Updated ---Why modernize? An historical perspective
Shipmates,
I am republishing this post with the following comments.
First of all, thank you for commenting. We understand there are many views and some concerns regarding modernization. I also assume the first two commentors are both active duty members of a Chiefs Mess. We need to hear from the Chiefs and, more importantly, we need them to be involved in this important effort. That is the reason I addressed both the CPOA Convention and the Reserve Chiefs Call earlier this year.
I also thank you for stating up front "the question isn't why modernize." I agree the case is clear and the cause for action compelling.
Let's discuss the concerns raised.
The first time I heard the phrase "we're simply not ready" was in 1986 when I was briefing the recommendations of the Gilbert Study to flag officers in the Coast Guard. As noted by Admiral Gilbert in his article that was the reason we didn?t consolidate our financial management system and the reason we are still not ready to pass an audit.
Perceived readiness for change does not change the requirement to change. I announced the need for modernization the day I became Commandant, two and a half years ago. I also told the Service that we would take several years to implement the changes so we could align billet changes with the military assignment process and provide proper notification and consultation with our civilian workforce and unions. We have done that and will continue.
The need for modernization exists independent of whatever resource levels we are provided. Let me be clear on this. It would not matter whether we were experiencing exponential growth, no growth, or downsizing. Our business processes and command and control structure do not support mission execution in any funding environment. Regardless of your salary, you need to be able to balance the checkbook.
Fund base transfers associated with organizational change are difficult and made more difficult by the lack of a core financial accounting system. In 1987, we had to separate cutter maintenance funds which were managed at the district and centralize them at the Maintenance and Logistics Commands. However, for many years districts had moved funding back and forth between cutter support and small boat support (between what is now AFC 30 and the 4X accounts) and it wasn?t clear what the right level of basic support for each really was. We did the best we could but it was surgery with a meat cleaver. The major obstacle?...the lack of reliable financial information on the costs to operate our small boats and cutters. How do I know this? I was the first budget officer at MLCLANT and I was responsible for identifying and recommending the levels of fund base transfers.
Regarding access to support, we intend to create one stop shopping through product line or service line managers at our logistics and service centers. Questions regarding maintenance on small boats, configuration on cutters, TRICARE access, employee assistance programs, or government vehicles will be referred to a single point of contact and accountability in the Coast Guard. The implementation planning for this new business model is underway and in some cases, like HEC maintenance and small boat maintenance, we have accelerated the process.
Regarding the impact on the Chiefs Mess, I will ask Master Chief Bowen to provide comments in a subsequent post. I have been involved in Chiefs Call to Initiation and Indoctrination and the "predecessor activities" for nearly 40 years. The Chiefs Mess at a particular unit provides critical leadership and is indispensable. However, when I think about the "Chiefs Mess" I tend to think in broader, symbolic terms. I think of the cohesion chiefs bring to our Service. I think of the critical role Chiefs play in translating command intent into action. I think of my Dad. Chiefs are not divided by organizational charts. They are united by commonly held values and the critical role they play in mission support and mission execution. They are indispensable.
ADM A
The original post follows:
Our current modernization effort seeks to address a number of mission execution and mission support challenges, including the Deepwater program, the current condition of our surface fleet, our financial management system, and recent changes in our human resource system. These are all products of a multi-decade challenge to maintain and recapitalize our assets and adapt our workforce to changes in mission demands in a constrained fiscal environment. This is the first in a series of posts that chronicle how our need to modernize evolved and why I have made it the centerpiece of my tenure as Commandant. The end goal is to better integrate internal Coast Guard structure and business processes to meet the increasingly complex demands of the 21st Century.
This attachment was written by RADM Marshall Gilbert, director of the Gilbert Study, which resulted in the Coast Guard's major realignment in 1987. It is a good datum from which to begin a discussion of the current and desired future state of our mission support systems. /GilbertStudy.PDF
Consider the Coast Guard in 1986:
· Area Commanders controlled no assets.
· Districts owned large cutters homeported in their Area of Responsibility.
· All naval, civil, and electronics engineering support functions were located in districts.
· Districts were stand-alone financial entities...financial systems were not networked. There was no unified general ledger from which to create financial statements.
· Personnel and pay transactions were carried out at the unit and district level.
· E-City (ARSC) and the CG Yard were, and remain, stand alone financial centers dealing directly with treasury.
After the realignment of 1987:
· Major cutters were placed under the control of Area Commanders.
· Districts retained control of buoy tenders and patrol boats.
· Maintenance and Logistics Commands (MLC) were established (one for each area). Naval, civil and electronics engineering were consolidated on each coast, but not centralized.
· Financial accounting, contracting, and bill paying consolidated at each MLC with the exception of ARSC, the Yard, and payroll. This was immediately understood to be a mistake and a short time later our Finance Center (FINCEN) was created.
· Personnel and pay moved to Pay and Personnel Center but separate from FINCEN
· E-City (ARSC) and CG Yard still stand alone financial entities.
The Gilbert Study (I was the junior member as a Lieutenant Commander) was the starting part of our current cause for action to modernize. Even at the time of this reorganization we knew that it was not THE fix, but it was an improvement. In his own words, Admiral Gilbert said, "Early in our study we concluded that the Coast Guard's accounting functions cannot be regionalized or centralized at this time."
Two decades ago these changes were seen as revolutionary by the Service and the change was hard because of our evolved culture of independence by field commanders and the perception that only they could make effective decisions regarding mission support. We had just fielded the standard Coast Guard Work Station based on a proprietary operating system. Our IT systems remained largely stove piped and it would not be until the mid 1990's, (another decade) before we would move to a more open architecture and openly compete our workstation contract. In those two decades a number of independent reforms have been started, stopped, and in some cases started again. In each case, there was well-meaning intent, but limited integration, and thus limited progress. We will discuss these more in our next installment...
I am republishing this post with the following comments.
First of all, thank you for commenting. We understand there are many views and some concerns regarding modernization. I also assume the first two commentors are both active duty members of a Chiefs Mess. We need to hear from the Chiefs and, more importantly, we need them to be involved in this important effort. That is the reason I addressed both the CPOA Convention and the Reserve Chiefs Call earlier this year.
I also thank you for stating up front "the question isn't why modernize." I agree the case is clear and the cause for action compelling.
Let's discuss the concerns raised.
The first time I heard the phrase "we're simply not ready" was in 1986 when I was briefing the recommendations of the Gilbert Study to flag officers in the Coast Guard. As noted by Admiral Gilbert in his article that was the reason we didn?t consolidate our financial management system and the reason we are still not ready to pass an audit.
Perceived readiness for change does not change the requirement to change. I announced the need for modernization the day I became Commandant, two and a half years ago. I also told the Service that we would take several years to implement the changes so we could align billet changes with the military assignment process and provide proper notification and consultation with our civilian workforce and unions. We have done that and will continue.
The need for modernization exists independent of whatever resource levels we are provided. Let me be clear on this. It would not matter whether we were experiencing exponential growth, no growth, or downsizing. Our business processes and command and control structure do not support mission execution in any funding environment. Regardless of your salary, you need to be able to balance the checkbook.
Fund base transfers associated with organizational change are difficult and made more difficult by the lack of a core financial accounting system. In 1987, we had to separate cutter maintenance funds which were managed at the district and centralize them at the Maintenance and Logistics Commands. However, for many years districts had moved funding back and forth between cutter support and small boat support (between what is now AFC 30 and the 4X accounts) and it wasn?t clear what the right level of basic support for each really was. We did the best we could but it was surgery with a meat cleaver. The major obstacle?...the lack of reliable financial information on the costs to operate our small boats and cutters. How do I know this? I was the first budget officer at MLCLANT and I was responsible for identifying and recommending the levels of fund base transfers.
Regarding access to support, we intend to create one stop shopping through product line or service line managers at our logistics and service centers. Questions regarding maintenance on small boats, configuration on cutters, TRICARE access, employee assistance programs, or government vehicles will be referred to a single point of contact and accountability in the Coast Guard. The implementation planning for this new business model is underway and in some cases, like HEC maintenance and small boat maintenance, we have accelerated the process.
Regarding the impact on the Chiefs Mess, I will ask Master Chief Bowen to provide comments in a subsequent post. I have been involved in Chiefs Call to Initiation and Indoctrination and the "predecessor activities" for nearly 40 years. The Chiefs Mess at a particular unit provides critical leadership and is indispensable. However, when I think about the "Chiefs Mess" I tend to think in broader, symbolic terms. I think of the cohesion chiefs bring to our Service. I think of the critical role Chiefs play in translating command intent into action. I think of my Dad. Chiefs are not divided by organizational charts. They are united by commonly held values and the critical role they play in mission support and mission execution. They are indispensable.
ADM A
The original post follows:
Our current modernization effort seeks to address a number of mission execution and mission support challenges, including the Deepwater program, the current condition of our surface fleet, our financial management system, and recent changes in our human resource system. These are all products of a multi-decade challenge to maintain and recapitalize our assets and adapt our workforce to changes in mission demands in a constrained fiscal environment. This is the first in a series of posts that chronicle how our need to modernize evolved and why I have made it the centerpiece of my tenure as Commandant. The end goal is to better integrate internal Coast Guard structure and business processes to meet the increasingly complex demands of the 21st Century.
This attachment was written by RADM Marshall Gilbert, director of the Gilbert Study, which resulted in the Coast Guard's major realignment in 1987. It is a good datum from which to begin a discussion of the current and desired future state of our mission support systems. /GilbertStudy.PDF
Consider the Coast Guard in 1986:
· Area Commanders controlled no assets.
· Districts owned large cutters homeported in their Area of Responsibility.
· All naval, civil, and electronics engineering support functions were located in districts.
· Districts were stand-alone financial entities...financial systems were not networked. There was no unified general ledger from which to create financial statements.
· Personnel and pay transactions were carried out at the unit and district level.
· E-City (ARSC) and the CG Yard were, and remain, stand alone financial centers dealing directly with treasury.
After the realignment of 1987:
· Major cutters were placed under the control of Area Commanders.
· Districts retained control of buoy tenders and patrol boats.
· Maintenance and Logistics Commands (MLC) were established (one for each area). Naval, civil and electronics engineering were consolidated on each coast, but not centralized.
· Financial accounting, contracting, and bill paying consolidated at each MLC with the exception of ARSC, the Yard, and payroll. This was immediately understood to be a mistake and a short time later our Finance Center (FINCEN) was created.
· Personnel and pay moved to Pay and Personnel Center but separate from FINCEN
· E-City (ARSC) and CG Yard still stand alone financial entities.
The Gilbert Study (I was the junior member as a Lieutenant Commander) was the starting part of our current cause for action to modernize. Even at the time of this reorganization we knew that it was not THE fix, but it was an improvement. In his own words, Admiral Gilbert said, "Early in our study we concluded that the Coast Guard's accounting functions cannot be regionalized or centralized at this time."
Two decades ago these changes were seen as revolutionary by the Service and the change was hard because of our evolved culture of independence by field commanders and the perception that only they could make effective decisions regarding mission support. We had just fielded the standard Coast Guard Work Station based on a proprietary operating system. Our IT systems remained largely stove piped and it would not be until the mid 1990's, (another decade) before we would move to a more open architecture and openly compete our workstation contract. In those two decades a number of independent reforms have been started, stopped, and in some cases started again. In each case, there was well-meaning intent, but limited integration, and thus limited progress. We will discuss these more in our next installment...
Posted at
2:54 PM
24 Comments:
The question isn't why modernize, it's why set an artificial and unatainable deadline of 1 June 2009.
We're simply not ready. Unions have not been given proper notification and it's unlikely we'll work through the I&I issues in time to reasonably meet any time line near 1 June.
What we're already seeing is leaders making agreements that they will report success, when really only standing up in name only. Our budget models CG wide already were in need of serious tweaking, now we're slicing up units like pie without any reasonable expectation of monetary and budgetary constraints.
Our Chief's mess at our base was already divided and fragmented and now it will be split in an additional five new slices.
Small pockets of employees who have relied on the support, leadership and management of their current construct will now have a boss located in another state that they will see know only in casual reference. When a small office of one needs back up for a sick day, they must now close and the service provided to the customer go unattended.
I could go on and on and I know that some smart person somewhere is working on these details but I'm befuddled as to why my Admiral is not among those smart people who are in the know on who will be paying his cell phone bill next month among other things.
Ditto. Same here at my unit. Our one person e ESO offic will report to someone in another state. With a customer base of over 2K, who do they turn to when the ESO is on leave, sick, etc.?
Right now the current organization can fill the gap. Not so after modernization.
The Chief's Mess issue is another real concern. Our Mess already is divided among 5 or more commands, and now we'll have some Chief's with no local Mess. The notion that they will be absorbed by other commands is not reasonable.
What do you do when a new fragmented unit with one or two Chief's have a Chief who needs mentoring by other Chief's doesn't seek it out?
My question is how will the MWR organization be funded after mondernization? Right now the ISC provides my cell phones, my vehicles, my travel to professional conferences, my supplies and much more. What budget model will be established to ensure that my new chain of command is funded to support my mission?
I have an even better question. Why are we renaming the ISC's to BSU's. That makes about zero sense to me since it will have no commonality with the other military services.
USCG: Hi I'm the CO of BSU Portsmouth.
USN: Nice to meet you I'm CO of Naval Station Norfolk. What's a BSU?
USCG: Oh, it's Base Support Unit.
USN: Oh, you're a Support Unit. I was looking for the CO of the Base.
USCG: I am the CO!
USN: I'm confused, you said you were CO of a Support Unit not the Base.
USAF: I'm Colonel Doe, and I'm the Commander here Langley Air Force Base, I have 32 Unit's under my command. Who is the Commander of your Base Support Unit?
USCG: I am the CO!
USMC: We get that, but you're a Unit CO, we want to talk to the Base CO.
Chiefs,
Thanks for the comments. Admiral Allen has already addressed the larger issues so I will just throw out a couple of thoughts. Back in 86/87 when the current system was being created and subsequently put in place, I remember having many of the same concerns you voice now. The potential gaps in service we worried about were eventually taken care of; however, the bifurcated system we ended up with could never be as accountable, responsive, and efficient as we needed. In the past couple of years it has been my privilege to visit almost every type of unit in every District. It is my opinion that many of the problems we face whether in support, maintenance or mission execution are directly related to how we are organized.
As for the Chief?s Mess, we currently have hundreds of units where only one or two Chiefs are stationed. That is the reason for the regional Chief?s Mess and in most places the system is working well. If I am misunderstanding something please email me and I would be glad to discuss it.
As far as I am concerned, Chief Petty Officers are a primary key to the future success of modernization. Our purpose is both to raise issues and to propose solutions. No change comes without challenges. There will have to be course corrections and adjustments made as we move forward.
I am encouraging all Chiefs to provide input to every forum available. Between myself, and the Command Master/Senior Chief support system there is no part of the Coast Guard that we can not positively affect. Admiral Allen has made it very clear that he depends on the Chief Petty Officers to be leaders in this change. We can and will make a difference.
MCPOCG Skip Bowen
First a general statement: I read a book once called "Eating the Big Fish." It was a business book and essentially talked about how a 2nd Tier competitive company can move to the top of the category and jump over the brand leaders. The book's thesis was that the challenger had to make a bold, significant, strategic change, and make that change so aggressive and immediate that there was no turning back.
The options for the company and its employees become success or failure. This has the result of the entire organization working harder to make the "game-changing" change succeed and to take the organization to the next-level.
Though the Coast Guard is not a competitive business, I think this concept has merit to our current organization. We are trying to address the dynamic and daunting challenges of the 21st century, with a decades old business structure! That hurts every aspect of what we do, it makes us less effective and less efficient and increases our risks (personal and financially). We need to succeed at modernization and to do that we have to embrace the necessity to change 100% and eat the big fish...This doesn't mean we will agree on the exact form of the change, but working together we can and must succeed.
Second, and more direct to the Chiefs. I think the Admiral and the Master Chief were pretty kind to you.
If anyone knows how to eat some fish, it should be our Chiefs. You are critical to everything this Service does. Any Chief worth their salt will never make a complaint without being prepared to offer a solution. Maybe you can come back and provide some more constructive insights that can actually be used to influence the outcome for everyone's benefit.
I agree with most of what you?ve said about modernization, but I take exception to your statement to the two Chiefs. You are generally correct when you say that when a Chief raises an issue he/she should also propose a solution, but there are many issues that might impact a unit or personnel that originate far outside the reach of an individual Chief. To have our folks remain silent, and not say anything is not where we want to be.
Colin Powell said, ?Don?t be afraid to challenge the pros, even in their own backyard. Leadership does not emerge from blind obedience to anyone. Xerox?s Barry Rand was right on target when he warned his people, if you have a yes-man working for you, one of you is redundant. Good leadership encourages everyone?s evolution.? Our people need to be able to speak their minds.
MCPOCG Skip Bowen
On one hand it's good to see chiefs bringing up these questions, on the other I wonder why they are anonymous?
I have 100% faith that modernization is the right thing to do and we will succeed in it. The plan might not be flawless from the start, but it will all work out for the better. Is the last NSC going to be built exactly as the first? No, problems will be encounter and steps will be taken to correct them along the way. Or should we to continue sailing 378's? Of course that is an analogy for modernization, using modernization, but I'm sure my point is visible.
Master Chief,
Well said! I think part of the solution is mandated regional Chief's Mess'
I'd like to see the ISC's or BSU's carve out some space at the Clubs for the Chief's. We have a CPOA out in town that is dark, smells of smoke and frankly my wife won't go. We need a place on base.
I agree we need to change and support most of what is proposed. My biggest issues with the modernization is the lack of deckplate information. The 378 product line is supposed to stand up in the beginning of January and I still don't know where, or under what chain my shop will be working.
There are multiple pieces of equipment that span multiple hulls. I support 110's, 210's, 270's and 378's. Under the product line I will have 4 different people/chains I will report to. How is this "one stop shopping'?
The information that is being passed is great, and we are using many different tools to get it out. The problem is, the deckplate doesn't care which admiral is going to be working for which office in HQ. The deckplate level wants to know, where their job is going to be in 4 years. They want to know how it is going to affect them. It is a selfish society and people want to know what is in it for them. Until those details are worked out, and distributed, there is going to be heatache with the idea.
Some of the renaming is an OER bullet!! Renaming wastes money an time; confuses people e.g. renaming of admin to SPO???? I for one am in favor of change, (even though I voted for McCain) for all that are not, read "Who Moved My Cheese".
This is why we are spending $18 billion bailing out the Big 3; they didn't move with the cheese. We will be like the Big 3 if we don't change. This is my first tour at CGHQ and I see a lot of wasted time and money because of all the RED-TAPE; the time and money that can be spent on our crews and legacy fleet. Whatever you want to call it streamlining, right sizing or modernization, this change needs to be started and completed as soon as possible.
Deepwater was a great concept (change, wasn't for the better) we need to divorce them NOW!!! Pay them off, do whatever it takes and let's build dependable assets for our crews. We pay ICGS about 3 times more for assets then if we went straight to Casa, Zodiac etc. I thought Stewardship was one of the items Commandants Vision statements, let's support him.
Change without a purpose/goal is not worth the change, it creates hate and discontent.
To anonymous, when I talk about a regional Chief?s Mess, what I am really talking about are all the individual Chiefs located in a regional area. When they get together they are the regional Chiefs Mess.
A dedicated place where Chiefs meet afloat or ashore can also be called a Chief?s Mess. I support having a dedicated place but it is up to the local Chiefs to make the case for space in their areas. When I came to HQ the first time 2002-2004, there was no private space for the Chief?s to meet in. I had to just about give up my first born son, (he?s still not happy I did that) to get the space on the ground floor that is now the HQ Chief?s Mess. I was recently out at Station Cape Disappointment where they opened their Chief?s Mess area. They did a beautiful job and it was a pleasure to be at the ceremony. It is important for Chief Petty Officer?s to have a place to meet, but each installation has to be worked on independently by the local Chiefs.
One of the major problems I am having with our modernization efforts is not that we are reorganizing. It seems to me, specifically with the Coast Guard's ICS program that HQ directoratres have more problems embracing the reorganization than we in the field do.
I find myself constantly having to justify to those in the field why the Commandant has said we are going to FORECOM while elements at HQ continue to resist the fact that they are not going to be in charge of the program.
It is even more difficult to explain and justify to our folks that their billets have been reprogrammed while thier bosses in the program at HQ have consistantly resisted relinquishing control and billets to the reorganization efforts.
This is a time of great change for the Coast Guard and job one of leaders in any organization during great change is clarity. Given the size of our team and the amount of things changing, our leaders are being as clear as possible in defining the mission and the direction we are heading. While the onus is on "them" to communicate clearly to us, ?we? (the chiefs) shouldn't forget that we have a powerful responsibility as well and the organization's success depends on it: our job one is to trust.
After the mission is defined and the desired outcomes clarified and we've given our feedback, it is our job to trust those directions and commit to them as if they were our own. During this modernization the most useful thing a chief can be is an evangelist. Because at the end of the day the deckplate is looking to us for that clarity of purpose, not the Admiral. In the end, they want to see us believe.
This is the single greatest exchange of dialogue I have seen on this blog. I give credit to MCPOCG Bowen for entering the conversation the rest of you as well.
Modernization is about as clear as mud. Maybe we can continue to discussion here
Admiral Allen Sir:
My thoughts on what I believe to be a leading frustration re: Modernization:
One of the more difficult constraints to effective implementation -- & I believe brought about by organizationally imposed deadlines -- is the lack of shore infrastructure to support increased billets. This seems to be especially true at Sectors. So, now you have all these new people -- which creates increased stress -- & no place to put them. If we could turn the pages back that would be great. Unfortunately we can't. I don't know what the solution is so I can't propose one but it is something I think needs to be dealt w/, imho. The reality is there will likely be a smaller budget & the ole axe usually falls on infrastructure. Thoughts?
And thanks, Admiral, for such a great way for shipmates keep up to speed w/ the thoughts of our organization's senior leadership.
There is no doubt that the healthy debate surrounding our modernization efforts are a key part of the process. While we will never experience a time of total agreement, few could question that this a very exciting time to be in the Coast Guard. For the past 15 years I've heard about an LE rating, modernization efforts, new cutters, and new boats. In my opinion, it's no coincidence that these things started actually happening en masse at the same time our current COMDT and MCPO-CG took over. Thank you!!!
@ Master Chief Dec. 15, 1:18 p.m.
Master Chief raised the issue of divorcing ourselves from the Deepwater concept. Currently, my directorate manages 22 major acquisition projects-- of which 15 are from the old Deepwater program. I say "old" because little--except the name--remains of the original Deepwater commercial integrated lead system integrator (LSI) concept--so Master Chief's point of abandoning that acquisition construct is exactly the direction our Commandant has led us in acquisition reform.
All but one of the last major asset contracts with ICGS (the Deepwater joint venture) have been awarded. We will continue working with them on some systems engineering wrap-up work as we continue to transition almost all former ICGS work to full and open competition, or directly with appropriate manufacturers (e.g. such as including ourselves within Navy contracts, partnering with CBP, going directly to providers, etc.). While contracts awarded through ICGS in past years will continue to be administered through completion, the original LSI contract expires Jan 2011, and we will not renew it.
RADM Gary T. Blore, USCG
Assistant Commandant for Acquisition (CG-9)
Awesome discussion. Kudos to all who make this happen.
I totally concur with the previous comment about infrastructure. I was assigned to a sector and the billet structer was and SKC and an SK3(legacy MSO). Now there is an SKC, SK1, SK2, 2 SK3s and a GS-07. I will not complain about having extra bodies as long as there is enough work. Luckly we are co-located at an ISC and we just merged the two shops and thier responsibities together, but there are too many butts and not enough seats, not to mention WSIIIs.
Anonymous,
I think the problems with infrastructure have less to do with modernization and more to do with Coast Guard personnel growth in the post 9-11 world. In addition, our shore infrastructure needs in general did not do very well in the budget for most of the last decade. When the Commandant took office he referred to shore infrastructure, (along with Polar Ice Breakers and inland ATON cutter recapitalization) as major problems that had not been properly addressed. Because they were not addressed, today there is a huge backlog of projects we need resources for. I can personally attest to this from my travels? all parts of the Coast Guard are not as bad as others, but I will say that in one District I saw more building maintenance issues (aging roofs, apparently decaying floors, leaking pipes) than I?ve seen in my entire career. I will agree that Sectors, (which can be considered part of modernization) have to some extent aggravated the problem because at many places staffing was increased without a whole lot of good short term options on where to put the new people.
One of Admiral Allen?s early goals was to increase the amount of shore infrastructure money we were receiving in the budget to at least 100 million dollars per year by the time he left command. He?s been fairly successful, and in FY2009 we have 68 million dollars dedicated to this issue. Along with that we will receive resources related to Deepwater logistics? waterfront projects, piers, etc that will effectively increase the shore infrastructure pot of money this year.
Unfortunately the need is so great that in many places it will be a very long time before relief is felt. Meanwhile we have to continue to grow? Coast Guard missions critical to the safety and security of our country demand it. During last year?s state of the Coast Guard address the Commandant stated that the Coast Guard has been held to effectively the same size as it was 40 years ago. He stated the adage, ?We can do more with less? no longer applies. He continues to press for more people because we need them.
So we are in a quandary, we are growing because we must. We are increasing shore infrastructure resources, but there is no way to keep the organization out of a long stern chase. In this case I would ask our folks to be patient. I would ask them to consider this might be a pretty good problem to have. The administration and Congress is acknowledging the Coast Guard?s critical role by increasing our budget/workforce. The cuts we took in the 1990s were very hard for the Coast Guard to absorb? Now the problem is reversed, but it?s a better problem to have.
MCPOCG Bowen
Thanks for the questions. We are indeed growing our workforce to meet increased demand for services and and maturing our resource planning and implementation processes to address infrastructure requirements. To this end, we are aggressively increasing our investment in shore infrastructure.
In FY08 we had approximately $40 million enacted for shore projects nationwide including Alaska, North Carolina and New England among others. In FY09, we have $68 million in the base budget, and another approximately $280 million in 2009 Hurricane supplemental for the Gulf Region.
We will continue to seek increased funding in future years and be happy to discuss the issue in more detail in a future post.
CDR Jon Spaner, CG-82
I'm all for, and charging ahead, with modernization. I don't remember having boats and equipment this nice in my 21 yrs. And the stuff I see coming out in the future is nothing short of exciting.
But on the reserve side of the house, I see a little different story when it comes to modernization. It has to do with the eCoast Guard. To me, it's a double edged cutlass. I'm using it right now to communicate and that's great. I can now get my CG email at home, still waiting for CGCentral, and it's great. But here's the downside that affects the reserves where I come from, and some recommendations that I'm sure you've heard before. But I think it bears repeating to keep it fresh in the minds of those decision makers.
It has to do with the plethora of required on-line training/GMT. I can appreciate that on-line training is an easy way for folks to get some good training. It reaches the masses well. However, as reserves, our time is limited with trying to maintain boat hours and proficiency. On top of that at my unit, we have 18 reserves and 4 work stations available on a drill wknd. We, and I'm sure other places do also, have reserves who work for federal, state, and local govt's who get the same training in their civilian work as the CG requires. Things such as Sexual Harassment, First-aid, CPR, computer security, etc.. Pretty basic stuff, but redundant to those who have to do it over and over and over again.
I mentioned I have recommendations, so I will deliver here:
1. Instead of requiring every member to log in under their own name to get credit for all this on-line training, I recommend that the members all sit in the training room, project the training on the screen for all to see. When complete, print out a final exam, and give to each member. They take and pass the exam, and the results get entered manually into TMT by one person while the others get u/w. This would open up more time for u/w proficiency training, instead of having four folks log-in for an hour, then four more for an hour, then four more for an hour.
2. When a reserve takes a basic first-aid course, or sexual harassment training, or computer security awareness training, etc. for their civilian job, and receives a certificate for it, why can't the CG accept that certificate, place it in the training record, and have that training entered into TMT as completed? When I have a driver's license in one state, do I need to take another state's test if I want to rent a car there? Again, this would free up limited computer time for those members who don't get that type of training in their civilian jobs, and allow for more proficiency training. Does it make any sense for a paramedic to take basic first-aid and CPR training yearly? Does in make any sense for someone who works for Microsoft to take computer security training?
Again, I know this has all been brought up before, and hopefully it's being worked on.
Thanks for listening.
Adm Allen,
It is great to see what you are doing for the Coast Guard. Although I am now retired and do not have much input to offer except that I wish you were Commandant while I was active duty. I hope to meet you some day. RMC Dick Levesque USCG (ret)57-77
The successful of a mission is decided on how to create good strategy. I don't how the real soldiers do their task, but based on some movies and I read some news from outside that U.S. army are too dependent on technology. So I think besides modernize the technology it is a must to enhance the ability of each personnel.
I'm just a civil person who love military stuff.
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