pumping and then  
23 volumes.

24 Q. Okay. And these -- when you're -- when  
25 you're going through that is this almost like



1 a presentation that you're making to the well  
2 site leader?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. And then he or she can then say 'No,  
5 no, no, no. Let's go this way, let's do this,  
6 this is what the well -- this is what we've  
7 changed it to or we're altering to or adding  
8 to it'?

9 A. Yes, sir. That's correct.

10 Q. Okay. And then do you go back to your  
11 supervisors and let them know 'Hey, the  
12 company man or someone's changing this or  
13 wanting to change to it'?

14 A. If it's a big change, yes, we go back  
15 to our supervisor. But if it's just something  
16 small, we just make that correction on our  
17 own.

18 Q. Okay. And, when you are discussing  
19 these with the well site leader, is that a BP  
20 employee?

21 A. Yes, sir. That's a BP employee.

22 Q. Okay. Do they honor that work process  
23 change guidelines that Transocean has in place  
24 I think it is or does the BP employee just  
25 simply 'This is what we want' and if it's not



1 too far off then you guys give it the blessing  
2 and just go with it?

3 A. You know, I really -- I'm not really  
4 sure about the Transocean methods. Just if  
5 they -- if they agree with it we go with it.

6 Q. Okay, alright. Good enough. Before  
7 you came up I had mentioned that I wanted to  
8 show you a chart --

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. -- or a diagram of the rig. I want to  
11 get that up and I would like of like to have  
12 you just identify where you were at. Thank  
13 you, sir. Level-2.

14 A. I was in -- this (indicating) is our  
15 room right here. I'm sorry. Let me just --

16 Q. Yes, please.

17 A. Alright.

18 Q. Thank you. What room number are you  
19 in?

20 A. 231.

21 Q. Okay. Now -- so, again, this is where  
22 you came down. You're printing out the well  
23 -- excuse me, the cement procedures that  
24 you're hoping to go into a meeting here  
25 shortly with the well site leader; is that



1 right?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Okay. Now, I'm curious just to let you  
4 know where I'm going with this. You know,  
5 there's a few of you that were onboard the rig  
6 that can actually tell us what type of damage  
7 was done to the accommodations. You know, I'm  
8 interested in finding out the condition of the  
9 accommodations as you were leaving. You know,  
10 when you heard these explosions, can you tell  
11 me what you saw, what you heard, what you  
12 felt, things of that nature?

13 A. After the explosion I was right -- I  
14 was about right here (indicating) in the  
15 hallway.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. And, you know, that knocked me and I  
18 went through this wall (indicating) into the  
19 galley.

20 Q. Now, did something hit you or was it a  
21 percussion that came through?

22 A. It was a percussion that came through.

23 Q. Okay. So, there wasn't anything that  
24 physically -- you know, like a piece of a  
25 bulkhead or a chair --



1 A. No, sir.

2 Q. -- or a locker? Okay.

3 A. When I stood up and, you know, got my  
4 bearings and looked back this way (indicating)  
5 there were walls, beds. I could see into the  
6 sack room. So, it blew everything.

7 Q. Okay, alright. Okay. And then when  
8 you got up what did you do then?

9 A. There were a bunch of people coming out  
10 of these rooms here (indicating). We helped  
11 get them over the debris and then the  
12 sprinklers were on, so it was a bit slippery.  
13 And, let's see, we came around this way  
14 (indicating) down the hallway and out to the  
15 muster station.

16 Q. Okay. Tell me about that sprinkler  
17 system. So, the sprinkler system is a fire  
18 fighting; is that right?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. Okay. Was there fire in the  
21 accommodations?

22 A. Not to my knowledge. There was a lot  
23 of smoke.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. But I didn't -- I didn't see any fire.



1 Q. Black smoke, white smoke, gray smoke?

2 A. It was pitch black. I really couldn't  
3 tell what color the smoke was.

4 Q. Okay. Did you have a flashlight with  
5 you?

6 A. No, sir.

7 Q. Was any of the emergency lighting  
8 that's usually up on the bulkheads, the top  
9 bulkhead, were any of those on?

10 A. No, sir.

11 Q. Okay. Was there any low level lighting  
12 along the deck that would help direct you to  
13 the lifeboat station?

14 A. No, sir.

15 Q. How about any flourescent tape or  
16 anything like that kind of pointing you to a  
17 direction?

18 A. Yeah, there was some flourescent tape  
19 that you could see.

20 Q. Did it work?

21 A. Yes, sir. I could see it.

22 Q. Okay. And did you know how to get  
23 there because of your training in running  
24 through the drills or was that just where  
25 people were going and you were following?



- 1 A. From the drills --
- 2 Q. Okay.
- 3 A. -- I knew where to go.
- 4 Q. Did you have your life jacket?
- 5 A. No, sir.
- 6 Q. Where did you get that at?
- 7 A. Outside.
- 8 Q. Okay. So, you proceeded through. Now,
- 9 did you see what the galley looked like as you
- 10 were going by?
- 11 A. Yes, sir.
- 12 Q. How was that? What did it look like?
- 13 A. The galley was pretty in tact actually.
- 14 I just -- just the walls right here
- 15 (indicating) --
- 16 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).
- 17 A. -- the integrity was gone. I mean I
- 18 went through there, but when I got up and I
- 19 could see in the galley it didn't, you know,
- 20 get that bad.
- 21 Q. Okay. What about the deck that you
- 22 were walking on? Was it damaged in any way?
- 23 Buckled or --
- 24 A. You know, I really don't recall. There
- 25 was so much debris over it. I mean it was



1 hopping over beds and walls.

2 Q. Could you identify what the debris was  
3 on the floor?

4 A. Just walls and beds and desks.

5 Q. Did it look like any of the ceiling  
6 tiles or insulation?

7 A. A little bit, yeah. There was some  
8 ceiling down, too?

9 Q. Okay, alright. So, you made it out to  
10 the lifeboat station. Which one were you  
11 assigned to? I think you said the Number 1?

12 A. Yes, sir. The Number 1.

13 Q. Okay. When you got there, who was in  
14 charge do you know? I think you were asked  
15 that before. Sorry about that, asked and  
16 answered right?

17 A. Yes. I don't remember who was in  
18 charge.

19 Q. Okay. I'm sorry. Who gave the command  
20 to go ahead and get inside the lifeboats, do  
21 you remember? Or, again, was it just everyone  
22 just started filtering in?

23 A. I think for the most part people just  
24 kind of started piling in.

25 Q. Okay. And, when you got in the



1 lifeboat, do you know how many people were in  
2 there?

3 A. No, sir. I don't.

4 Q. Okay. Was it full?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Okay. So, everyone was sitting down  
7 and it was full as far as you could see and  
8 tell?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. Okay. Do you remember was there anyone  
11 telling the person driving the vessel or  
12 operating the vessel what to do or was the  
13 coxswain the person behind the steering wheel  
14 in charge?

15 A. He needed a little bit of assistance,  
16 but he got his bearings and was able to get  
17 everything under control.

18 Q. Okay. How close were you in location  
19 to the coxswain? Were you right next to him  
20 or in the front of the lifeboat?

21 A. I was in the back.

22 Q. Okay. Is that near the coxswain?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Okay. What kind of assistance was  
25 being provided to him? If you know who that



1 person was that was providing him assistance  
2 could you tell us that, too?

3 A. I don't -- you know, I really couldn't  
4 even tell you what assistance was being  
5 provided to him.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. I know that he needed help seeing. He  
8 couldn't see out.

9 Q. Okay. Was that still up on the rig  
10 then or was that down -- once you guys were  
11 launched away he was needing assistance?

12 A. That was once we were in the water.

13 Q. Oh, okay. Prior to the boat actually  
14 lowering away from the rig, was anybody  
15 providing him any assistance at all?

16 A. No, sir.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Not that I recall.

19 Q. Good enough. When you got in the  
20 lifeboat did you notice any other difficulties  
21 with releasing it from the actual pendants  
22 that are holding it down into the water?

23 A. No, sir. I don't recall.

24 Q. Okay, good enough. And that's when you  
25 were saying the gentleman, the coxswain, was



1 needed assistance just seeing ahead?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Did anybody say why he needed  
4 assistance or was everyone just kind of  
5 helping out?

6 A. I think everybody was just kind of  
7 helping out.

8 Q. Okay. Good enough, alright. Thank you  
9 very much.

10 E X A M I N A T I O N

11 BY MR. MATHEWS:

12 Q. I have one further question, sir. How  
13 long had you been on the DEEPWATER HORIZON  
14 location at Mississippi Canyon-252? How many  
15 hitches?

16 A. Since February.

17 Q. Okay. Were you aware of any other  
18 cement jobs that would require any type of  
19 advanced person on the rig to do the cementing  
20 with nitrogen?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. How many were there?

23 A. Just one.

24 Q. And do you know which casing that was  
25 run on?



1 A. That was on the 9 and 7/8ths by 7 inch.

2 Q. And do you know who that was performed  
3 by?

4 A. Are you talking company or person?

5 Q. No, person. Individual?

6 A. Vincent Tabler.

7 Q. Vince did that one, okay. And that was  
8 the only one you were aware of in that whole  
9 well?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 EXAMINATION

13 BY MR. DYKES:

14 Q. To follow on that question there by Mr.  
15 Mathews, none of the cement jobs up the hole  
16 or in any of the shallow portions of the hole  
17 required nitrified cement?

18 A. No, sir.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 MR. McCARROLL:

21 Can I follow up with one brief  
22 question?

23 EXAMINATION

24 BY MR. McCARROLL:

25 Q. Did you test anything else while you



1 were there like the BOPs, anything of that  
2 nature?

3 A. During that hitch?

4 Q. Yeah or prior hitches?

5 A. Yes, sir. We test the BOPs.

6 Q. Okay. Were you aware of any  
7 irregularities with BOPs when you performed  
8 the test?

9 A. No, sir.

10 Q. Everything went fine? You weren't  
11 asked to retest any components?

12 A. No, sir.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 EXAMINATION

15 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

16 Q. A couple of questions from me. Did you  
17 supervise Mr. Tabler, Vince Tabler?

18 A. No, sir. He supervises me.

19 Q. Okay. So, do you have any experience  
20 with nitrogenated cement work?

21 A. I've done one job.

22 Q. One job doing that?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Is that required special knowledge on  
25 how to perform that particular activity?



1 A. I wouldn't call it "Special knowledge",  
2 but, you know, yes, sir. Some experience.

3 Q. Okay. Can you explain how, without  
4 going through proprietary information, is that  
5 the most complex method, technique? I don't  
6 know anything about cementing. Can you  
7 explain the -- is it more complex than the  
8 regular job that you did for the regular  
9 casing?

10 A. On our end we actually do it the exact  
11 same, we just have a nitrogen specialist out  
12 there just to monitor rates of the nitrogen  
13 injection. So, I mean I guess from his  
14 prospective yes.

15 Q. Okay. Why is it needed?

16 A. What are you talking about?

17 Q. With the nitrogen additive?

18 A. That forms the cement.

19 Q. Okay. Is that because it's way down  
20 there, the clearing is small? Why is it used?

21 A. Usually when hydrostatic pressure is a  
22 concern when, you know, you don't want to  
23 exceed a frac gradient. You don't want to put  
24 too much weight, too heavy a fluid.

25 Q. Does it have the same reliability as



1 the other type of cementing?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Okay. Thanks.

4 EXAMINATION

5 BY MR. MATHEWS:

6 Q. Just one question: You said you had  
7 been in the position for two years, sir?

8 A. Yes, sir. As a service supervisor-1.

9 Q. In a 9 and 7/8ths inch hold is it  
10 easier -- I mean does it -- I'm trying to  
11 think -- do you have a higher success rate as  
12 a cementer to do a proper cement job on a 7  
13 inch casing or a 5 inch casing?

14 A. I would say a 5 inch casing.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 CAPT NGUYEN:

17 Flag state?

18 MR. LINSIN:

19 No questions, thank you, Captain.

20 CAPT NGUYEN:

21 Thank you, sir. Halliburton, do  
22 you have any questions for your  
23 witness?

24 COUNSEL REPRESENTING HALLIBURTON:

25 No questions, Captain.



1 CAPT NGUYEN:

2 Okay. Thank you, sir. M-I SWACO?

3 COUNSEL REPRESENTING M-I SWACO:

4 No thank you.

5 CAPT NGUYEN:

6 Dril-Quip?

7 COUNSEL REPRESENTING DRIL-QUIP, INC.:

8 No questions.

9 CAPT NGUYEN:

10 Weatherford?

11 COUNSEL REPRESENTING WEATHERFORD,

12 INC.:

13 No questions.

14 CAPT NGUYEN:

15 Anadarko?

16 COUNSEL REPRESENTING ANADARKO

17 PETROLEUM CORPORATION:

18 No questions, Captain.

19 CAPT NGUYEN:

20 Yes, sir. MOEX?

21 COUNSEL REPRESENTING MOEX USA:

22 (No response.)

23 CAPT NGUYEN:

24 Douglas Brown?

25 COUNSEL REPRESENTING DOUGLAS BROWN:



1 No.

2 CAPT NGUYEN:

3 Thank you. BP?

4 MR. GODFREY:

5 Thank you, Captain. But no

6 questions of the witness.

7 CAPT NGUYEN:

8 Thank you, sir. Transocean?

9 MR. KOHNKE:

10 No questions.

11 CAPT NGUYEN:

12 Thank you, sir. Cameron?

13 COUNSEL REPRESENTING CAMERON, INC.:

14 No questions, Captain.

15 CAPT NGUYEN:

16 Thank you. Alright. Mr. Haire,

17 are there any questions that we didn't

18 ask you or any information that you

19 think we should know that has relevance

20 to our investigation that you would

21 like to tell at this time?

22 THE WITNESS:

23 No, sir.

24 CAPT NGUYEN:

25 Okay. Thank you, sir. If we need



1           your assistance in the future will you  
2           be available to testify before the  
3           board?

4           THE WITNESS:

5           Yes, sir.

6           CAPT NGUYEN:

7           Okay. Thank you very much. You  
8           are dismissed.

9           THE WITNESS:

10          Thank you.

11          CAPT NGUYEN:

12          Okay. The board will now call on  
13          Mr. Miles Ezell with Transocean. Thank  
14          you for being here. I will place you  
15          under oath.

16          \* \* \* \* \*

17                               MILES EZELL,

18          after being first duly sworn in the cause,

19          testified as follows:

20                               E X A M I N A T I O N

21          BY MR. MATHEWS:

22          Q. Mr. Ezell, for the record could you  
23          please state your name and spell your last?

24          A. Miles Randall Ezell. And my last name  
25          is E-Z-E-L-L.



1 Q. Sir, I was just reminded. Mr. Kohnke  
2 is representing Transocean. Is that okay with  
3 you?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. By whom are you employed?

6 A. Transocean.

7 Q. Can you move up to the mic?

8 A. Yeah. (Witness complies.)

9 Q. Thank you. And what position do you  
10 hold with Transocean, sir?

11 A. I'm a senior toolpusher.

12 Q. And how long have you had that  
13 position?

14 A. Approximately four years.

15 Q. And, prior to becoming a senior  
16 toolpusher, what experience did you have with  
17 Transocean or any other oil and gas company?

18 A. I've had a total of 33 years offshore  
19 and 23 of those have been with Transocean.

20 Q. Okay. Can you briefly describe your  
21 responsibilities as a senior toolpusher at the  
22 DEEPWATER HORIZON, sir?

23 A. A lot of my responsibilities are  
24 administrative, but a portion of that is to  
25 support operations wherever needed.



1 Q. And what type of operations are those?

2 A. That would be drilling operations.

3 Q. Okay. How long have you been assigned  
4 to that rig?

5 A. Eight plus years, not quite nine. I  
6 was one of the original crew members in 2001.

7 Q. On the hitch that you were on at the  
8 time of the incident, what day did you arrive  
9 on the DEEPWATER HORIZON?

10 A. I don't remember the exact day, but it  
11 was approximately a week prior to that.

12 Q. Up to the time of the incident were you  
13 made aware of any issues with the well,  
14 possible loss returns, stuck pipe or anything  
15 that you may be aware of?

16 A. Yes, sir. I was aware of lost  
17 circulation areas that we had. There --

18 Q. When was the last lost circulation that  
19 you were familiar with?

20 A. Well, during the -- during the last  
21 week that I was on the rig the well was  
22 actually stable. We didn't have any losses  
23 then.

24 Q. Was there any stuck pipe in that last  
25 week?



1 A. No, sir. Not in the last week.

2 Q. How about cement in that production  
3 casing? Was there any problems that came to  
4 mind?

5 A. None that I was made aware of.

6 Q. Do you have communication with the  
7 Halliburton reps on that rig?

8 A. Yes, quite frequently.

9 Q. Did they have any problems with any  
10 tests or any type of shearing of pins of that  
11 production casing?

12 A. I think we had a little bit higher  
13 pressure on the shoe track than normal, but  
14 not excessive.

15 Q. Can you just in the next few minutes  
16 just give me from the day of the incident up  
17 to the time of the incident what you can  
18 recall?

19 A. Okay. Starting from that morning,  
20 right?

21 Q. Yes, sir. Please.

22 A. Well, we typically have a 6:30 meeting  
23 first thing in the morning. That's for the  
24 Transocean management. And then after that  
25 meeting is over we roll into a BP meeting that



1 they have with Houston, their morning meeting.

2 And that would have been approximately 7:30

3 when that started. And after that we have a

4 Transocean supervisor meeting that's all of

5 the department heads and we have that daily.

6 And that would have started about 8:30. And

7 it was pretty extended because we had talked

8 about some of the issues like one program we

9 had was called a DROPS Program. It was meant

10 to control dropped objects. We went over that

11 to some degree. But it probably would have

12 lasted somewhere in the neighborhood of an

13 hour, hour and fifteen minutes. Then, of

14 course, I made a round around deck, observed

15 several operations. I made a trip to the rig

16 floor, came back down --

17 Q. And what time was that? Right after

18 the 8:30 meeting?

19 A. That would have been when I was out on

20 deck it could have been somewhere around 10:15

21 to 10:45 or something like that. And then of

22 course we had lunch. I talked to Jimmy

23 Harrell, the OIM, pretty extensively. We were

24 going over our 2010 rig goals and making sure

25 that we were updated on that. We had a VIP



1 group that came out from BP and Transocean.  
2 We were going to have a general tour of the  
3 rig with those individuals and several of the  
4 department heads. And we did conduct that  
5 tour. We went to several different areas on  
6 the rig. One of the last areas that we went  
7 to was the rig floor where they were already  
8 conducting the negative test. And --

9 Q. The first or the second? The first  
10 negative test?

11 A. The first negative test. And the tour  
12 group left and left Jimmy Harrell and myself  
13 there because they were having a little bit of  
14 a problem.

15 Q. Who?

16 A. The drill crew conducting that test.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And we observed that they had lost some  
19 mud in the riser. And I witnessed Jimmy tell  
20 the subsea engineer, the senior subsea  
21 engineer, to increase the pressure on the  
22 annular. And, when he did increase that  
23 pressure, it became static. They, of course,  
24 filled the riser up. We monitored and made  
25 sure everything was 100 percent and it was,



1     like I say, static. The other toolpusher that  
2     was coming on at 5:30, Jason Anderson, had  
3     came on at that time. And he and his relief  
4     Wyman Wheeler were discussing, you know, the  
5     events of the day. Wyman was briefing him on  
6     what was going on. And, of course, the BP  
7     company men, Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine were  
8     there. And they were doing the same thing.  
9     They were relieving and handing over so to  
10    speak.

11           I went outside of the rig floor and I  
12    talked to the assistant driller, Steve Curtis,  
13    for a few minutes. I was going to let them go  
14    ahead and have their discussion. You know  
15    have their formal handover. And, when they  
16    did that, I came back in and after talking to  
17    Jason Anderson, the toolpusher, it was my  
18    expectation that they was going to stop the  
19    job at that point. They was going to have a  
20    meeting. That would have been Don Vidrine and  
21    it would have been Jason, the subsea engineer,  
22    it would have been the mud engineer, Gordon  
23    Jones. And they would discuss about, you  
24    know, what had gone wrong and what they was  
25    going to do on their second negative test.



1 Well, at this time, it had got to where it was  
2 a little after 1800 hours. Our meeting was at  
3 1900. Jason told me, he said, "Why don't you  
4 go eat?" And I said "Well, I can go eat and  
5 come back." And he said "Man, you ain't got  
6 to do that. I've got this. Don't worry about  
7 it. If I have any problem at all with this  
8 test I'll give you a call." And I knew Jason  
9 well. I've worked with him for all those  
10 years, eight or nine years. And I know y'all  
11 know that when you know somebody that well you  
12 can even tell by their body language if  
13 something's wrong. He was just like a  
14 brother. So, I had no doubt that if he had  
15 any indication of any problem or had any  
16 difficulty at all he would have called me.

17 Well, I went ahead and ate. I did  
18 attend the meeting with the dignitaries. That  
19 lasted till shortly after 9:00 or right around  
20 9:00. From there I went to the galley and got  
21 something to drink. And I spoke to someone.  
22 I can't even remember who it was in the galley  
23 now, but I made my way back down to my office  
24 and, when I got to the office, I looked at my  
25 watch. Of course everybody has different



1 times pieces, but it was 9:20 by my watch. I  
2 called the rig floor and I talked to Jason  
3 Anderson. And I said "Well, how did your  
4 negative test go?" And he said "It went  
5 good." He said "We bled it off. We watched  
6 it for 30 minutes and we had no flow." And I  
7 said "What about your displacement? How's it  
8 going?" He said "It's going fine." He said  
9 "It won't be much longer and we ought to have  
10 our spacer back." I said "Okay." I said "Do  
11 you need any help from me?" And he told me  
12 "No, man." Just like he told me before he  
13 said "I've got this." He said "Go to bed.  
14 I've got it." He was that confident that  
15 everything was fine. I said "Okay." So, I  
16 went to my cabin, which is a short distance,  
17 probably five feet, away from the  
18 toolpusher's office. I went in there and  
19 closed the door and prepared for bed and I  
20 think I -- yeah, I called my wife and talked  
21 to her for a few minutes. And -- it wasn't  
22 long, fifteen or twenty minutes, and I had  
23 laid there and I turned my overhead light off  
24 in the bunk and I was still watching a little  
25 TV. And my room phone rang. Well, I hit my



1 little alarm clock light and, according to  
2 that alarm clock, it was ten minutes till  
3 10:00. And the person at the other end of the  
4 line there was the assistant driller, Steve  
5 Curtis. Steve opened up by saying "We have a  
6 situation." He said "The well is blown out."  
7 He said "We have mud going to the crown." And  
8 I said "Well --" I was just horrified. I said  
9 "Do y'all have it shut in?" He said "Jason is  
10 shutting it in now." And he said "Randy, we  
11 need your help." And I'll never forget that.  
12 And I said "Steve, I'll be -- I'll be right  
13 there." So, it took only minutes for me to  
14 put my coveralls on, they were hanging on the  
15 hook. I put my socks on. My boots and my hard  
16 hat were right across that hall I was telling  
17 you in the toolpusher's office. So, I opened  
18 my door and I remember a couple of people  
19 standing in the hallway, but I kind of had  
20 tunnel vision. I looked straight ahead and I  
21 don't -- I didn't even remember who those  
22 people were. And about the time I -- I made  
23 it to the doorway of the toolpusher's office  
24 was when a tremendous explosion occurred. It  
25 blew me probably twenty feet against a



1 bulkhead, against the wall in that office.  
2 And I remember then that the lights went out,  
3 power went out. I could hear everything  
4 deathly calm. My next recollection was that I  
5 had a lot of debris on top of me. I tried two  
6 different times to get up, but whatever it was  
7 it was a substantial weight. The third time  
8 it was something like adrenalin had kicked in  
9 and I told my self 'Either you get up or  
10 you're going to lay here and die.' So, my  
11 right leg was hung on something, I don't know  
12 what still. But I pulled it as hard as I  
13 could and it came free. I attempted to stand  
14 up. That was the wrong thing to do because I  
15 immediately stuck my head into smoke. And  
16 with the training that we've all had on the  
17 rig I knew to stay low. So, I felt -- I  
18 dropped back down. I got on my hands and knees  
19 and for a few moments I was totally  
20 disoriented. I mean I had lost orientation on  
21 which way the doorway was. And I remember  
22 just sitting there and just trying to think  
23 'Which way is it?'  
24 Then I felt something and it felt like  
25 air. And I said to myself 'Well, that's got



1 to be the hallway. So, that's the direction I  
2 need to go. That leads out.' So, I had to  
3 crawl very slowly because that end of the  
4 living quarters was pretty well demolished.  
5 Debris everywhere. But I made it to the  
6 doorway and what I thought was air was  
7 actually methane and I could actually feel  
8 like droplets. It was moist on the side of my  
9 face. I continued to -- to crawl down the  
10 hallway slowly and I put my hand on a body and  
11 it was Wyman Wheeler. I mean I didn't -- I  
12 didn't know it at the time because there was  
13 no light, I couldn't see. The next thing I  
14 recollect is I saw like a beam of light like a  
15 flashlight bouncing. And I guess it was  
16 because this individual was coming down the  
17 hallway and it had all the debris hanging from  
18 different places, so the light was going up  
19 and down as he ducked and went through  
20 different things. He came around the corner  
21 there and I saw that to be our electrical  
22 supervisor, Stan Carden. Along about that  
23 time Jimmy Harrell, the OIM, came out of his  
24 room. He had managed to find a pair of  
25 coveralls and put those on. He told me he was



1 in the shower when the explosion happened.  
2 And he was gritting his eyes real hard and he  
3 said he couldn't hardly see. And he said "I  
4 think I've got something in my eyes." And I  
5 looked down and he didn't have any shoes  
6 either. And I said "Jimmy, I've got Wyman  
7 down right here." And he said "Yeah, okay. I  
8 got to see if I can find me some shoes." So,  
9 Stan and I were in the process of trying to  
10 remove some of the debris off of Wyman. And  
11 at that time or along about that time another  
12 flashlight entered and that was Chad Murray.  
13 And as soon as he got to where we could see  
14 him we asked him to go to the bow and get a  
15 stretcher. So, we continued to remove this  
16 debris off of Wyman. I helped him up and I  
17 was -- in my mind I was going to try to help  
18 walk him out thinking that that might be  
19 quicker to walk him out. Well, he made a  
20 couple of steps with his arm around my  
21 shoulder and he was in pain and he said "Set  
22 me down. Set me down." So, we set him back  
23 down and he said "Y'all go on. Save  
24 yourself." And I said "No, we're not going to  
25 leave you. We're not going to leave you in



1 here." And along about that time I heard  
2 another voice saying "God help me. Somebody  
3 please help me." And I looked to where our  
4 maintenance office had been and all I could  
5 see was feet, a pair of feet sticking out from  
6 underneath a bunch of wreckage and debris. We  
7 -- we worked to get that off of this  
8 individual. We didn't know exactly who it  
9 was, but, when we got the debris off of this  
10 person, we saw that it was Buddy Trahan, who  
11 was one of the visiting Transocean dignitaries  
12 that came out for that trip. Looking at him  
13 we saw that the extent of his injuries were  
14 greater than that of Wyman's. So, naturally  
15 he got the first stretcher. So, we loaded him  
16 on the stretcher and it took three of us  
17 because we had to remove debris. It was  
18 hanging from the ceiling and the walls was  
19 jutting out, the floor was jutting up. I mean  
20 it was just total chaos in that area of the  
21 living quarters. But when we got him loaded  
22 on the stretcher Stan and Chad conveyed him  
23 all the way out of the front of the rig, the  
24 bow of the rig to the lifeboat station. I  
25 stayed right there with Wyman Wheeler because



1 I told him I wasn't going to leave him and I  
2 didn't. And it seemed like an eternity, but  
3 it was only a couple of minutes they came back  
4 with the second stretcher. We were able to  
5 get Wyman on that stretcher and we took him to  
6 the bow of the rig. When we got outside of  
7 the living quarters the first thing I observed  
8 is both of the main lifeboats had already been  
9 deployed and they left. I also looked to my  
10 left and I saw Captain Kurt and a few of his  
11 marine crew starting to deploy a life raft.  
12 And we continued down the walkway till we got  
13 to that life raft and we set the stretcher  
14 down. And after several minutes we had  
15 everything deployed and the chief mate, David  
16 Young, and myself got in the life raft and we  
17 were able to catch the head part of the  
18 stretcher and assist getting Wyman into the  
19 life raft, which I don't know if any of y'all  
20 ever been in a life raft, but it's hard to  
21 keep your balance and especially if you've got  
22 any type of weight. And I think we actually  
23 fell trying to, you know, get him into the  
24 life raft. But the main thing is Wyman was  
25 there. You know, he didn't get left behind.



1 From that point we were lowered down and I  
2 believe that was by Captain Kurt, to the best  
3 of my recollection. We made it to the water.  
4 I remember intense heat. I remember fuel or  
5 oil or some type of hydrocarbon burning on the  
6 water extremely close to where our life raft  
7 was. And the painter was still attached to  
8 the rig. Well, we didn't have a whole lot of  
9 light. We were looking through the provisions  
10 trying to find a knife. I was pulling tension  
11 on the painter thinking by chance maybe it  
12 might part. When it did part. Okay,  
13 unbeknown to me at that exact moment it didn't  
14 part. It was cut. The captain of our rig was  
15 able to get a knife and cut the painter. And  
16 from that point I remember being thrown a  
17 rope. I think it was from the fast rescue  
18 craft from the DAMON BANKSTON. And from there  
19 they were able to tow us to the BANKSTON and  
20 safely away from the rig.

21 Q. Thank you. When you had the  
22 communication with Mr. Curtis on the rig  
23 floor, did he mention anything about possibly  
24 lining up to the gas buster or diverter?

25 A. No, sir. He didn't.



1 Q. Basically all he said to you is that  
2 you were having a well control situation?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. To your knowledge is there any policy  
5 within Transocean to lock out any portion of  
6 the BOP stack at any time during the well?

7 A. No, sir. I'm not aware of a policy  
8 that would state that.

9 Q. Are you aware of any time during the  
10 duration of the well that any portion or  
11 function of the BOP stack was functioned out?

12 A. No, sir. I'm not aware of that.

13 Q. Were you aware of any BOP stack issues  
14 prior to the incident of the incident, whether  
15 from being splashed or once it was on the rig  
16 floor -- I'm sorry, sea floor.

17 A. No, sir.

18 Q. Were you ever aware of any leaks on the  
19 accumulator system?

20 A. No, sir. I wasn't.

21 Q. Do you know who's authorized to  
22 activate the emergency disconnect system?

23 A. Yes, sir. It would be the captain, it  
24 would be the OIM, the senior toolpusher,  
25 myself -- toolpushers, drillers, subsea



1 engineers.

2 Q. I'm sorry, did you say the captain?

3 A. Yes, sir. I did.

4 Q. Do you know who activated the EDS?

5 A. No, sir. I do not because I was not on  
6 the bridge.

7 Q. Okay. Had you had any communication  
8 after the incident with anyone that said they  
9 tried to activate the EDS?

10 A. Yes, sir. I have.

11 Q. And who was that?

12 A. Chris Pleasant.

13 Q. As your background as a toolpusher, are  
14 you familiar with the EDS system?

15 A. Pretty well.

16 Q. Is there any way to delay activation of  
17 the EDS within the logic of the system?

18 A. Delay it?

19 Q. Say if you accidentally functioned the  
20 EDS by hitting the control panel and then hit  
21 EDS is there any way that a delay function to  
22 have your lower marine riser package come off?

23 A. I know of no way to delay that.

24 Q. Okay. Are you familiar with the auto  
25 shear system?



1 A. The auto shear?

2 Q. Yes, sir.

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Is there any way for that to be  
5 disabled?

6 A. That would -- that would be a question  
7 that would have to be directed to the subsea  
8 engineer.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I'm not aware.

11 Q. Okay, thank you. Do you know if, at  
12 the time of the incident when they were  
13 displacing the riser, who was monitoring the  
14 volume coming and volume going out?

15 A. Well, as far as real time data, to the  
16 best of my recollection that would have been  
17 our Sperry Sun sample -- not sample catcher.  
18 Sperry Sun person who would be manning the  
19 unit and his name is Joseph. And --

20 Q. Joseph, do you know his last name?

21 A. Keith.

22 Q. Keith?

23 A. I think.

24 Q. Do you know if Joseph Keith was taken  
25 off the job for monitoring the flow of the



1 returns?

2 A. No, sir. I have no knowledge of that.

3 Q. Do you know of anybody who would have  
4 knowledge of that outside of Mr. Keith?

5 A. Not that would be alive.

6 Q. How was the mud being displaced? What  
7 was the flow path?

8 A. Well, they were pumping down the drill  
9 pipe --

10 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

11 A. -- with sea water.

12 Q. Right.

13 A. And returns were coming back up the  
14 annulus.

15 Q. Okay. And where were they going?

16 A. They were going back to the shakers,  
17 which that was returning to the pits.

18 Q. Is it possible to offload to the  
19 offshore supply vessel through the mini trip  
20 tank?

21 A. Offload from the supply vessel?

22 Q. No, from the rig through the mini trip  
23 tank to the offshore supply vessel the DAMON  
24 BANKSTON?

25 A. No, sir. Not to my knowledge. That's



1 not -- not an option.

2 Q. Earlier you had mentioned that you had  
3 some VIPs I guess from BP and Transocean. I  
4 think I wrote down you had a meeting with them  
5 at 9:00?

6 A. That's when it ended.

7 Q. Okay. So --

8 A. From 7:00 to about 9:00.

9 Q. Did y'all discuss the issues with the  
10 negative test --

11 A. No, sir.

12 Q. -- that they had --

13 A. We had a whole different format for the  
14 meeting.

15 Q. Okay. What was discussed in that  
16 meeting, sir?

17 A. We talked about the work that we were  
18 going to do in the shipyard in 2011. We  
19 talked about our DROPS campaign. We talked  
20 about our 2010 goals for the year. The BP  
21 guys elaborated on how good a job we had done  
22 in seven years without a lost time incident.  
23 And how proud they were of the rig. It was  
24 just a lengthy meeting with all those main  
25 topics there.



1 Q. Okay. So, correct me if I'm wrong,  
2 were one of those gentlemen Mr. O'Brien from  
3 BP?

4 A. Pat O'Brien.

5 Q. Pat O'Brien?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. He's the drilling and completions  
8 manager of BP, correct?

9 A. Yes, sir. I believe that's right.

10 Q. And he actually was on the rig floor  
11 when the OIM, Mr. Harrell, had took them off  
12 and they went somewhere else or he stayed  
13 behind in the first negative test when they  
14 were having a problem on the rig floor?

15 A. Pat O'Brien did not stay behind.

16 Q. I know. But they actually know  
17 something's going on on the rig floor about  
18 the negative test?

19 A. Yes, sir. I'm sure that they were  
20 aware that something wasn't a hundred percent.

21 Q. And at no time during that meeting the  
22 drillings and completions manager of BP  
23 mentioned anything about the negative test  
24 that had a problem?

25 A. No, sir. There was no mention of it



1       whatsoever.

2       Q. Did they bring up anything of where the  
3 rig was going? I know you said about the 2011  
4 shipyard visit, but did they bring up anything  
5 about Viosca Knoll 914 by chance?

6       A. Would you repeat that please?

7       Q. Did anybody from BP bring up where the  
8 DEEPWATER HORIZON was scheduled to go next  
9 Viosca Knoll 914?

10      A. Not that particular group. No, sir.

11      Q. In your experience on the DEEPWATER  
12 HORIZON how often did BP come to the rig with  
13 VIPs?

14      A. How often?

15      Q. Yes, sir.

16      A. Three or four times a year, I'm just  
17 guessing there.

18      Q. Was it normally the drilling and  
19 completions manager, Mr. O'Brien?

20      A. That's actually the first time I've  
21 seen that man.

22      Q. Okay. Are you aware of any type of  
23 Transocean policies that have been implemented  
24 since the incident? I doubt you've been back  
25 to work, but have you been brought aware of



1 any type of policies?

2 A. No, sir. I have not. And you're  
3 right, I haven't had any communication really.

4 Q. Have you talked to people involved with  
5 the Transocean investigation?

6 A. No, sir. I have not.

7 Q. No, okay. A quick question: Just when  
8 I said Viosca Knoll 914 just from a cursory  
9 thing that we've done with inside the MMS  
10 we've identified that that rig was supposed to  
11 be on another location 43 days prior to the  
12 day of the incident. How do you, as a  
13 toolpusher, balance rig efficiency and safety?

14 A. Well, safety is always paramount in  
15 everything we do. And, as far as efficiency  
16 goes, the HORIZON had a record for being one  
17 of the most efficient rigs that Transocean had  
18 plus it was probably the best rig that BP had,  
19 too.

20 Q. So, you never felt any pressure from  
21 anyone at any time to be more efficient or  
22 operate quicker or get off to another location  
23 quicker?

24 A. No, sir. I didn't feel that pressure.

25 Q. Okay. No further questions, sir.



1 Thank you.

2 EXAMINATION

3 BY MR. McCARROLL:

4 Q. Sir, Mr. Ezell, that was quite a series  
5 of events that you detailed there and I'm not  
6 going to take you back through that, but could  
7 we go back over the earlier events say from  
8 10:00 or 11:00 up till the meeting starts at  
9 7:00? Were you on the rig floor when Wyman  
10 Wheeler was up there discussing the negative  
11 test?

12 A. I would have been up there -- now, this  
13 is a time estimate.

14 Q. Yes, just roughly.

15 A. I would have been up there somewhere  
16 around 1730.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And that was real close to the time  
19 that he and Jason were doing their relieving  
20 and handing over information.

21 Q. So, they were relieving at 6:00 in the  
22 afternoon?

23 A. Well, we call it working from 6:00 to  
24 6:00, but they typically do thirty minutes,  
25 you know, earlier.



1 Q. Oh, okay. Did you hear any specific  
2 conversations about the negative test that was  
3 going on?

4 A. Uh --

5 Q. Any discussions about they wanted to  
6 repeat it or anything wrong? Anything of that  
7 nature?

8 A. Well, I'm relatively sure that all  
9 parties, BP and Transocean, was not happy with  
10 the first one and that they did want to repeat  
11 the test.

12 Q. You were present when it was discussed  
13 or someone just told you that later?

14 A. No, I was present there. 'Cause, like  
15 I said just a little while ago, they were  
16 going to stop the job and have a meeting and  
17 talk about a forward plan as far as having a  
18 second negative test.

19 Q. And, from what you could tell, who was  
20 in charge as far as telling them how to  
21 conduct the test?

22 A. Well, that would have been the well  
23 site leader.

24 Q. Okay. And he was the one that was not  
25 happy with the way the test was conducted or



1 -- I don't want to lead you, but I'm just  
2 trying to find out what happened there.

3 A. No, sir. He wasn't happy with the  
4 results from the first test.

5 Q. Okay. And he is --

6 A. That would have been Don Vidrine.

7 Q. Don Vidrine?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Do you remember any exact remarks he  
10 made or anything?

11 A. No, sir. I had a break right there  
12 when they were -- there was people talking  
13 throughout the room and they were having --  
14 the BP guys were having their discussion and  
15 then our toolpusher were having their  
16 discussion. So, I ended up going outside and  
17 talking to the assistant driller, Steve  
18 Curtis, for a few minutes.

19 Q. And did Steve have anything to say to  
20 you about the way the test was run?

21 A. No, sir. No, he didn't.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 EXAMINATION

24 BY LT BUTTS:

25 Q. Good afternoon, sir. It sounds like



1 there was a busy day on the rig. Lot's of  
2 meetings, is that typical to have meetings  
3 most of the morning before lunch?

4 A. Well, kind of typical, but actually a  
5 little bit more meetings on this day than we  
6 typically have.

7 Q. Yes, sir. Because of the VIP visit?

8 A. That and going over our 2010 budget and  
9 then talking about this DROP campaign. That  
10 took us some additional time that we didn't  
11 normally have to worry about. We were outside  
12 or doing something.

13 Q. Sure. During the morning meeting was  
14 there a discussion on the day's events, what  
15 was going to happen?

16 A. Yes, sir. There was. They talked  
17 about the last 24 hours and they talked about  
18 the -- the -- the next tour or the plan, the  
19 forward plan.

20 Q. And we had heard that there was some  
21 discussion at the end of that meeting, Mr.  
22 Jimmy wanted to talk on the side and asked a  
23 couple of people to stay back about what was  
24 going to actually happen that day. Were you  
25 engaged in those conversations?



1 A. I was engaged in a portion of that.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Jimmy was adamant about conducting this  
4 negative test.

5 Q. Yes, sir.

6 A. And, just to give you a little  
7 background on that --

8 Q. Please.

9 A. -- in our Transocean manual I don't  
10 believe you can find a negative test.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. This was something that Jimmy Harrell,  
13 as OIM, always insisted on.

14 Q. That's what he said.

15 A. That's the way it was. He was that  
16 adamant about doing it and we knew that he was  
17 not going to deviate from that. And he had  
18 some bad experiences on another rig, another  
19 time years back. I'm not a hundred percent  
20 sure, but it taught him a lesson he said -- he  
21 said that day that he would always do a  
22 negative test. So, maybe in some people's  
23 mind that could have been overkill, but it was  
24 standard procedure for us to do that. It was  
25 something that we felt more comfortable with,



1 about doing it.

2 Q. Right. And I guess he had a difference  
3 of opinion than someone else in the meeting  
4 then?

5 A. Yes, sir. He did. With the well site  
6 leader.

7 Q. Alright. And, again, it sounded like  
8 kind of a busy day. There was a crew change  
9 going on, but I heard some testimony that  
10 there was a short change. What's a short  
11 change?

12 A. Short change is when you have a crew  
13 come out and the crew that is out there has to  
14 work a partial day and then they get off and  
15 rest and then they come back for their next  
16 tour. They're trying to rotate it and get on  
17 the right schedule or the right tour.

18 Q. Okay, alright. And it sounds like  
19 during this negative test when the drill crew  
20 was coming on it was kind of during this  
21 negative test or -- is it the second negative  
22 test?

23 A. Can I -- can I stop you just a second?

24 Q. Yes, you can.

25 A. The drill crew was not changing out.



1 Q. Oh, I thought you said Mr. Anderson was  
2 coming on?

3 A. Yes, sir. But it was just a  
4 toolpusher handover.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And it was a well site leader handover.

7 Q. Got you.

8 A. Yeah, those two changed out and also it  
9 would have been the senior subsea engineer,  
10 Mark Hay, swapping out with Chris Pleasant.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Now, that would have been the change  
13 out and I think even the mud engineers would  
14 have changed out during that time frame.

15 Q. Okay. And would you -- those three  
16 folks that you just described there were they  
17 the senior people on the floor?

18 A. Well, I mean Chris Pleasant wasn't a  
19 senior, Mark Hay was in that particular case.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Mark was knocking off so to speak.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Don Vidrine, yes, he would have been  
24 the senior person. And, you see, Bob had only  
25 been there for two or three days and he was



1 not really familiar with the rig's operations,  
2 you know.

3 Q. Yes, sir.

4 A. And Jason would have definitely been  
5 the senior.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. So, yes, in a lot of cases, yeah, there  
8 were senior people --

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. -- coming on.

11 Q. Alright. And they were the people that  
12 were making the decisions of what was going on  
13 at the time?

14 A. They would have made those decisions.

15 Q. Yes, sir. Thank you. Now, you had  
16 mentioned as the tour was going through the  
17 drill floor it seemed like it was shortly  
18 after the time where the -- and I'll call them  
19 the "Senior people" that were there on the  
20 floor, Mr. Jason included. They were going  
21 through, you had come through. There was  
22 discussion about a way forward it seems like  
23 on this negative test procedure. You said it  
24 was -- you had actually had to take someone  
25 outside, the assistant driller I think you



1 said, to kind of talk to him on the side --

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. -- about what was going on?

4 A. Yeah. I was going to see if he had any  
5 extra input, but he didn't have anything of  
6 any value.

7 Q. Okay. And then you went ahead and  
8 left?

9 A. Shortly after I talked to Jason, the  
10 night toolpusher, had came on and, you know, I  
11 told him I would come back.

12 Q. Yes, sir.

13 A. And he said "No, I've got this. Don't  
14 -- don't worry about it."

15 Q. Yeah.

16 A. He said "If I need anything I will call  
17 you.

18 Q. Yeah.

19 A. And he would have called me.

20 Q. I believe you. Now, if the tour wasn't  
21 going on, if there wasn't any visitors would  
22 you have stayed?

23 A. Yes, sir. And I wouldn't be here  
24 talking to you.

25 Q. And I don't mean to put you in that



1 spot, but I just wanted to ask you. You knew  
2 what was going on and if the VIP tour wasn't  
3 going on I probably would have expect -- as  
4 you were talking about it you would have  
5 stayed there?

6 A. Yes, sir. And, not only that, if the  
7 explosion had happened at a different time I  
8 would have been on the rig floor. I was  
9 heading in that direction.

10 Q. Yeah.

11 A. I was just unable to get there.

12 Q. Yes, sir. And I understand the intent  
13 of the VIP visit, but it seems to me that  
14 probably just that timing of it was kind of  
15 critical, so --

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Thank you very much.

18 A. Your welcome.

19 EXAMINATION

20 BY MR. MATHEWS:

21 Q. We've had a lot of discussion with the  
22 negative test, the first test wasn't up to the  
23 OIM's standards. What was the difference  
24 between the first and second test?

25 A. Well, I can't tell you anything about



1 the second test other than the toolpusher told  
2 me it was okay and, also, Don Vidrine told  
3 Jimmy that it was a good test. So, I have no  
4 knowledge of that second test.

5 Q. Was the testing procedure being  
6 questioned by the OIM on the initial test?

7 A. Yeah, it was a question, but it wasn't  
8 that big a deal. I think he -- I think there  
9 was a desire from BP to have the kill line  
10 open to where they could use it for another  
11 way to monitor. Our standard procedure did  
12 not call for that. This would have been out  
13 of the normal procedure that we do for a  
14 negative test?

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. And, in my mind, that's why they had  
17 chose to stop at that point when we tightened  
18 the annular up and everything held rock steady  
19 they decided to stop -- everybody relieve each  
20 other, get all the data, all the information  
21 they need, reassemble and start the negative  
22 test and that would be negative test Number 2.

23 Q. And, just in closing, were you familiar  
24 with any of the changes in the casing program  
25 at that well?



1 A. No, sir. I wasn't. That's BP's  
2 decision, the casing.

3 Q. So -- it's BP's decision, but you're  
4 the one putting it in the hole, correct?

5 A. Well, we convey it in the hole with the  
6 help of Weatherford making the casing up.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. But I mean that is all their decision  
9 as far as the casing program, the design of  
10 the casing, everything.

11 Q. Correct, I'm aware of that. The thing  
12 I'm questioning is though is: At any point  
13 Transocean are on the rig is there anybody  
14 that says 'Hold up, there's an issue of  
15 changing a casing program here, we're running  
16 out of hole. What should we do?' Or is that  
17 only up to BP?

18 A. Well, if they just -- subtle changes to  
19 the casing program that would be all in BP's  
20 court.

21 Q. Okay. Thank you, sir.

22 EXAMINATION

23 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

24 Q. Mr. Ezell, a couple of questions for  
25 you.



1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Over the last month or so I learned a  
3 little bit about MODU operation and working  
4 relationship out there. My understanding is  
5 that operation decision making involves the  
6 OIM, the company man and the toolpusher; is  
7 that correct?

8 A. Yes, sir. And sometimes it could be  
9 even the captain involved in that.

10 Q. That's fine.

11 A. It's according to what the situation  
12 is.

13 Q. This just has to do with drilling.

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Yes?

16 A. With drilling, you're right.

17 Q. So, it would be three individuals?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. And you are the senior tool pusher?

20 A. Yes, sir. I am.

21 Q. And from your testimony it appears to  
22 me and you can correct me if I'm wrong, but  
23 you didn't have full visibility of what's  
24 going on during that afternoon, did you?

25 A. No, sir. I did not.



1 Q. Okay. Saying that you didn't have full  
2 visibility, part of it is that you relied on  
3 Jason Anderson because he's a toolpusher

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. -- who you have a personal  
6 relationship, you have confidence in his  
7 ability --

8 A. Yes, sir. Could I explain why?

9 Q. Yes, sir. Please.

10 A. Well, Jason he probably had more  
11 experience as far as shutting in for kicks  
12 than any individual on the DEEPWATER HORIZON.

13 He also was offered a position with  
14 Transocean's well control department. He was  
15 going to be the instructor of the well control  
16 department. He had just been recently  
17 promoted to senior toolpusher. He did carry  
18 an OIM's license, as I did. Jason was very  
19 acute on what he did and then that made me  
20 feel comfortable that when he said "If I have  
21 any problem I'll call you." Because I knew  
22 him that well and that's why I was able to  
23 kind of rest at ease because I knew that they  
24 were going to do another negative test and, if  
25 they had any kind of result that wasn't what's



1 expected, that he would call me.

2 Q. Yes, sir. I understand that and that's  
3 my understanding, however you are the senior  
4 toolpusher.

5 A. Right.

6 Q. You are in that layer of the safety net  
7 in terms of the decision making.

8 A. Right.

9 Q. And because of your confidence in Mr.  
10 Anderson you did not have full visibility of  
11 what's going on and you rely on him to make  
12 the proper judgement; is that correct?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Okay, sir. Thank you.

15 CAPT NGUYEN:

16 Flag state, any questions?

17 MR. LINSIN:

18 No questions. Thank you, Captain.

19 CAPT NGUYEN:

20 Thank you. Transocean, any  
21 questions for your witness?

22 MR. KOHNKE:

23 Yes, I have a couple of questions.

24 At least one question.

25 EXAMINATION



1 BY MR. KOHNKE:

2 Q. Mr. Ezell, during these hearings it has  
3 been brought out that the DEEPWATER HORIZON  
4 was being congratulated by BP for a no loss  
5 time accident record over a seven year period  
6 and I think you testified that you were aware  
7 of that, correct?

8 A. Yes, sir. That is correct.

9 Q. During this hearing an accident -- a  
10 loss time accident was brought out in  
11 questioning with several witnesses by members  
12 of the board and it involved an MMS record  
13 showing an accident date of --

14 MR. MATHEWS:

15 March 6th, 2008.

16 MR. KOHNKE:

17 Thank you.

18 BY MR. KOHNKE:

19 Q. And I have that accident record here.  
20 Would you take a look at it please and tell me  
21 if you have any personal knowledge about that  
22 accident?

23 A. (Witness complies.) Yes, sir. As a  
24 matter of a fact, I was on the rig when that  
25 happened. That was a third party hand on the



1 boat.

2 Q. Was that an employee of Transocean?

3 A. No, sir. It wasn't, it was a boat

4 hand.

5 Q. Alright. And so the accident happened

6 -- where did it happen, on a boat or on the

7 rig?

8 A. It was on the vessel. He removed a

9 chock and a tool rolled on his foot I think.

10 Q. Alright. So, this would have been a

11 member of the crew of a vessel, of a supply

12 boat?

13 A. Yes, sir. That's exactly what it was.

14 Q. And the accident would have happened on

15 the supply boat?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. But because it was on the BP lease and

18 BP reports all accidents to MMS then this

19 accident report would have emanated from that

20 lease?

21 A. You're exactly right.

22 Q. Okay. And, in fact, it shows the

23 reporting person as BP?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. Okay. Thank you, sir.



1 EXAMINATION

2 BY MR. MATHEWS:

3 Q. A quick follow up on that, Mr. Kohnke,  
4 if you don't mind.

5 A. Okay.

6 Q. This was occurring during a lifting  
7 operation, correct?

8 A. Yeah, but I don't think that the crane  
9 had even hooked to anything yet. I think the  
10 boat hands were prepping the deck for the  
11 removal of these tools. And --

12 Q. Can I read a sentence for you?

13 A. Sure.

14 Q. "The crew was unloading the motor  
15 vessel FAST BULLET using the port crane." Who  
16 is responsible for the lifting with the port  
17 crane?

18 A. Well, of course, if it was actually  
19 being hoisted with a crane that would be  
20 Transocean.

21 Q. And what is Transocean's health and  
22 policy statement that says "Each employee has  
23 the obligation to interrupt an operation to  
24 prevent an incident from occurring" --

25 A. That's correct.



1 Q. And who is the sole responsibility in  
2 the Transocean lift plan who manages the lift?

3 A. The sole responsibility?

4 Q. Yes, sir. Is it not the crane  
5 operator?

6 A. It would be the crane operator.

7 MR. KOHNKE:

8 Excuse me, Mr. Mathews?

9 MR. MATHEWS:

10 Yes.

11 MR. KOHNKE:

12 You're suggesting that the crane  
13 operator caused this. I'm telling you  
14 that this witness has personal  
15 information that it was the removal of  
16 a chock --

17 THE WITNESS:

18 Yeah.

19 MR. KOHNKE:

20 -- causing the load to move.

21 THE WITNESS:

22 He removed the chock --

23 MR. MATHEWS:

24 I'm not arguing with the witness.

25 I'm arguing with what was reported to



1 the MMS.

2 MR. KOHNKE:

3 I understand you're making a  
4 statement for the record and I'm  
5 pointing out for the record that the  
6 fact that a crane may have been used  
7 does not indicate from this report  
8 that the crane was the cause of the  
9 accident and I understand what your  
10 point is, but I hope you also  
11 understand mine.

12 THE WITNESS:

13 Yes, sir. And I understand your  
14 point. But he actually removed that  
15 chock and it rolled on his foot prior  
16 to the crane being hooked to it.

17 E X A M I N A T I O N

18 BY MR. DYKES:

19 Q. Why would he have moved the chock --

20 MR. KOHNKE:

21 You want to ask this witness why a  
22 deckhand on a boat removed a chock?

23 BY MR. DYKES:

24 Q. Do you think it was in preparation of  
25 the crane operations?



1 A. I can only assume.

2 Q. The boat was at the rig, correct?

3 A. Yes, it was at the rig.

4 Q. So, it was at the beginning of

5 operations of lifting.

6 EXAMINATION

7 BY MR. MATHEWS:

8 Q. And it's also noted in the report

9 "Contributing cause: High seas."

10 A. Okay.

11 MR. KOHNKE:

12 I don't think that's Transocean's

13 fault either.

14 BY MR. MATHEWS:

15 Q. Does Transocean not concern themselves

16 with the injuries of people -- does Transocean

17 not concern themselves with individuals

18 performing operations at the site of the

19 DEEPWATER HORIZON?

20 A. Oh, yeah. They do.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 MR. KOHNKE:

23 Well, concerning yourself with

24 operations does not mean you're

25 responsible for a loss time accident.



1 And what does this have to do with what  
2 we're investigating? Please.

3 MR. MATHEWS:

4 You brought it up, sir.

5 MR. KOHNKE:

6 No, you brought it up.

7 MR. MATHEWS:

8 I brought it up in conjunction to a  
9 discussion when there was -- when a BP  
10 employee --

11 MR. KOHNKE:

12 You wanted to show that seven years  
13 of no loss times accidents may not have  
14 been technically correct. That's why  
15 you brought it up.

16 MR. MATHEWS:

17 Well, according to us it's not  
18 technically correct.

19 MR. KOHNKE:

20 Well, that doesn't have any bearing  
21 on this accident.

22 MR. MATHEWS:

23 It has a bearing in effect when  
24 we're told what happened when we had  
25 three discussions going on with the



1           VIPs: Loss time accidents, nothing to  
2           do with the duration of when the well  
3           was being drilled when they were 43  
4           days behind and that's all it was  
5           brought up for.

6           MR. KOHNKE:

7           Well, I hope this investigation  
8           proceeds in a more relevant way.

9           MR. MATHEWS:

10          It will. And I appreciate you  
11          questioning it, but from the MMS  
12          standpoint this is a loss time accident  
13          and that's the way we look at it.

14          MR. KOHNKE:

15          And for the record before this I  
16          offered this to you and tried to  
17          explain it. I offered to let you do  
18          the same line of questioning that I  
19          did. I'm not trying to embarrass the  
20          board, I just wanted the facts  
21          to be accurate.

22          MR. MATHEWS:

23          Sir, I assure you that they are  
24          accurate, they're just being  
25          questioned.



1 CAPT NGUYEN:

2 Alright. Parties In Interest. M-I

3 SWACO?

4 COUNSEL REPRESENTING M-I SWACO:

5 No thank you, sir.

6 CAPT NGUYEN:

7 Dril-Quip?

8 COUNSEL REPRESENTING DRIL-QUIP, INC.:

9 No questions.

10 CAPT NGUYEN:

11 Weatherford?

12 COUNSEL REPRESENTING WEATHERFORD,

13 INC.:

14 No questions.

15 CAPT NGUYEN:

16 Anadarko?

17 COUNSEL REPRESENTING ANADARKO

18 PETROLEUM CORPORATION:

19 No questions.

20 CAPT NGUYEN:

21 MOEX?

22 COUNSEL REPRESENTING MOEX USA:

23 (No response.)

24 CAPT NGUYEN:

25 Douglas Brown?



1 MR. SEELY:

2 Yes.

3 EXAMINATION

4 BY MR. SEELY:

5 Q. I'm Jeff Seely, how are you?

6 A. Doing good.

7 Q. I want to take you very briefly back to  
8 those meetings that occurred in the early  
9 morning hours of the 20th, okay? As I  
10 understand it the first one was around -- I  
11 think 0630 or something like that?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. And what was the purpose of that  
14 meeting?

15 A. That is our morning call with the asset  
16 and performance rig managers. That's done  
17 daily.

18 Q. And are those asset and rig performance  
19 managers on shore?

20 A. They are.

21 Q. What are their names?

22 A. Well, that would have been James Kent  
23 and Paul Johnson.

24 Q. And what was communicated to them or  
25 what did they communicate to you?



1       A. Well, there was a whole array of  
2 different topics that we just -- I mean it  
3 wasn't any particular focus on anything, but  
4 it -- other than just Jimmy, the OIM, usually  
5 tells them what happens, you know, what  
6 happened during the last 24 hours. And from  
7 there, you know, the captain if he has  
8 anything to speak on well he does. And, you  
9 know, the maintenance supervisor he's in the  
10 room and, if he has anything to say like  
11 having to do with maintenance of the  
12 equipment, of course, you know, he has his  
13 turn to talk to the rig managers. You know,  
14 the asset managers, you know, they -- when he  
15 talks he typically tells us about projects and  
16 different things that we're going to do, you  
17 know. Maybe at the end of the well projects  
18 or it could be the next well projects or it  
19 could be the 2011 shipyard. You know, those  
20 are the kind of discussions we have with the  
21 performance and asset managers daily.

22       Q. So, was one of the topics the  
23 operations that were underway the day prior to  
24 the accident?

25       A. Uh --



1 Q. Did you keep them informed about what  
2 was going on on the rig?

3 A. They were informed on what was going on  
4 on the rig.

5 Q. Did you tell them what operations were  
6 going to take place on the day of the 20th?

7 A. Yes, sir. They were aware of the  
8 operations.

9 Q. Okay. And, when you were in your bunk  
10 watching TV getting ready to go to bed, was it  
11 -- I don't have my notes, but was it Steven  
12 Curtis that called you?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. What did he tell you?

15 A. He told me that "We have a situation."  
16 He said "The well is coming in and we have mud  
17 flowing to the crown."

18 Q. Since that time has anybody told you  
19 why the well came in at that point?

20 A. No, sir. I can only assume.

21 Q. What do you assume?

22 MR. KOHNKE:

23 Don't do it. He's not going to  
24 make any assumptions under oath.

25 THE WITNESS:



1           Yeah.

2   BY MR. SEELY:

3           Q. Well, do you have any -- we've had a  
4 lot of opinions here over the last couple of  
5 days. Do you have an opinion about what  
6 happened?

7           MR. KOHNKE:

8           This will not be one of those  
9 opinions.

10          THE WITNESS:

11          I wouldn't care to share it.

12   BY MR. SEELY:

13          Q. You don't want to share that with us?

14          A. No, sir.

15          Q. With the board?

16          A. I wouldn't care to share it.

17          Q. Thank you.

18          A. Okay.

19          CAPT NGUYEN:

20          BP?

21          MR. GODFREY:

22          Captain, thank you. We'll pass on  
23 this witness.

24          CAPT NGUYEN:

25          Thank you, sir. Cameron?



1 COUNSEL REPRESENTING CAMERON, INC.:

2 No questions, Captain.

3 CAPT NGUYEN:

4 Halliburton?

5 COUNSEL REPRESENTING HALLIBURTON:

6 No questions, Captain.

7 CAPT NGUYEN:

8 Yes, sir.

9 E X A M I N A T I O N

10 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

11 Q. Mr. Ezell, just one more question.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. You admitted a while ago that you  
14 didn't have full visibility of what was going  
15 on in the drilling operation.

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Now, Mr. Harrell, yesterday, the OIM,  
18 from his testimony my understanding that he  
19 didn't -- he wasn't aware of certain  
20 activities going on also. Do you believe that  
21 he had full visibility of what was going on  
22 during that drilling operation?

23 A. Do I believe Jimmy did?

24 Q. Yes, sir.

25 A. No, sir. I don't think he had full



1 visibility either.

2 Q. Okay. So, here we have a three legged  
3 stool. You don't have full visibility, Mr.  
4 Harrell doesn't have full visibility and so  
5 then the third guy is a company man. So, if  
6 he doesn't have full visibility also what's  
7 going on? We're having a problem, do you  
8 think?

9 MR. KOHNKE:

10 Your question reaches a conclusion  
11 and I didn't hear the conclusion. What  
12 is the conclusion?

13 CAPT NGUYEN:

14 The conclusion is that there's  
15 three people, three senior people,  
16 onboard this MODU that -- in the  
17 decision making here.

18 THE WITNESS:

19 But you've got --

20 CAPT NGUYEN:

21 Mr. Ezell doesn't have full  
22 visibility. Mr. Ezell say that Mr.  
23 Harrell, the OIM, doesn't have full  
24 visibility of what's going on and my  
25 thing is if the company man,



1           whoever that is, Kaluza or Vidrine or  
2           -- didn't have full visibility of  
3           what's going on my conclusion or ways  
4           on that is that nobody has full  
5           visibility of what's going on in the  
6           senior leadership.

7           THE WITNESS:

8           Keep in mind that --

9           MR. KOHNKE:

10          Let me note my objection. I want  
11          you to answer, but I want to note my  
12          objection. The captain of the ship  
13          sleeps sometimes, I'm sure he showers  
14          sometimes and he doesn't have full  
15          visibility sometimes, but has a hand  
16          off to an appropriate person. I  
17          believe this witness has described how  
18          appropriate that person was. Secondly,  
19          there was an operation, you're saying  
20          "Drilling operation", there was no  
21          drilling going on. This was a static  
22          well. It had been tested. So, when  
23          you say this "Full visibility" or "Lack  
24          of full visibility" there are a lot of  
25          pertinent facts that aren't built into



1 your question and therefore I object.

2 With that objection, I want the witness  
3 to answer.

4 THE WITNESS:

5 That's exactly what I was going to  
6 say. We've got two toolpushers that  
7 provide a hundred percent coverage as  
8 far as supervision. And both of them  
9 are highly capable or were highly  
10 capable of taking charge of something  
11 of that nature. And they're also to  
12 the point if they have any kind of  
13 problem they will call and it will move  
14 to the next level. If I have a problem  
15 I'll tell Jimmy. Everybody will be in  
16 the loop.

17 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

18 Q. I understand, sir.

19 A. Okay.

20 CAPT NGUYEN:

21 Well, thank you for your testimony.

22 Are there any questions that we have  
23 not asked, any information that you  
24 think we should be aware of that's  
25 relevance to the investigation that you



1 would like to tell us at this time?

2 THE WITNESS:

3 Maybe just a couple of things I can  
4 add.

5 CAPT NGUYEN:

6 Yes, sir.

7 THE WITNESS:

8 Lord, I don't know how to tell you  
9 guys this, but that was one of the most  
10 painful things we could have ever done  
11 is stay on location and watch the rig  
12 burn. Those guys that were on there  
13 were our family. It would be like  
14 seeing your children or your brothers  
15 or sisters perish in that manner. And  
16 that -- that put some mental scarring  
17 in a lot of people's heads that will  
18 never go away. I wish that we could,  
19 to the bear minimum, have moved away  
20 from the location or something where we  
21 didn't just have to sit there and  
22 review that many hours. That was  
23 extremely painful. I guess the only  
24 other thing is you've got to keep in  
25 mind the HORIZON I don't -- I don't



1 care what anybody says, in my mind, the  
2 HORIZON was an exemplary rig with  
3 excellent personnel. It won all kinds  
4 of records from MMS awards to our own  
5 company excellence award. Those people  
6 were not losers by any means. They  
7 paid the ultimate price, they gave  
8 their life to try to minimize the  
9 damage that was done to people,  
10 property, environment. And I hope that  
11 at least that message is clear that  
12 they paid the ultimate price.

13 CAPT NGUYEN:

14 Yes, sir. We acknowledge that.

15 We believe that their heroic actions  
16 contributed to the saving of 115  
17 survivors of the HORIZON. At the same  
18 time though we didn't know what the  
19 fate of the 11 missing members was and  
20 the BANKSTON was the only one on scene  
21 that had the capability to conduct the  
22 search and rescue during that time.  
23 Until appropriate resources from Coast  
24 Guard and other entities were on scene  
25 that's when the BANKSTON was relieved



1 from what I understand. So, that's the  
2 reason why the BANKSTON had to be there  
3 to provide that kind of assistance in  
4 searching for the 11 missing members.

5 So, I just want you to understand

6 that --

7 THE WITNESS:

8 Yeah.

9 CAPT NGUYEN:

10 -- that was testified earlier.

11 THE WITNESS:

12 Okay.

13 CAPT NGUYEN:

14 Thank you, sir.

15 THE WITNESS:

16 Well, we -- we knew that it was

17 Coast Guard protocol so to speak,

18 that's what we were told on the

19 BANKSTON. I just want to let you know

20 how painful it was.

21 CAPT NGUYEN:

22 Yes, sir. I understand. I thank

23 you for your testimony and if we need

24 for you to appear before the board

25 again if we have additional questions



1 for you will you make yourself  
2 available?

3 THE WITNESS:

4 Yes, sir.

5 CAPT NGUYEN:

6 Thank you very much. You are  
7 dismissed, sir.

8 THE WITNESS:

9 Okay.

10 CAPT NGUYEN:

11 The board will take a fifteen  
12 minute break and we'll reconvene at  
13 3:00.

14 (Whereupon, a short break was taken off the  
15 record.)

16 CAPT NGUYEN:

17 The board will now call on Mr.  
18 William Stoner with Transocean.

19 \* \* \* \* \*

20 WILLIAM STONER,

21 after being first duly sworn in the cause,  
22 testified as follows:

23 CAPT NGUYEN:

24 Thank you, sir, please be seated.

25 THE WITNESS:



1 (Witness complies.)

2 E X A M I N A T I O N

3 BY MR. MATHEWS:

4 Q. Mr. Stoner, can you please state your  
5 full name and spell your last?

6 A. William Wilton Stoner, S--T--O--N--E-  
7 R.

8 Q. Thank you. By whom are you employed,  
9 sir?

10 A. Do what?

11 Q. By whom are you employed?

12 A. Transocean.

13 Q. And what is your current position with  
14 Transocean?

15 A. Oiler motorman.

16 Q. And how long have you been in that  
17 position, sir?

18 A. I believe roughly 9 years.

19 Q. Did you have any other oil and gas  
20 experience prior to your current -- last 9  
21 years with Transocean?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And what was that?

24 A. On land rigs.

25 Q. Land rigs, okay. What is your



1 educational background, sir?

2 A. 12th grade.

3 Q. Can you please briefly describe your  
4 job responsibilities as motorman with  
5 Transocean?

6 A. Maintain PMs and on the engines  
7 thrusters, get the readings from the thrusters  
8 in the engine rooms, engines that is. If we  
9 had any leaks or anything on that we would go  
10 ahead and have to do isolations and then  
11 change out any spools to that effect or  
12 whenever it comes time to do maintenance or  
13 PMs on the engines to -- or thrusters we would  
14 have to go ahead and have to fill out the  
15 paperwork and go ahead and attempt to do the  
16 PMs.

17 Q. And "PM" you mean preventative  
18 maintenance, sir?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. Thank you. How long have you been  
21 assigned to the DEEPWATER HORIZON?

22 A. Seven and a half years.

23 Q. In that time frame has there been a  
24 de-manning in the engine control room?

25 A. Well, I would say yes and then I would



1 say no.

2 Q. Okay. Can you tell me why you would  
3 say yes?

4 A. In a way when I first started we had  
5 one extra motorman working 6:00 to 6:00. And  
6 then they dropped that down, but if we needed  
7 any extra help we would always get with the  
8 deck foreman or drill crew and they would send  
9 down an extra hand to go ahead and provide us  
10 a little bit of assistance.

11 Q. Okay. Thank you. At the time of the  
12 incident on the DEEPWATER HORIZON, do you feel  
13 that you had adequate support to maintain and  
14 prevent any type of damage or repairs to the  
15 engines?

16 A. At night, yes.

17 Q. Alright. How long had you been on that  
18 hitch prior to the incident?

19 A. Six nights -- or six days.

20 Q. Six days. From the day of the -- the  
21 morning of the incident, can you please lead  
22 me up to when the incident occurred? Can you  
23 just give me a synopsis of what you recall?

24 A. Well, now I know in pre-tour they said  
25 they was going to have a negative test and



1 then they was going to displace. But I mean  
2 that there doesn't matter to me because I'm in  
3 the engine room. And so to my effect that --  
4 that Friday afternoon and everything like that  
5 I went and did my rounds checking out all the  
6 thrusters and checking out the -- going  
7 through the engine room making sure everything  
8 was okay to their end. We had a spool to  
9 change out that we needed to do in thruster  
10 Number 7. As soon as we got through with the  
11 spool and everything, there was a meeting with  
12 the -- all the leaders and stuff like that.  
13 And -- while that was going on and everything  
14 like that we just finished putting in a spool.  
15 Well, after that was through we had the  
16 paperwork ready to be signed by the OIM and by  
17 the BP representative. And then we was fixing  
18 to go down and start de-isolating, but we was  
19 discussing if there was possibly anything else  
20 we needed to accomplish before we released  
21 that there thrusters back to the bridge.

22 Q. Okay. Can you lead up to the incident,  
23 what happened?

24 A. Well, as we was discussing and  
25 everything like that, the gas light came on.



1 Q. And what do you mean by that "The gas  
2 light came on"?

3 A. Well, we got a -- a --

4 Q. And the gas light where? I'm sorry.

5 A. There is a monitor box -- or a box that  
6 was mounted on the wall that has a emergency  
7 shut downs on it and it has a panel on one  
8 other side that lets you know if it's toxic  
9 gas or if it's a fire or there would be --  
10 let's see, I believe there's three alarms.  
11 Fire, gas and another gas. Uh -- and the blue  
12 light came on, so we knew for a fact that gas  
13 was all the sudden coming up present. And as  
14 soon as the light came on then the -- over the  
15 radio you could hear Captain Curt asking the  
16 BANKSTON to move out either 500 or 600 meters  
17 because we was under -- going under well  
18 control. And so I -- I was sitting in a chair  
19 right in front of the desk. As soon as he  
20 started talking I got up and moved over  
21 towards the Simrad, where the radio was. I  
22 turned the radio up so we could listen to what  
23 he was saying. As I was standing there the --  
24 you could start hearing the roaring sound from  
25 up above. And then --



1 LT BUTTS:

2 Mr. Stoner, over here, sir

3 (indicating). Would you mind if I put

4 a diagram up on the board there and you

5 could kind of point to us where you

6 were at and how you were hearing these

7 things. Would that be okay?

8 THE WITNESS:

9 Yes, sir.

10 LT BUTTS:

11 Okay.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

13 You were on level-3 or 2?

14 THE WITNESS:

15 I'm in the ECR.

16 MR. MATHEWS:

17 He's on level-2.

18 THE WITNESS:

19 The engine control room.

20 LT BUTTS:

21 You were over here (indicating)?

22 THE WITNESS:

23 Right.

24 LT BUTTS:

25 Okay.



1 THE WITNESS:

2 Okay. This is the engine control  
3 room right here (indicating).

4 BY MR. MATHEWS:

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Okay. The desks were coming right  
7 through here (indicating) and right through  
8 here (indicating).

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Okay. I was right here (indicating).

11 Q. Got you.

12 A. And then, when Captain Curt came on, I  
13 stood up in the -- the control is right here  
14 (indicating). Okay. Well, I stood up, I  
15 moved over here (indicating) to this console,  
16 which the radio is right here (indicating) on  
17 top. I turned it up, moved back out over here  
18 (indicating) and about that time you could  
19 hear the roaring. As it was roaring, the  
20 Number 3 engine you could hear the Number 3  
21 engine, which would be right here (indicating)  
22 started revving up. And, as soon as it  
23 started revving up, it started a load down  
24 change over. In other words, it's supposed to  
25 kick off the line.



1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And, as soon as it did that, I could  
3 see -- well, Doug said "Something ain't  
4 right."

5 Q. Doug who, sir?

6 A. Doug Brown.

7 Q. Doug Brown.

8 A. And, as he said that, about that -- as  
9 soon as he stated that, he turned and came  
10 right over to the console just to look at the  
11 screen. And, within seconds of that, I saw  
12 roughly three, maybe five ESDs on the very  
13 bottom of the panel start flashing. I don't  
14 know if somebody set them off or if --

15 Q. I'm sorry, did you say "ESD"?

16 A. That's emergency shut downs. It's  
17 supposed to be actually for dampeners and to  
18 that effect if there's a fire or something to  
19 that effect. Okay. They started flashing,  
20 within seconds of that there was a big  
21 explosion, a loud "Bang", it got black. The  
22 port door on this here side (indicating) blew  
23 in. It just folded over and blew inward  
24 instead of outward, which way it opens. I  
25 could see it fly in because the porthole



1 windows they opened up where you could see  
2 moonlight through it. Okay. As soon as it  
3 blew in within a matter of seconds the  
4 starboard side blew in as soon as you heard  
5 the second explosion. That's what hit me. As  
6 soon as it hit me, of course the tiling -- we  
7 was on an elevated floor. Okay. The tiling  
8 flew up -- I ain't going to say where, I don't  
9 know. I fell through that there opening on  
10 there. I crawled back underneath the Simrad  
11 control because I could see just a little bit  
12 of green glow from the screen. As soon as I  
13 crawled under there I hollered out "Is  
14 everybody okay?" I could hear somebody and it  
15 sounded more like Brent. So --

16 LT BUTTS:

17 Mr. Meacom?

18 MR. MATHEWS:

19 Mansfield.

20 LT BUTTS:

21 Mansfield.

22 THE WITNESS:

23 Mansfield. As soon as -- nobody

24 else would answer. But I was

25 underneath there and I saw someone. I



1 don't know for sure, I don't feel like  
2 it was Doug, I feel like it was the ET,  
3 electrician or electrical -- but  
4 I go past and crawled to the water-  
5 tight door. So, as soon as he got to  
6 the water-tight door, I knew for a fact  
7 that he made it safely. There wasn't  
8 no more explosions yet or anything.  
9 So, I made my way to the water-tight  
10 door. As soon as I got to the  
11 water-tight door then I could hear  
12 Paul, the other -- the night motorman  
13 that works 6:00 nights to 6:00  
14 mornings.

15 LT BUTTS:

16 What's Mr. Paul's last name? Do  
17 you recall?

18 MR. MATHEWS:

19 Meinhart.

20 THE WITNESS:

21 Meinhart.

22 LT BUTTS:

23 Okay.

24 THE WITNESS:

25 And, as I got there, I opened up



1           the door. I was able to get fresh air,  
2           but I heard him holler "I need some  
3           assistance. Brent is injured." And of  
4           course I could hear Brent over here.  
5           Okay. As soon as he said that I turned  
6           completely around. I walked right back  
7           to here where roughly it is. As I was  
8           standing there I could hear Paul throw  
9           the stuff off of Brent and Brent  
10          more or less sort of lunged up. He  
11          jumped over some debris or stepped over  
12          some debris and fell on me knocking me  
13          back down. As soon as he did then we  
14          assisted him turning him facing towards  
15          the water-tight door and proceeded  
16          outside the water-tight door. As soon  
17          as we got to the -- out the water-  
18          tight door, closed it back, he washed  
19          his face off with a little bit of water  
20          from the pipe coming from up above and  
21          wanted to know what the blood was --  
22          wanted to know -- let's see. He put it  
23          as "It hurts."  
24          LT BUTTS:  
25          Uh-huh (affirmative reply).



1 THE WITNESS:

2 And we told him "Calm down. We're  
3 going to go ahead and make our way to  
4 the bridge" because the last thing as  
5 we heard was to muster at the bridge.

6 LT BUTTS:

7 Okay.

8 THE WITNESS:

9 Now, the lifeboats, as so far as I  
10 know in my mind, were there.

11 LT BUTTS:

12 Okay. So, when you walked out of  
13 this door the water-tight door, the  
14 engine control room when you came out  
15 here (indicating) those lifeboats were  
16 there, as far as you can remember?

17 THE WITNESS:

18 As far as I can visualize.

19 LT BUTTS:

20 Alright. And, if you don't mind,  
21 since you're going to -- and I'll sit  
22 down here in just a minute, but, when  
23 you came out of here (indicating), you  
24 were here in this room called the  
25 engine control room; is that right?



1 THE WITNESS:

2 Yes, sir.

3 LT BUTTS:

4 Now, when you felt or you heard or  
5 you saw this explosion did it fell like  
6 it was coming right here on the other  
7 side of the doors in this area right  
8 here (indicating) called the  
9 switchboard?

10 THE WITNESS:

11 Yes. I mean all I -- like whenever  
12 the explosion --

13 LT BUTTS:

14 Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

15 THE WITNESS:

16 -- whatever it was it blew straight  
17 -- the explosion, whenever it exploded,  
18 this here didn't bother the deals.  
19 It's just the door blew straight in  
20 opposite direction and this here door  
21 right here (indicating) blew in.

22 LT BUTTS:

23 Okay. So, both sides blew in?

24 THE WITNESS:

25 Yes.



1 LT BUTTS:

2 Okay.

3 THE WITNESS:

4 Port door went first, starboard

5 door flew in and that's what hit me.

6 'Cause we went ahead and proceeded this

7 way (indicating). Of course it knocked

8 my glasses off and hard hat and

9 everything. Well, I could tell there

10 was no handrails. I could tell over

11 right above where the handrails is

12 right over here (indicating),

13 somewhere around this here switch gear

14 room, okay, there was a big old dark

15 opening looking -- I mean I could not

16 see because I wasn't exactly standing

17 right there. But I could tell there

18 was no hand rails.

19 LT BUTTS:

20 What's on the other side of that

21 handrail right there? Is that a steel

22 bulkhead? Is that a wall right there?

23 THE WITNESS:

24 Yes, sir. The wall's right there.

25 LT BUTTS:



1           Okay.

2           THE WITNESS:

3           As you -- see, as you're going  
4           through the switchboard room right here  
5           (indicating), you go into this here --  
6           down this here first, the stairs or the  
7           door. Go right in here (indicating),  
8           you go -- there's an AC right there.  
9           You go around some electrical switches  
10          and you come into another door right  
11          here (indicating).

12          LT BUTTS:

13          Okay. Now, were you going outside  
14          here?

15          THE WITNESS:

16          And we was on the outside right  
17          here (indicating).

18          LT BUTTS:

19          Okay. And you said there was no  
20          handrail there?

21          THE WITNESS:

22          No.

23          LT BUTTS:

24          So, did you proceed?

25          THE WITNESS:



1           No. There was no handrails right  
2           there.

3           LT BUTTS:

4           Okay.

5           THE WITNESS:

6           So, we turned and went straight up  
7           these here stairs right here  
8           (indicating). As soon as you're -- at  
9           least this high (indicating) you could  
10          see the flair and flames from the rig  
11          floor. We come up. As soon as we got  
12          up we made our way straight to the end  
13          right here (indicating) on the port  
14          side, stepped over where the Gantry  
15          crane tracks is. Mr. Mansfield opened  
16          up the door, the water-tight door,  
17          saying "Let's go this way." I told him  
18          "No, sir. We're going to go ahead and  
19          go straight past that such and such."  
20          And --

21          LT BUTTS:

22                 What's a such and such?

23          THE WITNESS:

24                 Well, I'm not going to say, there's  
25          ladies present.



1 LT BUTTS:

2 Oh, okay.

3 THE WITNESS:

4 So, Mr. Mansfield shut the door.

5 We walked straight towards everything

6 and went straight to the bridge.

7 LT BUTTS:

8 Okay.

9 THE WITNESS:

10 And opened -- came to the bridge

11 over on the port side of the bridge.

12 LT BUTTS:

13 Okay. Was there fire and

14 everything in this area?

15 THE WITNESS:

16 No.

17 LT BUTTS

18 Okay.

19 THE WITNESS:

20 The only fire that I saw was right

21 at the rig floor.

22 LT BUTTS:

23 Okay. And right here where you

24 said there was no handrail, was the --

25 were any of the ladders or anything



1           there? You said there was a hole.

2           THE WITNESS:

3           No, I couldn't tell if the steps  
4           was there or not. But it seemed like  
5           there may have been steps there, but  
6           there was no handrails. I mean even if  
7           I loose my glasses I can tell if  
8           there's any yellow handrailing.

9           LT BUTTS:

10          Right.

11          THE WITNESS:

12          Because I mean they're painted a  
13          good enough yellow that at night, even  
14          if it's a dark night, you can see where  
15          the handrails would have been.

16          LT BUTTS:

17          Okay, alright. Let's go ahead and  
18          sit back down and we'll let Mr. Jason  
19          continue on with you.

20          THE WITNESS:

21          Thank you.

22          BY MR. MATHEWS:

23          Q. Thank you for that recollection. Are  
24          you familiar with the term "Shunt" as in  
25          electrical components?



1 A. About what?

2 Q. Shunt, S-H-U-N-T?

3 A. No, sir.

4 Q. Were there any safety functions that  
5 would shut in an engine if a gas alarm went  
6 off?

7 A. Not as far as I know.

8 Q. Earlier in your testimony you said that  
9 you heard communication with Captain Kuchta  
10 with the DAMON BANKSTON. How long before that  
11 communication took place did the first  
12 explosion occur?

13 A. It wasn't but within a few seconds.

14 Q. A few seconds, okay. Do you know of  
15 any safety devices on the engines that would  
16 prevent it from overspeeding?

17 A. Well, as soon as it starts to  
18 overspeed that governor's supposed to go ahead  
19 and shut the rig savers down and -- and shut  
20 it off.

21 Q. And where is the rig saver located?

22 A. The rig savers are underneath the  
23 turbos.

24 Q. And essentially what would the rig  
25 saver do that would actually prevent it --



1 A. It would close.

2 Q. And what would the closure prevent from  
3 coming in?

4 A. Sucking any gas or --

5 Q. Do you know if the rig saver activated?

6 A. I wasn't there.

7 Q. Okay. Are you aware of any safety  
8 devices that worked on the engines that  
9 prevented it from a runaway scenario?

10 A. Well, I mean as soon as the engine  
11 started revving up and then it started the  
12 load down change over, in other words this is  
13 telling us that the governor kicking it off  
14 already started kicking it off line. And  
15 that's when it turned dark.

16 Q. What happens if an engine runs away in  
17 the presence of gas?

18 A. It explodes.

19 Q. And which engines were running at the  
20 time of the incident?

21 A. 3 and 6.

22 Q. Do you know which -- if it was, the  
23 explosion was a result of one of those engines  
24 exploding?

25 MR. KOHNKE:



1           If the what? Excuse me.

2   BY MR. MATHEWS:

3       Q. Do you know if anyone of those engines  
4   was a result of the explosion -- caused the  
5   explosion?

6       MR. KOHNKE:

7           Do you know if the engine was the  
8   ignition source of the explosion?

9       MR. MATHEWS:

10           Yes, sir.

11       THE WITNESS:

12           No, sir.

13   BY MR. MATHEWS:

14       Q. You don't know or --

15       A. I mean I'm not going to say because I  
16   don't really -- I can't say for a fact that it  
17   was that or whether it was something else.

18       Q. Okay. How did the engine room look  
19   when you left? Was it still in tact?

20       A. Well, I wasn't in the engine room. I  
21   was in the engine control room and it was  
22   totally destroyed.

23       Q. Okay. Were you aware of any problems  
24   with the shut down safety devices on the  
25   engines prior to the incident?



1 A. No, sir.

2 Q. Do you know who is responsible for  
3 inspecting those devices?

4 A. We do PMs and then the ETs do  
5 inspections also on anything. If there's any  
6 kind of alarm or stuff like that, you visually  
7 go inspect it and make sure if it's just a  
8 sensor. If it's a sensor then you go and  
9 replace it.

10 Q. Okay. And do you recall inspecting  
11 those devices in the recent past?

12 A. As far as I know there was nothing  
13 wrong with Number 3. It was -- we just got  
14 through doing quite a few PMs on it.

15 Q. Okay. And, at any time, did you  
16 receive any word from the bridge? Because  
17 obviously you had a radio that you heard  
18 Captain Kuchta on. Was there any notice given  
19 to you to shut down the engines?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Okay. Thank you.

22 EXAMINATION

23 BY MR. McCARROLL:

24 Q. I just have one quick follow up  
25 question: In your testimony you said you had



1 five ESDs on the panel that started flashing.

2 Can you explain what a ESD is and the panel  
3 and why there were five? Just give us a  
4 little more clarification.

5 A. Well, all I know is I know I saw three  
6 of them. It could have been five.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. But the ESD is the emergency shut down.  
9 If you have a fire or something to that effect  
10 it shuts down the dampeners.

11 Q. The dampeners to the engine?

12 A. Well, the dampeners going into the  
13 engine room.

14 Q. Okay. Which would cut off any fuel  
15 going into the --

16 A. Fuel or air.

17 Q. -- gas or anything?

18 A. It would shut off mainly the air going  
19 -- so you ain't got the air and the fuel  
20 mixture and all that there.

21 Q. Where was that panel located that you  
22 saw the flashing lights?

23 A. It was over where -- like -- it's on  
24 the -- it was on the port wall just beside the  
25 port door going towards the switchboard.



1 Q. So, it was in the control room where  
2 y'all were --

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. -- at when the doors blew in? It was  
5 in that control room?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Okay. And it started -- did you hear  
8 gas alarms or anything first or --

9 A. No, just all the flashing light.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And then you could see or more or less  
12 hear the roaring of the gas.

13 Q. From your knowledge, would the ESD  
14 system be automated that these would flash and  
15 the automation would cause the engine to shut  
16 down? It's not any kind of manual  
17 requirement?

18 A. I don't understand what you're --

19 Q. If this light was flashing would it  
20 indicate it was trying to shut something down?

21 A. No, it seems to me like somebody may  
22 have tried pushing it.

23 Q. Okay. So, it's a manual device -- some  
24 sort of manual device that somebody had to  
25 push?



1 A. Usually it's somebody's going to push a  
2 button to shut something down.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. To try to save something.

5 Q. It's not automated like if it senses a  
6 lot of gas in the room it automatically trips  
7 this ESD? It's not automation, somebody has  
8 to push it manually?

9 A. As far as I know usually you just open  
10 up a lid on it, push a button and it will --  
11 right away you can save -- I ain't no expert  
12 on that?

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. I ain't an ET.

15 Q. That's fine. Do know is there more  
16 than one place where you can push the ESD  
17 button?

18 A. There is.

19 Q. Can you push it on the bridge, too?

20 A. Three places you can push it or can  
21 operate it: The engine control room, the  
22 bridge and the rig floor.

23 Q. The bridge and the rig floor. So, just  
24 from what you saw, I'm just trying to  
25 summarize here, you think that someone in one



1 of these locations probably pushed that ESD,  
2 but it probably wasn't the engine room because  
3 your group was all together in the engine  
4 room?

5 A. I know it wasn't the engine control  
6 room.

7 Q. So, probably the bridge or the rig  
8 floor?

9 A. So I would say either the bridge or the  
10 rig floor.

11 Q. Okay, thank you, sir.

12 EXAMINATION

13 BY LT BUTTS:

14 Q. Mr. Stoner, have you ever participated  
15 in tests on those ESDs?

16 A. No, sir.

17 Q. No? Have you ever participated in any  
18 tests on the overspeed devices?

19 A. No, sir.

20 Q. Okay. How about any tests on the low  
21 lube oil sensor? Like when the Coast Guard or  
22 the ABS comes out, you know, we want to see  
23 those tests.

24 A. Like if the -- do -- I guess in a way  
25 you would do ESDs because we would have to go



1 reset HPU units, the hydraulic power units, to  
2 open -- to make sure all the ventilation's  
3 opened back up.

4 Q. Okay. I was curious if you knew when  
5 the motor's over sped if they were in the  
6 overspeed would those dampeners go closed to  
7 the engine room, the air intakes?

8 A. Not right offhand. I wouldn't know.

9 Q. Okay. Would you know that if the  
10 engines or the motors were shut off would  
11 those dampers go closed?

12 A. No. As long as the -- the dampeners  
13 would stay open and running to keep the air  
14 all circulating just right otherwise if one  
15 dampener closed and everything like that it's  
16 going to blow a door off.

17 Q. Okay, alright. In the statement that  
18 you -- did you write your statement that the  
19 Coast Guard has?

20 A. I had to have the Coast Guard -- I'm  
21 south paw.

22 Q. No, that's okay. I just want to make  
23 sure. You had said or the Coast Guard officer  
24 or the person that accepted your, I guess,  
25 verbal statement they had mentioned you all



1 were de-isolating a thruster. Were y'all  
2 doing some maintenance on a thruster and  
3 where's that equipment at, located on the rig?

4 A. We had to go down to the thrusters,  
5 which is down in the pontoons and we changed  
6 out a sea water pool going --.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- and we replaced it and just got the  
9 paperwork finished to go ahead and de-isolate  
10 it, in other words put it back into service.  
11 Hoping that after -- we had to go back down,  
12 go ahead and open all the valves after we got  
13 all the paperwork and everything signed and  
14 then we would go ahead and proceed to have  
15 somebody down there to watch the pump kick on  
16 and verify that nothing was -- a hole in it  
17 somewhere else or the pump kicked on it just  
18 right or something to that effect.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And then it would have been somebody  
21 calling the bridge to make sure that they  
22 kicked the pump on.

23 Q. Okay. And then, when you all were  
24 finished, the thrusters were put back in  
25 service --



1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- and good to go? Okay. Now, we had  
3 stopped with you during the -- when did you  
4 hear the order to abandon the rig? Do you  
5 remember? If you don't that's okay.

6 A. I can't recall exactly whether it was  
7 as soon as the first -- after the first  
8 explosion or whether it was after the second  
9 one.

10 Q. Okay. And what was your muster  
11 station? Where was that at?

12 A. You stay put until you muster -- the  
13 muster station's going to be Lifeboats 1 and 2  
14 or Lifeboats 3 and 4.

15 Q. Okay. And where were you going? What  
16 did you hear?

17 A. They said -- they called Lifeboats 1  
18 and 2 would be muster stations.

19 Q. Okay. Now, I understood you didn't go  
20 across the main deck. You went down one deck  
21 and then --

22 A. No.

23 Q. How did you go?

24 A. We came out, went up on the main  
25 deck --



1 Q. Yep.

2 A. -- went forward to the port side all  
3 the way down.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Stepped over a step, Mr. Mansfield  
6 opened up the water-tight door to go back  
7 down.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. I told him not -- that we were not  
10 going to go that a way.

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. He closes the door. We went ahead and  
13 went straight past on top of the deck past the  
14 port crane and between the port crane and the  
15 BOP house.

16 Q. Okay, alright.

17 A. To the bridge.

18 Q. Alright. And then you went up to the  
19 bridge or did you get to your lifeboat  
20 station?

21 A. You went straight to the bridge. As  
22 soon as you got inside the bridge we sat Brent  
23 down. He more or less -- they looked at him  
24 and said that he needed a doctor or medic.  
25 And about -- by that time they was ready to



1 start evacuating. So, me and Mr. Mansfield  
2 got up and headed towards the lifeboats.

3 Q. Okay. So, you actually made it to the  
4 bridge before anybody started getting into any  
5 of the lifeboats; is that right?

6 A. No, we were a couple of the last ones  
7 that was actually -- we was the last ones that  
8 actually entered Lifeboat Number 2 I believe  
9 it is.

10 Q. Okay, Lifeboat Number 2. Now, when  
11 y'all got to the lifeboat, was the lifeboat  
12 full?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Was it -- I don't remember what the  
15 capacities were, I think it was 65 I think.  
16 Was it -- was everybody in it or was there  
17 still a few seats available?

18 A. There were still a few seats available.  
19 I mean I could tell that as soon as you step  
20 in the door you have to go all along that  
21 there side, going around toward the front --

22 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative reply).

23 A. -- it was full.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And I had to step over the railing in



1 the very back to get into a seat.

2 Q. Okay. And then, when you got to the  
3 boat, can you estimate about how much time it  
4 was when you sat down that they actually  
5 lowered the boats down into the water?

6 A. Not right offhand. I know it was right  
7 as soon as I got in it it wasn't within  
8 probably maybe a minute, maybe a couple of  
9 minutes.

10 Q. Okay. So, everybody that was there got  
11 onboard the boat?

12 A. Yes. I mean, as far as I could tell,  
13 there wasn't anybody else standing outside to  
14 get in one.

15 Q. Okay. Could you see out there if there  
16 was somebody standing there?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. It was solid.

20 Q. Okay. And the boats lowered down into  
21 the water. How did that go? Do you think --  
22 well, who was in charge? Was it the guy  
23 driving the --

24 A. Steve -- Steve Richardson was the one  
25 that lowered the boat.



1 Q. Okay. And --

2 A. And was the one operating and driving  
3 it forward.

4 Q. Okay, alright. And was anybody helping  
5 Steve along the way going down or operate the  
6 vessel or anything like that?

7 A. Yes, they had to open up the back door  
8 to release the cable and then somebody up at  
9 the front had to release the cable in the  
10 front.

11 Q. Why's that?

12 A. All I know is --

13 Q. -- somebody did it?

14 A. -- somebody did it. All I can say is I  
15 was hurting and I -- I didn't jump up to look  
16 and see what was going on or anything to that  
17 effect.

18 Q. Okay. Have you ever ridden down a  
19 lifeboat like that before on the falls?

20 A. I've gone down in a lifeboat before to  
21 -- so we could do the --

22 Q. -- motor it around?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay, alright. So, somebody had to  
25 open up the -- and release the --



1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- attachment on the back end on the  
3 front?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. And then when they motored away  
6 where were they heading, do you know?

7 A. As far as I know they was headed  
8 towards the BANKSTON.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I mean they was -- we was going slow  
11 enough to pick up anybody that had jumped.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Because I know they said that they saw  
14 one or two persons that jumped in the water.

15 Q. Okay, alright. Thank you very much. I  
16 appreciate it.

17 EXAMINATION

18 BY MR. WHEATLEY

19 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Stoner. I just  
20 have a couple of questions here concerning the  
21 statement the investigator took on your  
22 behalf. There's a statement that's attributed  
23 to you where you basically say all of the  
24 injectors were replaced recently. Do you  
25 recall making that statement to him?



1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Could you tell us why you thought that  
3 was important?

4 A. Well, it was -- I know the PM and  
5 everything like that was due for everything.  
6 So, we just got through changing out all the  
7 injectors, so it was running pretty good. It  
8 wasn't no -- I mean, to me it was making it  
9 more efficient and stuff like that.

10 Q. When you say you changed out the  
11 injectors, were you referring to a specific  
12 engine and which one?

13 A. Number 3 and then they changed out  
14 Number 6 the month before or something like  
15 that.

16 Q. So, you were referring to the change  
17 out of injectors on the two engines that were  
18 running at the time of the explosion?

19 A. Yeah. I know those two had been  
20 changed out.

21 Q. Okay. You also make another statement  
22 in here or at least the statement's attributed  
23 to you. It says "The air fans to tier room  
24 Number 3 is underneath the skate, which is  
25 closest to the wellbore. The gas could get to



1 Number 3 before it would get to the other  
2 engines to suck in the gas." Do you recall  
3 making that statement?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Could you tell us what you meant by  
6 that?

7 A. Well, you've got filters around the  
8 front of those air turbos. If the engine room  
9 is sucking in -- is sucking the gas in from up  
10 above it's going to fill that there room up  
11 first before it sucks into any of the other  
12 rooms. And it may and it may not have been  
13 what caused -- caused the explosion.

14 Q. Okay, thank you. And just one last  
15 question: Is it your understanding or your  
16 belief that if that gas got sucked into that  
17 engine room that that could lead to  
18 overspeed?

19 A. Yes, it would.

20 Q. Thank you, sir. I have no further  
21 questions.

22 EXAMINATION

23 BY LT BUTTS:

24 Q. Mr. Stoner, would you mind if I showed  
25 you another diagram of the rig and can you



1 identify where those intakes are to the motor  
2 room?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Okay. Just a second.

5 A. Okay. Like the intakes to the turbos  
6 are up this a way (indicating). The exhaust  
7 are back here (indicating). Okay. For the  
8 ventilation to go into the engine spaces and  
9 stuff like that, you got one of them right  
10 here (indicating) that goes to Number 3.

11 Q. I'll put a push pin right there.  
12 Where's the intake to the Number 3 engine?

13 A. The intake to the turbo is back right  
14 -- I believe it's right here (indicating).

15 Q. This one?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Okay. And that indicates the intake to  
18 the turbo --

19 A. That's the intake to the turbo.  
20 Number 3. Now, the intake to where the  
21 dampeners are for the air in the room --

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. -- is right here (indicating).

24 Q. Okay. Now, when you say "The room" is  
25 that the room for the Number 3 engine or --



1 A. The room for the Number 3 engine.

2 Q. Okay. 'Cause there's doors on each  
3 side of that room, right?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And then like Number 4 -- I mean Number  
7 1 and Number 2 the -- for those -- the air  
8 ventilation on those two rooms is right here  
9 (indicating).

10 Q. These things right here (indicating)?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Okay. And what is that again? Tell me  
13 again.

14 A. That there would be the ventilation for  
15 each room.

16 Q. Okay. So, 1 and 2?

17 A. And then this here (indicating) would  
18 be the intake to the turbo Number 2.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. The intake to Number 1 (indicating).

21 MR. KOHNKE:

22 For the record, when you say "This  
23 here" you're pointing to the stern of  
24 the vessel? Is that the stern end?

25 THE WITNESS:



1 Yes.

2 BY LT BUTTS:

3 Q. Mr. Stoner, is that the stern end of  
4 the vessel?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. It is.

7 MR. LINSIN:

8 Captain, could I just ask that  
9 someone recite for the record what is  
10 being marked on this chart? I gather  
11 stickers are being placed on this  
12 chart; is that correct? Can somebody  
13 let us know what stickers are being  
14 designating what locations? Thank you,  
15 Captain.

16 BY LT BUTTS:

17 Q. Tell me one more time what that is  
18 (indicating).

19 A. That would be the intake air  
20 ventilation to Number 2 engine room.

21 Q. Both of those?

22 A. And this here (indicating) would be  
23 Number 1.

24 MR. KOHNKE:

25 Do you want to highlight it with



1                   that (indicating) it might help. The  
2                   pins may get lost.

3 BY LT BUTTS:

4           Q. This one (indicating) is to the Number  
5           2?

6           A. Number 2.

7           Q. And this one (indicating) is Number 1?

8           A. Yes, sir.

9           Q. Okay. So, I wrote "Air intake  
10           ventilation Number 2 engine room" is this one  
11           (indicating)?

12           A. Yes, sir.

13           Q. And this one here (indicating) is the  
14           Number 1, right here (indicating)?

15           A. Yes, sir.

16           Q. Alright.

17           A. This (indicating) is the Number 1 air  
18           intake to the Number 1 turbo.

19           Q. And that's to the engine, right?

20           A. Yes, sir.

21           Q. Okay.

22           A. This is Number 2 (indicating).

23           Q. Is that the turbo?

24           A. They're going to the turbo.

25           Q. Okay. What's that one (indicating)?



1 A. This would be the Number 3 going to the  
2 turbo.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. This (indicating) is the air intake for  
5 the room ventilation.

6 Q. Okay. So, this is the same air --

7 A. Same as -- same as air intake for the  
8 ventilation.

9 Q. Which one?

10 A. Number 3.

11 Q. Engine room?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. Is it okay if I put "ER" for engine  
14 room?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. That would be Number 4 (indicating).

18 Q. Number 4 what?

19 A. Engine.

20 Q. The turbo?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Intake?

23 A. Intake, air intake for the ventilation.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Turbo -- turbo would be -- I'm not sure



1 if -- see, like these here (indicating) go to  
2 the -- those four right there go to the ones,  
3 the air dampeners to the transformer rooms.

4 Q. Okay. So, this one (indicating), this  
5 one (indicating), this one (indicating), this  
6 one (indicating) --

7 A. There's four of them for the  
8 transformer rooms are on each side of the --  
9 it would be --

10 Q. Would you say what they are one more  
11 time?

12 A. One would be -- it's the -- inlet  
13 and --

14 Q. Is it the same as these (indicating)  
15 except they go to the switchboard room, is  
16 that what you're saying?

17 A. They go to the little transformer room.

18 Q. Transformer room.

19 A. One would be for the exhaust and one  
20 would be for the intake.

21 CAPT NGUYEN:

22 Mr. Butts, are these labeling  
23 necessary for your questioning? If we  
24 can delay some of this until after the  
25 hearing and if -- if Mr. Stoner is



1 available we can label, if we can.

2 LT BUTTS:

3 Okay, sir.

4 THE WITNESS:

5 And see like these two right there

6 (indicating) is the same as these right

7 here (indicating).

8 BY LT BUTTS:

9 Q. Okay. So, it's just exactly the  
10 opposite?

11 A. This side is just -- all you would have  
12 to do is go "Ffft".

13 Q. Okay. Thanks, I appreciate it. Thank  
14 you, Mr. Stoner.

15 CAPT NGUYEN:

16 Flag state?

17 MR. LINSIN:

18 Thank you, Captain.

19 E X A M I N A T I O N

20 BY MR. LINSIN:

21 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Stoner. I'm Greg  
22 Linsin and I represent the Marshall Islands.  
23 I just have a couple of things that I would  
24 like to clarify from your testimony to make  
25 sure I understand what you're saying. You



1 testified first of all regarding being present  
2 in the engine control room when you heard or  
3 sensed the first explosion; is that correct?  
4 Is that where you were located?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Alright. And am I correct, sir, that  
7 after sensing and feeling that first explosion  
8 it was the port side door of the ECR that blew  
9 inward; is that correct?

10 A. The first explosion the port door blew  
11 in.

12 Q. Alright. And were you able to see what  
13 the condition was of the room on the port side  
14 of that port side door? Did you see out of  
15 that doorway?

16 A. Well, there was desks right in front of  
17 that there doorway. As soon as the doorway  
18 went in -- now, as far as I know it more than  
19 likely threw all that stuff, scattered it.

20 Q. Did smoke come into the engine control  
21 room?

22 A. I don't know about smoke.

23 Q. Alright. You didn't sense any at that  
24 point; is that correct?

25 A. Well, the insulation is sitting -- the



1 insulation and stuff like that come out of the  
2 ceiling.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. So, I mean I know for a fact insulation  
5 was floating around from the ceiling.

6 Q. Alright. At some point after that you  
7 sensed and heard a second explosion; is that  
8 correct?

9 A. Within seconds, yes.

10 Q. Alright. And it was after that second  
11 explosion that you saw the starboard side door  
12 of the engine control room blow inward; is  
13 that correct?

14 A. I didn't see it. I was facing away  
15 from it when it hit me.

16 Q. That door struck you?

17 A. That door struck me.

18 Q. Alright. And was that door, too,  
19 designed to swing outward from the engine  
20 control room?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Alright. Did that knock you over when  
23 the door struck you?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. Alright.



1 A. That's when the tile flew out.

2 Q. Alright. So, there were two separate  
3 explosions on either side of the engine  
4 control room; is that correct?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Alright. Now, you testified about  
7 observing the ESDs, the lights on the panel in  
8 the engine control room; is that correct?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. And would you describe how many lights  
11 you saw come on on that panel?

12 A. As far as I know I know I saw three to  
13 possibly five of them at the very bottom on  
14 the --

15 Q. And what color --

16 A. -- right side -- I mean left side.

17 Q. What color were those lights?

18 A. They would be flashing white.

19 Q. Flashing white?

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. Alright. And those ESDs are designed  
22 to shut down what pieces of equipment or to  
23 close what pieces of equipment, sir?

24 A. I do not know.

25 Q. Alright. Do you know what connection



1 those shut down devices had to the air intake  
2 systems you were just testifying about in  
3 connection to the last questioning?

4 A. No, sir. I do not know.

5 Q. Alright. I believe I understood you to  
6 testify a little earlier that after hearing  
7 Number 3 engine rev you also -- if I  
8 understood you to say correctly you said you  
9 could tell that the governor was kicking in  
10 and the engine was going offline; is that what  
11 you said, sir?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. Alright. So, what was it that had  
14 caused the governor to kick in in Engine  
15 Number 3?

16 A. Well, the governor did not kick in. It  
17 was trying to shut the engine down because it  
18 was overspeeding.

19 Q. Alright. And the governor was kicking  
20 Engine Number 3 offline; is that --

21 A. It was kicking off Number 3.

22 Q. Alright. And how could you tell it was  
23 kicking it offline?

24 A. As soon as it started kicking it off  
25 the -- you could see on the Simrad control



1 that it turned yellow. While the engine's  
2 running it's green. While it's shutting off  
3 it's yellow. Whenever it shuts down it will  
4 be I believe purple.

5 Q. So, you saw a light on a panel in the  
6 control switch to yellow; is that correct?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. And that indicated to you that the  
9 engine was being kicked offline?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Now, I also wanted to ask you --

12 MR. GORDON:

13 A point of clarification: Does he  
14 mean the generator was being kicked  
15 offline or the engine was being kicked  
16 offline?

17 MR. LINSIN:

18 Well, perhaps counsel could ask the  
19 witness that question when it is his  
20 turn.

21 CAPT NGUYEN:

22 I understand. Yes, I agree.

23 BY MR. LINSIN:

24 Q. When you're testifying, sir, about the  
25 engine going offline, what is it you're



1 testifying about?

2 A. Well, as far as I know the governor's  
3 shutting the engine down.

4 Q. Alright, okay. I have read through,  
5 sir, a handwritten statement that I understood  
6 a Coast Guard representative wrote out and  
7 that you then reviewed and signed apparently  
8 the day after the incident. I just have a  
9 question. I'm not sure I heard you correctly,  
10 but in your direct testimony I believe you  
11 said that Engine Number 3 and Number 6 were  
12 running at the time of the incident; is  
13 that --

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. -- did I hear your testimony correctly?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. If I am reading this handwritten  
18 statement correctly it recites in here that  
19 Engine Number 3 and Number 4 on the starboard  
20 side were running. Would that -- does that  
21 mean that the handwritten statement is  
22 incorrect?

23 A. That would be incorrect.

24 Q. Alright.

25 A. 'Cause it was Number 3 and Number 6?



1 Q. Alright. And your recollection on that  
2 is clear as you sit here today; is that  
3 correct?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. Alright.

6 MR. LINSIN:

7 I have nothing further, Captain.

8 Thank you very much.

9 CAPT NGUYEN:

10 Thank you, sir. Parties In

11 Interests? Dril-Quip?

12 COUNSEL REPRESENTING DRIL-QUIP, INC.:

13 No questions.

14 CAPT NGUYEN:

15 Weatherford?

16 COUNSEL REPRESENTING WEATHERFORD,

17 INC.:

18 No questions.

19 CAPT NGUYEN:

20 Anadarko?

21 COUNSEL REPRESENTING ANADARKO

22 PETROLEUM CORPORATION:

23 No questions.

24 CAPT NGUYEN:

25 Thank you, sir. MOEX?



1 Counsel representing MOEX USA:

2 (No response.)

3 CAPT NGUYEN:

4 Douglas Brown?

5 MR. GORDON:

6 Before I drag my computer up there,

7 I have a photo that's not introduced.

8 I would like to show it to the witness

9 and show it to everybody and ask him if

10 it accurately depicts the panel that

11 he's talking about. If it does I would

12 then offer it and e-mail it to you.

13 CAPT NGUYEN:

14 No, sir. We will stick with the

15 process. If you want to introduce

16 witnesses or evidence to the board for

17 it's consideration we do it in writing

18 and outside of the hearing.

19 MR. GORDON:

20 Alright.

21 CAPT NGUYEN:

22 Yes, sir.

23 E X A M I N A T I O N

24 BY MR. GORDON:

25 Q. Hi, Mr. Stoner, how are you?



1 A. Okay.

2 Q. I represent Doug Brown. How many  
3 lights on the ECR panel did you see that you  
4 -- on the engine control panel that you  
5 referenced that had the shut down lights, how  
6 many lights were on there?

7 A. What do you mean by "Lights"?

8 Q. There are -- there are buttons,  
9 correct, with lights?

10 A. Well, you got more than just one little  
11 old indication of lights on there. I mean  
12 certain lights go to something else. There's  
13 engine lights. If you're talking about on the  
14 Simrad control, depending on which panel, it  
15 could have been like a thruster -- showing  
16 thrusters on or thrusters off or engine on  
17 or --

18 Q. Okay. The panel that's on the wall --

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. Okay. And what side is that? Port or  
21 starboard?

22 A. It was on port.

23 Q. Alright. And how would you describe  
24 it? Is it about a foot and a half by three  
25 feet?



1 A. It's roughly about two and a half to  
2 three feet tall and about two feet wide  
3 possibly.

4 Q. Okay. And the lights that you call the  
5 engine shut down lights --

6 A. No, it's emergency shut downs.

7 Q. Emergency shut downs. Where are they  
8 located on that panel?

9 A. They would be on the right side of it.

10 Q. Top, middle, bottom?

11 A. It's all along the right side of it.

12 Q. The right side of the panel?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And you say you saw three in some sort  
15 of sequence, three; is that correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And there were two engines running?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What was the third light for?

20 A. I would not know what -- ESDs were shut  
21 down or pushed.

22 Q. If an engine is not running then that  
23 light would not -- that engine shut down light  
24 would not come on, emergency shut down light,  
25 correct?



1 A. Yes. I ain't going to say because I  
2 don't know for sure on that.

3 Q. Okay. But, for sure, only two engines  
4 were running?

5 A. I know for a fact there was two engines  
6 running that night.

7 Q. And for sure at least three of those  
8 emergency shut down lights that pertain to  
9 those engines --

10 A. I do not know that.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. They have been to somewhere else.

13 Q. Oh, okay. Well, but in your mind you  
14 said the right side of the panel were these  
15 lights, right?

16 A. Right.

17 Q. That's what you just said?

18 A. There's two sets of lights -- or two  
19 sets of buttons going up and down on that  
20 there right side of that there panel.

21 Q. Right. It's like two columns?

22 A. There's two columns of -- of buttons on  
23 that --

24 Q. Alright.

25 A. -- what those buttons go to, unless I



1 was looking on a certain screen, I cannot say  
2 because I do not know. I can find out if I had  
3 a screen.

4 Q. Would a picture help?

5 MR. KOHNKE:

6 No.

7 MR. GORDON:

8 Okay, sorry.

9 BY MR. GORDON:

10 Q. I just want to make it clear though  
11 because the testimony that you just gave  
12 indicates that three of those lights were  
13 actually engaging, they were changing colors.

14 A. Well, I mean I -- all I saw is -- as  
15 soon as I saw them they was white. Now, they  
16 may have changed because as soon as I saw  
17 those there 3 or 5 the next thing I knew it I  
18 was hit --

19 Q. Is it --

20 A. -- with a door.

21 Q. And I understand. Is it possible that  
22 those lights, sir, pertain to some other  
23 function other than the emergency shut down,  
24 those particular lights?

25 A. It could be that they went to something



1 else.

2 Q. Okay. Now, the doors that blew in --  
3 you said they blew in, correct?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. But they're supposed to open out?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. And what do they open out from the ECR,  
8 which is the engine control room, what do they  
9 go to?

10 A. A switch gear room.

11 Q. Okay. And what's in there?

12 A. There would be switch gears and a  
13 transformer.

14 Q. Transformer. Do you know if that room  
15 is what they call, I guess, explosion proofed?

16 A. It's supposed to be. That door was  
17 supposed to be an explosion proof door.

18 Q. Yes, sir. But the items in it, are  
19 they explosion proof?

20 A. As far as I know they're supposed to be  
21 sealed off where they can't -- no gas get in  
22 there or --

23 Q. Alright. "No gas get in there", is  
24 that what you said?

25 A. That's the way I see it. I mean



1 they're supposed to be air tight.

2 Q. But doesn't it get it's air the same  
3 place the ECR gets it's air?

4 A. I wouldn't know.

5 Q. And, once again, the ECR gets it's air  
6 from where the -- close to the rig floor; is  
7 that correct?

8 A. The air in the --

9 MR. KOHNKE:

10 Are you talking about the engine  
11 room or the engines themselves?

12 MR. GORDON:

13 Engine control room.

14 MR. KOHNKE:

15 Are you talking about the engine  
16 control room?

17 MR. GORDON:

18 Yes, sir.

19 MR. KOHNKE:

20 He wants to know the engine control  
21 room where it gets it's air.

22 THE WITNESS:

23 The engine control room gets it's  
24 air from I would say possibly the same  
25 place, but I would not -- could not say



1 positively because I didn't chase down

2 no dampeners.

3 BY MR. GORDON:

4 Q. I understand. So your opinion I heard

5 was that the engines were revving up because

6 there was gas in the room and it was sucking

7 in that gas?

8 MR. KOHNKE:

9 Counsel, he didn't say that.

10 MR. GORDON:

11 You're Transocean's counsel; is

12 that correct?

13 MR. KOHNKE:

14 Did you miss it the first time I

15 said that?

16 MR. GORDON:

17 Yes, sir.

18 MR. KOHNKE:

19 It's true, but it's still not

20 correct.

21 MR. GORDON:

22 I think he can correct me if I'm

23 wrong.

24 MR. KOHNKE:

25 I just did. It's not correct.



1 BY MR. GORDON:

2 Q. Let's try it again. Do you have an  
3 opinion what was causing the steady engines  
4 that are set at 720 RPMs to go up in  
5 revolutions?

6 MR. KOHNKE:

7 If you know answer. If you don't  
8 know, don't speculate.

9 THE WITNESS:

10 I do not really truly know what  
11 caused it.

12 BY MR. GORDON:

13 Q. Okay. But you did hear it?

14 A. Yes. I did hear.

15 Q. Do you know what they revved up to?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Did they rev up enough to cause a trip?

18 A. I would not know.

19 Q. Do you know what the trips are set to  
20 shut down those engines, what revolutions  
21 they're set at?

22 A. Right offhand, no.

23 Q. Are there three trips? A mechanical  
24 trip, electronic trip and rig saver?

25 A. I believe so. Yes, sir.



1 Q. And do you know if either one of those  
2 three worked for engine 3? Do you know for  
3 sure?

4 A. Yes. Whenever we do our PMs you trip  
5 the rig savers automatically to check them and  
6 check that out. And then the ETs are supposed  
7 to be checking out the governors and stuff  
8 like that.

9 Q. I'm sorry. My question was bad. Do  
10 you know if it worked the night of April 20th?

11 A. I wasn't down there.

12 Q. Okay. If Mr. Moore -- Mr. Brown,  
13 rather, said that they did not work would you  
14 agree with him since he was there?

15 MR. KOHNKE:

16 No. You're not here to agree or  
17 disagree --

18 THE WITNESS:

19 I ain't trying to agree with him  
20 or not.

21 BY MR. GORDON:

22 Q. Yes, sir. Did the room where you were  
23 in, sir, did it ever go dark?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Do you know what caused it to go dark?



1       A. Well, as soon as we had an explosion, I  
2 feel like it shut the generators completely  
3 off.

4       Q. Okay. So, it's your testimony that the  
5 explosion occurred first and then you went  
6 dark?

7       A. Yes, as far as I could tell.

8       Q. Okay. Thank you very much.

9       CAPT NGUYEN:

10             Thank you, sir. BP?

11       MR. GODFREY:

12             Thank you, Captain. I have no  
13             questions for this witness.

14       CAPT NGUYEN:

15             Thank you, sir. Cameron?

16       COUNSEL REPRESENTING CAMERON, INC.:

17             No questions.

18       CAPT NGUYEN:

19             Halliburton?

20       COUNSEL REPRESENTING HALLIBURTON:

21             No questions, Captain.

22       CAPT NGUYEN:

23             Thank you. Dril-Quip?

24       COUNSEL REPRESENTING DRIL-QUIP, INC.:

25             No questions.



1 CAPT NGUYEN:

2 Thank you, sir.

3 EXAMINATION

4 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

5 Q. I just have a couple of questions, Mr.  
6 Stoner. In determining the causes of this  
7 casualty we examine many aspects including the  
8 company's safety culture and the vessel safety  
9 management system, their effectiveness. Where  
10 are you -- do you supervise anybody as a  
11 motorman on this vessel?

12 A. No, I'm not a supervisor.

13 Q. Okay. So, the chain in your  
14 organization goes from Mr. Newman down to you,  
15 right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. Now, throughout these hearings  
18 we've heard that, you know, with Transocean  
19 safety is rig efficiency, do you agree with  
20 that?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Okay. We talk about -- they talk about  
23 -- the witnesses talk about -- Transocean  
24 witnesses talk about everyone is empowered to  
25 stop an operation if they feel that there's a



1 safety concern; is that correct?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Alright. If I tell you that, based on  
4 other testimony, we understand that there was  
5 well control issues and we understand that  
6 there was -- that the top managers on the  
7 HORIZON were giving a tour to BP and  
8 Transocean VIP during that period, do you  
9 think that's consistent with Transocean stated  
10 corporate safety policy?

11 MR. KOHNKE:

12 Excuse me, Captain. I have to  
13 object. This witness is being asked to  
14 comment on policy of a company based on  
15 a set of facts. You haven't established  
16 that he understands any of the facts.  
17 The fact that there may have been a VIP  
18 tour may mean something, but how can he  
19 correlate those facts to actually  
20 what was taking place to know if the  
21 company safety policy was being  
22 enforced or ignored. There's a lot of  
23 wiggle room in there and I just don't  
24 know how he will interpret your  
25 question, so therefore I have to



1 object.

2 CAPT NGUYEN:

3 I understand. And the way I frame  
4 it, safety is rig efficiency. Everyone  
5 is empowered to shut down operation if  
6 they feel there was a safety concern.  
7 And we have a situation where there was  
8 well control issues and the top manager  
9 was giving a VIP tour, which is a  
10 routine visit from what I understand,  
11 and also -- but there was also well  
12 control issues.

13 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

14 Q. Now, do you think those activities  
15 involved by the top managers are consistent  
16 with the company's stated corporate vision?

17 MR. KOHNKE:

18 I have to --

19 CAPT NGUYEN:

20 He's empowered to think whether  
21 it's safe or not there. That's what  
22 the company policy says.

23 MR. KOHNKE:

24 He's entitled to make his own  
25 judgement as to whether something's



1 safe and to shut it down. You're not  
2 asking him that question. If you ask  
3 him that question he will answer it.  
4 You're asking him about whether some  
5 policy was being fulfilled.

6 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

7 Q. Do you think that if there was well  
8 control issues the top manager should be  
9 involved in working on those well control  
10 issues instead of giving VIP tours? Should  
11 they stop what they were doing and go and  
12 address the well control issues?

13 MR. KOHNKE:

14 Let me make sure I understand your  
15 question. You're asking him what you  
16 think the top manager should do in a  
17 well control situation?

18 CAPT NGUYEN:

19 In accordance with stated corporate  
20 safety vision.

21 MR. KOHNKE:

22 Captain, I would ask that you not  
23 ask him this question. I would hope  
24 that he would not venture his opinion.

25 BY CAPT NGUYEN:



1 Q. Do you think that situation is  
2 consistent with the company stated safety  
3 vision?

4 MR. KOHNKE:

5 This is testimony that is being  
6 given under oath under penalty of  
7 perjury, as you reminded him. False  
8 statements are punishable by  
9 imprisonment and/or a fine. You're  
10 asking him to speculate, to opine, on  
11 what others may have been doing and to  
12 make a judgment under oath and it's not  
13 proper. And I submit that he shouldn't  
14 be asked to answer this question.

15 CAPT NGUYEN:

16 I understand.

17 BY CAPT NGUYEN:

18 Q. You have a choice to answer or not to  
19 answer it. It's up to you.

20 A. I do not wish to answer.

21 Q. Thank you, sir.

22 EXAMINATION

23 BY LT BUTTS:

24 Q. Mr. Stoner, just -- I wanted to go back  
25 to your statement that Lieutenant Kerry Duke,



1 an investigating officer of Sector New  
2 Orleans, wrote you -- wrote for you, excuse  
3 me. Is there a difference between engines  
4 running and on line?

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. Okay. What does it mean when engines  
7 are running?

8 A. If it's running in other words it's not  
9 connected. In other words the generator's not  
10 connected. If it's on line the generator is  
11 connected.

12 Q. Okay. And in your statement it says "I  
13 am unsure if engine 4 was running, but Number  
14 3 engine was running, Number 3 on port side  
15 and Number 4 on starboard side." Does that  
16 mean that they were running?

17 A. Uh --

18 Q. I'm not trying to confuse you. You  
19 told us today that Number 6 -- Number 3 and  
20 Number 6 were on line.

21 A. Right.

22 Q. That's what you told us today. That's  
23 not in your statement, so I just wanted to  
24 clarify your statement here today to us is 3  
25 and 6 was on line and your written statement



1 or the statement that was written by  
2 Lieutenant Duke of Sector New Orleans is  
3 simply documenting what you said was  
4 "Running", does that make sense?

5 MR. KOHNKE:

6 I think you're asking him was 3 or  
7 6 running or were they simply on line.

8 Is that what you're asking?

9 BY LT BUTTS:

10 Q. I think it's clear that 3 and 6 were on  
11 the line.

12 A. Right.

13 Q. And in your statement here, the written  
14 statement taken by you, it's simply stating  
15 "Other engines were running."

16 A. I may have not quite heard him whenever  
17 -- because my hearing was still a little bit  
18 off whenever I was making that statement. So,  
19 I mean he may have said 4 and I may have just  
20 agreed.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Thinking that he said 6.

23 Q. Alright. Good enough, sir. Thank you  
24 very much.

25 CAPT NGUYEN:



1           Mr. Stoner, thank you for your  
2           testimony today. Are there any  
3           questions that we have not asked or any  
4           information that you think we need to  
5           know that is relevant to this  
6           investigation that you want to offer?

7           THE WITNESS:

8           No, sir.

9           CAPT NGUYEN:

10          Okay. Thank you very much. If in  
11          the future we need you to come back to  
12          provide additional information will you  
13          make yourself available?

14          THE WITNESS:

15          Yes, sir.

16          CAPT NGUYEN:

17          Thank you very much, sir. You are  
18          dismissed. The hearing is adjourned  
19          for today. We will reconvene at 8:00  
20          tomorrow morning. Thank you.

21          (Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 4:15  
22          p.m.)

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CERTIFICATE

I, Dorothy N. Gros, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Louisiana, authorized by the laws of said State to administer oaths and to take the depositions of witnesses, hereby certify that the foregoing matter was taken before me at the time and place herein above stated; the matter being reported by me and thereafter transcribed under my supervision; that the foregoing pages contain a true and correct transcription of the matter as thus given to the best of my ability and understanding.

I further certify that I am not of counsel nor related to any of the parties to this cause, and that I am in no wise interested in the result of said cause.

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1 DOROTHY N. GROS, CCR  
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