

Report of Field Commanders' Concept of Doctrine

March 1995



COMMANDER ELEVENTH COAST GUARD DISTRICT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the Coast Guard seriously undertakes a reexamination of its internal organization and training, the time is right to subscribe to a doctrinal approach to the way it does business. Rather than perpetuating "can-do!" and reactive management, the Coast Guard now has the opportunity to put in place a mechanism for capturing the wisdom contained in its corporate history, its innovations, and its everyday experiences; and to apply that wisdom to a coherent and overarching vision for advancing the long-term goals and objectives of the Coast Guard. Doctrine will help the Coast Guard be a customer-focused organization, and would minimize internal competition for resources and cyclical emphasis on individual programs. It would align the Coast Guard's own strategic goals with the goals and expectations of its external customers, constituents, and fellow agencies.

Doctrine will empower every member of the Coast Guard to orient individual efforts with the intent of the National Security Strategy, DOT Strategic Plan, the Commandant's Direction, and the Executive Business Plan. Doctrine can bring coherence and synthesis to the Coast Guard's collective effort and carry the Coast Guard confidently into the future as the world's premiere maritime service.

The U.S. Armed Forces have doctrine programs that dovetail with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine for the National Military Strategy. By studying the experiences of doctrinal systems in the other Services, the strengths and weaknesses of doctrine implementation were identified. What has worked well for the other Services and what to avoid in the stand up of our system are captured in the "functional essentials."

The Coast Guard has "doctrine like" publications and guidance, written and implemented now on a daily basis. These have been developed in an ad hoc, uncoordinated manner by different programs and authors. The guidance is not linked together, nor is it linked to any overall doctrine. These publications are changed without reference to any framework, and without consideration for other evolving efforts.

The Coast Guard is in a unique situation with our training and streamlining studies to start a formalized doctrine system that takes advantage of the lessons learned from the other Services and incorporates them into our reorganized structure in a low cost, non intrusive way. Combining doctrine and training ensures that field experience and experimentation are captured and redistributed, helps maintain the relevance and credibility of doctrine for day-to-day operations, and smooths the process by which members of the Coast Guard are enculturated with doctrine. Where once there was little knowledge about doctrine and experience with its use, there now exists a growing groundswell of understanding, desire, and commitment.

A doctrinal system makes good managerial sense. It creates a focus and order for executive vision and values. It is a sales tool for our interactions with Congress, the other Services, and our civilian customers. It meshes well with our TQM efforts as a vehicle to capture and distribute our "success stories" and incorporate our lessons learned to prevent reinventing the wheel.

A Coast Guard Doctrine system can be evolutionary, and it does not have to be created and perfected overnight. The cost of such a system can be controlled by the rate at which we implement the process. It is of utmost importance to commit to doctrine process for the continued professional strength of the Coast Guard.

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I. CHARTER OVERVIEW

The Field Commanders' concept of doctrine team was established by Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area and Commander, Coast Guard Pacific Area letter 5000 of 16 December 1994 (Appendix D). The study team's charter included the following problem statement:

"The Coast Guard does not have a formalized program for the development and deployment of doctrine, and there are no formal connections among doctrine, training, and resources in our Service. Certainly, doctrine exists in myriad forms in the Coast Guard. However, there is no standardized approach and it is by no means universal. The doctrine that is in print today will endure the shelf life of the document or publication containing it; there is no mechanism for readily updating it to meet changes in the operational environment. Perhaps the most serious impact of the lack of a formalized doctrine program is the disconnect of doctrine and training -- there is no established mechanism to cycle the valuable knowledge accrued through operational experience and experimentation back into academia and training centers. Thus, benefits of operational experience and experimentation tend to remain within local circles as opposed to becoming updates in the Service as a whole, suboptimizing operational procedure and preventing unity of effort. Further, the absence of a formalized doctrine program precludes use of key factors in making resource decisions."

The team was asked to report on the following items on the subject of doctrine, as viewed by field commanders:

- a. Strength/downsides of a formalized doctrine program;
- b. Inventory of existing doctrine in the field;
- c. Significant gaps in field doctrine;
- d. Linkages of doctrine with Strategic Goals, National Security Strategy, Executive Business Plan, CIP, MBS, mission analysis, etc.;
- e. Recommended future courses of action for the development of a formalized doctrine program.

Beyond those in the charter, additional members were added as needed. The final composition of the study team was:

RADM R. A. APPELBAUM, Commander, CG District 11
RADM J. W. LOCKWOOD, Commander, CG District 13
RADM R. K. PESCHEL, Commander, CG District 9
CAPT J. M. MacDONALD
CAPT J. Q. NEAS
CAPT R. K. SOFTYE
CDR R. C. BOETIG
CDR T. J ALLARD
CDR T. G. WATERMAN
CDR W. R. BUCHANAN
CDR H. P. RHOADES
CDR C. D. BROMUND (facilitator)
CDR S. P. GLENN
CDR R. M. MILES
LCDR W. R. EDGAR
LCDR E. G. THOMAS
LCDR R. A. SANDOVAL
LCDR S. P. LaROCHELLE
LT W. J. ROGERS
CW03 J. S. FLUCKIGER (recorder)

II. METHODOLOGY

To fulfill the requirements of the doctrine team's charter, the team first developed a definition of doctrine applicable to the Coast Guard. Next the team reviewed current military literature on the subject of doctrine to educate team members and establish common definitions and language to be used throughout the report. A bibliography of doctrine literature was created (Appendix C).

The team prepared a videotape entitled "Unity of Purpose Through Doctrine" that was distributed to District Commanders, MLC Commanders, and the Academy Superintendent. This videotape served as an introduction of doctrine concepts and applications, highlighting a prototype Coast Guard doctrine publication, "Aviation Support for Marine Environmental Protection."

The team was divided into three groups and assigned specific tasks. Group One, using the newly developed definition of doctrine for the Coast Guard, inventoried existing Coast Guard publications for elements of doctrine and determined any significant gaps. This was accomplished by developing and conducting a survey of Headquarters program managers and training centers. Appendix (A) contains the survey letter and questionnaire.

Group Two consisted of members possessing a variety of professional backgrounds and specialities. They independently addressed the issue of doctrine as it relates to their areas of expertise. Opinion papers were created on the following subjects: Interagency Coordination; Joint Operations and Resourcing; Frustrated Operators; Mission Analysis and Acquisition; Doctrine and Training; and Pursuing Quality. Their conclusions embraced the concepts of doctrine with an end goal of advancing overall efficiency, effectiveness, and empowerment in the present and future Coast Guard. Appendix (B) contains the full-length papers.

Group Three performed case studies on six organizations which included the four U.S. Services, the Royal Australian Air Force, and the Hewlett-Packard company. The case studies identified triggers which prompted initiation or refinement of organizational structure and process for developing and deploying doctrine. Also identified were internal linkages between doctrine levels (capstone, operational, and tactical) and training, and also external linkages to national policies and directives. Conclusions could then be drawn with regard to benefits and lessons learned from each organization's experience.

The entire team came together in early March to merge the collected research, gain closure on conclusions/recommendations, and prepare a draft report for submission to the Area Commanders.

III. Doctrine Concepts & Definitions

Doctrine has been in use by companies and services for many years, yet as a concept, it is hard to explain and understand. These difficulties make people reluctant to embrace doctrine for the Coast Guard. In order for the concept of doctrine to be discussed and debated, it is necessary to define and explain basic terms and concepts about doctrine.

WHAT IS DOCTRINE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff define doctrine as, "the fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. Doctrine is authoritative, but requires judgement in application."

Doctrine is part philosophy, part system, and part commitment.

Philosophy

Doctrine, particularly at the capstone level, is a philosophy that expresses fundamental beliefs about the roles and vision of an organization. It outlines the philosophy of thought on how to best accomplish the business of the organization. It may express the philosophy of how the persons in the organization approach their jobs and the shared vision, decision making, and actions to accomplish their tasks. Doctrine at lower levels may express the collective wisdom and lessons learned by the agency over time.

System

Doctrine is a system in the sense that it is formalized within an organization. This can be accomplished in a number of ways. Doctrine is formalized through the publication of one or more documents to capture the philosophy, ideals, experiences, and lessons learned for the shared vision of the organization. Doctrine can be formalized through a system to inculcate the members of the organization about the philosophy and vision so as to affect their behavior toward a shared view. Doctrine can be formalized by creating links within and without the organization to ensure that the philosophy and vision are shared, considered, and implemented in the organization's normal course of business.

Commitment

Doctrine is a commitment in the sense that it will endure only if it is embraced and nurtured within the organization. Doctrine philosophy and ideals must be woven into the thought and fabric of the day-to-day tasks. It must be important to the mainstream goals, and as such, be a part of the focus at all levels of the organization.

In an attempt to define Coast Guard Doctrine, the study group coined a definition that expresses the meaning of doctrine as applied to our Service. This definition, rather than defining the word doctrine, defines what the concept of doctrine can do for the Coast Guard.

COAST GUARD DOCTRINE

Coast Guard doctrine embodies enduring fundamental principles which:

Promote unity of purpose,
Guide professional judgement, and
Enable our people to best fulfill national objectives.

REALITY VERSUS MYTH

Coast Guard men and women hold varying perceptions of what doctrine actually is and is not. Many objections and negative connotations derive from simply not understanding the word doctrine. Below are a series of paired terms and phrases that may help dispel misinterpretations individuals may currently have.

Doctrine is.....

Authoritative
Consensus about the best way to do things
A guide to professional judgement
Constantly improving
A guide to organizational structure/acquisition
Empowering
A framework for commonality
A linking mechanism
A context for measuring training
Catchment for experience and experimentation
A risk management tool
A means to enhance teamwork
A means to enhance interoperability
A conduit for strategy
Leadership enabling
A vehicle for enculturation
A marketing tool
A means to assimilate change
A publication reducer

Doctrine is not...

Directive
Dogma
Rigid
Inflexible
Be all to end all
Limiting
Ad hocery
Stovepipes
Incalculable
A sieve
A substitute for common sense
Team Coast Guard Friction
Limited to DOD
A closed system
Difficult to understand
New
Closely held
Atrophic
A publication increaser

There are several basic terms used in connection with doctrine that require a commonly understood definition:

CAPSTONE DOCTRINE

The two basic ways to express doctrine within an organization are capstone and continuous. Capstone doctrine is the top level of agency doctrine. It includes the enduring fundamental beliefs and core attributes of the agency. Capstone doctrine provides the intellectual and logical bridge between strategic policy at a level above the agency and how the agency in the broadest sense would approach the implementation of that policy. It is focused at the macro level and will not necessarily tie to the micro level of the day-to-day activities of individuals in their specific units without further levels of guidance. Some agencies express doctrine at the capstone level only.

CONTINUOUS DOCTRINE

Continuous doctrine is doctrine expressed at various levels of the organization. Continuous doctrine defines common beliefs and practices at organizational levels where decisions are made. It calls for conceptual consistency at each level of the organization in support of the strategic objective, from the relatively specific tactics and techniques level to the broader operational and broadest capstone level.

TTP

The model below reflects continuous doctrine, showing the linkages from one level of doctrine to another. Through its continuous doctrine, U.S. Army Capstone Doctrine ties to its Operational Doctrine, which then ties to its Tactical Doctrine.

Armywide Doctrine and Training Literature Hierarchy

Doctrine Examples


- FM 100.1 The Army
- FM 100.5 Operations
- FM 100.10 Combat Service Support
- FM 100.20 Low Intensity Conflict
- FM 72.100 Military Leadership

- FM 100.7 Doctrine for EAC: Ops & Snt(1BP)
- FM 100.15 Corps Ops(TBP)
- FM 71.3 Armored & Moch in Bde
- FM 71.1(MTF) Tank & Moch in Co Tm

- FM 44.1 US Army ADA Employment
- FM 17.12(MTF) Tank Gunnery
- FM 1.112 Attack Helicopter Bn

- FM 17.121 Tank Cbt Tables M1
- FM 44.18 ADA Emplmt Stinger(HTF)
- FM 1.400 Aviator's Handbook

- FM 25.3 Training in Units
- FM 90.3(HTF) Desert Operations
- FM 100.211 Soviet Army Ops & Tactics
- FM 22.101 Leadership Counseling
- FM 21.11 First Aid for Soldiers



LEVELS OF DOCTRINE


In the organizations studied, doctrine exists at various levels. In order that discussions be consistent, three doctrine levels are defined at the Capstone, Operational, and Tactical levels. The following explanations further define the different levels.

Capstone doctrine is overall guidance, sometimes referred to as strategic doctrine. Capstone doctrine includes enduring fundamental beliefs of the agency, the core attributes, and roles and authorities.

Operational doctrine addresses the mission and function to be accomplished and provides the link between the conceptual capstone doctrine and the more specific tactical doctrine.

Tactical doctrine is further divided into two parts: tactics and techniques. Tactics addresses employment of resources and forces, while techniques addresses employment of specific resources for mission and location. Procedures are not considered as part of doctrine in this explanation because they are directive.

DOCTRINAL HIERARCHY



DOCTRINE MODELS

Models used by other services for institutionalizing doctrine can be grouped into three types: **EMPOWERED**, **COORDINATING**, and **AD HOC**. Each is described below:

Empowered: An empowered model combines responsibility for creating and implementing doctrine in one part of an organization. It maintains links to operational parts of the organization during doctrine development. Doctrine is institutionalized by including it in all levels of training. Since an empowered doctrine model usually has tasking authority for doctrine implementation, it may also be called an "agent of change" model. In addition, as the focal point for doctrine development and implementation, an empowered model is generally linked with acquisition and budget development. This model is being used by the Army and Marine Corps, RAAF, and Hewlett-Packard.


Coordinating: A coordinating model establishes a single point for creating and promulgating doctrine but may not be empowered to direct implementation. This single point works with other elements of the organization to provide a centralized focus for doctrine development and provides a point of accessibility for doctrine issues both within and without the organization. This model is being used by both the U.S. Navy and Air Force, each of which has established Doctrine Commands.

Ad Hoc: An ad hoc model lacks any central point for developing organizational doctrine. Components may implement elements of doctrine within their areas, but no mechanism exists for relating concepts across functional lines. This model best describes the U.S. Navy before 1993.

DOCTRINAL PROCESS

Doctrine development can be expressed as a circular process having definite phases. The doctrine development phase is a cycle that analyzes, evaluates, and debates doctrine before deployment. The cycle then captures feedback as part of the improvement process. This development model is well suited to the development of tactics and techniques and capturing the lessons learned to feedback into a training cycle. The application phase also can be represented by a circular model and shows how doctrine can be applied by an agency in the context of strategic input from above. The interactions at the executive level outside the agency are key in Congress and from the JCS to better visualize our capabilities.

The Doctrinal Process



IV. FIELD RELEVANCE OF DOCTRINE

Six Coast Guard officers (O-5/6) with a variety of professional backgrounds and specialties independently addressed the issue of doctrine as it relates to their areas of expertise. Overwhelmingly, they concluded that doctrine would improve the ability to perform duties, accomplish missions, and achieve continuous improvement of our Service. The papers do not seek a prescriptive "how to" doctrine. Their conclusions embrace the concepts of doctrine with an end goal of advancing overall efficiency and effectiveness in the present and future Coast Guard. The spirit of their conclusions is consistent with the larger Coast Guard issues of improving government efficiency and assimilating the precepts of Total Quality Management. Executive summaries of the six papers follow. (See Appendix B for full-length papers.)

SUMMARY OF OPINION PAPERS

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

The lack of both adequate contingency plans and knowledge of fundamental operating principles by high-level decision makers eroded confidence in the Coast Guard's ability to respond to the EXXON VALDEZ disaster. The overwhelming surge of political, operational, and emotionally-driven activity without central focus or understanding of the problem resulted in much criticism to an otherwise capable response force. Local, state, and federal government responders were woefully unprepared to handle a response of this magnitude.

Written doctrine could help define the unique relationships that must exist among the Coast Guard, other agencies, and the responsible party in responding to such events. With doctrine, the Coast Guard could formally promote unity of purpose among agencies. Role clarification and mutual understanding are essential to every multi-agency response.

Doctrine would clarify and unify incident response so that all agencies' capabilities are identified and maximized, while eliminating organizational barriers to effective communications. Internally, doctrine would help the Coast Guard identify cross-program priorities and eliminate turf wars that bind our thinking. Confident that all players are aligned with fundamental principles and unity of purpose, field commanders would then be free to exercise their professional judgement in executing "Coast Guard" missions (as opposed to "Program" missions).

ICS

JOINT OPERATIONS & RESOURCING

Doctrine offers a powerful tool for focusing thought about the Coast Guard as an armed force and as a participant in joint/combined operations. Doctrine could improve alignment of expectations among the Coast Guard, DOD, Congress, and the Administration. Coast Guard Doctrine should clearly communicate to persons both within and outside the Service exactly what the Coast Guard does, provide a perspective for thinking about what the Coast Guard does, and illustrate how the Service goes about its business.

We require a strategic vision that is achievable within the framework of the military/naval strategy and contemporary force structure. "Can do" is not an approach that optimizes planning or Coast Guard resource commitment. Force planning and execution of joint operations demand a cohesive vision and grasp of the roles and capabilities that each of the Services and its components prepare for and provide.

The Coast Guard cannot safely assume continued Navy support for its weapons, sensor, and even communications systems if it cannot articulate, with some specificity, how Coast Guard platforms contribute to the total force in the current national military strategy.

Without authoritative guidance or a governing philosophy, analysts, decision makers, and persons at all levels and locations, both within the organization and without, are not only free to, but out of necessity are required to make judgements and develop decisions about the Coast Guard's posture as an armed force based on situational expediency and/or individual perspective. The fact that there is so much room for so much divergence of opinion within and external to the Coast Guard regarding our military role is a telling argument for doctrine.

The Coast Guard is already obligated to assimilate joint and naval doctrine if it is to integrate seamlessly into joint operations. Without its own body of doctrine, however, the Coast Guard is at a distinct disadvantage in its ability to communicate and incorporate Coast Guard precepts into the thinking of CINCs, planners, and the other forces present. This in turn hinders our ability to plan for and perform where we should. Adopting doctrine would reduce the level of "ramping-up" required for joint operations, and increase confidence that Coast Guard resources will be properly and appropriately employed in a joint/combined campaign. It would also help to build confidence in the Service's political and joint-service relationships.

Doctrine incorporates our accumulated knowledge and lessons learned, so for the careerist, doctrine should offer few surprises, but for the neophyte, doctrine would be an expedient for absorption of Service values, precepts, and expectations. Doctrine would arm CDR XYZ with greater assurance that his/her efforts will closely align with Coast Guard objectives without the need for continual, iterative approvals of each detail up the chain of command.

Through doctrine, the Coast Guard could empower itself with surety of purpose and direction, better educate those who would support or could make use of Coast Guard capabilities, and constructively bound the debate over Service involvement in joint/combined operations. Doctrine is a means to better integrate appropriate employment of Coast Guard capabilities into the national force structure and on a day-to-day basis make better and more consistent decisions about the Coast Guard's military roles and resourcing. Ultimately, it is a tool of empowerment to all of our personnel--from liaison to program manager to department head and others. Doctrine arms them with the common philosophical groundwork from which they can with some assurance apply their own initiative and judgement to advance the interests of our nation and of our Service as an armed force.

FRUSTRATED OPERATORS

The absence of formal, systematic (capstone, operational, and tactical) doctrine throughout the Coast Guard leads to frustrated operators in the field.

Doctrine provides the methodology to tie all the specialized communities (stovepipes) together. Experience and experimentation (research and development) must be tightly woven into that doctrine, which is then passed on to the workforce through training and education. As it is, training and education are not responsive to field needs and lessons learned. Actual experiences are seldom documented and reviewed for incorporation into Coast Guard policies.

There is a renewed demand to bring many planning processes together (such as maritime defense, disaster relief, terrorism) into one coordinated, efficient, multi-agency planning structure. Doctrine offers a straightforward method by which response planners can establish and document these most important planning tasks. Doctrine can also serve as the foundation for

future improvements in strategy development, equipment selection, hazard analysis, and exercise scenarios.

Doctrine is developed through a process of examination and interpretation of available evidence. It must change to reflect new experiences, new capabilities, and new requirements. Lessons learned from interpreting exercise scenarios should also bring the planners' perspective to doctrine. Good doctrine should therefore document the analysis of experience and serve as the strategist's fundamental guide in decision making.

Doctrine should serve as the basis for:

- * defining the roles of the planning communities;
- * developing goals, objectives, strategies, and tactics;
- * selecting equipment; and
- * drafting training/exercise scenarios.

Results of a recent effort to define doctrine for CG Aviation Support for Marine Environmental Response revealed the following frustrations:

- * lack of understanding by other communities of how to employ response personnel & equipment properly;
- * little understanding between communities of each other's jobs, responsibilities, and missions;
- * lack of support from the training community;
- * no concept of central mission ideals; and
- * poor coordination between procurement and operations.

Doctrine has proven successful in both military and industrial settings. The acceptance of a formalized doctrine system will:

- * maximize efficiency of our personnel, facilities and equipment;
- * provide central guidance to all personnel;
- * enhance interoperability;
- * breakdown existing stovepipes;
- * focus training and education field needs; and
- * assist with acquisition and development of new technology.

MISSION ANALYSIS & ACQUISITION

The outcome of Mission Analysis is a set of functional requirements which ultimately lead to a hardware acquisition. The "Why" of doctrine feeds the Demand Projection of Mission Analysis. The "How" of doctrine links up with the development of functional requirements.

The first question that must be answered in every acquisition is, "Can tactics and doctrine be changed to avoid the expense of a hardware acquisition?" Without a systematic approach to doctrine, this question becomes unanswerable, and hardware acquisitions cannot proceed.

Much of the requirements definition is accomplished as part of Mission Analysis, but the process continues through all the phases of a major acquisition. As Key Decision Points are passed, each successive statement of requirements must be reconciled with the doctrine for that mission area.

A systematic approach to doctrine also benefits the budget process for operating funds. External reviewers are less likely to "take our word for it" in terms of budget justification, and are more likely to provide full funding to those agencies who can provide the most logical, coherent arguments to support the need for mission performance (doctrine's "Why") and the efficiency and effectiveness of that performance (doctrine's "How").

The distillate of doctrine development is a body of "best practices" that compress the range of possible mission outcomes toward the desired standard of performance. Less dispersion from this standard means a substantially reduced risk of an undesirable outcome. It provides readily observable objectives for training, exercises, and readiness evaluations.

Doctrine provides a baseline of proven expertise to all field commanders so their on-scene performance is not so dependent on individual experience or improvisational ability.

Doctrine provides a systematic way to capture lessons learned and impart them consistently across a broad population over a considerable period of time. It is a vehicle for continuous improvement of mission performance.

The over-arching strength of a formal doctrine program is that it provides reliable and durable connectivity between mission requirements, training and exercises, readiness measurement, and system acquisitions.

TRAINING & EDUCATION

Enduring organizations develop characteristic "corporate cultures" which define, in at least a notional sense, the preferred methods of operation. Successful organizations manage their corporate culture to create "unity of purpose" among their workforce.

Traditionally Coast Guard curriculum objectives have been stovepiped. The concept of working in concert with other elements of the Coast Guard – unity of purpose – was generally overlooked.

This stovepipe approach is the result of "training to task" without explaining how the task contributes to meeting broader organizational objectives. Doctrine would bind the desired task performance to the commonly understood culture.

The training environment is the foundation upon which corporate culture is developed and disseminated. Doctrine, therefore, is a tool to manage and direct the corporate culture. Doctrine-based training places task accomplishment within the context of the broader operational mission. Training elements disseminate doctrine, test doctrine, and improve doctrine through student feedback.

Doctrine-based organizations receive feedback from user forums, professional articles and journals, operational reports, and students in the training environment (who are recent users of the doctrine).

A doctrine center ensures the doctrine publications are current and in alignment with current strategy.

Doctrine becomes the unifying element that links the skills and procedures taught in various Coast Guard schools. Since doctrine is a visible, finite explanation of our expectation for task accomplishment, no confusion exists among the different organizational elements concerning the correct methods. Since doctrine is meant to be only a guide to action, it encourages users to apply their "lessons learned" to improve the doctrine.

The relationship between doctrine and training is mutually beneficial. Doctrine defines the universe in which training is measured. Training disseminates doctrine, and receives a portion of the feedback that leads to doctrine improvements.

PURSUING QUALITY, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT, AND AN EMPOWERED ORGANIZATION

Doctrine is an effective tool for implementing operational improvements, linking training and education to operational needs, and overcoming stovepipes which have grown up over the years. The Coast Guard should adopt doctrine under the umbrella of TQM.

HPT

Doctrine provides consistent, service-wide guidelines which serve as a basis for mutual understanding. Mutual understanding can, in turn, reduce the friction and confusion associated with stovepipes and replace it with participative teamwork.

Doctrine can be a valuable *systematic support* for organizing, training, and operating our Service in a way which we believe is the best way of doing things. It is the adhesive that documents standard processes and defines *why* we do what we do and *how* we operate as a humanitarian organization, regulatory agency, and military force.

Numerous similarities naturally link the Coast Guard quality journey and the implementation of doctrine as a support system. TQM and doctrine are each inculcated from the top and coordinate input from a wide audience. For TQM to be effective, all employees must first be indoctrinated into organizational principles.

Doctrine is a mechanism for *effective* operations. It begins with setting strategic vision so that the Coast Guard is aligned with the ever changing requirements of its customers and shareholders (Congress). It reminds leaders throughout our organization *WHY* certain priorities, tactics, and techniques usually work best. Doctrine can provide clear rationale for budget models (and cuts) based on priorities which are cascaded throughout the organization.

Doctrine *empowers* the entire organization by enabling field commanders to make rapid decisions without the typical consulting process that often accompanies the chain of command. It reinforces a field commander's responsibility to exercise judgement under broad-brush guidelines and service-wide priorities. Doctrine, therefore, enables leaders to make consistent, right decisions in a variety of situations likely to be encountered.

The workforce is also significantly involved in its development. Doctrine incorporates a feedback loop which confers ownership and motivates the workforce. Personnel can feel a higher degree of ownership in "their doctrine."

Doctrine can promote efficiency by avoiding *suboptimization*. Greater synergy may be achieved when operations and support systems are designed according to how they will operate together (rather than learning how to employ them most efficiently after they are in inventory).

One of the most significant elements of the doctrine process is the ability to capture feedback and use it for continuous and meaningful improvement. Lessons learned from past failures and successess can be blended with future vision to develop new and better doctrine. Good doctrine is always improving. Doctrine development is an ideal process for institutionalizing continuous improvement so it really reflects what we know is the best way of doing things.

UNIFYING THEMES

The opinion papers also developed/identified seven "unifying themes" that promote doctrine or the establishment of a doctrinal system within an organization.

1. CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT

Incorporating a system of doctrine would enable continuous improvement throughout the Coast Guard through better assimilation of lessons learned, bridging disconnects between training and application, and availing our organization of an adaptable and evolutionary mechanism for promoting positive change.

2. FUTURE REQUIREMENTS

Doctrine provides an articulable framework with which to explore, develop, and justify our future requirements. This applies to hardware, training, and R&D products; and provides support to the budget process for their acquisition.

3. LONG-RANGE VISION and PLANNING

Doctrine provides a medium to establish a clear and firm linkage of Coast Guard roles and missions to national objectives. Sub-optimal planning and crisis management could be reduced throughout the Coast Guard by closer alignment to commonly understood objectives and priorities.

4. UNITY OF PURPOSE AND EFFORT

Authoritative doctrine helps to focus our internal efforts on the things that are important to the organization. Accordingly, it is a tool for bridging or eliminating stovepipes, promoting internal communications, and acculturating or imparting the shared values of the Coast Guard to all of its varied communities and specialties.

5. ALIGNING EXPECTATIONS AND COMMUNICATING EXTERNALLY

Doctrine will provide a written reference about the Coast Guard, its values, and its procedures to those outside it. This provides a means to better align expectations and integrate operations with other agencies; and provides assurance to those outside the Coast Guard of what we will do. There is value added by this approach, whether dealing with other federal agencies, DOD, or Congress.

6. EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS

Good doctrine enables the efforts of all levels of the Coast Guard to work together in a mutually supportive manner to move the organization forward. This implies both planning on expected behaviors elsewhere in the organization and incorporating lessons learned from the past to continually improve performance.

7. EMPOWERMENT

Doctrine is a medium of empowerment--from liaison to program manager to department head and others--arming all Coast Guard personnel with the common authoritative groundwork from which they can, in applying their own initiative and judgement, confidently advance both the interests and objectives of the Coast Guard and the nation as a whole.

DOCTRINE INVENTORY IN THE COAST GUARD

An inventory of existing Coast Guard publications and directives was conducted to determine if it contained elements of "Coast Guard Doctrine." Since any publication can include a number of different ideas that relate to doctrine at different levels, the survey dealt in doctrine elements. Joint and DOD Service publications were also surveyed to determine how many either relate to Coast Guard missions or require Coast Guard development or review.

The analysis shows that a large number of Coast Guard publications incorporate doctrine elements, but they are not distributed through the levels of doctrine nor linked in any type of hierarchy. In addition, connectivity gaps were identified between DOD doctrine systems and the Coast Guard's ad hoc approach to publications.

DETERMINING DOCTRINE ELEMENTS IN EXISTING COAST GUARD PUBLICATIONS

The team surveyed a small sample of the Coast Guard to determine what doctrine-like elements already exist. The survey instruments and introductory material provided to respondents are included in Appendix (A). Surveys were sent to twenty-four offices with programmatic responsibility at Coast Guard Headquarters. Surveys were also sent to all of the School Chiefs at RTC Yorktown, each of whom used one or more publications for course development. Twenty-two Headquarters offices and all the School Chiefs responded to the survey.

The study group's survey of doctrine began with a cursory review of the Directives, Publications, and Reports Index. Of the 810 publications identified, the group determined 100 to 150 were likely repositories of capstone, operational or tactical doctrine. According to the survey results, many of these publications are no longer in use or have been consolidated into other publications. In addition, the respondents included other documents (bulletins, correspondence courses, program directions, business plans, strategy papers, memorandums, inter-agency agreements, etc.) which they believed contained doctrine elements. While the responses were subjective evaluations of doctrine content by individuals with varying levels of expertise, the consistent pattern indicated that no single inventory (or systematic process of document management) influencing the corporate knowledge of Coast Guard operations exists. Further, most of the documents uncovered are developed and maintained in a functional stovepipe with little or no connectivity to documents developed and maintained in other offices or units. Additionally, there was no discernible hierarchy among publications.

In assessing existing levels of doctrine, 2,487 doctrine elements were reported in 115 documents. Respondents reported the number and level (capstone, operational, tactical) of doctrine elements in publications with which they were familiar, not just those in their area of responsibility. The general category of tactical doctrine was subdivided into tactics and techniques. Procedural elements, which are not doctrine elements since they are directive in nature, were included in the survey to better assess the number of elements at these levels, and to help define the lower limit of doctrine. According to those surveyed, many Coast Guard publications contain several levels of doctrine.


Survey respondents were also asked to rank the emphasis (primary, secondary, tertiary) placed on each doctrine element when compared with all other doctrine elements at the same level of doctrine included in the publication. Finally, the survey team also reviewed Joint and Inter-Agency publications for possible relationships with Coast Guard missions. The result of the survey are summarized below.

COAST GUARD DOCTRINAL SURVEY RESULTS

	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	TERTIARY	TOTAL
CAPSTONE	117	24	140	281
OPERATIONAL	159	328	156	643
TACTICS	125	102	36	263
TECHNIQUES	92	158	93	343
PROCEDURE	534	58	58	650
JOINT	120	149	38	307

DISTRIBUTION OF DOCTRINE ELEMENTS BY LEVEL

Data analysis indicated, as expected, that the predominant type of information in the survey documents was procedural. While the total number of operational doctrine elements almost equaled the total number of procedural elements, surprisingly little doctrine exists that addresses the tactics and techniques needed to provide the required link between operational doctrine and specific procedures. The number of elements of capstone doctrine identified by survey respondents was also surprising. The table on the following page shows the distribution of Coast Guard doctrine elements by the level they address.



The survey results tend to reinforce the notion that operators have insufficient tactical guidance (tactics and techniques) on "how" to do their job. Experiences of past operators and their "lessons learned" are not being recovered in the form of tactical guidance. Whether or not individual operational commanders filled this gap was not determined, however respondents were asked to address all doctrine, not just that in their particular area of responsibility. The lack of tactical doctrine may explain why "Aviation Support for Marine Environmental Protection" was so well received by field units.

The large number of capstone doctrine elements identified by survey respondents may reflect the Coast Guard's emphasis on vision and mission statements and business plans. Many of the capstone doctrine elements may address the same concept (i.e. there are not 281 different capstone doctrines for the Coast Guard). However, the number of capstone elements reported indicates that there is a lack of coordination between programs and supports the conclusion that Coast Guard doctrine development is an ad hoc process.

EXISTING COAST GUARD LINKAGES TO JOINT AND DOD SERVICE PUBLICATIONS

The Coast Guard has a role in both the Joint and DOD Service publications systems as many documents relate to our missions. The Coast Guard is included in more than 100 Joint and DOD Service publications. We have responsibilities for assisting in the development of new publications and reviewing and commenting on existing ones. We are also the lead agent for the SAR Manual, JP 3-50 and 3-50.1.

Because we do not have a centralized doctrine command, different program managers and operating commands are responsible for representing the Coast Guard's point of view in the Joint and DOD Service doctrine systems. As the Navy discovered with its pre-1993 ad hoc doctrine model, this arrangement does not promote unity of focus across programmatic lines, and can not ensure that doctrine review receives the same amount of attention as is available in the other services.

The Coast Guard's ad hoc doctrine model also weakens both our credibility and connectivity with the other services. Coast Guard reviewers of Joint and Service Doctrine are normally O-4's and below who are located across the functional spectrum at Coast Guard Headquarters and on the Area staffs. Doctrine review is typically a collateral duty. As a result, Coast Guard input to Joint and Service doctrine development is often inconsistent, stovepiped, and noncommittal. It is also more difficult for the other Services to connect with the Coast Guard since we do not provide "one stop shopping" for all doctrine issues. This virtually eliminates our ability to influence doctrine in its formative stages.

Beyond the administrative aspects of promulgating and maintaining doctrine publications, the Department of Defense is developing doctrine for missions traditionally under Coast Guard purview. The Multi-Service Application Labs (Air, Land, Sea Applications Center, Center for Low Intensity Conflict, and Mobility Concepts Agency) are developing doctrine for peace-keeping operations, domestic support operations, and humanitarian assistance. The Coast Guard should participate in the doctrine development to ensure that our knowledge, experience, and capabilities are incorporated into the Joint Doctrine. Coast Guard input to this type of doctrine will also improve Coast Guard integration to joint operations and cooperation between the DOD Services and the Coast Guard.

V. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Some excellent lessons can be learned by studying the development of military doctrine by other U.S. Armed services. An examination of how other organizations implement doctrine helps one visualize how a doctrine system might be implemented in the Coast Guard. The four DOD Services were reviewed as case studies along with the Hewlett-Packard Corporation. The Royal Australian Air Force was studied from a perspective of its existing doctrinal structure.

These case studies identified some of the events that caused the organizations to establish or revise their doctrine. The armed forces of the United States have had differing experiences with doctrine and their doctrine development process. In the past twenty years, each of the services have made significant changes to their doctrine or their doctrine development process. In most cases the changes were triggered by specific events.

The U.S. Army, for example, recognized in 1973 at the end of the Vietnam War that it lacked a process to capture the lessons learned from previous wars and to anticipate the technological and personnel requirements for future wars. Thus, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was formed to standardize the Army's fundamental approach to combat development and individual training.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps shifted the Marine's doctrine in 1989 from attrition warfare to maneuver warfare. Because maneuver warfare requires flexibility, initiative, quick reactions, and ability to work independently at all levels, its adoption required significant changes to Marine training and professional education.

The U.S. Navy had difficulty integrating with the other armed forces and conducting joint air operations during Operation Desert Storm. Although the Navy had a doctrine system, it created the Naval Doctrine Center in 1993 to focus its effort on doctrine development and to better represent Naval views in joint doctrine.

The U.S. Air Force has struggled with doctrine since its days as the Army Air Corps. In seventy years it has moved the responsibility to develop doctrine or the location of its doctrine command 10 times within the Service. The Air Force has recently formed a new Doctrine Center to develop capstone and, for the first time, operational doctrine.

It could be argued that the shift in the Coast Guard during the late 1960s and early 1970s from a virtual single mission—Service of lifesaving to a multi-mission Service with emphasis on lifesaving, law enforcement, and eventually marine environmental protection should have acted as a trigger to develop a doctrinal structure within the Coast Guard.

Each Service has approached doctrine development differently and with varying degrees of success. The mechanisms used to develop and disseminate doctrine were studied to look at lessons learned and develop "functional essentials" of doctrine implementation. These functional essentials can be used as indicators or measures to evaluate a doctrine system. Not all functional essentials reside in any one system. Inclusion of all the functional essentials when implementing a doctrinal system will certainly increase the probability of success.


The Field Commanders' Doctrine Study Team prepared six papers to discuss the reasons for doctrine within the Coast Guard. Their papers developed/uncovered several "unifying themes" that promoted doctrine or the establishment of doctrine within an organization. Although the doctrine case studies were written independently from the opinion papers on the advantages of implementing doctrine, the "functional essentials" and "unifying theme's" identified are consistent and complementary.

CASE STUDIES OF DOCTRINE MODELS USED IN OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

The U.S. Army

In 1973, at the end of the Vietnam War, the United States Army recognized that it lacked a process to capture the lessons learned from previous wars and to anticipate the technological and personnel requirements for future wars. As a result, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was formed to standardize the Army's fundamental approach to combat development and individual training. Working through its subordinate commands, TRADOC provides advanced warfighting capabilities in the form of new doctrine, training, force structure, material, and leadership techniques. TRADOC is the third largest major Army Command and reports directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army.

DEPARTMENT of the ARMY STRUCTURE




The Army's FM 100-5, Operations, is the capstone document which unites theory and analysis to create warfighting doctrine. It links the Army's statutory roles and assigned missions to the National Military Strategy and gives Army field commanders a description of how to think about the conduct of major operations. In addition to developing Service-unique doctrine, TRADOC represents the Army in joint and combined doctrine development.

TRADOC runs the Army schoolhouse, providing professional and leader development training for commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned officers. TRADOC enforces curriculum standards by "accrediting" training programs and insisting on training relevance. It is responsible for both the Combined Arms Associated Schools (Armor, Air Defense, Aviation, Command and General Staff College, Field Artillery, Infantry, etc.) and the Combined Arms Service Support Associated Schools (Logistics Management College, Ordnance, Transportation, Aviation Maintenance Training Activity, etc.). In addition, TRADOC operates Combat Training Centers which support unit level training including live fire and maneuver exercises.


The Combat Development process is the way TRADOC develops effective and efficient solutions to maximize combat power. Key components of combat development are TRADOC's Battle Labs. These Labs break down stovepipes by horizontally integrating combat and support interests of several schools into joint mission areas. They examine both warfighting ideas and changes to technology to enhance battlefield capabilities. The Battle Labs are also linked to the Army Material Command and have a role in the material requirements definition phase of procurement. They allow for experimentation and tinkering with warfighting concepts and technology to the maximum extent possible before a program or system enters the Department of Defense acquisition system.

TRADOC Structure



Links between doctrine development and acquisition occur in the Army's Enhanced Concept-Based Requirements System. The system incorporates input from the branch school staffs, CINCs, and Battle Labs within a doctrine framework to update the Army Modernization Plan (AMP). The result is a statement of warfighting concepts and a list of desired capabilities for procurement of materiel as mentioned in a process objective memorandum (POM).

Army Enhanced Concept Based Requirement Process



Functional Essentials of the Army Doctrine Model

TRADOC provides direct links between doctrine development, inculcation, training, and education.

TRADOC is able to determine the applicability of new doctrine, force structures, and material by testing them in Battle Labs.

TRADOC doctrine, training, and material acquisition focus is operational. All activities are designed to maximize combat power.

Although the capstone doctrine contained in FM 100-5 has been updated to reflect the shift to stronger joint operations and to account for the end of the Cold War, it retains the emphasis on operational art and maneuver warfare formalized in 1986. TRADOC has been in service since 1973 and provides organizational stability in doctrine development.


TRADOC provides the institutional link to decisions regarding how the Army is trained, organized, and equipped.

TRADOC represents the Army during joint and combined doctrine development. Its capstone doctrine integrates air and land forces into an AirLand Battle Doctrine.

The Army expresses doctrine continuously through publications at all levels, not just through capstone documents.

The U.S. Marine Corps

U.S. MARINE CORPS STRUCTURE



* Deputy chief of Legislative affair for Marine Corps Matters (SecNav)
 ** Deputy Chief of Information for marine Corps Matters (SecNav)

The Marine Corps Combat Development Command provides direct links between doctrine development, training, and education. MCCDC includes staff elements for developing doctrine, overseeing USMC training (basic and skill specific), and conducting professional military education. MCCDC develops individual and collective standards (e.g. a PFC should be able to . . . , or a Marine unit should be able to . . .), approves course descriptions, accompanies IG teams to determine if field training is conducted in accordance with standards, administers the budgets and table of equipment for formal schools, manages USMC training resources (ammunition, ranges and simulators), provides Marine Air-Ground Task Force staff training, and represents the USMC on joint and interservice training issues.

The Marine's FMFM 1, Warfighting, is the capstone document which provides the authoritative basis for how Marines fight and prepare to fight. In addition, it describes the Marine's understanding of the characteristics, problems, and demands of war and provides a theory about war based on that understanding. It was issued in 1989 when the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Gray, shifted the Marine's doctrine from attrition warfare to maneuver warfare. Because maneuver warfare requires flexibility, initiative, quick reactions, and an ability to work independently at all levels, its adoption as doctrine required significant changes to Marine training and professional education.

The doctrine of maneuver warfare requires a large investment in Professional Military Education (PME). A MCCDC component, Marine Corps University, is responsible for PME. Marine

Corps University oversees both initial officer training (OCS, and The Basic School) and further military education through Amphibious Warfare School (Captains), Command and Staff College/School of Advanced Warfighting (Majors), and the Marine Corps War College. Officers complete PME through resident or correspondence courses throughout their careers. Enlisted PME occurs through the NCO staff academies with are also supervised by Marine U.

Doctrine development begins when the field identifies a need for revisions to doctrine, equipment, training or organization. MCCDC's Warfighting Development and Integration Division analyzes the requirement to determine if it is valid. If the requirement is valid, MCCDC begins the Combat Development Process. The CDP objective is to facilitate change institutionalization by ensuring that the doctrine, organization, education, training, and equipment needed to support the change are on line when the change is made. The process applies equally to changes in organization, equipment, or doctrine.

FUNCTIONAL ESSENTIALS OF THE MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE MODEL

The Marine Corps has buy-in to its doctrine at all levels. The capstone doctrine was signed by the Commandant and the professional knowledge needed to implement the doctrine is provided to all levels through professional military education.

MCCDC is responsible for doctrine development, training, and professional military education.

The Marine Corps has a defined hierarchy of publications that begin with FMFM 1. Field requirements for changes in doctrine, organization or equipment are reviewed and validated by MCCDC.

The Marine's current capstone doctrine has been in place since 1989. Doctrine development has been assigned to Quantico since the 1920s.

The Combat Development Process provides links between doctrine and how the Marines are trained, organized, and equipped. The Combat Development Process keeps doctrine relevant to day to day operations by responding to field input for changes.

MCCDC represents the Marine's view in joint and combined doctrine development.

MCCDC was flexible enough to accommodate significant changes to doctrine with the shift to maneuver warfare in 1989.

Royal Australian Air Force

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) doctrine process is based on the Air Power Doctrine Board, the Doctrine Working Party, and the hierarchical command structure of the RAAF. Changes to doctrine are initiated and reviewed by various levels within the chain of command. This is augmented by an informal line of communication within the hierarchy to the Doctrine Working Party. A function of this element is to incorporate informal proposals into the formal chain of command.

Within the command hierarchy, specific positions have responsibility for a defined action at each stage of the doctrine review process. Major responsibilities include: Chief of the Air Staff (equivalent to the Commandant) endorses or vetoes doctrine; the Air Power Doctrine Board approves or rejects completed proposals; Deputy Chief of the Air Staff advocates doctrine changes to the Air Power Doctrine Board; the Director of Air Power Studies Center prepares doctrinal change submissions for the Deputy Chief of Air Staff either periodically or as part of the process of staffing a proposed change initiated elsewhere. Each position receives commensurate authority to execute their responsibilities.

Each level of command is responsible for initiating proposed changes in doctrine, forwarding upward proposals initiated at lower levels, and passing down for staffing proposals initiated at higher levels. Each individual has a responsibility to: initiate, formally or informally, doctrinal changes; and, when in an appropriate position, to assess other proposed changes to air power doctrine. Once doctrine has been endorsed, each level of command and appropriate individuals have the responsibility to implement and incorporate the changed doctrine.

The process can be maintained as a dynamic one through simple expedients. These involve the inherent checks balances of the command chain which give order and direction to the review process. Monitoring the process at the Working Party level maintains the continuity in staffing flow. Broad representation at this level and at the higher Board level ensures that the integrity of the process is not compromised.

The Air Power Manual is the authoritative guide from which all other doctrine flows and also is used to ensure consistency with other Service doctrine. The RAAF Staff College and the Director, Air Power Studies Center promulgate doctrine and subsequent education.

Doctrine produced through the chain of command has been incorporated into the normal course of business at all levels. Links to budget and resource determinations and planning put an intrinsic value on the effort to produce valid and quality doctrine.

FUNCTIONAL ESSENTIALS OF THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE MODEL

Doctrine development and review responsibilities are integrated into the day-to-day activities of a number of RAAF officers.

Because of the direct link between doctrine development and specific elements in the chain of command, the RAAF process is consistent with the empowered model.

HEWLETT-PACKARD

The Hewlett-Packard Company has incorporated a number of management concepts into a set of corporate objectives and a business style known as "the HP way." While not explicitly titled "doctrine," the HP way gives guidance on personnel management, and is reflected in the Company's view of profit, customers, fields of interest, and growth. According to Dave Packard, "If we could simply get everybody to agree on what our objectives were and to understand what we were trying to do, then we could turn everybody loose and they would move along in a common direction."

Hewlett-Packard was formed in 1953. The company's objectives were written by its founders in 1957 and have seen only minor modifications since then. The company has made difficult decisions to remain consistent with its doctrine. For example, job security is an HP objective. In the 1970s, HP employees took an across the board pay cut and reduced their working hours to avoid having to lay anyone off during a down turn in profits. Stability in doctrine implementation is provided by the long association the founders have had with the firm, and by an organizational preference to promote from within.

By 1973, HP was too big to pass on its culture solely by example and word-of-mouth. Executive seminars, management courses, and an all-hands presentation called "Working at HP" were started to help assimilate new people into the organization. "Working at HP" begins with the history of HP and the development of the HP way. The course also covers personnel policies, evaluations, salary, and personal development. In addition, HP provides training in using management techniques (Management By Wandering Around, Management By Objectives) consistent with the doctrine.

The HP way is accepted throughout the company. Company leaders buy-in to the doctrine because the founders wrote it. Management seminars and promotion from within help assure that senior leadership continues to follow the doctrine. In addition to training, the emphasis the doctrine places on team work, communication, and process is self-perpetuating. There is a certain amount of peer pressure to conform to the HP way of doing business.

HP's emphasis on a process that supports individual freedom and initiative while emphasizing commonness of purpose and teamwork affects day to day operations as well as long term plans. According to one employee, "The seven corporate objectives guide operational decisions on an hourly-by-hourly basis. Sometimes that is the only guide you have to knowing if something is the right thing to do."

FUNCTIONAL ESSENTIALS OF THE HEWLETT-PACKARD DOCTRINE MODEL

Hewlett-Packard's corporate leaders are closely associated with the doctrine because it was written by the company's founders. In addition, there is a buy-in to the doctrine at all levels. The "HP way" is applicable and credible to day-to-day operations. The "HP way" has been consistent throughout the life of the company, but has been flexible enough to allow for growth.


U.S. NAVY UP TO 1993

The initial Commanding Officer of the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC), RADM Lewis, gave this explanation for the traditional model of Navy doctrine development,

"Until now, the Navy doctrine development process at all levels was a fragmented, bottom-up, fleet-driven approach. The fleet or organizations such as the Naval Strike Warfare Center, the Naval War College, or the Space and Electronic Warfare Center--Centers of Excellence--for example, identified doctrinal deficiencies, assigned primary review authorities, evaluated solutions, and drafted and coordinated a publication addressing the issue. The impetus for publishing a revision--or an entirely new publication--was related more to the resources available than to the need" (Proceedings, Oct 1993).

The relationships between the fleet and Centers of Excellence, the CNO Staff (OP-73), Technical Cognizance Offices, Primary Review Authorities, and Naval Warfare Publications is diagrammed below:

The Old Doctrine Process



Any group of publications could be considered Navy Doctrine, only to the extent that they reflected commonalities of tactics between fleets or functional areas. Other than the seapower theories of Admiral Mahan, the Navy did not have an established capstone doctrine.

This fleet-driven approach was neither appropriate for joint force projection operations or familiar to leaders of other Services. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm the Navy had great difficulty with the joint doctrine used by the other Services. Equipment and procedures for joint operations were not in place; and --because of earlier neglect--joint doctrine had been developed that was ineffective and, in some cases, impossible to execute by naval forces.

FUNCTIONAL ESSENTIAL OF THE (OLD) NAVY MODEL

The old Navy process for doctrine development fits the ad hoc model.

Doctrine development was inductive vice deductive. It was focused more on the commonalities of tactics between field units than responsive to guidance from the top.


U.S. NAVY SINCE 1993

The Secretary of the Navy directed the establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command on 25 September 1992 and the Doctrine Command was commissioned in March 1993. According to SECNAVINST 5450.16, NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND (NDC),

"The Naval doctrine Command will be the primary authority for the development of naval concepts and integrated naval doctrine; serve as the coordinating authority for the development and evaluation of Navy Service-unique doctrine; provide a coordinated USN/USMC naval voice in joint and combined doctrine development; and ensure naval and joint doctrine are addressed in training and education curricula and in operations, exercises, and wargames."

Command of NDC alternates between a 2-star admiral and a Marine Corps major general. The deputy will normally be from the other sea service. The Commanding Officer reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps. As a 2-star, the NDC Commander is junior to the major operational commanders and the DCNO directorate commanders.

NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND



NDC is institutionalizing doctrine via capstone documents and a reorganization/rationalization of the NWP/FMFM library. NDP 1, Naval Warfare, was published in March 1994. It will be followed by doctrine publications dedicated to: Naval Intelligence, Naval Operations, Naval Logistics, Naval Planning, and Naval Command and Control.

NDC coordinates the development of doctrine with inputs from the Fleet CINCs, Numbered Fleet Commanders, and Doctrine (tactics) Centers of Excellence. NDC can obtain assistance from the CINCs and component commanders in developing/testing doctrine. NDC is responsible for assisting the Fleet and warfighting Centers of Excellence in the identification of tactical deficiencies in NWPs and deficiencies in fleet tactics.

Unlike the Army and Marine Corps doctrine organizations, NDC is not directly responsible for training. It will not have the capability for direct feedback from the field through attendance at formal schools that MCCDC and TRADOC enjoy. This may be a reflection of the Navy's decentralized approach to education and training.

The Navy does not have a "Training Czar." The Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) is double hatted as Director of Naval Training (N7) on the CNO's staff. CNET is responsible for undergraduate training in aviation, recruit training, service school apprentice and "C" school training, and Surface Warfare Officer School. CNET provides funding, manpower, and tasking to TRALANT/PAC in their (TRALANT/PAC) role of providing school house training. TRALANT/PAC also receive funding, manpower, and tasking from the Fleet Commanders (CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT) in their role of providing operational training. The fleet side of TRAPAC includes the Afloat Training Organization (basic level ship training), Expeditionary Warfare Training Group (amphibious and landing force training), and the Tactical Training Group (battle force level team training).

Tactical development and training also take place at the Centers of Excellence (Strike Warfare Center, Surface Warfare Development Group, Submarine Development Squadron, Top Gun, Top Dome, SEW Center, Navy Space Command, Commander Mine Warfare Command, Air Tactical Evaluation Squadrons and Naval Special Warfare Command). Most Navy Centers of Excellence work for the DCNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments (N8) subdivisions. However, the Naval Post Graduate School, Naval War College, and Naval Academy report to the Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations (N09B).

FUNCTIONAL ESSENTIALS OF THE (NEW) NAVY DOCTRINE MODEL

The role and responsibilities of the Navy Doctrine Command are consistent with the coordination model. NDC works with the Fleets and Centers of Excellence to develop doctrine.


NDC does not have a role in procurement.

NDC provides information to be used during training, but does not have any direct responsibility for overseeing training and education.

U.S. AIR FORCE

Over the last seventy years, the Air Force has moved responsibility for writing capstone doctrine four times and operational doctrine six times. The creation of the Air Force Capstone Doctrine Center (AFDC) in 1994 at Langley AFB is the first time in Air Force history that there has been an attempt to centralize capstone and operational doctrine. AFDC acts as the Air Force's single point of contact for the development of all Air Force, joint, and combined doctrine. It conducts the Air Force doctrine program. AFDC gathers, shares, and distributes information by direct communication with those Air Force organizations that have pertinent capabilities and expertise. AFDC coordinates directly with the Joint Doctrine Center, TRADOC, Naval Doctrine Command, and Marine Corps Combat Development Command on matters related to joint doctrine development.

Air Force Planning and Operations Structure



Air Force Doctrine Center is a field operating agency reporting directly to the Air Force Director of Plans, and then to the Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans and Operations. The Air Force Director of Plans is responsible for developing, coordinating, reviewing, and maintaining capstone and operational Air Force doctrine. The Director of Plans performs these duties for joint and combined doctrine when Air Force is designated Lead Agent. Director of Plans designates the Primary Review Authority (PRA) (normally the Air Force Doctrine Center) for Air Force capstone and operational level doctrine and joint and combined doctrine programs for which the Air Force has been designated the Lead Agent. When required, Director of Plans may designate a major command, field operating agency or Air Staff Directorate as PRA for Air Force operational level, joint or combined doctrine projects.

The Air Staff Doctrine Division works policy and advocacy issues for doctrine matters. This Division will act as the Air Staff point of contact for doctrine matters and conduct formal joint doctrine coordination. It also acts as the final approval for Air Force doctrine publications. In addition, it manages the publication and distribution of Air Force Doctrine, establishing and maintaining distribution lists.

The Air Force doctrinal process starts at the major command level and proceeds up the chain and back to various levels for review and resolution. The links to formal training, planning, and budgeting seem to be missing.

Air Force Manual 1-1 (volume 1 and 2), Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, was published in 1992. As stated in the introduction, "Aerospace doctrine is, simply defined, what we hold true about aerospace power and the best way to do the job in the Air Force. Doctrine is also a standard against which to measure our efforts. Doctrine should be alive—growing, evolving, and maturing. If we allow our thinking about aerospace power to stagnate, our doctrine can become dogma" (AFM1-1, v1).

The implementing mechanism for education of doctrine in the Air Force is the Air University which does not report to the Director of Plans nor the Air Force Doctrine Center. Air University, through the center of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education (CADRE), provides advice, assistance, and research support to the Director of Plans, the AFDC, major commands, and field operating agencies for doctrine development projects.

FUNCTIONAL ESSENTIALS OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE MODEL

The Air Force has not maintained functional stability in doctrine development. Traditionally the doctrine development process was ad hoc, but with the establishment of the Air Force Doctrine Center, they are attempting to implement a coordination model.

There are no formal links between AFDC and schools or training. Air Force University, a separate command, is responsible for doctrine education.

FUNCTIONAL ESSENTIALS FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING DOCTRINE

Based on the previous case studies, we have identified 10 functional essentials for institutionalizing doctrine. Including these essentials as elements of any model for doctrine development and institutionalization will take best advantage of the lessons learned from the other organizations studied.

- * There must be a buy-in at all levels of the chain of command.
- * Doctrine is best inculcated into the organization when doctrine links directly to education and training.
- * Doctrine should be applicable and credible to the day to day operations of the organization. Beyond capstone publications, an intellectual consistency between the strategic objectives and the tactical and operational levels of Service doctrine should exist. This objective will be assisted by a logical system for numbering and organizing doctrinal publications that shows how they relate to each other.
- * Although doctrine has a role in justifying programs and budget levels, it should focus on the process by which the service accomplishes its mission.
- * Doctrine institutionalization requires some degree of organizational, personnel, and visionary stability. A learning curve must be overcome when changing functional responsibility and/or personnel assignments for doctrine development. On the other hand, consistency of vision produces its own momentum and leads to a deeper and wider institutionalization of doctrine.
- * Links must be established between doctrine and decision-making regarding how the organization is trained, organized, and equipped.
- * Doctrine should not be limited to existing technology. Capstone doctrine should lead technology.
- * Doctrine must be consistent with that of other agencies jointly involved in attaining the same strategic objectives.
- * Any doctrinal system should be flexible in its ability to change doctrine when needed.
- * The products of a doctrinal system must be accessible to users both inside and outside of the organization.

VI. ORGANIZATIONAL LINKAGES


EXECUTIVE LINKAGES TO DOCTRINE

In the continuous doctrine model, operational and tactical doctrine flows from capstone doctrine. Capstone doctrine must be embraced at the organization's executive level. Capstone doctrine is generally steady, yet the system that creates and tends it must demonstrate the flexibility, accessibility, and vision to foresee and periodically initiate change.

Developing doctrine involves a circular methodology with inputs needing consideration at various stages of development. Through this fluid process, feedback is continually added into the flow, doctrinal inputs are adjusted, and existing doctrine is refined.

The doctrine works both within the agency and externally to facilitate consistency, coordination, and focus. The Coast Guard, like all federal agencies, is affected by outside influences such as the president, Congress, Department of Transportation, Office of Management and Budget, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, our constituents, and the American public.

The Doctrinal Process



Capstone doctrine as an essential description of our roles and authorities is a key for interactions at the executive level outside the agency to enable the Secretary, Congress, and the JCS to visualize our capabilities more clearly.

Capstone doctrine that has survived the rigors of the external scrutiny and has helped justify the financial support for our duties then becomes the basis to focus actions internally to accomplish what we have been funded to do. In the era of the decremental budget, a timely connection between budget and doctrinal change and its implementation may be pivotal to the Coast Guard's success and survival.

This section examines doctrine and its relation to existing strategic executive documents and functions as part of the field commanders' concept of doctrine study required by the charter.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY/NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The National Security Strategy is initiated by the president and represents a policy level above service doctrine. Military aspects of the National Security Strategy are given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to execute. This results in the JCS developing the National Military Strategy. The JCS promulgates their capstone doctrine (JP-1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces) as part of the framework for coordinating the National Military Strategy. Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force Doctrine flow from JCS doctrine. The JCS also publishes a doctrinal publication system guide (JP 1-01) to index, cross reference, and coordinate doctrine publications among the services.

Elements of the Coast Guard Capstone Doctrine for national defense are outlined in our brochure "The Coast Guard, A Distinct Element of National Security." The Coast Guard linkages to the National Military Strategy are currently found in the Coast Guard Capabilities Manual M3000.3A. This manual also contains elements of Coast Guard Operational Doctrine. It specifies the "what we do," the "what we do it with," and the "how we will do it" from the organizational planning perspective. It also specifies the series of plans that are to be developed to address the contingencies outlined. Importantly, it outlines the processes and procedures for the Coast Guard to augment or work jointly with the Navy, DOD, or other federal and non-federal civilian agencies.

If the Coast Guard had a more formalized capstone doctrine publication, it could include the type of historical material now portrayed in Naval Doctrine Publication One (NDP-1), and perhaps some of the leadership, educational, decision making, and communications tenets from the Marine Corps Capstone Publication FMFM 1. If Coast Guard Capstone Doctrine were written this way, it would replace the current brochure with a publication of greater depth and perspective. This publication would complement the Coast Guard Capabilities Manual as a doctrinal series publication for our national security mission.

Coast Guard funding has been affected by the downsizing of DOD. Heretofore, we sought and received substantial funding for, among other things, the WHEC/WMEC armament, engineering, and the reserve program. Usually the Coast Guard received about \$50 million. This level of DOD funding to the Coast Guard is no longer available. Cuts have been made and can be expected to continue in future years. FY95 funding from DOD totalled only \$18.5 million. Since DOD funding is no longer available at the previous levels, we need capstone doctrine for our national defense missions to support budget requests that must stand alone. Successes in Operations Able Manner and Support Democracy are examples of our coastal patrol and interdiction skills that, like Operation Market Time, illustrate our capabilities and justify our value as a national asset.

Several joint and service doctrine publications exist now where the Coast Guard is mentioned. There are several others where the Coast Guard is the lead agency or has review authority. The responsibility for these publications is fragmented between Headquarters Program Managers and Area Commands. There is no central publications system in the Coast Guard to index, cross reference or track these joint and service publications. Further, there is no professional military education system that indoctrinates a broad section of the Coast Guard to their existence.

Formalized Coast Guard Capstone Doctrine would be the authoritative publication for the Congress, JCS, CNO, and other DOD components (as well as for Coast Guard men and women) to envision our peacetime as well as military capabilities.

Even more important, from the perspective that they may know less about the Coast Guard, would be the visualization created for the other civilian agencies we work with.

Capstone doctrine would provide the connectivity to the joint doctrine of the other armed services. It would provide a starting perspective from which the required contingency plan series could be written. It would trigger contingency planning under the Commandant's Multi-Mission Goal 4 for a more formalized agency surge and backfill plan (as opposed to the current volunteer solicitation method) to define and implement our multi-mission response capability better. Finally, formal capstone doctrine for national defense is a missing, yet essential element to our survival as a uniformed armed force.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION STRATEGIC GOALS

The Coast Guard has established strong Departmental partnerships that enable it to contribute to an effective, efficient, safe, and integrated transportation network. The Commandant's Direction states the Coast Guard's daily efforts will align with the DOT Strategic Plan. Marrying DOT strategic planning with Coast Guard planning provides unity of focus between the two organizations. As a result, both the Commandant's Direction, Program Directions, and ultimately field operations should reflect and implement the DOT Strategic Plan. However, to coordinate implementation of the DOT Strategic Plan, capstone doctrine is required to provide the philosophical and executive link. "Tying America Together" through an effective intermodal system, as well as "promoting safe and secure transportation" has application both in peace and in war. We can complement both goals through common doctrine. While promotion of safe and secure transportation is one of the basic Coast Guard tenets, the DOT strategic goal involving the advancement of intermodalism is a new concept to the Coast Guard. There is no doctrine to guide the field commanders' support and implementation of this important focus of the Department.

THE COMMANDANT'S DIRECTION

The Commandant has published his Direction, Vision Statement, and view of the core attributes and Strategic Goals and Objectives. These were developed from personal values, experience, integration of Departmental goals, interpretations of traditional roles and missions of the Coast Guard, historic research, and study. They represent the spirit of the incoming Commandant upon assuming command. They serve as his signature in his new job and alert Coast Guard personnel to the focus that he brings to the position. The Commandant's Vision, Attributes, and Strategic goals represent how the Commandant intends to define and implement the basic tenets and values of the Coast Guard. This document does not alter what the Service has defined (informally) as doctrine, rather it puts it in perspective from the new Commandant's viewpoint.

Although we do not have formalized doctrine, the Coast Guard is a small enough service, and has enough written (albeit unlinked and perhaps uncoordinated) documents to describe our capstone doctrine in the traditional sense. Unofficial doctrine describes the Coast Guard as a multi-mission, responsive, flexible, joint armed maritime service able to positively affect maritime safety, maritime pollution, maritime law enforcement, and national defense. A formalization of capstone doctrine would not necessarily change anything that a new Commandant may promulgate in documents that he distinctly develops for his new position, but capstone doctrine would further formalize and stabilize Service philosophy and focus, and provide a framework from which the Commandant's Vision, Strategic Goals, and Business Plan would flow.

The Commandant's Direction outlines a model that shows the relationships between the Department of Transportation Strategic Goals, the Executive Business Plan, and program plans.

From the field commanders' perspective, major disconnects exist in this model due to lack of capstone and operational doctrine as to how the districts are supposed to create their tactical plans. Informal surveys of the various Districts reveal a wide spectrum of plans, some very well developed in the sense that strategic planning has occurred over several years, to plans that are still in development. Some district staffs are still questioning how to merge headquarters program goals with the Executive Business Plan's cultural goals within the same tactical plan. Further, as the program goals become more formalized and directed from headquarters via the Program Business Plans, they become more pronounced as stovepipes linked directly to the field units, bypassing the field commanders. Somewhere, the stovepipes must be merged. It would be more efficient if tactical doctrine was written once. As it is now, field commands are reinventing the wheel while implementing the Commandant and the District Commander directives. If this model were approached from a capstone, operational, and tactical continuous model perspective, work would be done once, would be clearer, and would flow more easily.

TQM measures have been stressed heavily as an elemental step of the TQM implementation process. There is no real connection yet between data collected at the field level and measures of effectiveness and efficiency in the GPRA sense. Strategic goal measurement used to provide outputs to Congress does not necessarily translate to tactical goal measurement that is useful for the field commander. There is ongoing discussion at the field level because of this disconnect and the inability to manipulate and analyze the data locally. A headquarters (O,M,N) planning effort has been started to merge the business plans of these programs. None of this planning is being done in the context of capstone doctrine. (In the case of the commercial fishing vessel safety program for instance, the vision varies between facilitation and law enforcement.) Capstone doctrine, a link to the National Military Strategy, and a review of the implementation model in the Commandant's Direction are necessary to merge programmatic issues and facilitate the creation of integrated tactical doctrine.

EXECUTIVE BUSINESS PLAN

Creation of the Executive Business Plan is directed by the Commandant's Direction and Goals. Page 1 of the Business Plan outlines the framework for overall Coast Guard planning. It calls for the Executive Business Plan to be supplemented by the Commandant's Direction, the Capital Investment Plan, annual budgets, Program descriptions, Coast Guard Directions, and program business plans to result cumulatively in the five elements of a good plan.

- 1) What the Coast Guard wants to do.
- 2) How the Coast Guard will do it.
- 3) What resources are needed to do it.
- 4) How will the Coast Guard know it has done it.
- 5) What factors (internal and external) will affect the Coast Guard's performance.

A doctrine system seeks to answer many of the same questions and will supply a coordinated philosophy and framework for many of the separate documents listed.

Capstone doctrine defines what we do in essential terms. The Executive Business Plan is the first link in the implementation of Coast Guard goals in support of capstone doctrine. Capstone doctrine is an essential link needed to facilitate the field commanders' development of a tactical plan that should flow from the Executive Business Plan.

THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT (GPRA) AND ITS RELATION TO PROGRAM PLANS

The GPRA will have a pervasive effect on the Coast Guard in the future. Implementation is outlined in the Commandant's Direction which requires program and tactical plans. GPRA is also implemented in Executive Business Plan Goal 3 that requires the service to be responsive to both OST and OMB guidelines. The Act calls for both strategic and performance plans which the Marine Safety Security and Environmental Protection Program has started to build. However, the GPRA will be difficult for the Coast Guard to fully implement. The GPRA is an excellent model for a business that produces things. The GPRA requires goals and measures (like the Executive Business Plan), but it also requires an analysis of resources assigned and the efficiency and effectiveness with which they are used to achieve the goals. This part of the GPRA mandate has not yet been fully explored. The analysis will be especially difficult for the Coast Guard with respect to programs like Search and Rescue, Drug Interdiction, and National Defense -- the fire house type duties where the threat is not constant and/or where the contribution to the end goal is often not known.

Once described and supported by Congress, capstone doctrine can be bounded, priced, and implemented. Marine Corps Capstone Doctrine addresses this directly in FMFM 1. "Any military activities that do not contribute to the conduct of a present war are justifiable only if they contribute to preparation for a possible future one." Coast Guard missions may be more secure in this manner as they may never be justifiable on the basis of efficiency and effectiveness. It may be that with increasing direct congressional mandates, we may have to dual track our GPRA accounting of tasks, separating duties/capabilities that we are doctrinally expected to perform versus ones that we can truly support on the basis of efficiency and effectiveness. Capstone doctrine, as the documentation and sales mechanism, would outline and provide a perspective for these types of capabilities. GPRA accounting (much like previous A-76 mandates) may drive changes in Capstone doctrine in other ways. For instance, the recognition and endorsement of formalized partnering with the states and commercial companies may be necessary as part of our multi-mission strategy (e.g., for SAR or VTS) to achieve higher efficiencies with the resources available. This in turn will drive changes in our capstone and operational doctrine such as occurred with changes to our non emergency SAR towing doctrine as a result of the creation of the vessel assist industry. Most programs have little experience with the GPRA and have not developed their program plans envisioned by the Commandant's Direction. Yet these plans have to be blended into a tactical plan at the field level. From the field commanders' perspective, capstone and operational doctrine will be a vital element for the successful efficient development of these plans.

THE MULTI YEAR BUDGET STRATEGY

In the era of decremental budgets, all programs must seek reductions and efficiencies just to cope from year to year. The multi-year budget strategy (MBS) provides the process to track projected decrements and to project and balance them with the cost savings expected from streamlining studies and other initiatives. The MBS is also the vehicle to track and experiment with new initiatives and broker the fiscal successes between programs in a look ahead multi-year model. Operational doctrine would help here since it would force the Coast Guard to focus on core missions and prioritize between missions and programs systematically and unbiasedly.

Challenging budget issues lie ahead. Decisions as to what the Coast Guard does, and how it does it, must be made in a unified way and then implemented in a coordinated fashion. Ideally, doctrine provides the method for success. Currently programs are initiating changes on their own to refocus priorities and free up funds. G-CPA could use doctrine to drive programs toward the approved focus and to identify programs that must be reduced to remain within the core programs sustained by doctrine. Doctrine would also help dictate required top down cuts as it will provide the yardstick to measure program element relevance to core doctrinal mandates.

The MBS is seeking to implement permanent change in a short period of time. This begs a doctrine framework that connects the last-minute program direction changes as dictated by budget cuts or MBS projects and proposals, to a real time "just in time!" development, training, and education framework. This would assure a smooth, expeditious, and coordinated program change implementation that minimizes headquarters and field inertia and maximizes savings. Often, field commands feel the results of these decisions, but may not understand the urgency nor share in the ownership. A continuous, empowered doctrine model linkage would help with the education and buy-in, as well as the execution. If the Coast Guard reengineers its organization and thought process with regard to service delivery, a continuous, empowered doctrinal system would be an essential part of that delivery system as new people refocus and retrain for new jobs and a new perspective on how we do things.

MISSION ANALYSIS

Mission analysis was historically done by program managers focusing on program goals. More recently, integrated teams have done the mission analysis within a TQM framework. The TQM approach and our multi-mission focus resulted in a much broader, more complete, bottom up assessment of what was needed or being done. This approach tends to be expansive, and taken to the extreme, multi-mission equipment would be similar to the Swiss army knife. There has to be a balance. There are practical limits that currently focus the product or outcome. In the case of hardware, the end result may be constrained by budget, size or weight. In the case of personnel programs, the constraints may be training time, number of personnel or shifts in mission priorities. The question is how to focus and prioritize the competing elements.

It is imperative that future mission analysis be bounded and focused by a capstone doctrine. Although we are multi-mission, we cannot perform all missions (nor can we perform all aspects of some missions). Conversely, we have to look at core missions and prepare equipment, if practicable, to be adaptable. This is not a weakness, but a reality that Congress and executives should know. Doctrine provides the basis for defining the abilities as well as the limitations. This may seem naive, however congressional and staff ignorance of Coast Guard missions is still painfully apparent, especially at the field commanders' level where the goods and services are delivered.

THE CAPITAL INVESTMENT PLAN

The Capital Investment Plan (CIP) is an essential link to the future well being of the Coast Guard. The CIP is our formal executive tracking system to prioritize and replace/upgrade existing assets in a time phased manner. The publication's guiding principles include Coast Guard doctrinal principles (i.e. multi-mission, compatibility and interchangeability, standardized). This document links equipment procurement from the strategic Coast Guard perspective to the external drivers (Congress, OST, and OMB) and to the internal executive linkages (the Systems Coordinating Council (SCC), CG Acquisition Review Council (CGARC), G-CX (Strategic Planning Staff), and the Operations Coordinating Council (OCC)). The system in place for the review and approval of major purchase initiatives in the Coast Guard should be consistent with capstone doctrine. Certainly, the persons making the policy decisions for major purchases should be intimately familiar with Coast Guard Doctrine so field commanders get the "right" equipment to the "trained" operator to accomplish the "desired" missions.

The Systems Coordinating Council is already tasked with providing senior management oversight of the pre-acquisition process. This council could provide the vital link between doctrine and the visionary forward look and coordination of major resource purchases. This council should conduct its work within the framework and guidance of capstone doctrine. This is not a significant change. A review of the changes in our Capital Investment Plan between 1992 and 1993 reveals the addition of almost a doctrinal precept to the pre-acquisition process.

The Operations Coordinating Council is a forum to discuss and direct cross program issues, including mission needs and attendant requirements. This council advises the Chief of Staff on cross functional requirements and coordinates analytical and planning activities which cross programs. This council could conduct its work within the framework of capstone doctrine. This group could provide the vital link between doctrine and the operational requirements that need to be coordinated to effect programmatic change. This group is also the coordination link between doctrine and the regulatory change initiatives.

SUMMARY

Doctrine is needed by the executive system already in place in the Coast Guard. Capstone doctrine would allow a smooth flow from the strategic goals through the programmatic and tactical plans envisioned in the Commandant's Direction. Capstone doctrine would link the external inputs from the JCS, DOT, and Congress to the internal outputs for accomplishment.

Existing groups and councils provide vital links to approval, acquisition, and cross-programmatic operational decisions. They should conduct their work within the framework of capstone doctrine.

With a decremental budget, a continuous, empowered doctrinal system would help to inculcate fiscally driven changes. As the Coast Guard downsizes and re-engineers its operations, a continuous, empowered doctrinal system would help to change the mind-set and perspective of the Coast Guard to match the revised organizational relationships and expectations.

Examination of the current structure is done to illustrate the problems of doctrinal implementation in the status quo and to better understand how the fragmented, ad hoc nature of current Coast Guard doctrine evolved.

The Coast Guard is programmatically fragmented. Training is also fragmented along programmatic and command lines. No central authority oversees and coordinates all training.

Training is currently integrated into our personnel program and does not enjoy unity of focus.

There is no current mandate or empowerment between programs to bring them together either to coordinate training requirements or to ensure that training dovetails with the broad sense of mission or doctrine for the Coast Guard.

Training organizations at the area level are not networked with the programs.

Feedback loops between training given and training needed are not uniformly formalized.

A meaningful mechanism to capture and pass on (indoctrinate) current or inventive practices in the field that are discovered and perfected in one area that have application in another does not exist. ^{SCAR} ^{TEAMS?}

The training study group has identified these and other deficiencies in its study of Coast Guard training and is currently formulating plans to correct many of these deficiencies. The deficiencies identified and the improvements recommended by the training study team all work positively for improving training in the Coast Guard by controlling the content, quality, and the periodic curriculum updates of our training courses. This directly supports the implementation of doctrine. It is therefore timely to evaluate a doctrine system so one might be started in conjunction with training system changes.

The Doctrine Education and Training Command Concept (TRADOC)

As previously noted, for a doctrine system to be implemented successfully, a large number of the agency personnel must be inculcated rapidly and at all levels. Training provides a mechanism for inculcation. Perhaps even more important, there must be control over the content of what is taught and how it is changed, updated, and distributed.

The Army and Marine Corps decided that the best way to ensure these objectives were met was to establish a very senior-level training and doctrine command— Army TRADOC and Marine Corps MCCDC.

The merits of the Army's and Marine Corps' intent on the use of doctrine can and has been vigorously argued. However, their method of doctrine institutionalization is inarguably successful.

The Army Training and Doctrine Command and Marine Corps Combat Development Command:

have the responsibility for creating capstone, operational, and tactical doctrine and for filtering curriculum to ensure that doctrine was considered, included, and taught to students at all appropriate levels.

are staffed with programmatic as well as doctrinal specialists who provide the connectivity with the programs, but who operate within a framework of capstone doctrine that transcends individual program focus and maintains an overall perspective.

are empowered and focused on user feedback to capture and infuse the real world lessons learned, field experience, and experimentation back into operational and tactical doctrine as timely process improvement. Army TRADOC has the advantage of owning Battle Labs to test and perfect the doctrine it develops.

accredit courses, to ensure currency and content, and to filter them for doctrinal consistency. The Army TRADOC system implemented the accreditation system and successfully controls the courses taught at all their schools.

teach capstone doctrine as a lead-in or framework for professional military development courses, OCS leadership courses, and at boot camp. Operational and tactical doctrine are included in other courses at the appropriate class levels.

Aviation training most closely resembles a doctrine-based training system. It is focused on the safe operation and maintenance of the aircraft and its use in the SAR program. Cross-mission understanding and use are not well developed.

If doctrine education and training were linked in our current organization, a TRADOC would logically reside somewhere in G-PTP, as this is the current center of development and control of most training.

Although doctrine could be developed and promulgated by G-PTP, many difficulties with this organization become evident. The training commands are not all under G-PTP control. The fragmented programmatic training is not entirely under G-PTP control. Currently, curriculum development is supposed to be a partnership between the programs, G-PTP, and the training commands. Programs generally govern curriculum content. Each, however, sets its own priority for curriculum maintenance. Some courses have not been upgraded in ten years. Area and aviation training teams are not linked to G-PTP so that course content (and doctrine) being taught by them are not coordinated and may differ between the areas and the training commands under G-PTP.

Under this structure, the TRADOC head (probably an O-6) would not be empowered as an "agent of change." As Doctrine and Training Director, G-PTP could only **coordinate** doctrine across an unconnected organization. G-PTP is not properly positioned within the organization to ensure cooperation among the other programs. As the Chief of Personnel and the Doctrine Education and Training Program Director, G-P would have too large a span of control to concentrate on doctrine along with his/her other duties.

SUMMARY

In summary, the Coast Guard could implement a doctrine system with any current or future organizational model. The other Services have all implemented doctrine with different types of organizations and varying degrees of success. Hopefully, we can learn from their experiences. Doctrine implementation in the Coast Guard may be harder than in other Services due to the distinct multi-mission areas for which we are responsible. However, it is the diversity of these missions that begs for just such a system.

Much uncertainty exists over the ultimate organization of the Coast Guard as a result of changes proposed by the streamlining and training study groups. Therefore, discrete proposals for the institutionalization of doctrine are premature. However, there are a variety of options for implementing operational and tactical doctrine through a training process.

CONCLUSIONS

The Field Commanders' Concept of Doctrine Team developed papers describing the benefits a doctrine system would have to the Coast Guard and the problems created without one. The common points in these papers were distilled into seven "unifying themes." The need to improve unity of vision, efficiency, external links, training links, focus, unity of effort and empowerment emerge clearly as doctrine drivers. **The Team has concluded that the need for a doctrinal system exists.**

The team surveyed training centers and programs in the Coast Guard and determined that elements of doctrine currently exist throughout our publications. Additionally, a joint and service publications review reveals many references to the Coast Guard within existing joint and service doctrine publications. The Coast Guard currently has the responsibility as lead agency or primary review authority on several of them. **The Team has concluded that these doctrine-like elements are currently being developed, reviewed, and implemented in a fragmented, ad hoc way.**

Alternatives for implementing a system to develop doctrine have been examined through the study of the experiences of the other services from the historical perspective. Doctrine systems of the other services range from a capstone, coordination type model, to a fully empowered, continuous model. **The Team has concluded that, based on the experience of others, there are a wide variety of ways that the Coast Guard could implement doctrine. Further, the different doctrine models used yield markedly different results.**

The Training and Streamlining Study Teams are currently looking at different ways to improve the Coast Guard's efficiency. Identification and correction of problems within the training system are complementary to the purpose of a doctrine system. As new organizations are created within the Coast Guard, doctrinal assignments may be made without further disruption. **The Team has concluded that an opportunity now exists to start a doctrine system in conjunction with the ongoing Coast Guard training and streamlining efforts.**

History shows that doctrine requires inculcation and enculturation up and down the chain of command. Study of the other Services' experience shows the success of linking doctrine development to training. This facilitates inculcation, as well as captures the feedback and changes from lessons learned. U.S. Army and Marine Corps experience with training and doctrine commands provides a model for implementation. **The Team has concluded that doctrine should be linked to training to ensure rapid delivery to agency personnel. Further, the Team has concluded that the training and doctrine command concept would further this effort.**

While the linkage to training will ensure doctrine reaches the students attending the classes, an analysis of the experience of the other Services shows that buy-in at the executive level is necessary to ensure that doctrine is incorporated into the day to day business of the agency. Further, linkages must be established at executive levels to acquisition and operations coordination so trained people, the right equipment, and desired tasks are brought together in a coordinated fashion. **The Team has concluded that executive linkages are necessary in a Coast Guard doctrine system.**

Historically, doctrine has been in development since the 1500's. Within the U.S. Marine Corps, it has been formalized since the 1920's. All the Services have a differing approach to doctrine development and have achieved varying results based on effort, resources, and focus. **The Team has concluded that doctrine development can be evolutionary and that implementation is affected by resources and commitment.**

The study of the experiences of the other Services resulted in a list of ten "functional essentials." They result from the lessons learned by the other agencies studied. These "functional essentials" form the criteria for a model doctrine system. They are influenced by the agency's organizational structure as well as the number, experience, power, and personality of the assigned doctrine staff. **The Team has concluded that the "functional essentials" form the basis for a standard to design and measure successful implementation of an actual doctrine system .**

RECOMMENDATIONS

This report presents historical studies, opinion papers, collected data, and examinations of executive links to describe how doctrine may benefit the Coast Guard. By providing mission definition, focus, continuous linking, and feedback, it has been shown that a doctrine system could help the Coast Guard to be more efficient, effective, and empowered in carrying out its duties.

The Team recommends that the Coast Guard implement a doctrine system.

As decisions resulting from the training and streamlining team studies are made, and the form of the emergent Coast Guard becomes clearer, a focus group should be assigned to develop specific options to implement a doctrine system within the Coast Guard.