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I.

I am grateful to General Wood and AFCEA and to Admiral Marfiak and Fred Rainbow of the U.S. Naval Institute for inviting me to speak and for their work in organizing this conference on "Winning the Wars of the 21st Century."

Whenever I attend a Naval Institute event—and Fred makes sure that happens at least twice a year—I make a point of pitching Naval Institute membership and explaining the value of supporting an independent forum where military professionals can subject their ideas to the crucible of honest peer review. My experience is that the heat and pressure of rigorous professional debate is more likely to lead to refinement than affirmation—but that the product from the refining process makes any discomfort worthwhile.

The partnership with AFCEA takes that value to an even higher level by sharpening the focus and expanding the range of participant viewpoints—especially those from the defense industries represented here.

This collaboration is a wonderful thing. But it can produce some awkwardly long titles. When I received my invitation to the AFCEA & U.S. Naval Institute Western Conference and Exposition, I thought at first that it was some kind of sporting event. I wondered if the winner of this conference would play the winner of the Eastern Conference and Expo. And I figured I had probably been placed in the western region because I couldn't get such a high seeding if I stayed home and competed in the eastern bracket with Vern Clark and all the Pentagon heavyweights.

II. Introduction:

I never realized how expressive a reptilian face could be until I saw an ad in the *Wall Street Journal* last fall. The ad showed an upside-down turtle straining all four legs and his neck in a futile attempt to right himself. The turtle's face conveyed a priceless combination of bewilderment, terror, and surprise. Beneath the turtle, the caption read: "Just when you thought you had the 'security thing' covered."

This ad was aimed at business computer users—but it also has great relevance to those of us in the national security business.

I tried to do a little thinking prior to my opportunity to chat with the President as we reviewed the Coast Guard contingent in the inauguration parade. I read a good bit of Dr. Condoleeza Rice's work on national security. I reviewed *Joint Vision 2020* and the National Military Strategy. I pondered "Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now. I reviewed our Coast Guard trend toward a Prevention/Compliance/Response model for much of our work. I watched the History Channel review the significant naval engagements in the Solomons and at Midway. Then I listened to President Bush tell the audience at Vice President Cheney's Salute to Veterans that we needed to keep our military strong so as to prevent war. A half dozen or more very significant intellectual stimuli. Where did they take me? Where do they take us?

That upside-down turtle I mentioned a moment ago shows our future if we try to "cover the security thing" by preparing for the wrong threat . . . by underestimating the right threat . . . by developing our acquisition and operational plans in isolation from other agencies with relevant and related national security roles . . . by not matching the versatility of our adversaries with agility and superior innovation on our part . . . by not adapting to the growing complexity of the national security context.

This conference should help us avoid finding ourselves in that turtle's situation.

I hope your attendance at the AFCEA and U.S. Naval Institute Western Conference and Exhibition shows your understanding that the "security thing" never does get covered with any degree of settled permanence.

That lack of settled permanence is especially apparent to those of us who fought in Vietnam as junior officers and came of age during the Cold War when the context of national security began and ended with the Soviet threat.

Looking at the multitude and complexity of the threats and challenges we now face, it is very easy to empathize with that turtle.

It's kind of like preparing to play a game of checkers against a familiar opponent, only to sit down and discover that you are already ten moves into a chess game . . . only, it is three-dimensional chess . . . against multiple opponents . . . whose pieces are unconstrained by your previous understanding of their rules of movement. Such a game would be so unrecognizable that we wouldn't even know what to call it. And that is true of the era in which we are responsible for national security. That's the circumstance we need to impose on our enemy . . . not find ourselves in.

Most historical eras have names, but most of the names are affixed after subsequent events have defined the full context. What people call an era in the present tense is seldom how it will be remembered in the past tense. Such are the limits of finite human knowledge.

There are some occasions when the principal actors in great events understand what stakes have really been laid on the table. But most of those occasions are wars. Peace is harder to characterize.

There are exceptions. It was clear immediately after World War II that we had concluded one struggle only to begin another. The term "Cold War" was coined in 1945, and it stuck because it accurately characterized the next two generations of national security challenges.

However, it also stuck because leaders like Dean Acheson and George Marshall and Harry Truman had the wisdom to fulfill what President Bush's new National Security Advisor refers to as the responsibilities of being on the right side of history. Their work, says Professor Rice, to rebuild the destroyed economies of Europe, to place recent enemies within the same security organization, and to promote democracy in places without strong democratic traditions gave structure to the conflict and sowed the seeds of our eventual success. There was no war, but the players called the era by the right name.

She wonders whether we are doing as well today.

Compare the resolution of Truman's national security team to build a new Europe at the beginning of the Cold War to our condition a decade after the end of the Cold War. Consider the fact that the officers making O-6 in our services this year have spent nearly half of their commissioned service attending to national security business during a period known as the post-Cold War era.

Any time we refer to an era as post-anything, we are admitting that we really don't know what is significant about it.

"Post-Cold War" is not a very helpful label. It tells us what happened before, but it doesn't tell us what will happen next or shed light on what is happening now. It defines the era in terms of a struggle that is already over. And when we combine that label with our habit of describing security threats in terms of what they aren't—namely, symmetrical—frustration can set in fairly quickly.

Studying national security with the current nomenclature can be like playing twenty questions when every question is met with either a "no"—or worse, an "it depends." If it's any consolation, at least we're better off than those poor literature professors who have to pretend they know what they're talking about when they refer to "post-Modernism."

When conformity to current usage does lead us to refer to the post-Cold War era, we would do well to bear in mind that future historians are not likely to refer to the last decade of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century as the post-Cold War era. It will probably be the "pre-something else" era.

And while we are waiting for the jumble of global security concerns to come together in a recognizable pattern of something-else, Professor Rice's concern for fulfilling the responsibilities of being on the right side of history takes on a compelling relevance.

Not knowing what's next cannot be an excuse for not preparing. There is practical business to be taken care of today—protecting against real and present threats, promoting stability and the responsible exercise of sovereignty by friendly nations, improving joint coordination among all five armed services, and providing for homeland defense. These responsibilities are clear . . .

III. Lessons from the "War on Drugs"

. . . And this conference is a serious attempt to help fulfill those responsibilities.

The Coast Guard is involved in many of the issues under consideration at this conference, but my purpose today is not to tout our national security responsibilities. To be sure they are many, relevant and growing.

Rather, my purpose is to look at our experience in drug interdiction—the subject of the one panel with which most attendees readily associate a Coast Guard role—and draw some lessons from that experience in a way that may provoke some useful ideas for looking at the other topics under consideration at this conference. I'll offer three lessons on what we should be doing now to meet the responsibilities of the as-yet undefined era in which we serve.

A. Lesson One: Complexity Demands Collaboration.

The first lesson is that greater complexity demands greater collaboration.

Every mission is more complicated than it appears on the surface, and most layers of complexity bring additional players to the table. As a military service working for a civilian department with an additional oversight link through the Office of National Drug Control Policy, we have learned that our effectiveness in counter-drug operations depends on our effectiveness in working collaboratively with the broad range of armed services, civilian federal state and local agencies, and foreign governments that also have seats at the table.

There are two parts to that collaboration. The first is clearly understanding what we bring to the table. The second is finding out how to help and/or complement the other organizations that are responsible for other pieces of the puzzle.

With respect to drug interdiction, we offer one particularly distinctive core competency: dealing with those maritime threats that are conveyed towards our shores in ways that are not effectively countered by traditional naval forces. A freighter that may or may not have a few tons of cocaine buried under a cargo of iron ore cannot be prosecuted in the same way as a hostile combatant. This ship and other suspect vessels demand special treatment. We can't launch cruise missiles or air strikes against them. They draw near in civilian vessels that look like and mingle with legitimate commercial and recreational traffic.

They can't be blown up from over the horizon. Somebody has to engage these vessels one at a time, up close and personal. Somebody has to distinguish the suspicious from the

obviously innocent. To separate the guilty from the merely suspicious, somebody has to get alongside and put a boarding team aboard, even if the suspect vessels resist or won't stop. Once aboard, somebody has to exercise sound judgment about employing such physical force as may be necessary to maintain the safety of the boarding teams and the crews of the vessels boarded. Somebody has to size up each case and dispose of it based on the complex humanitarian, diplomatic, military, geo-political, environmental, and legal issues at stake.

Somebody has to coordinate proposed enforcement actions with other government departments, flag states, law enforcement agencies, and everybody else who has a legitimate voice in the matter. It must all be done according to the rule of law.

For more than 210 years, that somebody has been the United States Coast Guard. Sorting through these sorts of situations is a distinctly coast guard—lower case "c" and "g"—mission. We have the unique combination of military discipline, law enforcement authority, and maritime expertise that is needed to prosecute these missions successfully and to do so offshore—well offshore, when necessary.

Knowing that we bring this competency to the table, we have an obligation to find out how other services, particularly the Navy, might make use of that capability . . . not just against drug traffickers but against any national security threat with a maritime dimension.

Joint Vision 2020 predicts a more unpredictable and less stable era in which much of our maritime security activity will be concentrated at the low end of the spectrum of conflict. It stands to reason, then, that the Navy will find our interdiction competency to be applicable to a broader range of maritime national security challenges in the coming years.

Admiral Clark has embodied this spirit of collaboration and is helping to identify those applications where we can help. He has affirmed the principle of the National Fleet agreement that I signed with his predecessor, and he is reviewing both that agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Defense and Transportation Departments so as to find opportunities for expanding their scope. He and I are consciously seeking to build Navy requirements into our Deepwater fleet modernization, and we are working to define the Navy-CG relationship as the cooperative interaction between complementary, interoperable members of the same team.

My goal will never be to become the second best navy, but to remain the world's best coast guard, one of whose jobs is to help the world's greatest navy—in ways that the Navy actually wants our help. That collaboration is essential to winning the wars of the 21st century.

B. Lesson #2: We must push information technology forward.

The second lesson is that we must push information technology forward. Continually evolving threats demand continually evolving tactics, which depend on continually developing technology. The drug smugglers against whom we contend are flexible,

creative, and well-capitalized. They continuously modify their shipment routes and refine their methods of concealment. They continuously surprise us with the sophistication of their infrastructure and the aggressiveness of their tactics. They are the likely prototype of other 21st century asymmetrical threats.

Last fall, I testified before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee hearing on a preliminary report issued by the Hart-Rudman Commission on Crime in U.S. Seaports.

The phase-one report of this commission had published two simple goals. First, to sustain our economic prosperity. Second, to ensure the security of the homeland. Both goals were offered as absolutes for our future in the same sort of language as in the "How do we" titles of our conference sessions.

I observed to the committee, however, that, at least on the surface, these are opposing goals.

The goal of sustaining economic prosperity implies a loosening of control at the borders. Sustained prosperity clearly depends on our accommodating the global trade that is predicted to double or triple in the next 20 years, so government needs to be attentive to finding ways to minimize the disruptions and delays caused by federal inspections and other requirements. More stuff has to move through faster—so borders need to become looser.

"Ensuring homeland security" on the other hand, suggests a requirement to tighten down the borders. Government has an obligation to keep illegal immigrants, drugs, weapons, and other contraband from entering and leaving through those same ports whose throughput we want to maximize in the interests of prosperity.

To sustain prosperity we open the gates. To ensure security we close the gates. We clearly need to get beyond the METAphor of an opened-or-closed gate and find a concept that permits both prosperity and security. Prosperity and security should not be competing interests when they serve the transcending national interest.

The concept I will offer to unite these goals is an idea that we may call, for the purpose of preliminary discussion, "Maritime Domain Awareness." I acknowledge up front that MDA is a subset of Total Domain Awareness. As a sailor, I ask you to bear with me!

Maritime Domain Awareness would be the umbrella that overspreads all of the information requirements of everybody in government with any responsibility for national security in the maritime domain.

Applied to the government interest of getting more cargo through Customs and Coast Guard inspectors in less time with greater security, its key elements would be an integrated, accessible database of information; one-stop coordinated inspections; high technology sensors, readers, x-rays, and scanners; solid risk based decision-making forums charged with taking on and solving problems.

As we get better at collaborative approaches to maritime security issues, we quickly realize how many agencies have important roles, and how varied and complex their information requirements are.

Imagine for a moment the information requirements associated with a hypothetical 6000 TEU flag-of-convenience container ship with a multi-national crew cobbled together by a hiring agent who works for an Algerian vessel operator who chartered the vessel from a Greek ship owner whose corporate offices are in the Cayman Islands.

How would you begin to manage the information required to prosecute an inter-agency response to any of the various threats that might be aboard such a hypothetical ship—a report of a nuclear device being smuggled, chemical or biological agents, or any of hundreds of other possibilities? Maritime Domain Awareness can become the forum we use to get our arms around that issue.

Its key characteristics would be a system of systems approach that integrates the many and varied efforts of military and civil agencies; transparency in the domain from "over there" internationally to the U.S. port; collaboration among federal agencies; coordination among international, national, and local interests; sensitivity to customer service; risk-based decision making; and facilitation of the Incident Command System when incidents do arise. "Jointness plus" with an emphasis on the "plus."

Its tools would have to include solid vulnerability assessments with action plan follow-ups; a model port guide with special attention to security guidelines; counter-terrorism and contingency plans and exercises; real-time cargo, people, vessel tracking systems; and rigorous analytic models & simulations capable of producing tactically actionable products

The wars of the 21st century present information technology challenges, many of which will place demands well beyond simply gaining informational superiority over known adversaries.

Real Maritime Domain Awareness is beyond our grasp in terms of current technology, current capabilities, and current budgets. It multiplies many times over the challenges of getting everybody all the data they need without pushing anybody into information overload. Frankly acknowledging these enormous obstacles, I nevertheless believe that continuously advanced, integrated information systems offer us our closest point of approach to a sustainable advantage against 21st century threats. They also offer us the best chance of managing the interagency collaboration I spoke of earlier.

C. Lesson #3 The Future is Now.

My final lesson is that the future is now. It would be easy to read the program for this conference, to note the theme of "Winning the Wars of the 21st Century," and to conclude that our focus this week is on the long-term future. That conclusion would be only partly correct. We do have an obligation to look ahead and prepare our services to meet tomorrow's challenges. However, we must also remember that the twenty first century is

already here, and we have sailors at sea engaging twenty first century threats . . . Just ask the kids on the *Cole*.

Every panel at this conference addresses a mission capability or an issue of immediate relevance to unit commanding officers and sailors in the fleet right now. Consider these thoughts shared by a Coast Guard O-5 at the ceremony marking his relief at the end of a tour in command of one of our medium endurance cutters:

"We didn't get the big drug seizure we were constantly looking for . . . I can't tell you how disappointing it is to pursue high-speed drug-laden vessels through a moonless night, to close them within 3,000 yards, to be so close as to hear the wail of their engines as they crash across the wave tops—and then to hear them turn away, accelerate, and disappear over the horizon. How fervently we beseeched the gods for greater speed and better sensors in the fading wake of our adversaries!"

The Coast Guard operates some venerable ships, but this unit commander wasn't stepping down from command of one of our museum pieces. He experienced the helpless frustration of inadequate speed and obsolete sensor packages while in command of the second newest national security cutter in our inventory. I understand his impatience with the futility of sending his crew to sea without the tools to succeed. That's why our IDS project is so important to us. It defines our potential to succeed in the future. The best industrial minds in America will guarantee that.

The Coast Guard lost one of our great leaders last week when Admiral Jack Hayes, the Commandant during the 1980 Mariel Boat Lift, was killed in an auto-pedestrian accident while hiking in the Florida Keys. I mention our collective grief at this point in my speech because the Coast Guard hasn't bought an open-ocean multi-mission cutter since Jack Hayes obtained funding for our 270-foot medium endurance cutters way back at the very dawn of modern counter-drug operations—when that frustrated unit CO was an officer candidate.

Greater speed and better sensors won't come from whatever figurative gods this poetically inclined CO invoked. Neither will inter-operability, network-centric operations, data security, effective counter-terrorism measures, or any other infrastructure requirements that sailors and marines in the fleet and the field need right now. These will only come about through determined leadership that understands the urgency of the immediate operational situation.

The best case for future requirements may come from our present operations.

IV. Conclusion:

General Barry McCaffrey, who recently stepped down as the Director of ONDCP, steadfastly resisted the labeling of our national drug control strategy as the "Drug War." He insisted that the comparison falls short on just about every meaningful element of the definition of war, most notably for its lack of an adversary whose vanquishing would signal the end of the struggle. Rather, he likened it to a cancer pervasively spreading throughout America. He was right.

I thought about General McCaffrey and the firmness of his resolution when I read the titles of the panel discussions for this conference. How do we win the drug war? How do we win the war against terrorism? How do we win the war to protect information?

As undeniable as his point about the drug war certainly is, I decided that the prominence of "How do we" questions in the titles of the panel discussions is actually a valuable feature of this conference. How do we implement network-centric operations? How do we maintain interoperability?

The framing of these "How do we" questions conveys three important attitudes. The "how" attests to the necessity of success. Not "Can?" or "Should?" We're already committed, and we must succeed, so the question is "How?" These challenges are wars in the sense the consequences of failure are as dire as those associated with losing a declared hot war. And they are wars in the sense that we don't have the option of declining to wage them.

The "do" emphasizes that these huge challenges before us will require sustained work—miracle cures and silver bullets are not likely to bail us out.

And the "we" attests to the necessity of collaboration in all of these ventures. We will succeed. We will succeed by working hard. And we will succeed earlier by working hard together. It's a great range of topics, and a distinctly constructive way of looking at them.

And so I offer you three lessons from the drug war to prepare for the other wars of the twenty first century. Collaboration. Integrated information systems. Do it now. I hope you find them helpful in your work.

Semper paratus.

