



U.S. Coast Guard Oral History Program

Attack on America: September 11, 2001 and the U.S. Coast Guard

U.S. COAST GUARD ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM
Operation Noble Eagle Documentation Project

Interviewee: Captain Dan Deputy, USCG
Chief, Office of Cutter Forces (G-OCU)

Interviewer: PAC Peter Capelotti, USCGR
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Q: First, see if you could say a few words about . . . tell me who you are and what your position is here and how you came to be here.

CAPT Deputy: Okay; Captain Dan Deputy, Office of Cutter Forces [G-OCU]. We're the facility managers for basically all the fleet 65-foot cutters and above. So we, in effect, try to get the funding associated with how to do their jobs as well as any sort of proposals for new initiatives. We also, out of OCU, are the weapons facility manager.

Q: Yes.

CAPT Deputy: We run the Ordnance Manual as well as guns and weapons.

Q: I want to ask you about all those things, but I want to talk a bit more about you specifically. How did you come here in your career?

CAPT Deputy: Okay; Coast Guard Academy graduate in 1974.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: And I started out on the CGC *Westwind* [WAGB-281].

Q: An icebreaker.

CAPT Deputy: An icebreaker back in the Great Lakes when we still had the *Wind*-class icebreakers around.

Q: Did you see the documentary the other night that Doc [Robert] Browning was in?

CAPT Deputy: I did not.

Q: On the History channel about icebreaking?

CAPT Deputy: No, I missed that. Maybe I'll see it next time. And then I've been, let's see, Operations Officer on [CGC] *Dependable* [WMEC-626], which is a 210 out of, at that time, Panama City, Florida.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: I was XO [Executive Officer] on [CGC] *Escape* [WMEC-6] out of Charleston, South Carolina; XO on [CGC] *Jarvis* [WHEC-725], a 378 out of Honolulu and then CO [Commanding Officer] of [CGC] *Morgenthau* [WHEC- 722] out of Alameda. Then I also had a stint there in Governor's Island, when we were still on Governor's Island, as the RCC [Rescue Coordination Center] Senior Controller, and Guantanamo Bay [Gitmo] for two years as the Liaison Officer down at the Fleet Training Group.

Q: Following your tracks I spent some time at Activities New York last week and I'm going to Gitmo next month to interview our PSU [Port Security Unit] down there.

CAPT Deputy: Oh, okay. Well I lived in the lighthouse when you get out there.

Q: Is that right?

CAPT Deputy: Hopefully it's still there . . .

Q: I'll check it out for you.

CAPT Deputy: . . . and supposedly turned into a museum.

Q: Really?

CAPT Deputy: Yes. I really would like to see if you see it.

Q: I will, yes.

CAPT Deputy: I've heard that it was turned into a museum now. Whether it's "a museum" or they just abandoned it and . . .

Q: Called it a museum!

CAPT Deputy: . . . called it a museum, yes. And there's nothing in it other than the lighthouse.

Q: That's it for a museum in a lot of places. Well that's interesting. So you woke up a few mornings with the World Trade Center in the foreground of your life when you were at Governor's Island?

CAPT Deputy: Yes I did, very much so. I've got, as a matter of fact, I've got an eerie picture of the . . . we were in Building 112, which, when you're physically looking out the door, there was the World Trade Center. So in our house we've got this drawing that we bought in the airport-type of a thing that was from

Governor's Island looking towards Manhattan. And sure enough, there's the two World Trade Centers at the dominance of the picture.

Q: Yes. I was over at the Exhibit Center a few weeks ago and they have a big painting of a change of command on Governor's Island. I don't know whether it was when they closed it down, but it's interesting because in the background are the World Trade Centers.

CAPT Deputy: Oh sure. It dominated the skyline as far as from Governor's Island.

Q: And it's a doubly historic painting now, not just because it recorded that particular change of command, but because those aren't there anymore. Were you here that morning?

CAPT Deputy: I was not. I was one of the probably hundred that was playing golf in a Coast Guard Golf Tournament.

Q: Oh, well that's the first time I've heard about that.

CAPT Deputy: Oh, is that right?

Q: Yes Sir.

CAPT Deputy: Well we have a monthly tournament, and it was very ironic in that . . .

Q: And where is that played?

CAPT Deputy: Well at different courses about the [Washington] DC area.

Q: Okay.

CAPT Deputy: In any case it was in Fort Meade and it was on a Tuesday as I recall.

Q: Mostly all officers?

CAPT Deputy: Anybody, but I would say mostly officers.

Q: Any particular level?

CAPT Deputy: We had a couple of Admirals out there that found out about it and started to leave and everybody was getting phone calls on their cell phones, and guys were going back and forth.

Q: What hole were you on?

CAPT Deputy: Gee, we had just started.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: It's an eight o'clock shotgun start, so I think we were only on the second hole when the word started passing about . . . veering golf carts and everybody was getting calls.

Q: Well everybody was leaving this building. I guess you folks were all coming back, is that right?

CAPT Deputy: I did not. I basically knew that at this point you could either go in and get into a parking lot jam or wait it out and be kept informed through other people.

Q: Let me ask me you, what sorts of issues were you working through for the Cutter Force on September 10th let's say, or before September 11th? What were the big things on your plate?

CAPT Deputy: A lot of it is, again, associated with Deep Water; what type of weapons that the Deep Water notional design would entail. You know there are a lot of - and still to this day - the type of medium caliber weapon that the new vessel will be using. There's a lot of concern with the Navy that they may not need an intermediate caliber weapon.

Q: What does that exactly mean? I guess the bow mounted or the gun that's mounted at the bow of these vessels.

CAPT Deputy: Exactly. They either have a really, really big gun that is way too big for a Coast Guard cutter or they have more of a chain machine gun; AAV-30 millimeter.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: We still have a requirement; law enforcement, as well as we feel the Navy does, a requirement for what traditionally was the three-inch 50; the 76-millimeter type of a weapon.

Q: What do we have on the 378's?

CAPT Deputy: It's a 76-millimeter.

Q: Yes.

CAPT Deputy: There are a couple of them out there but there was, again, the Navy kind of going back into that missile arena; that missiles are better than guns.

Q: Was there any thought before . . . well was there any thought at that point that the Coast Guard . . . we used to have missiles at one point in the Eighties, or tested them?

CAPT Deputy: Correct. We tested and proved the feasibility that it could be done and then in effect said, space-weight types of prototyping, which state that it can be done. If they wanted to put a box launcher onboard they could, and that was about it.

Q: Was that under discussion for the Deep Water Project?

CAPT Deputy: Oh, very much so. Anymore, when you look at a capability ship its very modular, especially now versus then, in that you, in effect, put the type of weapon that you need or the capability that you need and you just attach it to the ship, or detach, the case being, and you go off and do that mission. Because we're so multi-missioned you might have a CIWS [Close-In Weapon System] mount. You might have a gun mount. You might have a missile mount. You might have a different anti-radar type of suite. And a lot of these types of capabilities will come with the personnel detachments, and if you don't need them then you don't put them onboard.

Q: You mean you might have, let's say you need a missile for a certain situation. You might put a missile crew on there.

CAPT Deputy: Very much so.

Q: Yes.

CAPT Deputy: Yes. It could be a Navy missile crew.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: It could be Coast Guard. A lot of that, especially if we get into this National Fleet, is for law enforcement. Obviously we can be the Coast Guard law enforcement detachments going onto a naval combatant, or if we're going out of hemisphere, our new National Security Cutter could, in fact, have several Navy detachments, whether it's in the CIE . . . it's an acronym for the listeners; the spook type guys.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: They listen . . . they're already doing that right now on 378s. We'll have a detachment of them and they do some listening-types of things. So I think more and more you'll get to that because then your crew size can go from 300 down to 90.

Q: Yes, sure, and you can save on the personnel costs.

CAPT Deputy: And you, in effect, tailor your ship for that type of mission.

Q: Right. How does your office inter-finger with the Deep Water office?

CAPT Deputy: Well we're still the Sponsor Rep, and so for us; the Cutter Force, both in weapons and capability, is that they would come to us for the operational requirements.

Q: The Deep Water people would come to you?

CAPT Deputy: That's correct.

Q: And then you would tell them what you need and they go out and try to find a way to make it happen.

CAPT Deputy: That's correct, and we'll also be a part of the Operational Test and Evaluation; the OT&E part.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: To ensure that what we said we wanted is in fact what we are getting . . .

Q: And actually happens.

CAPT Deputy: . . . and actually happens, and give the evaluation for that. And really that's the hard part. I mean there's obviously compromises and you have to get to a point where, is the operational requirement that you asked for being met? And if it isn't, then that's a failure.

Q: Where you asked after 9-11 to sort of go back to your requirements to re-evaluate them?

CAPT Deputy: Oh, very much so. We still are. A lot of the things that are associated with Port Security, as far as our PSUs; our Port Security Units, which traditionally are the Reservists that go OCONUS [Outside the Continental U.S.] via Bahrain or wherever, they have their Raider Boats. They are under the

Rules of Engagement. They are over there to protect national assets. It's very much different 12 miles and in.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: They are under Law Enforcement.

Q: Is there any discussion . . . well just to follow up on that. What were you asked to look at specifically for the Cutter Force after 9-11, either for Deep Water or for cutters that were part of Deep Water?

CAPT Deputy: The things that we're probably looking at are chemical, biological, and radiological types of detection systems.

Q: And would it be fair to say that those were not on the radar screen before 9-11, or at least not in any kind of major way?

CAPT Deputy: Not in a major way. I think that we were looking at it; the threat of a type of chemical, maybe not biological or radiological, but certainly biological and chemical was heightened. So we had been looking at it and so had the Navy. So I won't say that we weren't, but it certainly came to a more progressed look.

Q: And you have to do that both in terms of the vessel and its crew; like what kind of protective suits the crew would wear as well as how you might protect the vessel?

CAPT Deputy: That is correct, as well as the detection devices.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: But the protective equipment for the people and the ship, as well as a capability to detect these types of things before they go off, I mean that's our business.

Q: Right. How do you put all of those together? Do you have different working groups and they all . . . ?

CAPT Deputy: We do. The National Fleet Working Group, with the Navy, is a standing group that I'm chairman of. It has been kind of . . . it's growing in its capability.

Q: Could you explain what the National Fleet Concept is?

CAPT Deputy: Well it is to ensure that we don't go off in different directions and that we try to cenergize (phonetic) as best possible.

Q: And primarily with the Navy?

CAPT Deputy: Very much so with the Navy. But I won't say that . . . Navy then represents the Joint Forces as well.

Q: I sort of meant in the sense of whether it's NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] or other fleets that they might have.

CAPT Deputy: No, right now it's just this working group is Navy.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: And again, we report out to the NAVGUARD [Navy Coast Guard] Board, which meets every six months, and we're kind of the working entity of the NAVGUARD Board.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: But, again, its interoperability; both within communications and its capabilities whenever possible. So this vein of the idea of the weapon systems is that a lot of the Navy provides us the maintenance and supportability of the weapons that we end up buying and in some cases they buy for us.

Q: It seems that 9-11 has spun out a lot of contradictory problems for you folks. It seems that crew sizes have been generally getting smaller or rotating for different missions as you say. You know, [CGC] *Healy's* [WAGB-20] a perfect example.

CAPT Deputy: Correct.

Q: And yet 9-11 sort of forced everybody to stay out there for a long time; a lot of hours, with little or no rotation. Did those enter into your discussions at all; those kinds of problems?

CAPT Deputy: Well they are, and certainly 9-11 has brought up the fact that all of this optimum manning is a great concept on paper.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: But it really did. You know there are a couple of initiatives that we are doing outside of that, which is what we call Cutter Support Teams as well as Maintenance Facilities on our newest buoy tenders that have just come out of there; the 175s and the 225s.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: They set up with a smaller crew and with these Maintenance Facility Teams that are on the shore. Yet they're supposed to come onboard and do all this work and yet not be a part of the crew, and that they would be managed by a shore facility. Well over the years it didn't work out quite as well as it should have, maybe on paper.

Q: Why is that?

CAPT Deputy: Well it works with larger vessels. It certainly works with the Navy. You know they go out for six-months. They come back for six-months. The White Fleet; the 378s, we go out for 90 days. We come back for 90 days. So there is a timeframe in there where you can get things scheduled.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: It breaks down a little bit when you get down into the 175s, which they go out when the weather's good and they don't go out when the weather's bad. They work a buoy that's discrepant and they also work buoys that are scheduled. But to say I'm going to guarantee you that I'm going to go out on a Tuesday and come back on a Thursday, they really don't do it that way. And now you've got another boss that is the maintenance guy and he says, well, wait a minute. I just scheduled my guys to be over to you on Friday to do all this work and low and behold you didn't come in. Well, he says, that's fine. I'm in on Saturday and I'm going to go back out on Monday. He says, well fine. My guys are off. They worked their 40-hour work week.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: I'm not going to tell them to come in on a weekend. So a little bit of the control issue and then a little bit of this head butting. But the bottom line is the ships were too optimally crewed. So we realized that right off the bat. So we're dealing with this compromise. Well as it turned out the ships that, what we got covered in support teams is, in effect, what we did is we gave those MAT people to the ships and the CO decides who sails and who stays behind. We gave them their own little shop, and in fact, that maintenance then went to them was put on the back of the CO and EO. But it does give them the six extra bodies, and then he decides, or she decides, as to who sails for this patrol or for this next quarter and then they rotate people out. And what the idea is is that they will be on a five-year timeframe and in those five-years you'll sail about 150 or 137 days a year and you will get your rotational pool from shore to sea associated with that ship.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: And the ships that were under the CST concept; they were able to meet the homeland security/port security needs a heck a lot better than the other cutters. Like the [CGC] *Frank Drew* [WLM-557] that came to the Potomac; they were CST. They were able to rotate people out; go home, come back and say, okay, we're going to be back on Monday. They also had guys that when they came back in they were off and that other shore-based crews, they took the duty. So there are a lot of advantages to having that ability of the CO making the decisions. Without that they would have burned out real quick.

Q: I think it was [the Commander, Atlantic Area & Fifth Coast Guard District, Vice] Admiral [Thad W.] Allen who told me that whenever there's a crisis his first move is to send half his people home, because if he doesn't, then 24-hours later everybody's going to be exhausted and he'll have nothing to back it up.

CAPT Deputy: That's right, and unfortunately we had that a little bit.

Q: Yes.

CAPT Deputy: Some of the people in the First District, you know, they burned out. They really wanted to be out there, but, you know, that's port. Who's on starboard?

Q: Right, exactly. Well there was this enormous spike in hours across the board; whether it was the Boat Force or the Cutter Force those first three weeks. What kind of reports did you get on hour rates and what was going and how that was affecting your overall strategy for the Cutter Force?

CAPT Deputy: Again, at our level as the Facility Managers, we set out the requirements for "X" amount of hours, "X" amount of days away from home port against the Operational Commander's position to make those decisions. At least in OCU we did not get into the operational decision as to how they were going to meet that need. Our concern was that, again, we would burn out the Fleet and that New Normalcy would take us into a position that happened, what, I guess now 15 or 20 years ago, when the Mariel Boat Lift hit back in the Eighties. In that, the 210-fleet, as you recall, was sailing at 230 some days a year for like three years in a row. It killed us. I mean the ships were dying years later, or not so many years later, but in the middle Eighties all of those extra hours caught up with them and the maintenance time wasn't really given back to the ships. It was the "pay me now or pay me later" time of Fram oil filter commercial.

Q: Sure.

CAPT Deputy: You can do that short term, sure, and nobody's going to say that you can't. But there is a price to pay, and you know, we've done that before.

Q: Is there sort of an overall model that you operate by?

CAPT Deputy: Oh, very much so. It's Cutter Employment Standards, and we have "X" amount of hours and that's what you're paid for. And if you go above that then you better have the money associated with that extra; both fuel and the maintenance.

Q: But even if you . . . well yes, I can understand maintenance. But even if you threw all the money in the world at the Fleet and sort of let them run . . .

CAPT Deputy: You'll cut into service life. If the ship's supposed to be around for 25 years -and that's what we predict - service life is based on "X" amount of hours.

Q: And it's a bank account?

CAPT Deputy: It's a bank account.

Q: And once it's gone, it's gone.

CAPT Deputy: If you withdraw it, it's gone. Well I mean you've got to do something. Obviously for the Coast Guard we keep our ships around a heck of a lot longer than the Navy.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: But we'll do a Major Maintenance Availability [MMA] or we'll do a Service Life Evaluation-type [Program; SLEP] thing; what we have done on the 180s. Before the 225s came out we did the SLEP program. Well they did the Service Life Extension and they put the new engines in, and for the most part the hulls were in pretty good shape. The 110s right now, I mean what we're going through right now.

Q: Well we just canoed by some sitting moored somewhere up in the Delaware River, so it's still floating.

CAPT Deputy: Yes, the 110s are falling apart. Well we knew that. It was a decision that we made that, yes, we were going to cut into it. We probably didn't know it was going to be this fast.

Q: Was that a design flaw?

CAPT Deputy: No.

Q: What was it about the 110s that they were burning out so fast?

CAPT Deputy: There are some inaccessible places on the hulls such that the ships' crew physically couldn't get to them. You had some mounting brackets that you just could not get underneath and in those areas we were rotting from the inside, not from the outside. But our decision was to go from two year drydocks to three year drydocks. You know there were other enterprise-wide type of decisions on these that you could look back to hindsight to say that this ship surprised us, and to some point I don't think it did.

Q: Is that a vessel that's sort of at the head of the class when it comes to replacement of Deep Water?

CAPT Deputy: Very much so. I think it will be the first that will be . . . I mean it's got too. We have got, right now, hull problems on 22 of them; 22 out of 50, and those are the ones that we have documented. All the others, to some lesser extent, are having hull failures. So we're going to have to tackle the hull problems, and we are.

Q: Yes. Could you speak a little bit to the post 9-11 discussions in regard to the re-evaluation of Deep Water and looking at the requirements? Was there emphasis on more guns or whatever it was after 9-11, or more intelligence or whatever? Was the consensus at the end that the requirements before 9-11 were pretty much what you were going to need after 9-11?

CAPT Deputy: Yes, I think that, again, you could say that port security in waterways management has always been one of our missions.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: Certainly the emphasis was not as high as it is now, but it was a mission of the Coast Guard. For the fact that our vessels would be able to do that is a point that it was there.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: What probably will have to happen is that different types of communications - in what they call the Maritime Domain Awareness - is where Deep Water comes in, is that ideally what we want to be able to do is to, and again ideally, know where every vessel is and if any ship is coming into the United States we want to know before it gets here, who he is and what they have onboard. And that's the awareness part of the Maritime Domain.

Q: Now that capability to access that intelligence is going to be down to at least the 110s, is that right, or is the vision to have that on every cutter?

CAPT Deputy: Well I don't think every cutter needs to know. I think you're going to have enough Fusion Centers. You're going to have them back into some of these joint . . . whether it's going to be the Office of Homeland Security, NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command], whoever. That type of information is where your Domain Awareness will probably reside.

Q: So if there's a vessel that needs to know about that, they'll get that information to them somehow?

CAPT Deputy: That's right, from the Fusion Center and then back to maybe a 110 or a 378 or whatever the new National Security Cutter is. The farther you go out the larger ship you're going to have to have. Once you get into the port security-type of framework that's when you get into your patrol boats and that's where you get into your smaller harbor boats and alike.

Q: Is there any discussion of . . . you say . . . well first can you describe the National Security Cutter?

CAPT Deputy: Again, it's a concept. We are going out with a Performance Base Specification, so it's not a design that we have said, here is what I want you to go build. We have got a set of requirements and capabilities that the ship has to go this fast. It has to have the capabilities of stopping types of things. We're not giving ranges and all that stuff, and we're giving the contractor the job of ensuring that our requirements are met without the preconceived idea that it has to be this. That's more traditional of a design spec.

Q: That's the design I want and you stuff it full of whatever.

CAPT Deputy: Exactly. Here's my design. You go build it and you go ask various vendors to give me a price tag on this design. We are not going in that direction.

Q: Let me ask you a similar thing for Inshore. Was there any discussion of having a Coastal Warfare Patrol Boat/Port Security Vessel?

CAPT Deputy: Yes. As a matter of fact [the Chief of Boat Forces] Captain [Dana] Goward probably briefed you on that, is that we very much are, and that is in not so much Deep Water because really Deep Water is deep water. What we're talking about here for coastal capability is smaller vessels; sort of high speed yet smaller type of patrol boats, or even harbor boats.

Q: Is there anything like that in the Cutter Force; say 65 feet and above being looked at, say a 70-foot armored port security vessel, something like that?

CAPT Deputy: I think we're looking a little bit smaller; in the 50-foot range.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: These are for newly to stand up Marine Safety Detachments; the MSSTs, Port Security/Safety.

Q: Right. So you would envision kind of a dedicated vessel for that mission?

CAPT Deputy: Very much so, oh yes. And I think they're under contract. If not now, they're closing in on buying some off the shelf, and our requirement within OCU is to come up with the weapon they need.

Q: What would you envision them having?

CAPT Deputy: Well what they need is to, again . . .

Q: They need weapons that they would carry or are these weapons going to be mounted on the vessel?

CAPT Deputy: Both.

Q: Yes.

CAPT Deputy: We're still experimenting with this idea of do we really want armed vessels with guns blazing, patrolling New York Harbor and up the Potomac.

Q: Stopping Aunt Millie's sailboat.

CAPT Deputy: Stopping Aunt Millie's sailboat, and, you know, 99.9 percent of them will be in that type of vessel.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: Do we want a weapon that is traditionally a Department of Defense weapon; is the farther the better the shot?

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: If I can get a rifle that can shoot two miles away, that's great. If I can get one that can shoot two-and-a-half miles away and I can be accurate, that's even better. We don't want that. We want something that's very effective at 200 yards but doesn't skip two miles down range and then hit into Aunt Millie's sailboat.

Q: Right, exactly.

CAPT Deputy: It's a new paradigm. It really is.

Q: Well this seemed to have forced a lot of re-evaluation in that sense that you don't have a kind of strictly military problem on a number of levels. The one you've just identified is obviously one and then there's this whole other issue that sort of stuck the Coast Guard right in the middle as to preparation of your people versus instilling public confidence in that sense.

CAPT Deputy: Well that's right.

Q: You show up with a lot of people and a lot of guns, it sort of enhances public panic rather than public reassurance.

CAPT Deputy: Well public panic. It also gives you, really, the thought that the terrorists won. They have changed the way we live and they have put fear into the American people such that the entire Department of Defense and Coast Guard is out there with armed weapons, and, you know, we've become the enemy, not the terrorist.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: Kind of like that movie with Bruce Willis a few years ago, whatever, that was the whole intent of the terrorist acts.

Q: It turned the Army into the enemy.

CAPT Deputy: It turned the Army into the enemy and the Army came in and seized New York City. I don't know; whatever that one was.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: It was very apropos unfortunately. And that's exactly what we don't want to happen is that we want to be able to do our job. We want to be able to protect the Nation but we don't want to do it in such a conspicuous manner that it looks like we have really changed the way we do business.

Q: The nature of the Coast Guard.

CAPT Deputy: And the nature of the Coast Guard.

Q: Do you think that there's . . . I think you just answered it, but there's a consciousness on the part of the American people that we are a certain type of service and that if we present ourselves in a different way it would throw the general public off in their sense of who we are?

CAPT Deputy: Oh, very much so. That and, you know, *Posse Comitatus* and some of the 14 U.S.C 89; some of the types of things that we enforce; regulations, is done under the caveat of the Department of Transportation.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: Not so much under the Department of Defense. And if we start playing ourselves off as in a defense operations type of a mode, more and more legality comes into play that we are not enforcing regulations but we are more into Defense operations, and it does not allow us to go onboard ships without a search warrant; the types of things that we do have the capability of doing and we do that under certain regulations.

Q: Yes. This scenario also presented a number of alternatives since the Coast Guard is a service that sort of has never found a comfortable home after it left Treasury, that we might become some part of some Border Security or Customs agency, or you name it . . .

CAPT Deputy: Right.

Q: . . . and that sort of lack of focus in our identity has, at least all of these dichotomies in the Service, whether in a military service or a civilian service.

CAPT Deputy: It does, and you could say that our multi-missions of the Coast Guard sometimes can be a downfall on us because we do cross a lot of boundaries in that we can be spread thin, and we've always been spread thin.

Q: How do those different boundaries affect the Cutter Force? I mean in terms of . . . the interesting thing about Deep Water, obviously, is just what you said, that it's just performance based. We need to do all of these things and you figure out how to do it and just give us a platform that can do these things. And yet how does that sort of detract from the traditional "these are our vessels and this is what you're going to see when you see a Coast Guard vessel?"

CAPT Deputy: I don't think it will. I think that, again, doing boardings is what we do for a living, whether that be recreational or the enforcement of laws and regulations, whether it's in the Maritime Port Safety arena, whether it's in law enforcement; smuggling or recreational. So we do boardings. So the fact that a Coast Guard vessel stops somebody and goes onboard is no change whatsoever. What we go onboard to look for, again, is we go onboard to inspect for all rules and regulations. That's how we get onboard. And we are going to ensure that your paperwork is in order.

Q: Especially since we're in an environment now where we're potentially dealing with people who could care less about their paperwork.

CAPT Deputy: Well that's right.

Q: And maybe carrying a nuclear bomb on their vessel.

CAPT Deputy: And that's the hard part. There is a point where, you know . . . and then you fear for your life, and then the standing Rules of Engagement can come into play and you're not into a law enforcement action there.

Q: Do you think it's clear . . . well since you're responsible for training these people to know the difference, or to accelerate or decelerate, or whatever, are you comfortable in your mind that the people in the field have a sense now, or are gaining a sense, of when these situations turn from being a law enforcement to an armed sailor?

CAPT Deputy: It's a concern. We're certainly working on it right now.

Q: Is that a concern that spun out of 9-11?

CAPT Deputy: Oh, very much so, and it's a concern that we are doing this harbor security within the confines of the harbors.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: You know, again, you go into Rules of Engagement and our standard law enforcement tactics; shouldering, and trying to stop somebody. In the Caribbean we've got plenty of time and we walk right through the levels of force that it takes to gain compliance.

Q: Sure.

CAPT Deputy: Well if I've got a boat that I'm trying to escort, whether it's a naval combatant or anybody, and we've got a 400 yard security range on it, and all of a sudden here comes a boat flying right at you, you're not going to have a whole lot of time.

Q: To accelerate that decision.

CAPT Deputy: Yes. You're going to have to accelerate that real quick. And you go from, not even a law enforcement action to . . . you have to discern that this guy is trying to do bodily harm to yourself or to that naval combatant. Again, if we have this discernible confidence that that is a bad guy, then the Rules of Engagement come into play and you can use deadly force, considering you've got the authority. You've always got authority to use deadly force to defend yourself or the defense of other . . .

Q: Have you seen a lot of discussion among your Fleet Commanders about their, I don't want to say new responsibilities because they obviously have that responsibility, but their new awareness of just that issue?

CAPT Deputy: It's been, at least at this level we are trying to ensure that we've put out the written guidance. But I think there's a, I guess a degree of Pollyanna that everybody knows and then everybody's going to make sure that, I hope it never happens; that type of thing, because when the first time it happens . . .

Q: Everybody's going to scrutinize that case.

CAPT Deputy: Yes, they're going to scrutinize that case. That's very good, yes. It really will. We haven't had it happen yet, but I know when I was talking to the CO of the [CGC] Ocracoke [WPB-1307], I think it was; the 87-footer [110-footer] that came up here the first days after 9-11 and was on patrol right out here in the Potomac, they even had one of the small boats of the Navy come try to sneak through, you know, just to test them. Well as stupid as that is, I mean here they had their guns drawn and they were about ready to blast them and yet they didn't; common sense prevails.

Q: I heard a CBS crew tried a similar type of thing in Charleston.

CAPT Deputy: Yes. I mean how stupid is that, trying to test the system? I mean you get to the point where . . . I think there's a lot of people out there that still don't get it that times have changed.

Q: Right. Do you look back at times like this historically when your commanders are looking for guidance to things like the *Sea Mist Congerca* (phonetic) or incidents in Coast Guard history where cutter commanders have been put on the spot with really no guidance, or had to make those kind of decisions very quickly? Is there any kind of, like, playbook that they look back too in sort of a historical playbook that this commander; Commander "X", was faced with this problem and this is how . . . and these were the repercussions and those sorts of things?

CAPT Deputy: Well yes. It's just like everything else. A lot of changes happened because of an incident. The Coast Guard is not alone in that type of arena.

Q: Sure.

CAPT Deputy: But you're right. Sometimes it's caused by a situation that went bad. Sometimes it was a situation that went good. But yes, certainly we have - like a lot of them - we adjust and put out policy based on some sort of an application or an incident that happened.

Q: Do you have specific . . . I want to be clear on this. Do you have a specific guidance that you put out since 9-11 about this sort of heightened awareness of these kinds of issues of when to use force?

CAPT Deputy: Oh, very much so. Now we didn't per se. That would be, again, in your policy shop; Lieutenant Kizerman (phonetic) and Captain [Kenneth A.] Ward. They're your policy people.

Q: And those are the policy people for right here in cutters?

CAPT Deputy: Yes, they're the law enforcement side. And again, we've always said 12-miles and in, this is a law enforcement action, not a defense operation.

Q: And is that a matter of standing policy; the 12-mile limit, that defense operations are sort of offshore and inshore? Call the Marines if you have a problem?

CAPT Deputy: That's correct. Well it is, and it's really into the whole structure of our government. It gets back into your standing Rules of Engagement versus your law enforcement action, and the Office of Homeland Security has been determined as a law enforcement action.

Q: It raises a good - not a good - a conundrum though that what happens if you have containers full of these folks getting off at the docks. It seems to be a law enforcement action at that point.

CAPT Deputy: Well yes, you're right.

Q: We haven't had to defend the beaches, I guess, ever.

CAPT Deputy: We have not, and certainly there are some of the Army units and forts out there that are supposedly there to protect the continental United States. But until you declare war and, you know, we declared war on terrorism.

Q: But it's not the same thing.

CAPT Deputy: But it's not the same thing. So it is very tricky and I'm sure they'll do it. They'll do the right thing.

Q: How would we deal with that in a maritime context and a port security context?

CAPT Deputy: Well again, we do have the authority. So does Customs. So do some of the other civilian agencies, that they're trying border guards and things like that. It only gets into it when you get in the DoD arena that there could be contention. But I guarantee you they're going to take action if they see it and ask questions later. But just in the formality . . . and this is why the concern of the Office of Homeland Security, you should report to, why the Coast Guard maybe should be better to go over and they form up this group of individuals, and the reason why is because we have the authority right now. The U.S. Marshals, Border Patrol, Customs, INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service], Coast Guard, yes, that's probably a good fit.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: The whole TSA program; the Transportation Security Agency. Again, the Sky Marshal type of whole arena.

Q: I just want to kind of try to wrap this up in this sense. This issue of, as you say, all these different agencies working together, if you have . . . and the requirements for, say, the Deep Water Project; whether it's law enforcement or the enforcement of treaties, migrant interdiction, drugs or homeland security, is there some level at which those can all be looked at as border control issues or border security issues?

CAPT Deputy: I guess it depends on who the author is. Sure, I think it is a border security issue when you put it into that vein. But again, it's enforcing rules and regulations.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: It's something that we can do in the maritime environment.

Q: When do you expect to try out the first platform?

CAPT Deputy: For Deep Water, gee whiz, we'll find out here in June hopefully if the Deep Water award is in act in June.

Q: But after that award's made, the timetable for actually seeing something in the air or in the water is when?

CAPT Deputy: Oh gee, it could be probably within three years.

Q: Really?

CAPT Deputy: Yes. I mean they've got an aggressive timetable and then that's back into changing out the existing fleet with the new fleet.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: Yet still keeping the capability that we have without going down and taking peaks and valleys. That's a big challenge.

Q: Is there any discussion about as the old fleet is retired, keeping parts of that in reserve?

CAPT Deputy: Oh, very much so. That's their main, not dilemma, but their challenge, is that we are requiring that our capability does not dip at anytime.

Q: But even after all of those are switched out, is there any sense that some of those will be kept for situations like this when you need, say, just to drop a cutter in a port?

CAPT Deputy: Oh, like a reserve fleet or something like that?

Q: Or it's just too expensive to . . . ?

CAPT Deputy: It's too expensive, and we certainly do have the mothball fleet. The Navy has a lot more than we do but we've got a few ships. As a matter of fact we've called back the, let's see, one patrol boat that we were going to decommission we've allowed to stay on. That's the 82-footer out in San Francisco. We just recently allowed them to stay longer.

Q: And why was that? Was that a program decision or was that related to . . . ?

CAPT Deputy: Yes, the Operational Commander requested it and we said . . .

Q: Because of the new port security requirements.

CAPT Deputy: Very much so, yes. The [CGC] Cowslip [WLB-277], which is a buoy tender up in D-13, it was supposed to be decommissioned last year. We are going to keep it around for another year-and-a-half. So those are the two vessels that I know of that, had not 9-11 come around, they would have been decommissioned already.

Q: Right. We're growing in the short term. Where do you see us in the long term in terms of personnel?

CAPT Deputy: Oh, I think we're going to grow quite a bit. Again, that's not so much that we're going to have new requirements above and beyond what we thought Deep Water was going to look like. If in fact these Maritime Domain Awareness goals are to, in fact, have 100 percent saturation, we're going to have a heck of a lot more than what we expected.

Q: More platforms.

CAPT Deputy: More platforms, very much so.

Q: Yes.

CAPT Deputy: Instead of nine or ten of these larger ones we may have to have 20.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: If we . . . patrol boats, just a phenomenal amount of more patrol boats in our Marine Security Detachments that we're just forming up. And to say that . . . right now they're talking about ten to twenty percent of all ships coming into the United States should be boarded. Well that's a nice number but what's that based on? That's based on kind of what we can maybe even do, but is that going to be effective?

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: If the Office of Homeland Security or the President says that's not good enough. I want you to board at least 50-percent of all boats that come into the United States at a tonnage of 100 tons or above, we are just going to have to have a phenomenal amount of more people. Not a capability, but just an increase in size.

Q: Right size. Does that sort of increase the validity of the argument that you've got to make these ships more efficient in terms of personnel?

CAPT Deputy: No. We just have to have more of them.

Q: But you're going to have . . . the vision, I guess, is that if 9-11 had never happened you'd have a much smaller Coast Guard, say in ten years, because you'd have the same ships. They'd be newer and they'd require fewer people to crew them, like the *Healy* for example.

CAPT Deputy: I think we would have, again, it would take less ships to operate and maybe do the job while on the ship. But it still takes people to board.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: It still takes people to fly airplanes, all be it they could be in unmanned areas. I don't know if we are ever going to get smaller. I think there will probably be less people at sea.

Q: You don't envision an unmanned cutter I guess doing the patrols?

CAPT Deputy: No. Unmanned aerial reconnaissance is certainly something that's not too far out in the future.

Q: Has the war in Afghanistan with these unmanned Predators played into the planning and thinking at all that the Coast Guard might use something like that at some point for patrolling areas of the ocean?

CAPT Deputy: Well I think in the 2020 timeframe the UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] for reconnaissance, being able to go down and even . . . it's one thing to put a UAV up 30,000 feet to take a picture of all of the vessels in the Yucatan or in the Eastern Pacific, but it doesn't do you a whole lot of good if you've got a little blip there and you don't know what that thing is.

Q: Sure.

CAPT Deputy: So you still have to have the capability of moving it down so that you could either take pictures or something that you would get more information other than a little radar contact. In some instances maybe that's all you need. There isn't a whole lot of movement in some of those areas in the Eastern Pacific.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: The Yucatan or the Caribbean; I mean there's a bazillion boats out there.

Q: Yes.

CAPT Deputy: So that type of information, while it's nice . . .

Q: You still have to act on it.

CAPT Deputy: . . . you still have to act on it and you still have to go and investigate. Whereas a helicopter or something like that, or even a C-130, can dive down and actually view it. But I think it's there and it's just a matter of being able to keep up with the technology and that UAV type of . . .

Q: You would see that as a complimentary technology?

CAPT Deputy: Oh yes.

Q: Not in any sense a human replacement technology?

CAPT Deputy: Correct.

Q: This is fascinating Sir. I get more and more insights into this problem with every new person I talk too.

CAPT Deputy: Yes.

Q: Did you have anything else you wanted to add?

CAPT Deputy: Well the challenge for the Coast Guard, if we don't get any bigger, or even if we get bigger, it doesn't happen overnight.

Q: Sure.

CAPT Deputy: We've gotten people now, and they've plussed us up, but our throughput for Cape May and for the Academy, for all our accession points is, like what Captain Ward would say; is bricks and mortar.

Q: Right.

CAPT Deputy: It just doesn't happen overnight.

Q: It's an interesting question that I hadn't really thought of, but when you're sending people through Cape May; the enlisted force, how do you get the people that you need as opposed to, say, small boat stations, aviation and so forth? How are all those decisions . . . how do you apportion those?

CAPT Deputy: Well there are priority assignments and certainly . . .

Q: Because you need certain numbers of people . . .

CAPT Deputy: Correct.

Q: . . . to crew all these vessels.

CAPT Deputy: Very much so.

Q: If you've got a lot more platforms, off-year platforms coming on line, small boats coming on line and so forth, are those battles that are fought out here, or who decides who gets what resources?

CAPT Deputy: I think that's probably more the Office of W [Human Resources]. They really have everybody's requirements. You do do your battles in priority levels of who's more important than others, and there is a sequence that says, if I only have 20 people and I have 30 billets, we will fill the Priority One billets first and you walk your way down. And every year, then you get to reevaluate those priorities. Shipboard assignments traditionally have been the higher billets to fill. Staff jobs and things like that are traditionally ones that you fill if you have enough people.

Q: Sure.

CAPT Deputy: So again, this year, we're going to probably be short quite a few billets here within my office because they just don't have the people. They're going to be going out to the operational field and that's just the way it is.

Q: Well the Captain was shocked when I told him that the Naval Historical Center [NHC] had mobilized 12 Reserve O-6s to document what the Navy's been doing in Noble Eagle.

CAPT Deputy: Yes.

Q: And the Coast Guard has sent a single Reserve E-7, so. Of course some people in the Coast Guard say that's about the equivalent. (Laughter)

CAPT Deputy: Yes, that's right. I don't see anything wrong with that.

Q: I don't say that when I'm at the NHC but I can say it in this building. Well Sir, I want to thank you for your time.

END OF INTERVIEW

